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Using   South   Africa   as   a   case   study,   this   thesis   examines   what   role   financial  
operations  play   in  the  activities  of  non-­‐‑financial   firms  and  their   impact  on  the  
macro   economy.  Rising   corporate   cash  holdings  are  used  as   analytical   lens   to  
evaluate   competing   theories.   South   Africa,   with   its   relatively   deep   financial  
markets,   has   elicited   clear   predictions   from   mainstream   and   heterodox  
economists.   The   former   expect   rapid   economic   growth   driven   by   business  
investment,   while   the   latter   believe   non-­‐‑financial   firms   engage   in   financial  
speculation,  thus  reducing  growth.  
While   the   thesis   agrees   with   the   heterodox   view   that   changes   in   financial  
activity  of  South  African  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  have  had  an  adverse  effect  
on  financial  stability  and  job  creation,  it  challenges  the  simplistic  view  that  non-­‐‑
financial   firms  have  engage   in  more   financial   speculation.  Crucially,   since   the  
1990s   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   have   shifted   from   using   their   financial  
resources   to   extend   trade   credit   to   small   and   informal   businesses,   towards  
active   liquidity   management.   A   driving   force   behind   this   trend   are   mining  
companies   and   large   JSE-­‐‑listed   non-­‐‑financial   (and   non-­‐‑mining)   companies,  
frequently  engaged  in  merger  and  acquisitions.  Thus,  large  South  African  non-­‐‑
financial  corporations  are  overcapitalised,  meaning  they  hold  more  liquid  assets  
than  necessary   for   their  productive  operations.  This   shift  meant   that   informal  
companies,   which   notoriously   suffer   from   poor   access   to   finance,   lost   an  
important   source   of   credit.   The   thesis   argues   that   non-­‐‑financial   corporations’  
liquidity  management   facilitates   credit   extension   by   domestic   banks,   fuelling  
the  domestic  real  estate  bubble.  Changes  in  financial  operations  of  non-­‐‑financial  
companies,   under   way   since   the   1990s,   have   impacted   growth   and   financial  
stability   adversely.  Thus,   this   thesis   argues  against   the  mainstream  claim   that  
South  African  growth  has  been  facilitate  by  the  domestic  financial  sector,  while  
shedding   light   on   the   complex   processes   behind   the   transformation   of   non-­‐‑
financial   firms’   financial   transactions,   which   are   not   simply   speculative   as  
claimed  by  financialisation  proponents.      
The  originality  of  the  thesis  lies  in  its  contribution  to  the  understanding  of  the  
processes  behind  financial  operations  of  non-­‐‑financial  companies,  in  particular  
how  these  firms  utilise  financial  operations  to  support  their  speculation  in  real  
assets.  As  consequence,   they  are  overcapitalised.  The  research  also  contributes  
to  the  growing  literature  on  financialisation  in  emerging  economies.  The  thesis  
develops   an   operationalisation   of   the   concept   of   overcapitalisation   and   an  




This  work  was   supported  by   the   SOAS  Research  Scholarship.   I  would   like   to  
express   my   gratitude   to   the   SOAS   Economics   Department.   The   staff   and  
especially   the   PhD   student   community   make   this   place   unique   and  
intellectually  stimulating.  
  
I   am   particularly   indebted   to  my   supervisor,   Professor   Jan   Toporowski,  who  
always  encouraged  me   to   read  widely,   think   critically  and,  despite   seemingly  
overwhelming  research  loads  and  looming  deadlines,  keep  pursuing  my  artistic  
interests.  He  was  extremely  generous  with  his   time,   intellectual  guidance  and  
academic  support  –  well  beyond  the  normal  call  of  duty  of  a  PhD  supervisor.  I  
have   also   enjoyed   important   encouragement   and   academic   support   from  
Professor   Ben   Fine   and   Dr   Stephanie   Blankenburg,   who   were   part   of   my  
supervisory  committee  at  SOAS.      
  
My  work  greatly  benefitted  from  discussions  with  other  PhD  students  at  SOAS.  
Here,   Nina   Kaltenbrunner,   Jo   Michell   and   Jeff   Powell   deserve   the   greatest  
recognition  for  their  tireless  organisational  efforts,  which  created  an  active  and  
fertile  research  environment.  Equally,  I  would  like  to  thank  Jennifer  Churchill,  
Mimoza   Shabani,   Jago   Penrose,   Bruno   Bonizzi,   Christina   Laskaridis,  Mariana  
Mortágua,  Ilara  Mahdi,  Gilad  Isaacs,  Nimrod  Zalk  and  many  others  within  the  
PhD   community   for   stimulating   conversations,   moral   support   and   their  
friendship,   which   crucially   contributed   to   the   completion   of   this   PhD.   I   also  
thank  the  Economics  Department  of  Kingston  University  and  my  colleagues  for  
their  faith  in  my  abilities  as  lecturer  and  researcher.    
  
Finally,  my  greatest  gratitude  goes  to  my  family,  friends  and  my  partner  who  –  
especially   during   the   past   year   –   have   suffered   most   under   my   relentless  
research   efforts.  Bardzo  dziękuję  moim   rodzicą   za   ich  wsparcie  moralne   i   finansowe  
podczas   moich   studiów:   Przepraszam   że   nie   mogłam   być   z   Wami   częściej!   -­‐‑   My  
gratefulness   to   my   partner,   Florian   Schäfer,   for   our   thought-­‐‑provoking  
discussions,   his   moral   and   practical   backing,   kindness   and   patience,   which  
vitally  supported  the  process  of  writing  this  PhD  thesis,  cannot  be  adequately  




Table of contents 
  
Chapter I: Introduction 13 
1.1. Research question 14 
1.2. Working hypotheses 17 
1.3. Structure and methodology 21 
1.4. Data and data sources 25 
1.5. Major findings 28 
1.6. Research limitations 32 
1.7. Originality 33 
   
Chapter II: Literature review: Financial Operations of Non-Financial Firms 34 
2.1. Financial operations of non-financial firms in mainstream economics 35 
2.1.1. The emergence of corporate finance theory 35 
2.1.2. The Modigliani-Miller theorem 40 
2.1.3. Asymmetric information 43 
2.1.4. Empirical findings on corporate cash holdings 47 
2.2. Heterodox approaches to corporate financial operations 52 
2.2.1. Marx and the German economic tradition 53 
2.2.2. Keynes and Post Keynesian thought 62 
2.2.3. The ‘financialised’ firm 73 
2.3. Summary and conclusion 82 
   
Chapter III: A Balance Sheet Approach to Financial Operations of Non-
Financial Firms 
85 
3.1. Balance sheet analysis in mainstream economics 86 
3.1.1. The origins of balance sheet analysis 86 
3.1.2. The concept of net worth 92 
3.1.3. Shortcomings of mainstream balance sheet analysis 97 
3.2. An alternative balance sheet approach 102 
3.2.1. The overcapitalisation of non-financial firms 102 
3.2.2. The gearing ratio 107 
3.2.3. Mergers and acquisitions 110 
3.2.4. A methodology to measure overcapitalisation 117 
3.3. A balance sheet approach for South African non-financial firms 123 
3.3.1. The emergence of capitalist firms 124 
3.3.2. The mining-finance houses and dominant company groups 131 
3.3.3. Firm heterogeneity in South Africa 140 
3.4. Summary and conclusion 143 
   
Chapter IV: Balance Sheet Analysis of JSE-Listed Non-Financial Firms 146 
4.1. Data and methodology 148 
4.2. Balance sheet analysis: The aggregate perspective 153 
4.3. Balance sheet analysis: The sectoral level 156 
4.4. Balance sheet analysis: The firm level 164 
4.4.1. Types of liquidity preferences among the top 20 strongly 
overcapitalised non-financial firms 
195 
4.4.1.1. The sectoral breakdown 195 
4.4.1.2. Changes in the role of mining-finance houses 201 
 6 
4.4.1.3. Speculation in mining subsidiaries 204 
4.4.2. Types of liquid assets held among the top 20 strongly 
overcapitalised non-financial firms 
206 
4.4.3. Findings from the full set of 132 company profiles 210 
4.5. Summary and conclusion 215 
   
Chapter V: Literature Review: The Role of Finance in the Macro Economy 218 
5.1. The role of finance in mainstream economic theory 221 
5.1.1. The economic orthodoxy of the post-World War II era and its 
origins 
221 
5.1.1.1. Money as a ‘veil’ in classical economic thought 221 
5.1.1.2. The Solow-Swan growth model 223 
5.1.1.3. Introducing real balances 225 
5.1.2. The ‘financial repression’ hypothesis and its critique 227 
5.1.2.1. Shaw’s and McKinnon’s work 227 
5.1.2.2. McKinnon-Shaw financial development models and 
policy recommendations 
229 
5.1.2.3. Criticisms of the ‘financial repression’ hypothesis 230 
5.1.3. The emergence of the current consensus 232 
5.1.3.1. Financial deepening revived 232 
5.1.3.2. Today’s consensus in historical perspective 234 
5.1.3.3. Mainstream finance theory after the financial crisis 237 
5.2. Financial markets in heterodox economic theory 241 
5.2.1. Marx and ‘German’ economic thought on finance 242 
5.2.1.1. Marx’s and Marxist thought on finance 242 
5.2.1.2. The lasting influence of Wicksell 247 
5.2.1.3. Endogenous money in Schumpeter’s and Hahn’s 
analysis 
249 
5.2.2. Keynes’s analysis and post-Keynesian thought on finance 255 
5.2.2.1. Keynes on the role of finance 255 
5.2.2.2. Endogenous money 257 
5.2.2.3. Kaleckian finance theory 260 
5.2.2.4. Evolutionary banking theory 263 
5.2.3. The financialisation approaches on the role of finance 266 
5.3. Summary and conclusion 273 
   
Chapter VI: A Flow-of-Funds Approach to Understanding the Interaction 
between Finance and Non-Financial Firms in the Macro Economy 
276 
6.1. The flow-of-funds approach in detail 278 
6.1.1. A brief historical perspective 278 
6.1.2. The flow-of-funds matrix 280 
6.1.3. The strength and weaknesses of flow-of-funds analysis 283 
6.2. Classifying national financial systems using flow-of-funds analysis 288 
6.2.1. The bank-based versus market based-financial systems 
classification 
288 
6.2.2. Theoretical and empirical shortcomings of the classification 292 
6.2.3. A methodology to classify financial systems 298 
6.3. A historic perspective on the interaction between finance and non-     
financial firms in the macro economy 
304 
6.3.1. The historical origins of banking in South Africa 305 
6.3.2. The historical origins of mining-finance houses in South Africa 314 
 7 
6.3.3. The historical origins of capital and money markets in South 
Africa 
319 
6.4. Summary and conclusion 322 
   
Chapter VII: The Macroeconomic Impact of Non-Financial Firms Financial 
Operations 
324 
7.1. The structure of the South African national financial account 329 
7.2. Analysing net and gross sectoral balances for South Africa 332 
7.3. Sources and uses of funds for South African non-financial firms 344 
7.3.1. Assessing net sources and uses of funding for South African 
non-financial firms 
346 
7.3.2. Assessing gross sources and uses of funding for South African 
non-financial firms 
355 
7.3.3. Assessing the stock of financial instruments held by South 
African non-financial firms 
361 
7.3.3.1. The stock of non-financial firms’ financial liabilities 366 
7.3.3.2. The stock of non-financial firms’ financial assets 369 
7.4. The impact of corporate liquidity on other macroeconomic 
aggregates 
371 
7.4.1. The impact on South African households and non-incorporated 
business 
372 
7.4.2. The Impact on South African financial intermediaries 377 
7.5. Summary and conclusion 384 
   
Chapter VIII: Conclusion 386 




The significance of the findings 
391 
393 
8.4. Future research 396 
   
Bibliography 398 
















Table of figures 
 
Figure 3.1.  Schematic representation of the balance sheet of a listed 
corporation 
Figure 3.2.  Trade-off between investment and liquidity 
Figure 3.3.  Overview over the most common liquidity ratios 
Figure 3.4.  JSE-market capitalisation of top 5 company groups, 1983-2012 
Figure 4.1.  Unweighted average cash ratio of JSE-listed non-financial firms 
Figure 4.2.  Aggregate cash ratios for selected sectors, 1994-2012 
Figure 4.3. Cash ratios and OCRs for top 10 strongly overcapitalised non-
financial firms  
Figure 4.4. Cash ratios and OCRs for top 11-20 strongly overcapitalised non-
financial firms 
Figure 6.1.  Historical map of South Africa, British possessions and Dutch settler 
colonies in 1885 
Figure 7.1.  Simplified sector balances for South Africa, 1970-2013  
Figure 7.2.  Gross saving and investment of South African public enterprises, 
1980-2013   
Figure 7.3.  Financial balances of general government and public enterprises 
in South Africa, 1980-2013  
Figure 7.4.  Gross saving and investment of the South African general 
government, 1970-2013  
Figure 7.5.  Financial balances of South African private enterprises and 
households, 1970-2013  
Figure 7.6.  Gross saving and investment of South African households, 1970-
2013   
Figure 7.7.  Gross saving and investment of South African private enterprises, 
1970-2013  
Figure 7.8.  Gross saving and investment of the financial sector in South 
African, 1970-2013  
Figure 7.9.  Financial balances of South African private enterprises and the 
foreign sector, 1970-2013  
Figure 7.10.  Bonds and equity issued as share of total investment by South 
African non-financial firms, 1970-2014  
 9 
Figure 7.11.  Net sources of funds as share of total investment for South African 
non-financial firms, 1980-2014  
Figure 7.12.  Gross sources of funds as share of total investment for South 
African non-financial firms, 1970-2014  
Figure 7.13.  Selected financial stocks accumulated by South African non-
financial firms between 1995 and 2013  
Figure 7.14.  Mortgage loans as share of total loans and advances  
Figure 7.15.  Stocks of financial liabilities of South African non-financial firms, 
1995-2013 
Figure 7.16.  Stocks of financial assets of South African non-financial firms, 
1995-2013 
Figure 7.17.  Direction of funds flowing into the South African economy 
Figure 7.18.  Real price inflation of residential property in US, UK and South 
Africa 
Figure 7.19.  Deposits held with South African banks, 1995-2013 

















Table of tables 
 
Table 2.1.  Cash holdings by non-financial firms in empirical analysis  
Table 2.2.  Summary of theoretical micro perspectives on finance, 
mainstream economics       
Table 2.3.  Summary theoretical micro perspective on finance, Marx & 
German tradition        
Table 2.4.  Summary theoretical micro perfective on finance, Keynes and the 
Kaleckians        
Table 2.5.  Summary theoretical micro perspective on finance, 
financialisation approaches      
Table 2.6.  Summary of theoretical micro perspectives on finance   
Table 3.1.  JSE-listed corporations by sector, number and market value    
Table 3.2. The big five company groups: Comparing 1980s and 2014 
ownership structure  
Table 4.2.  Number of JSE-listed non-financial firms by sector 
Table 4.2.  Average cash ratios by sector and selected sub-sector  
Table 4.3.  Number of overcapitalised NFFs by sector, 1994-2012 
Table 4.4.  Case studies of overcapitalised JSE-listed non-financial firms  
Table 4.5.  Top 20 overcapitalised JSE-listed non-financial firms  
Table 4.6.  Important characteristics of strongly overcapitalised firms 
Table 5.1.  Summary of macro perspective on finance, mainstream 
economics  
Table 5.2.  Summary of macro perspective on finance, German-language 
tradition  
Table 5.3.  Victoria Chick’s stages of banking evolution (Chick, 1992)  
Table 5.4.  Summary of macro perspective on finance, (post-)Keynesian 
tradition  
Table 5.5.  Summary of macro perspective on finance   
Table 6.1.  Calculation of net sources of investment funding by NFFs  
Table 6.2.  Relationship between gross sources and gross uses of funds by 
NFFs 
Table 7.1.  Calculation of net sources of investment financing  
 11 
Table 7.2.  Total net sources of funds by South African non-financial firms as 
share of their capital formation, by decade  
Table 7.3.  Relationship between gross sources and gross uses of non-
financial firm funds 
Table 7.4.  Total gross uses of funds by South African non-financial firms as 
share of their capital formation, by decade 
Table 7.5.  Share of total trade credit received by sector, 1970-2014 
Table 7.6.  South African non-financial firms’ uses of funds for other financial 
assets as share of their capital formation, 1970-2014 
Table 7.7.  Other financial liabilities as source of funds by sector, as share of 
GDP, 1970-2013 
Table 7.8.  Other financial assets as use of funds by sector, as share of GDP, 
1970-2013 
Table 7.9.  Main sources of households’ external finance by decade, 1970-
2014 
Table 7.10.  Sectoral shares in total outstanding credit for the four major South 
Africa banks  
Table A.1. JSE industrial sector classifications and sub-sectors 
Table A.2. National financial account 2014, (SARB, 2015, p. S-46) 

















List of acronyms  
 
Due  to  stylistic  reasons  the  use  of  acronyms  has  been  kept  to  a  minimum.    
AER      African  Eagle  Resources  (JSE-­‐‑listed  company)  
BAT      British  American  Tobacco  
BEE      Black  economic  empowerment  
FIRE      Finance,  insurance  and  real  estate  
GBP      British  Pounds  
GDP      Gross  domestic  product  
IFRS      International  Financial  Reporting  Standards  
IMF      International  Monetary  Fund  
JSE      Johannesburg  Stock  Exchange  
LSE      London  Stock  Exchange  
M&A      Mergers  and  acquisitions  
MRI      Mine  Restoration  Investments  (JSE-­‐‑listed  company)  
NFA      National  financial  accounts  
NFFs      Non-­‐‑financial  firms  
NIPA      National  income  and  production  accounts  
OCR      Overcapitalisation  ratio  
OECD   Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  
R      South  Africa  Rand  
SARB     South  African  Reserve  Bank  
SMEs      Small  and  medium-­‐‑sized  enterprises  
SMMEs   Small,  micro  and  medium-­‐‑sized  enterprises  
UN      United  Nations  
UNCTAD   United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  
UK      United  Kingdom  
US      United  States  
   13  
Chapter I:  Introduction 
  
‘[I]t  is  not  the  theory  that  is  paradoxical  but  its  subject  –  the  capitalist  economy’  
Kalecki  (1990[1939],  p.  318)  
Corporations  and  their  activities  are  at  the  core  of  the  economic  system  since,  to  
use  Thorstein  Veblen’s  words,  ‘[t]he  material  framework  of  modern  civilization  
is  the  industrial  system,  and  the  directing  force  which  animates  this  framework  
is   business   enterprise’   (Veblen,   1904,   p.   1).   Therefore,   corporate   operations  
should  be  expected  to  be,  almost  naturally,  an  elementary  object  of  the  study  in  
economics,   which   as   a   ‘theory   of   the   modern   economic   situation   must   be  
primarily   a   theory   of   business   traffic,   with   its   motives,   aims,   methods,   and  
effects’   (Veblen,   1904,   p.   2).   The   broader   macroeconomic   importance   of  
corporate   transactions   lies   in   the  driving  force   that  business   investment  exerts  
on  the  business  cycle  and  growth.    
However,  non-­‐‑financial  businesses  and  the  processes  underlying   their  activity  
are   often   absent   from,   or   caricatured   as   passive   in   economic   theory.   For  
instance,  much  of  corporate  finance  theory  (despite  its  name)  does  not  deal  with  
decisions   taken   by   corporations,   but   rather   with   investors’   decisions   about  
dealings   in   corporate  paper,   such   as   equity   and  bonds.   Financial   transactions  
undertaken   by   non-­‐‑financial   companies   are   rarely   considered   within  
mainstream  theory  (see  Myers,  1984).      
Among  heterodox   economists,   the   involvement  of  non-­‐‑financial   companies   in  
financial   investment  has  been  acknowledged   for   some   time.  Nevertheless,   the  
puzzle   does   not   seem   resolved.   For   some   financialisation   proponents  
(especially  of  the  post-­‐‑Keynesian  variety),  non-­‐‑financial  companies  are  passive  
victims  of  financial  deregulation  and  the  rising  power  of  the  rentier.  For  others,  
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they   have   become   financial   speculators,   shifting   their   source   of   profit   from  
production  to  financial  investment.    
  The  author  of  this  thesis   is  passionate  about  re-­‐‑establishing  the  importance  of  
the   non-­‐‑financial   firm,   its   centrality   in   economic   processes   and   its   impact   on  
economic   structures,   including   -­‐‑   importantly   -­‐‑   financial   transactions.   This,   of  
course,  does  not  mean  that  non-­‐‑financial  companies  solely  determine  economic  
processes.   To   the   contrary,   the   thesis   will   show   that   pressing   the   modern  
company  into  a  rigid  model  does  not  work.  Non-­‐‑financial  corporations  are  not  
simply  at  the  mercy  of  rentiers;  they  can  be  rentiers  themselves.  Their  business  
activities  are  complex:  they  engage  in  financial  precaution,  while  speculating  in  
real  assets.    
1.1. Research question 
In   order   to   reveal   the   processes   which   underpin   financial   and   business  
transactions  within  non-­‐‑financial   companies,   this   thesis  pursues   the   following  
research   question:  What   role   do   financial   operations   play   in   the   activities   of  
non-­‐‑financial   firms,   and   what   impact   do   they   have   on   the   macroeconomy?  
Throughout   this   thesis,   orthodox   (or   mainstream)   and   heterodox   economic  
theories   will   be   distinguished   to   structure   the   analysis.   While   mainstream  
economists   operate   in   an   equilibrium   framework   and   carefully   avoid   the  
discussion   of   any   form   of   power,   heterodox   economists   stress   the   inherent  
instability  of  the  capitalist  system  and  the  importance  of  economic  and  political  
power.1    
Since   economic   activity   does   not   happen   in   a   vacuum,   but   is   contingent   on  
historical  time  and  space,  a  country  case  study  was  chosen.  South  Africa  is  an  
ideal  case  study  and  was,  therefore,  purposefully  chosen  for  this  thesis  for  two  
main  reasons:    
                                                                                                 
1  Also   see   Lavoie   (2006),   F.   Lee   (2008)   and  Dymski   (2014)   on   the   difference   between  
orthodox  and  heterodox  economics.    
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(1)   Heterodox   financial   theory,   which   explicitly   acknowledges   the   financial  
dealings   of   non-­‐‑financial   companies,   provides   the   theoretical   basis   for   the  
thesis.   However,   financialisation   approaches,   as   well   as   Kaleckian   financial  
theory  (such  as  the  capital  market  inflation  theory,  see  Toporowski,  2000),  have  
been  developed  in  the  context  of  advanced  economies,  mainly  with  the  Anglo-­‐‑
Saxon  countries   in  mind.  Extending   the   theory   to  an  emerging  market   setting  
and   accounting   for   the   distinctiveness   of   developing   economies   –   especially  
South   Africa’s   rich   mineral   resources,   which   are   characteristic   of   many  
developing  countries  –  constitutes  one  of  the  original  aspects  of  this  thesis.    
And  (2),  contrary  to  popular  belief,  many  emerging  economies  possess  financial  
markets,   which   are   long-­‐‑standing,   deep   and   liquid.   South   Africa   is   a   good  
example.  The  Johannesburg  Stock  Exchange  (JSE)  is  the  largest  stock  exchange  
in  Africa  and  its  establishment  can  be  traced  back  to  1887,  when  it  emerged  out  
of   the   need   to   finance   capital-­‐‑intensive   mining   production   in   the   country  
(Johannesburg  Stock  Exchange,  2012).  South  Africa  today  possesses  some  of  the  
deepest  and  most  liberalised  financial  markets  among  emerging  economies.  In  
2009,  the  Milken  Institute’s  capital  access  index  ranked  South  Africa  among  the  
25%   top   performing   countries   in   its   assessment   of   businesses’   and  
entrepreneurs’   ability   to   access  domestic   and   foreign   capital   (Barth,   Li,   Lu,  &  
Yago,   2010).2  Since   the   early   1990s,   following   a   general   global   trend,   South  
Africa   has   liberalised   its   financial   markets,   however   without   reaping   the  
promised   gains   in   growth   driven   by   expected   improvements   in   financial  
intermediation  (Rashid,  2013).  
Methodologically,   the   thesis   represents  a  diachronic  single-­‐‑case  study  because  
the   South   African   economy   and   the   changes   it   underwent   over   time   are  
analysed  in  detail  (Gerring,  2007).  The  analytical  lens  chosen  for  this  thesis  are  
                                                                                                 
2  This  mainly  refers  to  large  corporations’  access  to  finance  because  small  and  medium-­‐‑
sized  enterprises  (SMEs)  notoriously  struggle  to  secure  external  financing  (see  Berry  et  
al.,  2002,  World  Bank  Group,  2007).  
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holdings  of   cash  and  cash  equivalents  by  non-­‐‑financial   firms.  The  heightened  
liquidity   preference   among   large   corporations   in   advanced   economies   has  
gained   increasing   academic   and   media   attention   in   recent   years.   Large  
multinational   companies   have   been   criticised   in   the   aftermath   of   the   global  
financial   crisis   because   they  have   been  holding   on   to   large   volumes   of   liquid  
assets   instead  of   investing  their  cash  or  paying  it  out   to  shareholders   (Waters,  
2014).   Standard   &   Poor’s   has   claimed   that   multinational   investment   globally  
was  reduced  by  some  US$  900  billion  between  2012  and  2013  due  to  corporate  
liquidity   holdings   (Sakoui,   2014).   The   negative   relationship   between   cash  
holdings   and   corporate   investment   is   also   supported   by   findings   in   the  
empirical   corporate   finance   literature   (Lee   &   Suh,   2011;   Baum,   Schäfer,   &  
Talavera,  2007),  which  will  be  discussed  in  the  following  chapter.    
Despite   this   recent   surge   in   attention   to   corporate   cash   holdings   the  
phenomenon   is   by   no   means   a   new   one.   Bates,   Kahle,   &   Stulz   (2009)   have  
documented  a   secular   increase   in   cash  holdings   as   share  of   total   assets   of  US  
non-­‐‑financial  firms  since  the  1980s.  Similar  long-­‐‑term  trends  have  been  reported  
in  other  major  OECD  countries.   Iskandar-­‐‑Datta  &   Jia   (2012)   find   that   for  non-­‐‑
financial   companies   in   Australia   and   Canada   median   cash   and   marketable  
securities   as   share   of   total   assets   have  more   than   doubled   between   1991   and  
2008.  The  ratio  has  grown  by  between  40%  and  90%  in  Germany,   the  UK  and  
the  US  over  the  same  period.        
Similar  to  US  companies,  South  African  firms  have  been  holding  large  amounts  
of   cash   on   their   balance   sheets   and   have   also   come   under   criticism   for   their  
sluggish  investment  and  unwillingness  to  pay  out  higher  dividends.  Corporate  
cash  holdings  in  South  Africa  exceeded  R500  billion3  in  early  2003.  Since  interest  
rates  have  simultaneously  been  at  a  historical  30-­‐‑years  low,  this  development  is  
                                                                                                 
3  Currently  ca.  GBP25  billion.  
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somewhat  of  a  puzzle  to  economic  commentators  (Gunnion,  2012;  Bruggemans,  
2013).    
1.2. Working hypotheses 
South   Africa,   with   its   relatively   deep   financial   markets,   has   elicited   clear  
predictions   from   orthodox   and   heterodox   economic   theory:   mainstream  
economists   and   policy   makers   expect   South   Africa’s   liberalised   financial  
institutions   to   support   rapid   economic  growth  driven  by  business   investment  
(see   Jones,   2009;   BRICS,   2012;   National   Planning   Commission,   2012),   while  
financialisation   researchers   believe   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   engage   in  
financial   speculation,   which   jeopardises   growth   (Ashman,   Fine,   &   Newman,  
2011;  Ashman,  Mohamed,  &  Newman,  2013;  Ashman  &  Fine,  2013;  McKenzie,  
2013;  Marais,   2011).  What   the  mainstream   (including   hopeful   policy  makers)  
perceives   as   South   Africa’s   way   out   of   its   socio-­‐‑economic   difficulties,   critical  
heterodox   economists   flag   as   the   core   of   the   country’s   economic   problems:  
finance   and   specifically   the   changing   nature   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms’   financial  
transactions,  often  labelled  as  ‘financialisation’.    
This   thesis  argues   that  South  Africa’s   financialisation  story   is  a  more  complex  
one.   The  mainstream   view   can   be   refuted.   In   contrast   to   popular   perception  
(Amphlett,  1914;  Jones,  2009),  the  South  African  financial  sector,  and  especially  
the   big   banks,   did   historically   not   contributed   to   the   country’s   economic   and  
industrial   development   because   long-­‐‑term   funding   was   not   made   available.  
South  African   non-­‐‑financial   companies,   and   especially  mining   conglomerates  
financed  much  of  their  investment  internally,  especially  during  the  second  half  
of  the  20th  century.  But  equally  the  heterodox  argument  misses  out  on  layers  of  
complexity  by  lazily  accusing  large  South  African  NFFs  of  financial  speculation  
that   emerged   as   consequence   of   the   country’s   financialisation   since   the  mid-­‐‑
1990s.  In  fact,  NFFs  always  invested  heavily  into  financial  instruments  in  South  
Africa.   Crucially,   NFFs   changed   (rather   then   intensified)   their   financial  
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investment  strategies  in  the  course  of  the  1990s,  shifting  away  from  trade  credit  
towards  active  liquidity  management.  Thus,  this  thesis  reveals  the  mechanisms  
behind  the  heterodox  ‘gut  feel’  that  finance  in  South  Africa  is  not  contributing  
towards   investment  and  employment  creation,  but  rather  weakening   the   local  
economy.    
The  mainstream  argument  has  its  roots  in  the  financial  deepening  story,  which  
is   influential   in   economic   theory   and   policy   until   today.   It   claims   that   the  
presence  of  deep  financial  markets  will   foster  economic  growth  (see  Levine  &  
King,  1993,  Levine,  1997,  Levine,  2005).  The  assumption  behind  the  claim  is  that  
non-­‐‑financial  companies  in  developing  and  emerging  economies  lack  access  to  
financial   markets   and   liquidity   in   comparison   to   their   peers   in   richer  
economies.    
Consequently,   financial   market   liberalisation   has   been   promoted   as  
development  policy  and   implemented   in  a  range  of  emerging  and  developing  
economies   for  some  time.  South  African  policy  makers  see   the  country’s  deep  
financial  markets   as  major   strength,  promoting   their  policies   and   institutional  
example   as   best   practice   from  which   other   emerging   economies   should   learn  
(BRICS   2012).   Equally,   the   government’s   National   Development   Plan   2030  
identifies   sophisticated   financial   services   (alongside   South   Africa’s   resource  
endowment)   as   comparative   advantage   that   will   form   the   basis   for   the  
country’s  future  growth  (National  Planning  Commission,  2012).    
In   contrast,   from   a   heterodox   perspective,   South  Africa   appears   to   exemplify  
the  ‘financialised’  emerging  economy.  The  financial  sector  is  perceived  to  be  at  
the   core   of   South   Africa’s   ailing   economy.   Since   the   end   of   apartheid   the  
financial   sector’s   share   in   South   African   gross   domestic   product   (GDP)   has  
grown   rapidly,   trebling   between   1994   and   the   2007-­‐‑8   financial   crisis   (Marais,  
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2011).  As  a  consequence,   the  sector4  accounts   for  more   than  one   fifth  of  South  
African   output   today   (SARB,   2015a),   which   makes   it   the   single   largest  
contributor   to   GDP.   This   sectoral   growth   has   been   interpreted   as  
financialisation   of   the   South  African   economy   in   the   belief   that   the   country’s  
low  private   investment   rate   is   the  consequence.  This  has  also  been  coined   the  
emergence  of  the  ‘financialised  mineral-­‐‑energy  complex’  (Ashman  et  al.,  2011).  
The  term  refers  to  an  increased  importance  of  financial  players  within  the  South  
African   economy,   which   has   traditionally   been   dominated   by   the   mining  
industry   and   other   closely   linked   capital-­‐‑   and   energy-­‐‑intensive   sectors.   The  
processes  behind  the  argument  that  finance  is  the  actual  problem  in  the  South  
African   economy   are   often   scantily   explained,   resembling   an   academic   ‘gut  
feel’.   Crucially,   heterodox   economists   identify   rampant   and   allegedly  
speculative  financial  transactions  by  non-­‐‑financial  firms  as  main  cause  of  South  
Africa’s  stagnant  development  and  sluggish  job  creation  (Marais,  2011,  Ashman  
&  Fine,  2013).  
This   thesis,   in   contrast,   argues   that   South   African   corporations   have   not  
dramatically  increased  but  fundamentally  changed  their  financial  transactions.  
Large   non-­‐‑financial   companies   in   the   country   have   always   been   very   closely  
intertwined  with   the   financial  sector;   to   the  extent   that  Anglo  American,   for  a  
long   time   the   largest   and   one   of   the   oldest   among   South  African   businesses,  
was   instrumental   in   establishing   the   local   money   market.   Similarly,   there   is  
little   evidence   that   these   corporations   are   engaged   in   financial   speculation.  
They  rather  speculate  in  real  assets.    
Crucially,   since   the   1990s   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   have   shifted   from   using  
their  financial  resources  to  extend  trade  credit  to  small  and  informal  businesses,  
                                                                                                 
4  The  data   refer   to   the   categories   provided  by   the   South  African  Reserve  Bank.  Here  
finance   is   subsumed   under   the   heading:   ‘Finance   and   insurance,   real   estate   and  
business   services’.   Business   services   include   services   that   are   used   by   the   private  
sector,  most  prominently  private  security  and  cleaning  services.    
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towards  active   liquidity  management.  Thus,   large  South  African  non-­‐‑financial  
corporations   are   overcapitalised,   meaning   they   hold   more   liquid   assets   than  
would  be  necessary  for  the  running  of   their  productive  operations.  Two  types  
of   large   JSE-­‐‑listed   non-­‐‑financial   companies   are   driving   the   overcapitalisation  
trend.  On  the  one  hand,  mining  companies  hold  large  volumes  of  liquid  assets  
out   of   precaution   due   to   the   inherently   speculative   nature   of   mining  
exploration   and   activity.   On   the   other   hand,   large   established   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations  outside  of  the  mining  sector  have  increasingly  engaged  in  mergers  
and  acquisitions,  which  also  requires  liquid  asset  holdings.  
Since   overcapitalisation   is   a   central   concept   in   the   analysis   to   come,   a   brief  
definition  is  required.  Historically,  overcapitalisation  referred  to  the  overstating  
of   goodwill   on   the   balance   sheets   of   companies   that   had   undergone  mergers  
and   acquisitions.   Future   profits   –   often   due   to   the  monopoly   position   of   the  
acquired   company   –   were   expected   to   be   large,   pushing   up   the   price   of   the  
acquisition  (see  Leake,  1938,  Lenin,  1975[1917]).  This  higher  price  increased  the  
value   of   equity   on   a   company’s   balance   sheet   after   its   acquisition   and   was  
therefore   balance   on   the   asset   side   by   an   increase   in   goodwill.   In   Kaleckian  
financial   analysis   (Toporowski,   2008),   overcapitalisation   emerges   during  
periods  of  capital  market  inflation  when  companies  can  raise  funding  in  capital  
markets  cheaply  as  equity  prices  are  on  the  rise.  Instead  of  inflating  goodwill  to  
balance   the   growing   volume   of   equity,   issuing   companies   hold   on   to   liquid  
assets   since   this   is   the   safest   way   to   ensure   that   the   balancing   of   assets   and  
liabilities.  
The   shift   of   financial   operations   among   South   African   non-­‐‑financial   firms   –  
from  providing  trade  credit  towards  their  own  overcapitalisation  –  meant  that  
informal  companies,  which  notoriously  suffer  from  poor  access  to  finance,  lost  
an  important  source  of  credit.    
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Therefore,   this   thesis   argues   that   non-­‐‑financial   corporations’   liquidity  
management  facilitates  credit  extension  by  domestic  banks,  which  in  turn  fuels  
the  domestic  real  estate  bubble.  Hence,  changes  in  financial  operations  of  non-­‐‑
financial   companies,   under   way   since   the   1990s,   have   impacted   economic  
growth  and  financial  stability  adversely,  but  not  because  of  their  sharp  increase  
or  their  speculative  nature  as  heterodox  writers  suggest.  Thus,  this  thesis  agues  
against  the  mainstream  interpretation  of  South  African  growth,  while  shedding  
light   on   the   processes   behind   the   transformation   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms   and  
their   financial   transactions   since   the   1990s,   highlighted   by   financialisation  
proponents.    
From   a   theoretical   perspective,   the   thesis   argues   that   the   financialisation  
literature   oversimplifies   financial   activity   by   NFFs   by   either   reducing   it   to  
financial   speculation   or   a   shift   from   bank-­‐‑based   to  market-­‐‑based   finance.   As  
consequence,  in  much  of  the  financialisation  literature  NFFs  are  merely  reacting  
to   changes   under   way   in   the   financial   sectors   of   advanced   and   emerging  
economies.  The  case  of  South  Africa  shows  that  NFFs  can  and  do  actively  shape  
financial  structures,  for  instance  through  their  own  liquidity  management.    
1.3. Structure and methodology 
This   thesis   is   written   in   the   Kaleckian   tradition,   putting   firms   (and   their  
heterogeneity)   centre-­‐‑stage,   while   abstracting   from   government   activity   to  
some   extent.   That   does   not   mean   that   government   policies   and   institutions  
important   for   the  analytical  narrative  will  be  neglected.  Rather,   it  means   that,  
given   the   research   question,   the   focus   will   mostly   be   on   non-­‐‑financial  
companies  and  state  action  will  be  considered  primarily  where  it  is  significant  
to  explain  business  behaviour.    
In   a   Kaleckian   manner,   microeconomic   and   macroeconomic   phenomena   are  
understood   as   organically   interlinked,   that   is,   different   aspects   of   the   same  
processes   with   the   same   underlying   principles   at   work.   This   is   especially  
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evident  in  Josef  Steindl’s  work  who  ‘moves  freely  between  the  micro-­‐‑economics  
of   the   firm,  and   the  macro-­‐‑economics  of   the  economy’   (Toporowski,  2005a,  p.  
108).  As  consequence,  the  thesis  will  deal  with  three  analytical  levels  on  which  
financial   operations   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms   have   an   impact:   (1)   the   individual  
firm,  (2)  its  interaction  with  other  companies  on  the  industry  level  and,  finally,  
(3)  the  economy  as  a  whole.    
The   first   and   the   last   levels   of   analysis   fit   neatly   into   the   traditional   micro-­‐‑
macro  distinction.  This  distinction  will   be  used  as   an  organising  principle   for  
the   chapter   structure   of   the   thesis.   Thus,   chapters   2   through   4  will   deal  with  
microeconomic  analysis,  while  chapters  5  to  7  will  address  the  macroeconomic  
perspective.  Since  micro  and  macro  analysis  are   intrinsically   linked   these   two  
halves  will   frequently  relate  to  each  other  and  connections  across  chapters  are  
highlighted   throughout.   The   close   interrelation   of  micro-­‐‑   and  macroeconomic  
analysis   is   also   evident   in   the   second   level,   i.e.   the   industry   layer.   Issues   of  
industry   specificities   and   firm   heterogeneity  will   be   discussed  wherever   they  
arise  in  both  parts,  providing  the  organic  link.          
The  formulated  research  question  has  been  broken  down  in  three  more  specific  
queries  for  both  the  micro-­‐‑  and  the  macroeconomic  levels.  The  microeconomic  
analysis  will  be  guided  by  the  following  three  questions:  
(1)   What   is   the   role   of   financial   operations   within   the   operations   of   non-­‐‑
financial  businesses?    
(2)   Which   non-­‐‑financial   businesses   are   considered   when   analysing   financial  
operations?    
(3)  Why  might  non-­‐‑financial  firms  increase  their  holdings  of  liquid  assets  (such  
as  cash  and  cash  equivalents)?    
These  three  questions  will  be  addressed  in  chapters  2  to  4  and  answers  will  be  
provided  by  way  of  summary  at  the  end  of  each  chapter.    
   23  
Likewise,   the   macroeconomic   analysis   will   be   guided   by   the   three   questions  
below:  
(1)  What  is  the  macroeconomic  role  of  financial  institutions?    
(2)  What  (or  who)  drives  credit  extension?    
(3)  How  are  non-­‐‑financial   companies  as  a  whole  positioned  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis   financial  
institutions?  The  last  question  is  one  of  agency  or,  if  one  wants,  power:  Who  is  
the  more  powerful  party  in  the  interaction  between  financial  intermediaries  and  
non-­‐‑financial  businesses?  The  answers   to   these   three  questions  will   in   turn  be  
given  at  the  end  of  chapters  5  to  7.    
The  three  chapters  constituting  the  micro-­‐‑  and  macroeconomic  parts,  meaning  
chapters   2-­‐‑4   (micro)   and   chapters   5-­‐‑6   (macro),   are   organised   in   the   following  
way:  first  a  theoretical  overview  in  the  form  of  a  literature  review  is  laid  out  (in  
chapter   2   and   5,   respectively).   Here   the   most   salient   and   most   interesting  
contributions   that   inform   the   formulated   questions   are   discussed.   This   is  
followed   by   a   methodological   chapter   (chapters   3   and   6),   explaining   the  
analytical  methods  used  to  understand  the  South  African  economy.  Finally,  the  
analysis   is   implemented   in   the   last   chapter   of   each   section   (chapters   4   and  7)  
and  findings  are  presented.  Chapter  8  provides  a  summary  of  the  thesis  and  its  
main  conclusions,  bringing  micro-­‐‑  and  macroeconomic  analysis  together.    
The  empirical  work  in  this  thesis  rests  on  comprehensive  balance  sheet  analysis  
with   respect   to   the  microeconomic   level,   and  on   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   analysis  when  
examining   the   macroeconomic   level.   The   comprehensive   balance   sheet  
approach   is   an   analytic   method   developed   by   the   author,   which   uses  
conventional   financial   ratios   to   identify   non-­‐‑financial   firms   of   a   certain  
character   (here,   overcapitalised   non-­‐‑financial   firms,   that   hold   liquid   assets  
beyond   their   requirements   for   productive   operations)   and   subsequently,  
undertakes  a  detailed  qualitative  assessment.    
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Once   these   overcapitalised   non-­‐‑financial   companies   were   detected,   their  
financial   information   (including   balance   sheet,   cash   flow   statement   and   the  
notes   to   both   financial   statements)  was   studied   in   detail,   and   combined  with  
qualitative   data,   which   is   used   to   develop   a   thorough   understanding   of  
processes   and   contexts.   Qualitative   information   was   extracted   from   annual  
reports,   JSE   announcements,   circulars,   pre-­‐‑listing   statements   and   information  
available  on  official  company  websites.  Consequently,  this  methodology  can  be  
classified  as  mixed  method  since  both  quantitative  and  qualitative  information  
was   probed   and   juxtaposed   (Johnson,   Onwuegbuzie,   &   Turner,   2007;   Flick  
2014).    
The  author  consciously  subscribed  to  this  explorative  method  in  order  to  allow  
for  hypotheses  generation  (rather  than  merely  testing  hypotheses).  This  method  
also   introduced   substantial  methodological   and   intellectual   freedom,  without  
sacrificing   empirical   rigour.   The   emphasis   is   on   describing   and   explaining  
causal  mechanisms,  rather  than  on  finding  causal  effects  (Gerring,  2007).  Thus,  
informed  by  relevant  economic  theory  the  processes  behind  non-­‐‑financial  firms’  
behaviour   are   analysed  with   the   help   of   quantitative   and   qualitative   data.   In  
this   sense,   the   thesis   used   an   inductive   rather   than   a   deductive   approach  
(Bryman,   2012).   On   the   microeconomic   level   this   is   justified   by   the   fact   that  
much   of   the   hypothesis   testing   around   the   corporate   liquidity   preference   has  
failed   to  generate   a   convincing   explanation   for  non-­‐‑financial  businesses’   liquid  
asset   holdings.   Crucially,   the   quantitative   data   used   is   often   either   of   a  
questionable  quality  or  unable  to  provide  the  nuanced  insights  that  qualitative  
data  holds.    
On  the  macroeconomic  level,  a  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  approach  was  adopted.  Here,  the  
Corbett  &   Jenkinson   (1996,   1997)  methodology  was  used   to   identify   the  main  
net   sources   of   investment   funding   among   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   in  
aggregate.   Since   the   thesis   focuses   on   financial   transactions   of   non-­‐‑financial  
businesses,  the  methodology  was  adapted,  in  a  second  step,  to  account  for  gross  
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sources   and   uses   of   funds   among   non-­‐‑financial   firms.   Finally,   an   estimate   of  
financial  asset  stocks  held  by  non-­‐‑financial  firms  in  aggregate  was  constructed,  
since  this  is  missing  from  the  available  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  data  for  South  Africa.          
An   important   comment   concerning   terminology   is   in   order   here.   The   terms  
‘non-­‐‑financial   firm’,   ‘non-­‐‑financial   business’   and   ‘non-­‐‑financial   company’   are  
all   used   interchangeably   in   the   thesis,   referring   to   all   types   of   non-­‐‑financial  
enterprises.  In  contrast,  ‘non-­‐‑financial  corporation’  is  purposefully  used  only  to  
denote  listed  non-­‐‑financial  companies.  When  referring  to  small  businesses,  the  
terminology   follows   South   African   convention   and   legislation   and   uses   the  
terms  micro  and  very  small  enterprises  for  informal  (that  is  non-­‐‑tax  registered)  
enterprises,  which  do  not  employ  more  than  five  people.  When  discussing  these  
non-­‐‑financial  businesses  the  prefix  ‘non-­‐‑financial’  was  usually  dropped.  
1.4. Data and data sources    
The   result   of   the   comprehensive   balance   sheet   approach   is   a   survey   of   132  
companies,  which  is  summarised  in  Table  4.4.  in  chapter  4.  The  table  provides  
information  about   each   company’s   activity  or   activities,   the  date   and  place  of  
incorporation  and  listing  (including  any  information  on  secondary  listings),  the  
source   of   company   cash   flow   and   JSE  market   capitalisation   as   of  April   2013.  
Any   peculiarities   are   noted   in   a   comments   section,   which   is   also   part   of   the  
company  profile.  The  data  work  in  chapter  4  was  carried  out  between  January  
and  September  2013  and  covers  data  up  to  the  financial  year  2012,  using  mainly  
the   INET   BFA   database,   supplemented   by   officially   available   corporate  
information  and   the  database  provided  by  ShareData.  Both  databases  are  of  a  
commercial  nature,  mainly  catering  to  financial  investors.  
Some  of  the  most  valuable  information  (as  is  often  stressed  by  accountants)  is  in  
the   notes   to   the   financial   statements.   These   notes   provide   further   detail   and  
disaggregation   as   well   as   additional   explanation.   They   enrich   the   data  
substantially.   The   annual   report   itself   is   of   importance   because   it   contains  
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additional   qualitative   data.   The   author   spent,   for   instance,   considerable   time  
studying   the   chairman’s   letter   in   each   annual   report.   The   letter   provides   the  
management’s  explanation  of  company  performance  and  rational  for  decisions  
taken.  Of  course,  this  is  a  marketing  tool  and  needs  to  be  read  critically.    
Nevertheless,  many  of  the  highly  liquid  companies,  holding  on  to  considerable  
cash  and  cash  equivalents   in   the   face  of   shareholders   complaints,   commented  
on  their  justifications  for  high  cash  holdings.  Mainstream  balance  sheet  analysis  
does  not  pay  attention  to  this  level  of  detail.  In  fact,  such  an  in-­‐‑depth  treatment  
of  annual  reports  on  such  a  large  scale  is  arguable  only  feasible  in  a  long-­‐‑term  
research  project.    
Another  layer  of  information  that  was  revealed  during  detailed  study  of  annual  
reports   was   the   actual   nature   of   corporations’   business   activity.  While   listed  
companies   are   classified   by   sector   on   the   JSE,   this   classification   often   only  
reflects   one   important   activity   of   a   firm,   but   does   not   necessarily   adequately  
categorise   its  operations.  This   is  especially   true   for   large,  diversified   (holding)  
companies,  which   effectively  would   have   to   be   classified   under   two   or  more  
sectoral  headings.  This  information  is  not  provided  by  the  INET  BFA  database  
and   was   extremely   difficult   to   obtain,   especially   for   delisted   companies.  
Historical   information   on   firms’   listings   is   also   not   available.   This   means  
changes   in   sectoral   membership   are   not   flagged.   Thus,   a   firm   might   start  
operations  as  a  consumer  goods  producer,  but  transform  itself  into  a  diamond  
mining   firm   in   the   course   of   a   couple   of   years   (see,   for   instance,   the   case   of  
Goodhope   Diamonds   Ltd).   All   of   these   nuances   highlight   the   complexity   of  
firms’  characteristics  and  histories.    
Given   the   large  presence   of   foreign   companies,   balance   sheet   analysis   of   JSE-­‐‑
listed  firms  is  only  meaningful   in  conjuncture  with  the  assessment  of  the  flow  
of  funds.  The  flow  of  funds  provides  a  picture  of  the  South  African  economy  in  
the  international  context.  By  contrast,  sectoral  balance  sheets  provided  by  INET  
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BFA,  for  example  for  the  mining  industry,  are  unlikely  to  be  representative  for  
the   position   of   the   domestic   mining   sector.   A   large   number   of   JSA-­‐‑listed  
companies   have   significant   global   operations,   which   do   not   affect   the   South  
African  economy  but  show  up  on  the  corporate  balance  sheet.    
The  microeconomic  empirical  analysis  (in  chapter  4)  had  to  strike  a  fine  balance  
between  the  depth  of  the  analysis  and  its  breadth.  As  will  be  discussed  in  more  
detail  in  chapter  4,  the  INET  BFA  database  provides  data  on  the  full  population  
of  JSE-­‐‑listed  corporations  for  the  period  since  1994.  Data  before  1994  (stretching  
back   to   1970)   is   less   reliable.   On   this   basis   a   large   number   of   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations   were   identified   as   having   high   (and   potentially   excessive)  
holdings   of   liquidity   (namely   132).   Consequently,   comprehensive   qualitative  
data   had   to   be   gathered   for   all   132   companies.   However,   as   pointed   out   by  
Gerring   (2007)   cross-­‐‑case   studies   of   a   number   of   analytical   units   (in   this   case  
non-­‐‑financial   corporations)   can   only   be   undertaken   and,   more   crucially,  
presented  effectively  for  around  a  dozen  cases  at  a  time.  The  larger  the  number  
of   units   studied,   the   harder   it   is   to   convey   the   level   of   depth   and   detail   that  
makes  out  the  essential  characteristic  of  case  study  work.      
Therefore,   for   20   cases   (where   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   had   the   highest  
volumes   of   liquidity   on   their   balance   sheet   as  measured   by   the   conventional  
cash  ratio)  the  motivations  and  processes  behind  corporate  financial  operations  
are  presented  in  detail  by  tracing  those  companies’  business  history.  For  the  full  
set  of  132  corporations,  16  analytical  categories  were  constructed  to  facilitate  the  
analysis.   In   this   way,   the   author   has   created   an   original   dataset   capturing   a  
large   range   of   qualitative   characteristics   of   South   African   listed   corporations  
with  a  high  liquidity  preference.          
For   the   macroeconomic   analysis,   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   data   was   obtained   from   the  
South   African   Reserve   Bank   (SARB).   A   rare   SARB   Quarterly   Bulletin  
supplement  was   located   to   include  data   that   stretches  back   to  1970.  Thus,   the  
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period  covered  in  the  macroeconomic  analysis  is  1970  to  2014.  In  the  interest  of  
looking   at   this   longer   time   period,   annual   data   have   been   used,   as   quarterly  
data  are  only  available  since  1990.  Analysing  the  South  African  flow  of  funds  is  
crucial   because   the   National   Financial   Accounts   (NFA)   link   real   economic  
activity  to  financial  transactions,  which  is  the  focal  point  of  this  thesis.  The  NFA  
are   set   up   as   tables  with   columns   representing  different   economic   aggregates  
and   sub-­‐‑sectors,  whereas   rows   provide   transaction   items   (see   tables  A.2.   and  
A.3.   in   the   appendix   for   the   2014   flow   of   funds   data   for   South   Africa).   The  
macroeconomic  aggregates  constructed  by  the  SARB  are   the   following  (SARB,  
2011):   (1)   General   government   (including   central   and   provincial   and   local  
government),   (2)   households   and   others   (this   includes   all   non-­‐‑incorporated  
firms),   (3)   non-­‐‑financial   corporate   business   enterprises   (subdivided   into   state-­‐‑
owned   and   private   non-­‐‑financial   corporations),   (4)   financial   intermediaries  
(including   the   monetary   authority,   other   monetary   institutions,   the   Public  
Investment   Corporation,   insurers   and   retirement   funds   and   other   financial  
institutions)  and  (5)  the  foreign  sector.  
Importantly,   the   absence   of   further   disaggregation   of   the   non-­‐‑financial  
corporate  sector  (by  legal  type  of  business  for  instance)  and  the  incorporation  of  
non-­‐‑incorporated   firms   into   the   household   sector  made   it   difficult   to   account  
for   firm  heterogeneity.   This  was  done  where  possible   by   contrasting   findings  
across  the  different  economic  levels  (i.e.  micro,  industry  and  macro).  
1.5. Major findings 
The  thesis  finds  micro-­‐‑  and  macroeconomic  evidence  for  the  overcapitalisation  
of  South  African   firms,  especially   listed  corporations.  Their  overcapitalisation,  
which   has   intensified   since   the   1990s,  weakens   the   country’s   growth   and   job  
creation   by   undermining   the   link   between   large   formal   and   small   informal  
companies.   Furthermore,   the   large   volumes   of   liquid   assets   held   on   South  
African  non-­‐‑financial   firms’  balance   sheets  and  with   local  banks   feed   into   the  
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South  African  real  estate  bubble  as  funds  are  recycled  into  mortgages  and  loans  
to   the   FIRE   (finance,   insurance   and   real   estate)   sector.   The   emerging  market  
context  is  crucial  to  explain  the  effect  of  non-­‐‑financial  firms’  overcapitalisation  
on  credit  extension.  Since  the  SARB  (South  African  Reserve  Bank)  is  concerned  
that  capital  outflows  could  hurt   the   local  economy,  which  has  been  running  a  
large  and  persistent  current  account  deficit  over  the  past  decade,  it  stops  short  
of  a  commitment  to  stable  and  low  interest  rates  for  commercial  banks’  lending.  
In   this   sense,   SARB’s   policy   differs   fundamentally   from   that   of  many   central  
banks   in   the   OECD.   Especially   the   Bank   of   England   and   the   US   Federal  
Reserve,   the   central   banks   part   of   the   deepest   and  most   innovative   financial  
markets,   have   embraced   this   commitment   whole-­‐‑heartedly.   The   large   South  
African   banks   still   focus   on   lending   as   their   core   business,   lacking   signs   of  
‘financialisation’.   Therefore,   the   presence   of   rising   corporate   liquid   funds   on  
their   balance   sheets   facilitated   and   arguably   pressured   them   to   create   loans,  
offsetting  the  liability  of  corporate  liquidity.        
More  concretely,  microeconomic  analysis  shows  that  a  considerable  number  of  
South   Africa   listed   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   is   overcapitalised,   meaning  
possesses   cash   and   cash   equivalents   and   other   liquid   assets   beyond   their  
liquidity   needs   for   productive   operations.   The  motives   for   these   holdings   are  
both  precautionary   considerations   as  well   as   speculative   intentions.  The   close  
study  of  financial  processes  within  these  non-­‐‑financial  firms  shows  that  it  is  not  
always   possible   to   clearly   differentiate   between   productive   and   speculative  
activity.   A   major   reason   to   hold   large   amounts   of   cash   for   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations   is   the  ability   to  acquire  business   interests.  Almost  half   (58)  of  all  
studied  companies  showed  evidence  of  speculation  in  subsidiary  trading.  This  
type  of  activity  can  be  a  speculation  in  real,  rather  than  financial,  assets  as  much  
of   the   financialisation   literature  predicts   to   be   characteristic   for   ‘financialised’  
non-­‐‑financial   companies,   especially   in   the   context  of   an   emerging  market   like  
South  Africa.    
   30  
Generally,   the   rising   liquidity   preference   among   South   African   listed   non-­‐‑
financial   corporations   is   strongly   shaped  by   the   country’s   specific   geographic  
location   and   mineral   endowments.   Thus,   a   large   proportion   of   financial  
dealings  by  non-­‐‑financial  business  is  undertaken  among  mining  companies,  the  
industry  which  has  fundamentally  moulded  the  economy  since  the  beginnings  
of  capitalism  in  South  Africa.    
A  change  in  financing  patterns  among  the  large  mining-­‐‑finance  houses  during  
the   1990s   has   resulted   in   a   number   of   mining   exploration   companies   being  
forced   to   finance   themselves  outside  of   the  mining-­‐‑finance  houses’   structures.  
These  individual  businesses  are  often  small  in  scale  and  need  to  overcapitalise,  
that   is   to   hold   more   liquid   assets   than   would   potentially   be   necessary   for  
routine   business   operations,   to   ensure   their   survival   until   exploration   is  
successful   and   they   can   sell   their   mining   rights,   or   even   until   the   mine  
development  stage   is  completed.  However,   in  attempting   to  reduce   their  own  
financial   fragility   (at   the   microeconomic   level),   overcapitalised   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations  contribute  to  rising  macroeconomic  fragility  through  their  impact  
on   the   balance   sheets   of   financial   institutions   and   small   and   medium  
enterprises.    
Flow  of  funds  analysis  shows  that  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  in  South  Africa  in  
aggregate  historically  have  engaged  extensively  in  financial  transactions,  while  
financing   the  majority   of   their   gross   capital   formation   internally.   In   the  New  
South   Africa   (since   1994),   these   companies   have   changed   the   composition   of  
their   financial   operations,   rather   than   simply   intensifying   them.   The   change  
consisted   of   a   reduction   in   trade   credit   towards   households   and   non-­‐‑
incorporated  firms,  and  an  increased  holding  of  cash,  bank  deposits  and  other  
financial  assets.  Thus,  macroeconomic  data  also  supports  the  finding  that  non-­‐‑
financial  companies,  increased  their  liquidity  preference  as  documented  for  the  
microeconomic  level.    
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Crucially,   flow   of   funds   analysis   shows   that   the   intensified   liquidity  
management   by  non-­‐‑financial   companies   impacts   the   balance   sheets   of   South  
African  banks,  facilitating  the  build-­‐‑up  of  financial  fragility.  In  aggregate,  non-­‐‑
financial   companies   raise   much   of   their   external   finance   through   equity  
issuance.   In   order   to   balance   the   sum   of   their   equity   and   liabilities,   non-­‐‑
financial   firms   hold   liquid   assets.   This   is   the  most   effective  way   to   avoid   an      
evaporation  of  assets  on  their  balance  sheets  because  cash  and  cash  equivalents,  
unlike   machinery   investment,   will   not   dramatically   lose   in   value   during   a  
recession.  In  South  Africa,  these  corporations  invest  into  financial  assets  that  in  
turn  become  liabilities  for  domestic  banks.    
Banks  are  then  under  pressure  to  generate  assets  matching  their  liabilities.  This  
happens  mainly   in   the   form   of  mortgage   lending   and   credit   extended   to   the  
FIRE   sector.   Bank   credit   flowing   into   the   real   estate   market   substantially  
inflated   house   prices   during   the   early   2000s.   Therefore,   non-­‐‑financial  
companies’   liquidity   preference   might   have   contributed   to   the   house   price  
boom  in  South  Africa.    
This  result  crucially  depends  on  South  Africa’s  status  as  emerging  market.  The  
author  does  not  subscribe  to  the  loanable  funds  model,  where  creation  of  loans  
is  only  possible  if  deposited  savings  increase.  This  thesis  firmly  stands  with  the  
concept   of   endogenous   money,   acknowledging   that   loans   create   deposits.  
However,   as   argued   by   Victoria   Chick   in   her   influential   stages   of   banking  
evolution  (see  chapter  5),  for  reserves  not  to  be  a  constraint  on  credit  creation  at  
all  the  central  bank  needs  to  accept  full  responsibility  for  financial  stability.  This  
goes  hand-­‐‑in-­‐‑hand  with  a  stable  and  low  interest  rate  policy  (Chick,  1992).  Since  
there   is  no  commitment  of   the  SARB  to  a  policy  of   low   interest  rates.   In  South  
Africa   interest   rates   are   relatively   high   and   often   driven   by   portfolio   inflow  
considerations,   especially   since   the   mid-­‐‑1990s   when   the   country   became   the  
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IMF’s  poster  child  of  ‘prudent’5  macroeconomic  policies.  Thus,  in  this  situation  
corporate   liquidity   on   bank   balance   sheets   can   facilitate   credit   creation.   It  
practically   pressures   South   African   banks   to   extent   credit   because   the   large  
domestic  banks  still  follow  a  business  model  that  relies  on  loans  as  main  asset  
on  their  balance  sheet.  Fee  generating  services  and  more  financially  innovative  
instruments  (also  created  for  a  fee)  have  not  been  an  important  source  of  profit  
for  South  African  banks.6  
Therefore,   the   agency   question   is   answered   in   favour   of   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations.   While   South   Africa   has   some   very   specific   political   and   socio-­‐‑
economic   characteristics,   the   observations   above   can   be   lessons   for   other  
resource-­‐‑rich  emerging  markets,  attempting  to  deepen  their  financial  markets.    
1.6. Research limitations 
This  research  could  not  reach  the  level  of  detail  it  had  aimed  for  is  with  respect  
to   firm  heterogeneity.   Ideally,   flow  of   funds  data   should  distinguish  between  
large   corporations   and   SMEs.   This   was   a   proclaimed   aim   of   the   old  
institutionalist  economists  who   first  pioneered   the  construction  of   this   type  of  
data.  As   stressed   by  Kalecki,   and  Kaleckian   economists   such   as   Steindl,   non-­‐‑
financial   businesses   behave   differently   depending   on   their   size,   volume   of  
liquid  assets  and  competitive  strategy  (to  single  out  a  few  important  aspects).  In  
the  case  of  South  Africa,  as   in  many  developing  and  emerging  economies,   the  
existence   of   non-­‐‑incorporated   businesses   is   important.   Almost   by   definition,  
there  are  no  comprehensive  data  on  non-­‐‑incorporated  firms,  and  they  typically  
figure  as  part  of  the  household  sector.  Thus,  the  results  arrived  at  in  this  thesis  
have  to  be  seen  against  the  background  of  this  caveat.    
                                                                                                 
5  In   the   global   context,   this   refers   to   the   country’s   efforts   to   liberalise   trade   and   the  
financial  markets,  while  domestically  focusing  on  public  debt  reduction,  conservative  
budgeting   and   inflation   targeting.   The   latter   policies   resulted   in   ‘ridiculously   high  
interest  rates’  (Bond,  2005,  p.  98).    
6  See   Rodrigues   Teles   Sampaio,   2012   for   a   detailed   discussion   of   the   absence   of  
convincing  signs  of  financialisation  among  South  African  banks.  
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1.7. Originality  
The  originality  of  the  thesis  lies  in  its  contribution  to  the  understanding  of  the  
variety  and  heterogeneity  of   the  processes  behind  financial  operations  of  non-­‐‑
financial   firms,   and   their   impact   on   the   economy   as   a  whole.  Concretely,   the  
research   reveals   the   changing   nature   of   financial   operations   among   non-­‐‑
financial  firms  in  South  Africa  since  the  1970s.  While  the  thesis  agrees  with  the  
heterodox  view  that  changes  in  financial  activity  of  South  African  non-­‐‑financial  
corporations  have  had  an  adverse  effect  on  financial  stability  and  job  creation,  it  
challenges   the   view   that   non-­‐‑financial   firms   have   simply   engage   in   more  
financial   speculation,   which   undermines   productive   investment,   growth   and  
job  creation  (Marais,  2011,  Ashman  &  Fine,  2013).  Thus,  the  thesis  sheds  light  on  
the  processes  underlying  these  changes  in  financial  operations,  highlighting  the  
channels   that   brought   about   financial   fragility   while   undermining   economic  
activity.        
The   thesis   provides   an   original   application   of   the   theory   of   capital   market  
inflation   and   in   particular   the   related   concept   of   overcapitalisation   to   an  
emerging   market   economy.   The   thesis   operationalizes   the   concept   of  
overcapitalisation  by  developing  a  financial  ratio  to  detect  it.  Furthermore,  the  
author   constructed   an   original   dataset   by   gathering   detailed   qualitative   and  
quantitative   information   on   132   South   African   non-­‐‑financial   corporations  
identified   as   overcapitalised.   The   developed   comprehensive   balance   sheet  
approach  is  combined  with  an  original  adaptation  of  the  Corbett  and  Jenkinson  
(1996,   1997)   methodology,   to   provide   a   macroeconomic   assessment   of   non-­‐‑
financial   firms’   liquidity   holdings   and   their   impact   on   financial   stability.  
Crucially,   the   thesis  has   created  an  original  dataset  of  non-­‐‑financial   JSE-­‐‑listed  
companies  with  high  liquidity  preferences.  The  dataset  covers  a  large  range  of  
qualitative   characteristics   and   was   laboriously   assembled   using   a  
comprehensive  balance  sheet  approach.    
   34  
Chapter II:  Literature Review: Financial Operations of Non-
Financial Firms 
  
This  chapter  reviews  the  most  salient  and  interesting  contributions  to  economic  
thought   that   deal  with   financial   operations   of   non-­‐‑financial   companies.   Since  
non-­‐‑financial  enterprises  are  essential  to  economic  activity  any  economic  theory  
is  built  on  certain  assumptions  about  what  these  firms  do,  how  they  use  finance  
and  how  they  generate  profit.  Depending  on  the  theory,  these  assumptions  are  
either   more   or   less   explicit.   In   the   following,   the   most   important   economic  
theories   and   models,   which   have   had   the   most   influence   on   economists’  
understanding  of  non-­‐‑financial  firms’  financial  operations,  are  discussed.    
The   empirical   (and   topical)   puzzle   of   increasing   cash   and   cash   equivalents  
holdings1  on  non-­‐‑financial  firms’  balance  sheets  will  serve  as  analytical  angle  to  
reveal  underlying  theoretical  assumptions.  Thus,  three  questions  will  guide  this  
literature   review:   (1)   what   is   the   role   of   financial   operations   within   the  
operations  of  non-­‐‑financial  businesses?   (2)  Which  non-­‐‑financial  businesses  are  
assumed   to  undertake   financial   operations?  And   (3)  why  might   non-­‐‑financial  
firms   increase   their   holdings   of   liquid   assets   (such   as   cash   and   cash  
equivalents)?    
Different   theories   of   the   firm   will   be   touched   upon.   However,   it   is   not   the  
nature   of   the   firm   that   is   at   the   analytical   centre   of   this   overview,   but   the  
theoretical  understanding  of  non-­‐‑financial  businesses’  financial  operations.  The  
reader   will   notice   that   more   attention   is   given   to   heterodox   theory   in   the  
discussion   below.   This   is   somewhat   inevitable   when   dealing   with   financial  
                                                                                                 
1  The  terms  ‘cash  and  cash  equivalents’  or  ‘cash  holdings’  refer  to  cash  in  call  deposits  
and  other  short-­‐‑term,  highly-­‐‑liquid  investments  that  are  readily  convertible  to  known  
amounts  of   cash,  meaning   that   there   is   insignificant   risk  of   change   in  value  due   to  a  
change   in   the   interest   rate.  Short-­‐‑term  refers   to  a   time  period  of   three  months  or   less  
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operations  of  non-­‐‑financial  business  since  heterodox  economists  tend  to  assign  
greater  importance  to  financial  phenomena.    
Orthodox   economists   turn   most   often   to   corporate   finance   theory   for   an  
understanding  of   financial  dealings  within  non-­‐‑financial   firms.  Part  2.1.1.  will  
review   the   emergence   of   corporate   finance   as   a   sub-­‐‑discipline.   This   will   be  
followed  by  a  discussion  of   the  Modigliani-­‐‑Miller   theorem  and   its   importance  
for  mainstream  analysis  of   corporate   financial  operations   (part   2.1.2.).   Finally,  
recent   empirical   findings,   dealing  with   the   puzzling   increase   in   non-­‐‑financial  
firms’  increasing  liquid  asset  holdings  will  be  reviewed  in  Part  2.1.3.      
Heterodox  economists  have  been  particularly  influenced  by  Karl  Marx  and  John  
Maynard   Keynes   in   their   theoretical   understanding   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms’  
financial   transactions.  These  two  writers  and  their   influence  on  finance  theory  
(and   especially,   ideas   on   financial   dealings   of   non-­‐‑financial   business)  will   be  
discussed   in   turn   (in   parts   2.2.1.   and   2.2.2.,   respectively).   In   recent   years,   the  
heterodox   research   agenda   around   financial   phenomena   has   culminated   in   a  
diverse   body   of   research   labelled   as   ‘financialisation’   theories,   shaped   by   the  
ideas  of  both  Marx  and  Keynes.  They  will  be  reviewed  in  part  2.2.3.,  specifically  
with  regard  to  financial  operations  of  non-­‐‑financial  companies.    
2.1. Financial operations of non-financial firms in mainstream economics  
2.1.1. The emergence of corporate finance theory 
Corporate   finance   theory   is   the  area  of  orthodox  economic   thought   that  deals  
with   financial   transactions   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms.   It   is   a   relatively   young  
economic  sub-­‐‑discipline,  which  mostly  developed  during  the  second  half  of  the  
20th   century,   aiming   mainly   to   assess   the   value   of   corporate   financial  
instruments   using   increasingly   sophisticated   statistical   tools.   This   section  will  
trace   the   emergence   of   corporate   finance   theory   since   the   history   of   the  
discipline’s  formation  will  help  answering  the  questions  (1)  what  role  financial  
operations  are  assumed  to  play  in  non-­‐‑financial  businesses,  (2)  which  firms  are  
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considered   to   undertake   these   operations   and   finally,   (3)   why   non-­‐‑financial  
firms  might  have  raised  their  liquid  asset  holdings.  
The   financial   transactions   of   the   non-­‐‑financial   corporation  were   important   in  
early  financial  thought,  mainly  through  analyses  of  stock  prices  and  exchanges,  
going  as  far  back  as  to  the  17th  century.2  The  first  company  stocks  were  shares  of  
a   chartered   company   –   namely   the  Dutch   East   India  Company   –   and   started  
trading  in  1602  (Poitras,  2007).  Not  entirely  incidentally,   it  was  the  Dutch  East  
India   Company,   which   established   the   first   colonial   outpost   in   South   Africa,  
Cape   Town,   in   1652.   The   early   financial   history   of  Cape   Town   and   the   city’s  
interaction   with   the   Dutch   East   India   Company   are   discussed   in   detail   in  
chapter  6.  
During  the  17th  and  18th  century   joint  stock  companies  were  chartered  only  by  
act   of   parliament   and   few   of   them   existed.   In   fact,   financial  markets   and   the  
activities   of   banks   mainly   dealt   with   government   securities   (for   instance,   to  
finance  war  expenditure)  rather  than  with  company  stock  (Kindleberger,  1984).  
This   changed  with   the   advent   of   limited   liability   legislation,  which   in   Britain  
was   put   into   effect   in   the  mid-­‐‑19th   century.  As   consequence,   it   became  much  
easier   to   establish   joint   stock   companies   and   their   shares   were   more   widely  
traded. 3   In   fact,   the   19th   century   was   characterised   by   re-­‐‑occurring   stock  
exchange  booms  across  Europe.    
Unsurprisingly,   strong   interest   in   the   stock   exchange   and  especially   in   equity  
investment  emerged.  The  aim  of  the  equity  investor  was  to  maximise  his  or  her  
profit,   choosing   a   portfolio   of   shares   that   were   generally   regarded   as  
undervalued.   Risk   management   (which   is   nowadays   regarded   to   be   a   major  
function  of  financial  institutions)  did  not  figure  in  portfolio  choice  techniques  of  
the  19th  and  early  20th  century.    
                                                                                                 
2  Financial  analysis  itself  can  be  traced  as  far  back  as  antiquity  (Poitras,  2006).  
3  In   the  UK,   the   Joint  Stock  Companies  Act  was  passed   in  1844,   the  Limited  Liability  
Act  in  1855.  
   37  
Irving   Fisher’s   maximisation   rule   in   his   separation   theorem,   stating   that   the  
income   generated   by   an   investment   decision   and   its   shape   over   time   can   be  
disentangled   (Fisher,   1930).   Consequently,   followers   of   Fisher,   such   as   John  
Burr  Williams,   advised   the   rational   financial   investor   to   invest   in   the   security  
with  the  highest  expected  return  since  inter-­‐‑temporal  consumption  and  saving  
decisions  could  generate  the  desired  shape  of  the  cash  flow  over  time  (Dimand,  
2007).  During  the  1930s,  despite  the  still-­‐‑fresh  memory  of  the  1929  crash,  such  
techniques  of  portfolio  investment  were  common.  Keynes  famously  stated  in  a  
letter  to  a  business  associate  that:  
‘[…]  the  right  method  in  investments  is  to  put  fairly  large  sums  into  enterprises  
which  one  thinks  one  knows  something  about  and  in  management  of  which  one  
thoroughly   believes.   It   is   a   mistake   to   think   that   one   limits   one’s   risks   by  
spreading  too  much  between  enterprises  about  which  one  knows  little  and  has  
no   special   reason   for   special   confidence.   One’s   knowledge   and   experience   is  
definitely   limited   and   there   are   seldom  more   than   two  or   three   enterprises   at  
any   given   time  which   I   personally   feel  myself   entitled   to   put   full   confidence’  
(Keynes,  1934).  
This   attitude   towards   financial   investment,   which   is   the   basis   of   traditional  
portfolio   choice   techniques,   is   tainted   by   the   expectation   of   ever-­‐‑increasing  
stock  prices.  In  such  a  situation  the  investor  has  to  find  the  most  undervalued  
security   and   simply   wait.   Irving   Fisher   shared   this   expectation,   remaining  
convinced  that  the  Great  Crash  of  1929  was  just  a  temporary  phenomenon,  and  
anticipating  the  resumption  of  price  levels  and  growth  (Dimand,  2007).              
It  was   this  attitude,  but  even  more  so   the   ‘traditional’   techniques,  with  which  
corporate  finance  theory  wanted  to  break  (Poitras,  2007).  The  emergence  of  the  
sub-­‐‑discipline  within  economics  was  fuelled  by  two  trends:  first,  the  progress  in  
probability  theory  of  the   late  19th  and  early  20th  century  (Jovanovic,  2007);  and  
second,   the   contracting   volume   of   government   bonds   available   in   advanced  
financial  markets,  resulting  from  the  pronounced  reduction  in  government  debt  
after  World  War  II  (Toporowski,  2010).  
The  first  development  coincided  with  a  general  shift  of  economic  method  since  
the  late  19th  century,  towards  more  usage  of  econometric  techniques,  promoted  
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as   more   scientific.   Harry   Markowitz’s   PhD   thesis   on   the   theory   of   portfolio  
selection   was   instrumental   in   the   assault   on   ‘traditional’   finance   and   is  
generally   seen   as   beginning   of   corporate   finance   theory   (Mehrling,   2005,  
Jovanovic,  2007).    
Markowitz  explicitly  attacked  Williams’s   investment  proposition,  according  to  
which   investors   should   focus   on   those   shares   that   are   expected   to   fetch   the  
highest   returns   (Markowitz,   1952).  While   Fisher’s   separation   theorem  was   an  
exposition  of  investment  decisions  under  certainty,  in  line  with  his  expectations  
about  stock  price  growth,  Markowitz  introduced  statistical  risk,  while  claiming  
to   include   uncertainty.   Of   course,   his   means-­‐‑variance   model   does   not  
incorporate   uncertainty   but   rather   risk,   since   changes   in   security   prices   are  
treated   like   dice   throws,   that   is   like   random   variables.   In   the   mean-­‐‑variance  
portfolio   investment  model   investors  aim  at  reducing  fluctuations   in  expected  
return   (the   variance)   through   security   diversification   given   a   certain   level   of  
average  expected  return  (the  mean).    
Markowitz’s  mean-­‐‑variance  model  crystallised  the  results  of  more  than  20  years  
of   statistical   analysis   applied   to   financial  market   observations.  Work  on   stock  
market   prices   had   started   developing   using   econometric   techniques   since   the  
1930s.  Alfred  Cowles   established   the  Cowles  Commission   in   1931   to   research  
the  stock  exchange.  Cowles  was  a  ‘victim’  of  the  1929  crash  and  believed  that  it  
could   not   have   been   predicted.   Out   of   this   research,   the   random   walk  
hypothesis  developed,  independently  from  earlier  work  by  Jules  Regnault  and  
Louise  Bachelier  (Jovanovic,  2007).    
Already   in   the   late   19th   century,   Regnault   and   Bachelier   showed   that  
developments  in  stock  prices  could  be  described  by  Brownian  motion  (Poitras,  
2006),  meaning  their  price  changes  over  time  can  be  mathematically  formalised  
as   a   motion   consisting   of   successively   random   but   calculable   steps   like   the  
throwing  of  dice,  that  is,  a  so-­‐‑called  random  walk.    
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This   finding  was   reinforced   decades   later,   first   by  Holbrook  Working   during  
the  1930s,  and  subsequently  during  the  1950s  by  Maurice  G.  Kendall,  and  M.  F.  
M.  Osborne,  who,  without  the  knowledge  of  the  preceding  results,  once  again  
demonstrated  that  stock  (and  commodity)  price  changes  behave  like  a  random  
walk  (Mehrling,  2005).  Bachelier’s  work,  written  in  1900,  was  only  rediscovered  
and  popularised  by  Paul   Samuelson   in   1950,   contributing   to   the   then  nascent  
economic  subfield  of  corporate   finance   theory   (Poitras,  2006,   Jovanovic,  2007).  
The   aim   of   the   new   subdiscipline   was   establishing   so-­‐‑called   mathematical  
rigour  while   discrediting   ‘traditional’   securities   analysis   as   non-­‐‑scientific   and  
‘based  on  accounting  practices,  rules  of  thumb  and  anecdotes’  (Merton,  1987,  p.  
150).    
Therefore,   this   research   agenda   was   little   more   than   the   application   of   new  
statistical   and   mathematical   tools   to   financial   market   observations.   The  
theoretical   foundations   of   Markowitz’s   model   were   so   weak   that   Milton  
Friedman  initially  refused  to  award  him  a  doctorate  in  economics:    
‘Harry,   I  don’t  see  anything  wrong  with   the  math  here,  but   I  have  a  problem.  
This   isn’t   a   dissertation   in   economics,   and   we   can’t   give   you   a   Ph.D.   in  
economics   for   a   dissertation   that’s   not   economics.   It’s   not   math,   it’s   not  
economics,  it’s  not  even  business  administration’  (quoted  in  Bernstein,  1992,  p.  
60).      
Thus,   the  aim  of   corporate   finance   theory  –  with   few  exceptions  –  was  not   to  
understand  companies’  financial  decisions,  but  to  be  able  to  assess  the  value  of  
financial   investment   into  corporate  equity.  As  a  consequence,   the  main  aspect  
of   corporate   activity,   which   is   of   interest   to   corporate   finance   theory,   is   the  
issuance   of   stocks   and   bonds   (Varian,   1993). 4   Implicitly,   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations   were   simply   assumed   to   use   the   funds   raised   for   productive  
operations.  This  provides  an  answer  to  question  (2).  The  type  of  firm  which  was  
in   the   research   focus  was   the   equity-­‐‑   and   bond-­‐‑emitting   business,   hence,   the  
large  listed  corporation.  
                                                                                                 
4  According  to  Hal  Varian,  ‘[c]orporate  finance  focuses  on  the  suppliers  of  the  securities  
–  the  corporations  that  issue  stocks  and  bonds’  (Varian,  1993,  p.  166).  
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This   is   in   line   with   the   second   trend   outlined   above   that   substantially  
contributed   to   the   rise   of   corporate   finance   theory   as   independent   economic  
field:  need  of  investors  to  make  more  extensive  use  of  private  securities,  such  as  
corporate  equity,   in  the  wake  of   falling  public  bond  issuance  and  government  
debt  repayment  after  World  War  II.  While  the  demand  for  financial  instruments  
with   low   levels   of   risk   was   increasing,   the   supply   of   government   bonds,  
typically   perceived   to   be   the   safest   type   of   financial   asset,   was   declining.  
Consequently,   corporate   finance   theory   was   providing   a   theoretical   (and  
allegedly  scientific)  foundation  for  encouraging  investment  in  corporate  equity,  
which  is  generally  more  risky  than  government  debt  (Toporowski,  2010).  
2.1.2. The Modigliani-Miller theorem 
Lacking  theoretical  foundations,  portfolio  models  (like  the  one  put  forward  by  
Markowitz)  were  absorbed  into  the  increasingly  dominant  general  equilibrium  
framework.   This   might   seem   surprising   since   Kenneth   Arrow   and   Gérard  
Debreu  (1954)  formulated  their  proof  of  equilibrium  for  a  competitive  economy  
on   the   assumption   of   perfect   markets,   including   those   for   future   goods   and  
services.   Consequently,   their   general   equilibrium   model   is   one   of   perfect  
foresight   and   therefore   closely   related   to   Irving   Fisher’s   (1930)   expositions,  
much  criticised  by  corporate  finance  theorists  for  the  assumption  of  certainty.    
Nevertheless,  financial  economists  never  considered  true  uncertainty,  replacing  
it   instead  with   risk.  Unlike  uncertainty,  which   is   inherently  unknowable,   risk  
follows  a  random  but  predetermined  distribution  with  outcomes  of  quantifiable  
probabilities.  Modigliani   &  Miller   (1958)   provided   the   theoretical   grounds   to  
put  corporate  finance  theory  onto  general  equilibrium  foundations  (Jovanovic,  
2007).  In  their  paper  on  the  irrelevance  theorem  they  argue  that  firms’  financing  
decisions  do  not  affect  their  value.  Otherwise,  investors  would  take  advantage  
of   arbitrage   opportunities   between   two   identical   firms   simply   differing   in  
capital  structure.  This  claim  relies  on  the  assumption  of  a  perfect  capital  market  
   41  
where   all   arbitrage   possibilities   are   exhausted,   leaving   company   profit  
determined  by  its  industrial  and  commercial  activity  (Toporowski,  2010).  
Notably,   it  was  Modigliani  who  mathematically  arrived  at   the  conclusion  that  
the  capital  structure  of  a  company  –  meaning  the  firm’s  choice  between  equity  
and  debt  held  on  the  balance  sheet  –  did  not  impact  its  value.  Doubtful  of  this  
result,   he  had   to  be   convinced  by  Miller   that   this  was   a   reasonable   argument  
(Mehrling,  2005).    
However,  the  irrelevance  theorem  relies  on  the  assumption  of  efficient  market  
workings   in   the   absence   of   frictions   such   as   taxes,   transaction   costs   and  
asymmetric  information.  Given  a  perfectly  functioning  market  there  is  however  
little  need  for  a  firm’s  cash  holdings  since  –  at  the  extreme,  namely  in  the  Arrow  
and  Debreu  (1954)  setting  –  the  company  can  prepare  for  future  transactions  as  
perfect   foresight   is   implied.   Hence,   under   these   conditions   there   is   no  
explanation  for  corporate  cash  holdings,  and  in  fact  the  company’s  asset  side  in  
general  does  not  figure  prominently  in  early  corporate  finance  theory.  
Modigliani’s  initial  doubts  about  the  findings  were  echoed  by  fellow  corporate  
finance   researchers   such   as   John   Lintner   and   his   colleagues   at   other   Boston-­‐‑
based  universities  especially  Edwin  Kuh  and  John  R.  Meyer  who  criticised  the  
Modigliani-­‐‑Miller  theorem  for  its  restrictive  assumptions,  abstracting  from  risk  
in  the  general  equilibrium  framework.  From  field  research  and  interviews  with  
managers   and   shareholders   Lintner   knew   that   both   paid   a   lot   of   attention   to  
financing   decisions   (Mehrling,   2005).   Furthermore,   Lintner   was   familiar   with  
William  Henry   Locke   Anderson’s   work   on   corporate   finance   (Lintner,   1967),  
which  dealt  with  balance  sheet  analysis,  guided  by  Michał  Kalecki’s  principle  of  
increasing   risk   (Locke   Anderson,   1964).   The   implications   of   the   ‘principle   of  
increasing   risk’   negate   the   capital   structure   irrelevance   theorem,   since   it  
asserted  that  company  value  would  be  impacted  adversely  by  rising  leverage.    
Modigliani  and  Miller  acknowledged  the  excessively  restrictive  assumptions  of  
their  analysis,   reconsidering   the   irrelevance   theorem   in  1963.   In   their  opinion,  
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however,   the   most   important   shortcoming   was   the   absence   of   tax   breaks.  
Allowing   for   a   corporate   tax   shield   on   debt-­‐‑financed   investment,   their  
conclusion  was  that  the  value  of  a  leveraged  firm  would  exceed  that  of  a  non-­‐‑
leveraged  company  by  the  present  value  of  the  tax  shield  (Modigliani  &  Miller,  
1963).  By  extension,   firms  with  high   levels  of   liquidity  on   their  balance  sheets  
must   be   holding   cash   and   other   liquid   assets   because   the   tax   rebates   they  
receive   from   borrowing   are   so   advantageous   that   it   pays   to   simply   borrow  
money   and   hold   it   in   liquid   assets.   This   is   called   the   tax   motive   for   cash  
holdings.  
For   the  US,   Foley,  Hartzell,   Titman,   and   Twite   (2007)   present   some   evidence  
that   corporations,   which   would   face   taxation   after   repatriation   of   foreign  
earnings,   hold   higher   volumes   of   cash   and   cash   equivalents.   This   does   not  
appear  to  explain  the  whole  story,  however,  as  US  corporations  without  foreign  
operations  have  also  increased  their  cash  holdings  (Bates  et  al.,  2009).    
More   fundamentally,   considering   the   complex   incorporation   structure   of  
modern   listed   companies   it   can   be   doubted   that   (changes   to)   tax   shields   can  
explain   the   rise   in   non-­‐‑financial   firms’   liquid   holdings.   Large   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations   have   often   holding   companies   that   are   based   in   low-­‐‑tax   centres  
(most  prominently  the  Channel  Islands,  Jersey,  the  Cayman  Islands,  Bermuda,  
the  Virgin  Islands,  Singapore  and  Switzerland).  Complex  financial  transactions  
within   the   corporate   group   then   allow   such   structures   to   minimise   tax  
payments  (Palan,  2012,  Donne,  2013).  Surely,   the  ability  of   these  companies   to  
avoid   taxation  has   increased  over   the  past  decades.  However,   it   is  unlikely   to  
have  increased  so  dramatically  that  it  can  easily  account  for  the  important  rise  
in  liquidity  preference  among  non-­‐‑financial  corporations.    
The   unrealistic,   but   logical,   consequence   of   Modigliani   and   Miller’s   revised  
findings  was  that  companies  should  finance  their  investment  completely  out  of  
debt.   Since   this   was   far   from   corporate   reality   the   research   agenda   over   the  
coming   years   was   importantly   influenced   by   the   need   to   find   costs  
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counteracting   the   tax   shield’s   benefits,   determining   an   optimal   debt   level   for  
companies,  which  would  be  below  100%-­‐‑debt-­‐‑financing.    
In   consequence,   the   static   trade-­‐‑off   hypothesis   emerged,   putting   forward   the  
following  argument:  there  is  an  optimal  level  of  debt  for  a  firm,  determined  by  
the   trade-­‐‑off   between   the   costs   and   the   benefits   of   borrowing   external   funds.  
The   company   benefits   from   the   tax   shield,   while   bankruptcy   and   financial  
embarrassment   are   potential   borrowing   costs.   Therefore,   debt   financing   is  
expected   up   to   the   point   where   company   value   is   maximised   and   costs   and  
benefits  balance  each  other  (S.  C.  Myers,  1984).  
Based   on   empirical   evidence   it   was   understood   that   corporations   were   not  
indifferent   between   debt   and   equity   financing   and   in   fact   preferred   a   third  
option:  internal  finance  (see,  for  instance,  Donaldson,  1961).  The  more  realistic  
pecking  order  hypothesis   (or   financial  hierarchy  hypothesis)   became   the   rival  
approach.   The   pecking   order   for   investment   finance   by   corporations   was  
thought   to   be   internal   financing   over   debt,   with   equity   issuance   only   as   last  
resort   (S.  C.  Myers,   1984).  Here,   non-­‐‑financial   firms   hold   on   to   cash   to   avoid  
either   foregoing   future   investment   opportunities   or   being   forced   to   finance  
these  externally.    
2.1.3. Asymmetric information 
Neither   the  static   trade-­‐‑off  hypothesis  nor   the  pecking  order  hypothesis  has  a  
strong   theoretical   anchor   within   orthodox   theory.5  In   fact,   neither   theory   is  
much  interested  in  firms’  assets  or  the  corporate  balance  sheet.  Both  hypotheses  
understand   firms’   investment   projects   and   assets   as   given   (Myers,   1984).  
However,   the   pecking   order   hypothesis   can   be   neatly   integrated   with   the  
concept   of   asymmetric   information,   which   became   popular   as   part   of   the  
                                                                                                 
5  Miller  himself  acknowledged  that  there  was  no  way  to  determine  the  optimal  capital  
structure  of  a  firm  (Fama  &  Miller,  1972).  Myers  used  to  ‘ignore  the  pecking  order  story  
because   [he]  could   think  of  no   theoretical   foundation  for   it   that  would  fit   in  with   the  
theory  of  modern  finance’  (Myers,  1984,  p.  582).  
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market  failure  analysis  promoted  with  the  rise  of  New  Keynesian  ideas  during  
the  1980s  (for  example  Greenwald,  Stiglitz,  &  Weiss,  1984).    
Acknowledging  that  managers  possess  information  about  their  business,  which  
is   superior   to   the   information   held   by   equity   investors,   it   was   argued   that  
investors  would  see  share  issuance  as  ‘bad  news’.  Generally,  so  the  argument,  
managers  would   avoid   issuing  new   shares   to  prevent  undervaluation  of   new  
stocks   at   the   expenses   of   existing   shareholders.   Therefore,   if   managers   were  
willing  to  issue  shares,  this  had  to  mean  their  financial  position  was  in  distress  
(S.  Myers  &  Majluf,  1984).  The  rational  financial  investor  knew  this,  making  him  
less  willing  to  purchase  newly  issued  stocks,  which  then  in  fact  results  –  like  a  
self-­‐‑fulfilling  prophecy  –  in  an  undervaluation  of  emitted  shares.      
The   story   about   asymmetric   information  between  managers   and   shareholders  
can  be   given   a   slightly  different   twist,   resulting   in   another   corporate   finance-­‐‑
cum-­‐‑New   Keynesian   market   frictions   explanation   for   different   capital  
structures  across  firms:  the  principle-­‐‑agent  problem.  Managerial  theories  of  the  
firm  at  the  time  were  focusing  on  the  question  to  what  extent  managerially-­‐‑run  
firm  could  pursue  goals   that  differed   from  short-­‐‑term  profit  maximisation.   In  
this   context,   the   principle-­‐‑agent   problem   stresses   the   (by   no   means   new)  
observation  that  the  development  of  large  capitalist  firms  was  supported  by  the  
separation   of   ownership   and   control   with   the   emergence   of   the   joint-­‐‑stock  
company.   Within   corporate   finance   theory,   proponents   of   this   type   of  
managerial  theories  of  the  firm  (Jensen  &  Meckling,  1976)  often  refer  to  work  by  
old   US   American   institutionalists,   such   as   Adolf   A.   Berle   and   Gardiner   C.  
Means,  as  their  precursors.    
The  aforementioned  managerial  theories  of  the  firm  are  based  on  the  idea  that  
interests  of  managers  and  shareholder  are  significantly  misaligned,  giving  rise  
to   an   agency   problem.   While   shareholders   (the   ultimate   owners   of   the  
corporation)   simply   care   about   their   profits,  managers   (executive   employees)  
have   a   wider   range   of   goals   going   beyond   profit   maximisation.   These   can  
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include   large   and   impressive   business   headquarters,   comfortable   business  
travel  or  attractive  office  staff  according  to  Jensen  &  Meckling  (1976).    
From   the   perspective   of   shareholders,   the   managers’   resource   allocation   is  
potentially   wasteful   but   they   cannot   control   and   discipline   managers.   The  
pecking  order  hypothesis  is  in  line  with  managers’  financing  preferences  since  
internal   funds   will   always   be   favoured   for   investment   projects   because   they  
preclude   external   control   and   interference   with   managerial   decisions.  
Furthermore,   if  managers’   and   shareholders’   interests   are  poorly   aligned  –   so  
the   argument   –   managers   would   rather   retain   cash   than   pay   it   out   to  
shareholders,  if  the  company  has  a  poor  investment  perspective  (Jensen,  1986).  
This  is  the  agency  motive  to  hold  cash.    
Empirically,   the   agency   motive   does   not   seem   to   play   a   prominent   role   in  
explaining  cash  hoarding  among  US  firms.  Harford,  Mansi,  &  Maxwell   (2008)  
show  that  weak  control  of  corporate  managers  might  lead  to  temporary  excess  
liquidity,  which  is,  however,  spent  quickly.  They  argue  that,  in  actual  fact,  firms  
with   agency  problems  hold   low  volumes  of   cash  and   cash   equivalents.  Bates,  
Kahle,   &   Stulz   (2009)   test   different   indicators   for   the   agency   problem   (for  
instance   managerial   entrenchment,   value   of   increasing   cash   holdings,   link  
between  current  and  future  levels  of  cash  holdings),  and  find  that  the  behaviour  
of  US  corporations  in  their  sample  (covering  1980  to  2006)  is  inconsistent  with  
the  argument.      
Once  economists  allowed  for  asymmetric  information,  the  idea  of  an  imperfect  
capital  market  was   introduced.   In  contrast   to   the  Arrow-­‐‑Debreu  setting,   firms  
do  not  possess  perfect  access  to  capital  markets,  in  the  sense  that  all  investment  
projects  with  a  positive  net  present  value  can  secure  external   financing.  Firms  
can   be   financially   constrained,   being   forced   to   forego   profitable   investment  
opportunities,   because   of   a   lack   of   internal   and   inaccessible   external   financial  
funds.  The  idea  that  at  least  some  companies  are  financially  constrained  brings  
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up   the   transaction   and   the   precautionary   motives   to   hold   cash   and   their  
equivalents.    
Both  motives  were  initially  introduced  in  John  Maynard  Keynes’s  exposition  of  
his   theory   of   liquidity   preference   (Keynes,   1936).   This   theory   predicts   that  
under   uncertainty6  individuals   will   hold   on   to   cash   and   cash   equivalents   in  
order   to   pay   for   transactions   (transaction  motive),  meet   unexpected   expenses  
(precautionary   motive)   and   speculate   (speculative   motive).7  Within   corporate  
finance   theory   the   transaction   motive   is   in   fact   a   transaction   cost   motive  
(Baumol,   1952,   Miller   &   Orr,   1966),   which   stresses   the   cost   of   illiquidity   for  
firms  under  pressure   to  meet  payment  obligations.  Selling  off  company  assets  
to   address   unexpected   expenditure  might   be   costly   for   a   firm   since   it  will   be  
forced   to   accept   the   best   available   price   at   that   moment.   The   precautionary  
motive  predicts  that  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  will  hold  cash  to  ensure  future  
investment   opportunities   are   not   foregone   due   to   a   lack   of   internal   finance  
and/or  an  external  financing  constraint  (Opler,  Pinkowitz,  Stulz,  &  Williamson,  
1997).    
The   speculative   motive   however   –   the   most   prominent   of   Keynes’s   liquidity  
motives   (Bibow,   2005)   –   is   typically   left   aside   when   looking   for   theoretical  
explanations  for  empirical  findings  on  corporate  cash  holdings.  The  few  authors  
who  do   refer   to   a   speculative  demand   for   corporate   liquidity   (see   Shah,   2011  
and   Kim,  Mauer,   &   Sherman,   1998)   tend   to   conflate   the   transaction   and   the  
precautionary   motive   so   that   the   speculative   motive   then   becomes   what   is  
typically  interpreted  as  precautionary  motivation  to  hold  cash.  In  consequence,  
a  company  holding  cash  for  future  investment  opportunities  is  seen  motivated  
by  speculation  instead  of  precaution.      
                                                                                                 
6  On   uncertainty   and   the   difference   between   uncertainty   and   risk   see   Frank   Knight    
(1921)  and  Keynes  (1936).  Furthermore,  the  information  asymmetry  paradigm  could  be  
seen  as  related  to  uncertainty  (Fazzari  &  Variato,  1994).  
7  This  is  somewhat  problematic  in  itself  because  it  assumes  that  firms  and  individuals  
are  interchangeable  while  companies  are  in  fact  complex  institutions.     
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Importantly,  all  the  orthodox  models  presented  here  assume  that  investment  by  
non-­‐‑financial   firms   is  always  of  a  productive  nature,   excluding   the  possibility  
that   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   derive   significant   profits   from   their   financial  
operations.   In  this  sense,  corporate   investment  decisions,  and  the  asset  side  of  
the  balance  sheet  more  generally,  has  for  long  been  taken  as  given  (see  Myers,  
1984).    
2.1.4. Empirical findings on corporate cash holdings 
Recently,  the  phenomenon  of  rising  corporate  cash  holdings  has  attracted  some  
attention  to  the  asset  side  of  the  corporate  balance  sheet.  Nevertheless,  it  seems  
there  is  little  coherent  economic  theory  and  too  many  different  models  to  guide  
this  interest,  resulting  in  varying  and  often  conflicting  empirical  findings.  Table  
2.1.   summarises   the  most   salient   recent   findings   on   the   reasons   for   corporate  
cash  holdings.  It   lists  the  variables  that  were  found  to  have  an  impact  on  cash  
holdings  by  non-­‐‑financial  firm,  and  the  sign  of  the  effect.  The  empirical  research  
agenda   attempts   to   adopt   the   motives   for   non-­‐‑financial   firms’   liquidity  
preference  motives  outlined   in   sections  2.1.1.   to  2.1.3.,  namely   the   tax  motive,  
the   agency  motive,   the   transaction  motive   and   the  precautionary  motive.  The  
latter  motive  in  particular  has  attracted  much  attention  and  confirmation  within  
this  strand  of  the  literature.  
Thus,   Dhaliwal,   Huang,   Moser,   &   Pereira   (2011)   construct   a   tax   avoidance  
measure  to  test  for  the  impact  of  the  tax  motive  of  cash  holdings.  Bates,  Kahle,  
&  Stulz  (2009)  and  Almeida,  Campello,  &  Weisbach  (2002),  both  test  for  agency  
problems,  with   divergent   results.   The   agency   problem   is   often   interpreted   as  
more  severe  where  corporate  governance   (and  consequently,   the  protection  of  
shareholders)   is  weak.  Dittmar,  Mahrt-­‐‑Smith  &  Servaes   (2003)   find   that  weak  
governance   increases   non-­‐‑financial   firms’   cash   holdings.   Similarly,   Ozkan   &  
Ozkan   (2004)   argue   that   strong   ownership   rights   reduce   corporate   cash  
holdings,  while  Harford,  Mansi,  &  Maxwell  (2008)  arrive  at  the  opposite  result.    
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The   transaction  motive  would  suggest   that   firm  size  has  a  positive   impact  on  
corporate   cash   holdings,   since   larger   operations   might   necessitate   larger  
volumes  of   liquidity.  Firm  size   is,  however,   found  to  have  a  varying  effect  on  
holdings  of  cash  and  cash  equivalents,  from  reducing  cash  holdings  (see  Bigelli  
&   Sanchez-­‐‑Vidal,   2011   or   Iskandar-­‐‑Datta  &   Jia,   2011)   to   increasing   them   (see  
Shah,  2011)  to  not  having  any  significant  impact  at  all  (see  Kim  et  al.,  1998).  In  a  
sample  for  almost  2000  non-­‐‑financial  firms  from  Brazil,  Russia,  India  and  China  
(BRICs)  covering  the  years  2002  to  2008,  Al-­‐‑Najjar  (2013)  found  all  three  effects  
of   firm   size   on   cash   holdings   depending   on   the   country.   The   precautionary  
motive   has   attracted   a   range   of   different   interpretations:   cash   flow   and   its  
volatility,  expenditure  on  research  and  development  (R&D),  credit  spreads  and  
cost  of  borrowing,  leverage,  debt  maturity  and  credit  ratings  have  all  been  used  
as  proxies   for   the   level  of   risk  a  company  might   face   in   its  operations.  Hence,  
the   presence   of   these   factors   might   necessitate   precautionary   cash   holdings.  
Some   authors   also   include   industry   and  macroeconomic   ‘uncertainty’8  in   this  
category.  
Most  of   these  variables  have  the  expected  signs  when  testing  for  their   impact:  
Cash   flow   volatility   raises   cash   holdings   (Opler,   Pinkowitz,   Stulz,   &  
Williamson,   1997;  Kim,  Mauer,  &   Sherman,   1998;   Bates   et   al.,   2009;   Iskandar-­‐‑
Datta  &  Jia,  2011);  so  does  R&D  expenditure  (Bates  et  al.,  2009;  Iskandar-­‐‑Datta  
&  Jia,  2011),  credit  spreads  (Acharya,  Davydenko,  &  Strebulaev,  2012)  and  other  
measures  of  cost  of  external   finance   (Kim  et  al.,  1998)  as  well  as   industry  and  
macroeconomic   ‘uncertainty’   (for   industry   level:   Baum,   Schäfer,   &   Talavera,  




                                                                                                 
8  They  mostly   include   risk   rather   than   uncertainty,   quantifying,   for   instance,   output  
volatility.    
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Table 2.1. Cash holdings by non-financial firms in empirical analysis 
  
  
Author(s), Year, and Title Economic variables with a positive, negative or 
undetermined impact on cash holdings (+, -, ..) 
Al-Najjar, Basil (2013): The financial 
determinants of corporate cash holdings: 
Evidence from some emerging markets 
Dividend pay-outs (-), leverage (-), profitability (-), size 
(+, -, ..) 
Acharaya, Viral Davydenko, Sergei A. 
and Ilaya A. Strebulaev (2012): Cash 
holdings and credit risk 
Credit spreads (+) 
Iskandar-Datta, Mai E. and Yonghong Jia 
(2012): Cross-country analysis of secular 
cash trends 
Cash flow volatility (+), dividend pay-out (+/-/..), 
investment (-), leverage(-), market-to-book value (+), 
research and development (R&D, +), size (-/..), working 
capital (-) 
Anderson, Ronald W. and Andrew 
Carverhill (2011): Corporate liquidity 
and capital structure 
Long-term average of cash holdings (-), profitability (..) 
Bigelli, Marco and Javier Sanchez-Vidal 
(2011): Cash holdings in private firms 
Cash conversion cycle (+), dividend pay-outs (+), 
financing deficit (-), firm age (-), investment in the 
medium run (+), profitability (+), size (-) 
Dhaliwal, Dan S., Huang, Shawn X. 
Moser, William and Raynoldes Pereira 
(2011): Corporate Tax Avoidance and the 
Level and Valuation of Firm Cash 
Holdings 
Tax avoidance (-) 
Lee, Bong Soo and Jungwon Suh (2011): 
Cash holdings and share purchases: 
International evidence 
Investment (-), equity repurchases (+) 
Shah, Attaullah (2011): The corporate 
cash holdings: Determinants and 
implications 
Cash flow (+), conversion cycle (+), debt maturity (-), 
dividend pay-out (+), market-to-book value (+), size (+) 
Alvarez, Roberto, Sagner, Andres and 
Carla Valdivia (2010): Liquidity crises 
and corporate cash holdings in Chile 
Macroeconomic uncertainty/ liquidity crises (-) 
Bates, Thomas W., Kahle, Kathleen M. 
and René M. Stulz (2009): Why do US 
firms hold so much more cash than they 
used to? 
Agency conflict (..), cash flow volatility (+), R&D (+) 
Harford, Jarrad, Mansi, Sattar A. and 
William F. Maxwell (2008): Corporate 
governance and firm cash holdings in the 
US 
Weak governance (-) 
Baum, Christopher F., Schäfer, Dorothea 
and Oleksandr Talavera (2006): The 
effects of industry-level uncertainty on 
cash holdings: The case of Germany 
Cash holdings in previous year (+), industry uncertainty 
(+), investment (-) 
Khurana, Inder K., Martin, Xiumin and 
Raynolde Pereira (2006): Financial 
development and the cash flow sensitivity 
of cash 
Level of financial development has a (-) effect on changes 
in cash holdings, that is the more developed the financial 
market the less sensitive cash holdings are to changes in 
cash flow. 
Ozkan, Aydin and Neslihan Ozkan 
(2004): Corporate cash holdings: An 
empirical investigation of UK companies 
Bank debt (-), cash flow (+), leverage (-), liquidity of 
other assets (-), market-to-book value (+), strong 
ownership rights (-) implying: agency conflict (+) 
Dittmar, Amy, Mahrt-Smith, Jan and 
Henri Servaes (2003): International 
corporate governance and corporate cash 
holdings 
Protection of shareholder rights (-), this effect is 
strengthened in countries with less developed capital 
markets, implying: financial development (-) 
Almeida, Heitor, Campello, Muriello and 
Michael S. Weisbach (2002): Corporate 
demand for liquidity 
Agency problems (+), financial constraints (+),  
Opler, Tim, Pinkowitz, Lee Stulz, René 
and Rohan Williamson (1999): The 
determinants and implications of 
corporate cash holdings 
Cash flow volatility (+), credit ratings (-), market-to-book 
value (+) 
Kim, Chang-Soo, Mauer, David C. and 
Ann E. Sherman (1998): The 
determinants of corporate liquidity: 
Theory and evidence 
Cash flow volatility (+), cost of external financing (+), 
difference in return on physical and liquid assets (-), 
market-to-book value (+), size (..) 
!
   50  
Conversely,  longer  debt  maturity  (Shah,  2011)  and  better  credit  ratings  (Opler  et  
al.,  1997)  are  found  to  reduce  cash  holdings.  However,  it  is  not  quite  clear  why  
higher   leverage   should   not   also   result   in   precautionary   cash   holdings   (Al-­‐‑
Najjar,   2013)  or  why  higher   financial  deficits   should  necessarily   lead   to   lower  
(Bigelli   &   Sánchez-­‐‑Vidal,   2012)   rather   than   higher   cash   holdings   out   of  
precaution,   except   if   high   debt   levels   are   assumed   to   absorb   additional   cash  
flow  in  an  attempt  to  pay  off  debt  (see  Ozkan  &  Ozkan,  2004).  Bringing  in  the  
emerging  market  perspective,   the  argument   is  often  made   that  corporate  cash  
holdings  would  be  smaller  in  countries  with  more  developed  financial  markets  
(Khurana,  Martin,  &  Pereira,  2006)  and  better  investor  protection  (Dittmar  et  al.,  
2003).   Thus,   cash   ‘hoards’   are   arguably   a   sign   of   under-­‐‑development.  
Interestingly,   as  will   be   discussed   in   part   2.2.1.,   Rudolf  Hilferding,   a  Marxist  
economist   of   the   early   20th   century   would   have   made   the   same   argument.      
Despite   these   eclectic   findings   the   precautionary  motive   appears   to   dominate  
empirical  findings.    
The   empirical   corporate   finance   literature   has   substantial   drawbacks.   What  
these   studies   fail   to   show   is   an   understanding   of   financial   operations  within  
non-­‐‑financial   firms,   especially  with   a   view   towards   the   underlying   processes  
and   decisions   taken.   Firm   heterogeneity   is   rarely   considered   and   if   it   is   then  
firm   size   or   age   are   used   as   distinguishing   characteristics.   Few   of   the   above-­‐‑
listed   empirical   studies   deal   with   the   changing   nature   of   corporate   financial  
operations.   Only   Bates   et   al.   (2009)   and   Iskandar-­‐‑Datta   &   Jia   (2011)   have  
addressed   the   phenomenon   of   secularly   rising   cash   holdings   among   non-­‐‑
financial  firms.    
On  a  methodological  level,  there  is  no  consensus  on  what  measure  of  corporate  
liquidity  to  use:  cash  and  cash  equivalents  as  share  of  total  assets,  or  rather  cash  
and   cash   equivalents   as   share   of   net   assets.   While   the   first   measure   simply  
states  the  volume  of  highly  liquid  assets  to  total  assets,  the  second  accounts  for  
corporate   leverage,  deducting   total   firm  debt   from  total  assets   to  arrive  at   the  
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net  asset  position.  Interestingly,   in  accounting  and  business  practice  neither  of  
the  two  is  a  much-­‐‑used  liquidity  ratio.  More  popular  are  cash  and  quick  ratios,  
which  will  be  discussed  and  advocated  as  superior  measures  of  firm  liquidity  in  
chapter  3.  
By  way  of  summary  of   the  corporate   finance   literature  and   its   theoretical  and  
empirical  insights  on  financial  operations  of  non-­‐‑financial  businesses,  the  three  
questions   about   (1)   the   role   of   financial   operations   in   the   dealings   of   non-­‐‑
financial   business,   (2)   what   type   of   firms   are   considered   and   (3)   why   the  
holdings  of  liquid  assets  by  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  would  rise,  can  now  be  
revisited:          
(1)  Corporate  finance  theory  analyses  the  position  of  large  listed  companies  in  
financial   markets   from   the   perspective   of   private   (institutional)   investors.9  
Consequently,   little   insight   on   how   firms’   actual   financial   operations   are  
provided.   The   Modigliani-­‐‑Miller   (1958)   theorem   makes   financial   structures  
irrelevant  to  the  true  value  of  a  firm,  marginalising  the  importance  of  decisions  
about  debt  versus  equity  financing.    
(2)  With  the  exception  of  some  empirical  work,  corporate  finance  theory  focuses  
on  the  listed  corporation,  disregarding  firm  heterogeneity  and  especially  small  
and   medium   enterprises,   which   in   many   countries   provide   the   majority   of  
employment.    
(3)   The   question  why   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   liquid   asset   holdings   should  
rise  can  fetch  a  range  of  replies:  due  to  the  tax  motive,  the  agency  motive,  the  
transaction   motive,   the   precautionary   motive   and,   very   occasionally,   the  
speculative   motive.   Importantly,   within   the   empirical   corporate   finance  
literature  the  precautionary  motive  appears  the  dominant  one.    
                                                                                                 
9  The  fact   that  many  of   the  early  contributions  to  corporate   finance  theory  came  from  
practitioners   (like   the   financial   consultant   Jack   Treynor)   or   researchers   at   the  
intersection   of   academia   and   practical   finance   (such   as   Fischer   Black   and   Myron  
Scholes)  has  most  likely  contributed  to  this  focus  (Mehrling,  2005).  
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Table 2.2. Summary of theoretical micro perspectives on finance, mainstream 
economics 
 
2.2. Heterodox approaches to corporate financial operations 
This   section   provides   an   overview   of   the   most   important   and   relevant  
theoretical  ideas  on  financial  operations  carried  out  by  non-­‐‑financial  firms,  and  
their   purpose   and   importance,   coming   from   heterodox   economic   thinkers.  
Among   heterodox   economists,   the   works   of   Karl   Marx   and   John   Maynard  
Keynes  are  typically  seen  as  two  sources  of  lasting  influence.  Hence,  the  ideas  
of   these   two   thinkers   serve   as   organising   principle   for   this   section.   Finally,   a  
third  part  (2.2.3.),  deals  with  financial  operations  by  non-­‐‑financial  businesses  in  
the   financialisation   debate.   The   latter   body   of   literature   represents   the   most  
recent   research   on   the   changing   nature   of   the   modern   financial   system   and,  
typically,   combines   influences   of   both  Marx   and  Keynes.   The   classification   of  
ideas   and   authors   along   these   lines   are,   of   course,   merely   a   heuristic  
organisational  device.  
Thus,  part  2.2.1.  groups  Marx’s  ideas  and  those  by  authors  writing  in  a  German-­‐‑
language   tradition   together   for   a   review.   Marx’s   ideas   shaped   much   of  
continental   European   (and   particularly   German-­‐‑language)   economic   theory  
subsequently.  With  respect   to  the  specific   issue  of   financial  operations  of  non-­‐‑
financial  firms,  the  works  of  Rudolf  Hilferding  who  developed  Marx’s  thought  
on   finance   (Argitis,   Evans,   Michell,   &   Toporowski,   2014),   were   especially  
influential.  The  works  of  Veblen,  who  is  typically  seen  as  the  founding  father  of  
old  US  American  institutionalist  thought  is  also  subsumed  under  this  heading.    
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Subsequently,   Keynes’s   and   post-­‐‑Keynesian   ideas   on   financial   operations   of  
non-­‐‑financial  business   is  reviewed  (in  part  2.2.2.).  Here   the  heuristic  nature  of  
the   proposed   classification   of   economic   thought   becomes   apparent.   Kalecki’s  
ideas   should   be  more   adequately   considered   as   distinct   from   post-­‐‑Keynesian  
thought  (see  Lavoie,  2015).  Nevertheless,  many  of  Kalecki’s  ideas  are  commonly  
seen  as  part  of  the  post-­‐‑Keynesian  school.  To  do  Kalecki’s  thought  justice,  and  
rectify  this  fuzziness  in  classifications,  his  research  is  considered  at  some  length.  
Since   Kalecki’s   writing   on   finance   is   limited,   the   principles   of   his   analysis   is  
supplemented  by  ideas  put  forward  in  the  Kaleckian  tradition,  most  notably  by  
Josef   Steindl   and   Jan   Toporowski.   Hyman   Minsky’s   work,   whose  
understanding  of  the  non-­‐‑financial  firm  as  a  balance  sheet  will  be  central  for  the  
analysis  in  chapters  3  and  4,  is  also  close  to  this  tradition.  
Finally,   part   2.2.3.   reviews   financialisation   approaches   that   can   theoretically  
enlighten  the  understanding  of  non-­‐‑financial  business’  financial  operations.  The  
thesis   deliberately   refers   to   financialisation   ‘approaches’,   since   there   are  
substantial  variations  and  contradictions  within  this  body  of  literature,  making  
it   a   collection   of   different   theoretical   ‘approaches’  mostly   in   the  Marxist   and  
post-­‐‑Keynesian   traditions,   rather   than   a   unified   theory.   These   differences  
become   particularly   visible   with   respect   to   the   non-­‐‑financial   firm   and   its  
financial  dealings.                    
2.2.1. Marx and the German-language economic tradition  
Karl   Marx   and   Friedrich   Engels   presented   one   of   the   first   accounts   of  
production   by   the   industrial   firm   in   a   capitalist   economy.   Volume   I   of  Das  
Kapital   focused   on   many   of   the   processes   within   the   firm   (such   as   the  
production  of  commodities,  the  creation  of  surplus  labour,  the  determination  of  
length  of  the  work  day  and  workers’  wage),  while  the  subsequent  two  volumes  
set   out   the  macroeconomic   system   (including   the   financial   system,   in   volume  
III),   in   which   the   capitalist   non-­‐‑financial   firm   operates   (Marx   &   Engels,  
2012[1885],  Marx  &  Engels,  1996[1894])..    
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It   is   worthwhile   to   present   Marx’s   economic   ideas   in   somewhat   more   detail  
than  would  be  strictly  necessary   to  clarify  his  understanding  of  cash  holdings  
within   the   non-­‐‑financial   firm,   as   especially   his   schemes   of   reproduction  
influenced   heterodox   economists   well   beyond   the   Marxist   tradition.   Marx’s  
understanding   of   the   economic   system   as   a   circular   and   continuous   flow   of  
money  and  commodities,  that  is  the  circuit  of  capital,  reappears  in  the  thinking  
of  Keynes  (1936)  and,  most  importantly  for  this  thesis,  in  that  of  Kalecki  (1933).  
It  is  in  volume  II  of  Das  Kapital  where  the  capitalist  –  who  owns  and  therefore  
represents  the  firm  –  is  described  operating  in  the  sphere  of  production  as  well  
as   the   sphere   of   circulation,   characterised   by   continuous   circular  money   and  













In  production,   inputs  (C)  –  that   is   labour  (L)  and  means  of  production  (MP)  –  
have   to   be   combined   to   produce   a   commodity   (C’),   which   then   passes   into  








Figure 2.1. The circuit of capital (Fine & Saad-Filho, 2004, p. 55) 
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money  (M)  that  cover  his  costs  and  realise  surplus  (s),  in  other  word  his  (or  her)  
profit.   The   capitalist   either   consumes   or   reinvests   his   profit   (s)   subsequently,  
which  closes  the  circuit  of  money  and  commodity  flows.  The  described  order  is  
by  no  means  imperative.  
Since   this   movement   of   capital   is   a   true   and   continuous   circle   there   is   no  
beginning   and   no   end.   All   productive   capitalists   face   these   considerations  
continuously   and   in   a   non-­‐‑coordinated   manner,   making   them   a   social   class  
rather   than   independent   individuals   or   representative   agents   as   assumed   in  
mainstream   economics.   If   all   capitalists   consume   their   entire   surplus   the  
economic   and   social   relations   merely   reproduce   themselves   in   simple  
reproduction  –  this  is  somewhat  similar,  even  though  not  in  Marx’s  intention10  
(Fine   &   Saad-­‐‑Filho,   2004),   to   the   neoclassical   steady   state   where   only  
replacement  investment  is  undertaken.  If  capitalists,  however,  reinvest  some  or  
all  of  their  profits  the  economy  grows  under  expanded  reproduction.      
In   this   setting,   Marx   described   non-­‐‑financial   companies’   cash   holdings   as  
‘money   hoards’   (Marx   &   Engels,   2012[1885],   p.   47,   p.   299;   Marx   &   Engels,  
1996[1894],  pp.  210-­‐‑212),  ‘reserve  fund’  (Marx  &  Engels,  2012[1885],  p.  48;  Marx  
&  Engels,  1996[1894],  pp.  211-­‐‑212)  or  ‘sinking  fund’  (Marx  &  Engels,  2012[1885],  
p.   69;   Marx   &   Engels,   1996[1894],   pp.   258-­‐‑9).   Hoarding   can   occur   in   both  
spheres  and  results  from  the  circumstance  that  it  is  more  important  to  sell  than  
to  buy  (Marx  &  Engels,  2012[1885],  p.  74),   implying  that  buying   is  easier   than  
selling.  Arguably,   there   is   a   nucleus   of   the   concept   of   liquidity   preference   in  
Marx’s  writings  (Lapavitsas,  2000).      
For   Marx,   hoards   were   both   a   sign   of   economic   stagnation   and   a   necessary  
corollary  of  capitalist  production.  If  the  above-­‐‑described  circuit  of  capital  breaks  
down  at  any  point  a  crisis  emerges  with  money  hoards  and  unsold  commodity  
stocks  as   symptoms   (Marx  &  Engels,   1996[1894],  p.   29).  Money   then  does  not  
                                                                                                 
10  Marx’s  approach  was  dynamic  and  he  would  have,  therefore,  objected  to  equilibrium  
analysis.  
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flow  (back)  into  production,  because  of  the  higher  liquidity  of  money  capital  in  
comparison   to   commodity   capital   since   buying   is   easier   than   selling.   Thus  
money  hoards  in  the  sphere  of  circulation  can  be  a  sign  of  crisis.    
On   the   contrary,   hoarding   is   necessary   for   a   smooth   production   process   –   at  
least   in   the   absence   of   external   funding.   There   are   several   reasons   for   the  
capitalist   –   or   the   non-­‐‑financial   firms   –   to   hoard   cash.   When   setting   up   an  
enterprise  start-­‐‑up  funds  are  necessary.  Capitalists  must  advance  the  money  for  
labour  and  means  of  production  at  the  beginning  of  a  business  venture.  Hence,  
they  have  to  pay  wages  and  purchase  machinery  before  making  any  profit  from  
business   operations.   If   the   economic   activity   undertaken   is   very   capital  
intensive  the  necessary  money  hoard  might  be  a  very  large  one.    
However,  over  time  this  reason  to  hold  cash  should  gradually  dissipate  as  the  
firm   is   able   to   establish   itself.   This   follows   from   Marx’s   exposition,   which  
stresses   the   unity   and   continuity   of   capital   in   the   production   and   circulation  
process  (Marx  &  Engels,  1996[1894],  p.  58).  Capital   flows  through  all  stages  of  
production   and   circulation   concurrently.  Hence,   once   the   circuit   is   closed   the  
company   does   not   have   to   wait   for   its   entire   invested   capital   to   progress  
linearly   through   every   stage   of   production   and   circulation,   only   receiving  
revenue  when   the   circuit   is   completed   ‘at   a   stroke’   (Lapavitsas,   2000,   p.   226).  
Firms’   cash   flow   is   typically   a  more   or   less   continuous   stream   rather   than   a  
regularly  erupting  gush.    
Importantly,   Marx   stressed   that   hoards   would   have   to   be   accumulated   over  
time,   as   latent  money   capital   in   sinking   funds,   to   enable   the   renewal   of   large  
constant   capital   such   as   expensive   specialised   machines.   The   sinking   fund,  
which   is   internal   to   the   firm,   functions  as   saving   for   future   investing  activity.  
Especially   capital-­‐‑intensive   companies   will   have   to   accumulate   capital  
gradually  to  be  able  to  undertake  investments  in  expensive  machinery,  which  –  
it   is   implied   –   would   have   to   be   paid   as   a   lump   sum   (Marx   &   Engels,  
1996[1894],  p.  44,  p.  69,  p.  107).   In   this  sense,  money  hoards  are   indispensable  
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for   the   production   process   and   particularly   for   expanded   reproduction   in  
Marx’s  schemes  of  reproduction.    
This   illustrates   that   the   financial   institutions   present   at   his   times   did   not  
provide  long-­‐‑term  credit  to  non-­‐‑financial  firms  (or  industrial  capitalists).  In  fact,  
funding,  that  is  the  granting  of  long-­‐‑term  credit  from  banks  or  capital  markets  
particularly  to  manufacturing  companies,  only  emerged  during  the  second  half  
of  the  19th  century  in  continental  Europe.  This  important  innovation  in  financial  
institutions  will  be  discussed  in  detail  in  chapter  6.    
Interestingly,   in   Marx’s   exposition   industrial   capitalists   –   and   therefore   non-­‐‑
financial   firms   –   are   exclusively   investing   in   productive   activities.   It   is   other  
classes  –  such  as  monied  capitalists  –  that  engage  in  financial  investment.  This  
implicit   assumption   is   shared   by   orthodox   economists   as   described   in   the  
previous   section.  The   important  difference   is,   of   course,   that  Marx  developed  
his   thought   more   than   one   hundred   years   ago   while,   since,   mainstream  
modern-­‐‑day  economists  do  not  seem  to  have  transcended  it.    
Admittedly,  Marx  hinted  at  the  possibility  of  financial  profits  generated  by  non-­‐‑
financial  firms  or  –  in  his  terms  –  industrial  capitalists.  Discussing  the  Circuit  of  
Productive  Capital  in  volume  II  (Marx  &  Engels,  1996[1894],  p.  36),  he  elaborated  
on   the   accumulation   of  money   hoards   during   the   process.  He   acknowledged  
that  in  reality  latent  money  capital  did  not  have  to  exist  as  actual  money  hoard  
but  could  take  varying  forms:  
‘It  may  also  exist  in  the  form  of  a  mere  outstanding  money,  of  claims  on  debtors  
by   capitalists   […].  As   for   other   forms   in  which   this   latent  money-­‐‑capital  may  
exist   in   the   meantime   even   in   the   shape   of   money-­‐‑breeding   money,   such   as  
interest-­‐‑bearing  bank  deposits,  bills  of  exchange  or  securities  of  any  description‘  
(Marx  &  Engels,  1996[1894],  p.  48).  
Hence,  without   elaborating   on   it  Marx   introduced   the   possibility   that  money  
originating   in   the   industrial   circuit   could   perform   ‘special   capital-­‐‑functions  
outside  of  this  circuit’   (Marx  &  Engels,  1996[1894],  p.  48).  Generating  financial  
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profits   from   liquid   assets   such   as   cash   and   cash   equivalents  might   be   such   a  
function  outside  of  the  industrial  circuit.  
David   Harvey   (2013)   argues   that   reading   Marx’s   exposition   of   the   circuit   of  
capital   (in   volume   II)   in   conjunction   with   volume   III   of   Das   Kapital   would  
suggest   that   in   an   economy  which   possesses   a   sophisticated   and   functioning  
credit   system   these  money  hoards  would  be  superfluous  and   in   fact  merely  a  
symptom  of  crisis.  This  view  was  elaborated  by  Rudolf  Hilferding  (1947[1910]).    
According  to  Hilferding,  money  hoards  within  companies  should  decrease  with  
the   emergence   of   a   sophisticated   financial   system.   Hilferding   believed   that  
hoards  could  be  mobilised  by  capital  markets  and  banks,  that  would  transform  
this  idle  stock  of  money  into  productive  capital  faster  than  industrial  capitalists  
could   do   so   themselves.   Thus,   Hilferding   arguably   recognised   the   profound  
impact   the   development   of   capital   markets   and   long-­‐‑term   industrial   credit  
would  have  on  economic  activity  (Kowalik,  2012;  Argitis  et  al.,  2014).  
Hence,  joint  stock  companies  in  particular  would  benefit  from  this  mobilisation  
of   money   hoards   since   they   have   better   access   to   bank   credit   and   have   the  
possibility   to   emit   shares.   For   Hilferding   (1947[1910])   this   was   the   crucial  
characteristic  of   listed  companies  –   the  easy  access   to  external   funding,   that   is  
long-­‐‑term  credit  –  rather  than  the  separation  of  ownership  and  control.    
Importantly,   in  Germany  of  Hilferding’s   time   large  banks  provided   long-­‐‑term  
credit11  and   also   placed,   for   a   fee,   newly   issued   shares   for   listed   companies.  
According   to   Hilferding,   firms   would   become   dependent   on   bank   financing,  
over   time   increasing   their   debt   levels,   while   banks   would   increasingly   be  
involved   in   the   ownership   and   control   of   large   industrial   firms.   This  mutual  
interdependence  would  result  in  the  creation  of  so-­‐‑called  finance  capital.  Finance  
capital   is   capital   at   the   disposal   of,   and   controlled   by,   banks,   but   used   by  
industrialists:  
                                                                                                 
11  Although  potentially  to  a  lesser  extent  than  conventionally  believed  (see  Deeg,  2003).  
This  will  be  discussed  in  detail  in  chapter  6.    
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‘Finanzkapital,  Kapital   in  der  Verfügung  der  Banken  und   in  der  Verwendung  
der  Industriellen’12  (Hilferding,  1947[1910],  p.  306).  
Following   Marx,   Hilferding   assumes   that   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   only  
engage  in  productive  investment.  In  his  view,  share  capital  has  no  effect  on  the  
circuit   of   industrial   capital,   once   it   has   been   emitted.   There   is   an   implicit  
presumption  in  Hilferding’s  thinking  that  as  economic  structures  develop,  they  
become  more  efficient  and  rational.  The  joint  stock  company  –  for  Hilferding  –  
had   the   potential   to   overcome   the   limitations   of   personal   property,   leaving  
individual   capitalists’   interest   behind   and   concentrating   on   technical   and  
economic  exigencies  of  the  production  process  (Hilferding,  1947[1910]).    
Similarly,   financial   speculation   in   the   stock   market   would   become   less  
important   as   shares   were   mostly   bought   by   banks   which,   given   their   close  
interrelation   with   industry,   would   have   good   knowledge   about   listed  
companies,   reducing   stock  purchases  out   of   speculation   in   future   firm  profits  
and  dividends;  for  Hilferding,  the  main  motivation  behind  financial  speculation  
(Hilferding,  1947[1910]).    
This   attitude   appears   reminiscent   of   his   German   contemporary   Max   Weber.  
Weber   (2012)   understood   capitalism   as   an   economic   system   that   favours   the  
rational   pursuit   of   economic   gains,   implying   that   institutions   become  
increasingly   rational   and   efficient   as   they   develop.   Consequently,   Weber  
argued   that   financial   speculation   and   arbitrage   have   a   stabilising   effect   since  
they  equalise  price  differences   (Weber  &  Borchardt,  1999),  which   interestingly  
resonated  later  in  the  no  arbitrage  assumption  of  general  equilibrium  analysis.  
Notably,   these  presumptions  were  in  stark  contrast   to  Marx’s  own  assessment  
of  joint-­‐‑stock  companies  and  stock  exchanges.  The  separation  of  ownership  and  
control   heralded   for  Marx   ‘the   abolition   of   the   capitalist  mode   of   production  
within   the  capitalist  mode  of  production   itself’   (Marx  &  Engels,  1996[1894],  p.  
569)  since  the  productive  capitalist  is  transformed  into  a  mere  manager.    
                                                                                                 
12  The  German  original  reads:  ‘Finance  capital,  capital  at  the  disposal  of  banks  and  used  
by  industrialists’.  
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This   transformation   ‘produces   a   new   financial   aristocracy,   a   new   kind   of  
parasite   in   the   guise   of   company   promoters,   speculators   and  merely   nominal  
directors;   an   entire   system   of   swindling   and   cheating   with   respect   to   the  
promotion   of   companies,   issues   of   shares   and   share   dealings.   It   is   private  
production   unchecked   by   private   ownership’   (Marx   &   Engels,   1996[1894],   p.  
569).            
Veblen   (1904)  also  disagreed  with   the  benevolent  perception  of   stock  markets  
and  financial  operations  of  firms  as  stabilising  to  the  economy  at  large.  For  him,  
the   separation   of   ownership   and   control   had   created   a   class   of   ‘captains   of  
finance’   (Veblen,   1921),  whose   interests  were  neither   aligned  with   society  nor  
with   the   industrial   firms   they  managed.   They   were  managers   of   large   listed  
industrial  firms  without  any  interest  in,  or  knowledge  of,  the  actual  production  
process.  Their  main  occupation  was  trading  company  shares  of  their  own,  but  
also   of   strategically   associated,   corporations   in   order   to   control   industrial  
sectors  with  the  ultimate  aim  of  pecuniary  gain:    
‘…  the   interest  of   the  managers,  and  of   the  owners  for   the  time  being,   is   to  so  
manage   the   enterprise   as   to   enable   them   to   buy   it   up   or   to   sell   out   as  
expeditiously  and  as  advantageously  as  may  be.  The  interest  of  the  community  
at   large  demands   industrial   efficiency  and  serviceability  of   the  product;  while  
the  business  interest  of  the  concern  as  such  demands  vendibility  of  the  product;  
and  the  interest  of  those  men  who  have  the  final  discretion  in  the  management  
of   these   corporate   enterprises   demands   vendibility   of   the   corporate   capital’  
(Veblen,  1904,  p.  50).  
Implicitly,  Veblen   in   fact  described   the  process  of  balance   sheet  management,  
the  buying  and  selling  of   financial  assets   rather   than  seeking   to  sell   corporate  
output   (Veblen,  1904).  He  stressed  the   interconnection  of  assets  and   liabilities,  
pointing   out   that   company   assets   can   be   used   as   collateral   to   credit-­‐‑finance  
further  financial  transactions  of  the  firm.  Crucially,  Veblen  stressed  that  credit  
raised   against   appreciating   company   assets   would   not   be   used   to   expand  
productive   capacity   but   utilised   for   dealings   in   corporate   capital,   that   is  
company   stock   (Veblen,   1904,   Toporowski,   2005).   Here   his   balance   sheet  
analysis   reveals   some   shortcomings.   If   companies   obtain  growing  volumes  of  
credit,  which   is  not  used  for  productive   investment,  where  does   that   liquidity  
end  up?    
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The  expanding  liability  side  must  logically  be  balanced  by  ever-­‐‑larger  liquidity  
on  the  asset  side  of  the  corporate  sectors’  balance  sheet  (Toporowski,  2005).  This  
systematic  consideration  is,  however,  missing  from  Veblen’s  exposition.  Finally,  
his   conclusions  were   similar   to   those   of   Hilferding.   The   ‘captains   of   finance’  
would   increasingly  use  bank  credit   to  back   their   financial   transactions,  which  
would   gradually   transform   them   into   ‘lieutenants   of   finance’   as   they   became  
progressively  more  dependent  on  banks  (Veblen,  1921).    
Thus,   coming   back   to   the   three   questions   about   (1)   the   role   of   financial  
operations  among  non-­‐‑financial  firms,  (2)  the  type  of  companies  considered  and  
(3)  the  explanation  for  rising  corporate  holdings  of  liquid  assets,  the  following  
answers  can  be  given  from  a  continental  European  perspective:  
(1)   In  Marx’s   own   and  Marxist   analysis   financial   operations   of   non-­‐‑financial  
businesses   mostly   support   their   productive   operations.   Here,   Veblen   was   an  
important  dissenter,   stressing   that   non-­‐‑financial   listed   companies   could  make  
substantial  financial  profits  through  trade  in  company  stock.  
(2)   While   Marx’s   work   explicitly   dealt   with   competing   capitals,   that   is,  
heterogeneous   firms,   Hilferding   who   chiefly   developed   Marx’s   thought   on  
finance   focused  on   the   listed   corporations.   Similarly,  Veblen   focused  on   large  
listed  companies  when  he  described  the  financial  transactions  of  the  lieutenants  
of  finance.    
(3)   In   the  Marxist   framework,  money   hoards   should   become   unnecessary   for  
the  purpose  of  production  finance  once  long-­‐‑term  capital  markets  are  in  place.  
Hence,  no  explicit  explanation  of  rising  corporate  liquidity  holdings  is  offered,  
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Table 2.3. Summary theoretical micro perspective on finance, Marx & the 
German-language tradition 
  
2.2.2. Keynes and post-Keynesian thought 
As   discussed   in   part   2.1.3.   above,   Keynes’s   influence   reaches   far   beyond  
heterodox   thought   into  mainstream  economics.  Dealing   specifically  with  non-­‐‑
financial   firms’   cash   holdings,   Keynes’s   liquidity   preference   theory   has   been  
adopted   by   mainstream   analysis.   But   Keynes   did   not   develop   his   liquidity  
preference   theory   with   the   non-­‐‑financial   firms   and   its   specific   financial  
transactions  in  mind.  The  theory  was  rather  a  macroeconomic  theory  of  interest  
rate  formation.    
In   The   General   Theory   (Keynes,   1936),   Keynes   identified   three   major   liquidity  
motives:   (1)   the   transaction   motive,   including   the   income   and   the   business  
motives,   (2)   the   precautionary   motive   and   (3)   the   speculative   motive.   These  
three  motives  can  be   interrogated  with  respect   to  the  question  about  secularly  
rising  liquidity  preferences  among  non-­‐‑financial  firms.    
(1) The  transaction  motive  simply  covers  business  expenditure  in  the  period  
‘between   the   time  of   incurring  business  costs  and   that  of   the  receipt  of  
the   sale-­‐‑proceeds’   (Keynes,   1936,   p.   195).   The   volume   held   under   this  
motive   might   increase   with   firm   size.   There   is,   however,   no   obvious  
reason   why   it   should   increase   as   share   of   firm   size   or   –   as   has   been  
observed  over  the  past  two  decades  or  so  –  gradually  over  time.    
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(2) The   precautionary  motive   provides   funds   for   unforeseen   expenditure,  
be   they   contingencies   or   investment   opportunities   (Keynes,   1936).  
Crucially,   Kalecki   pointed   out   that,   while   held   on   the   balance   sheet,  
these   precautionary   funds   were   also   a   source   of   cash   flow,  
supplementing   cash   flow   from   productive   operations   (Kalecki,  
1991[1954]).  
(3) Finally,  the  speculative  motive  –  being  the  most  complex  –  is  shaped  by  
financial   transactions   and   expectations   about   future   developments   in  
financial  indicators,  together  determining  the  interest  rate.    
Keynes’s   major   innovation   in   finance   theory   was   the   introduction   of   the  
speculative  motive  for   liquidity  (Bibow,  2005).   Interestingly,   this   is   the  motive  
that   is   rarely   studied   by   mainstream   economic   analysis.   In   Keynes’s   view,  
transaction   and   precautionary   demand   for   liquidity   mainly   depended   on  
income   levels,   while   it   was   the   speculative   motive   that   was   determined   by  
financial  variables  and  expectations.    
Caution  is  required  when  applying  Keynes’s  aggregate  view  to  the   individual  
firm.   For   example,   the   common   interpretation   amongst   corporate   finance  
economists   (see  section  2.1.3)   that  non-­‐‑financial   firms  hold   liquidity   for   future  
investment  appears  to  combine  a  specific  aspect  of  the  precautionary  motive  in  
Keynes’s   sense   with   his   finance   motive   (Keynes,   1937).   The   finance   motive  
refers   to   holding   liquid   assets,   raised   either   internally   or   externally,   in   the  
interregnum   between   investment   decision   and   its   execution.   The  motive  was  
introduced  by  Keynes   in  way  of   reply   to   the  critics  of  his   liquidity  preference  
theory.    
Keynes  was  accused  of  neglecting  the  fact  that  firms  would  require  funding  for  
future   investment   expenditure,   necessitating   ex-­‐‑ante   saving.   This   exact   idea  
appears   to   be   the   implicit   assumption   of   the   corporate   finance   theory  
interpretation   of   the   precautionary  motive.   Keynes   agreed   that   cash   balances  
might  increase  between  investment  decision  and  actual  expenditure.  However,  
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he  dismissed   the   argument   that   saving  would  have   to   precede   investment.   It  
seems   that   here   the   conflation   between   firm   level   and   aggregate   results   in   a  
fundamental  error.    
Dishoarding   or   credit   extension   on   the   aggregate   level   would   have   to   lead  
investment  according  to  Keynes  (Keynes,  1937).  However,  increased  aggregate  
saving   is   merely   a   consequence   of   investment   activity   rather   than   its  
precondition.   Consequently,   rising   aggregate   saving   tends   to   result   in   less  
investment  because  of   the  deficient  demand  it  creates.  Thus,   in  Keynes’s  view  
buoying  investment  activity  would  not  have  any  impact  on  aggregate  liquidity  
demand,  as   long  as   the   financial   institutions  managing   the  underlying  money  
flows,  the  so-­‐‑called  revolving  fund  of  finance13  (Cardim  de  Carvalho,  2002),  are  
functioning  speedily  and  without  disruptions:  
‘Completed   activity,  whether   the   proceeds   of   it   are   invested   or   consumed,   is  
self-­‐‑liquidating   and   makes   no   further   net   demand   on   the   supply   of   liquid  
resources’  (Keynes,  1937,  p.  668).  
In  fact,  a  lack  of  investment  activity  rather  than  its  anticipation  would  cause  a  
money  hoard  since   it  would   interrupt   the  circulation  of   this   fund.  With  rising  
investment   rates,   an   increase   of   liquid   funds   on   non-­‐‑financial   companies’  
balance   sheets   would   have   to   be   backed   by   credit   extension,   allowing   for  
hoarding   alongside   expanding   investment   (Cardim  de  Carvalho,   2002).   Thus,  
increased   liquid   holdings   could   be   a   side   product   of   rising   investment  
expenditure.   This,   however,  would   be   expected   to   be   a   cyclical   rather   than   a  
secular  phenomenon.    
A   contemporary   of   Keynes   whose   ideas   help   understand   the   financial  
transactions  of  non-­‐‑financial  business  is  Kalecki.  As  mentioned  in  the  previous  
section   (2.2.1.),   Kalecki’s   work   was   heavily   influenced   by   Marx’s   analysis.  
Therefore,   his   thought   could   legitimately   be   classified   under   the   German  
                                                                                                 
13  The  concept  of   the  revolving  fund  of  finance  is  reminiscent  of  Marx’s  idea  that   in  a  
closed   economy   without   government,   money   spent   in   the   economy   circulates   with  
capitalists’  expenditure  on   investment  and  consumption,   returning   to   them  as  profits  
(Toporowski,  2012).  
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economic   tradition   (see  Toporowski,  2012).  This  observation  will  be  discussed  
in  detail  from  a  macroeconomic  perspective  in  chapter  5.  As  to  the  dealings  of  
the   individual   firms,   Kalecki’s   ‘principle   of   increasing   risk’   is   key   (Kalecki,  
1937).  
According  to  Kalecki,  companies  could  hold  larger  volumes  of  liquid  assets  to  
reduce  their  gearing  ratio.  A  high  gearing  ratio  –  that  is,  liabilities  to  liquid  asset  
ratio  –  would  raise  a  company’s  riskiness.  The  risk  Kalecki  had  in  mind  was  not  
the   calculable   risk,  which  assigns   specific  probabilities   to  known  outcomes  as  
typically  done  in  mainstream  economics  model.  The  real  risk  faced  by  a  firm  is  
the  chance  of  loss  (Mott,  2012);  thus,  the  higher  the  share  of  debt  to  own  assets,  
the   larger   the   danger   that   exists   to   the   firm’s   wealth   position   in   the   case   of  
failure.   This  means   that   external   funding   becomes   increasingly   expensive   the  
more  indebted  a  firm  is.  This  is  Kalecki’s  ‘principle  of  increasing  risk’  (Kalecki,  
1937).  
Therefore,  in  Kalecki’s  framework,  firms  would  attempt  to  keep  their  leverage  
and   debt   levels   down.   The   possibility   of   investment   failure   means   that  
companies   do   not   possess   perfect   foresight,   introducing   uncertainty   (as  
opposed   to   risk)   in   Knight’s   and   Keynes’s   use   of   the   term   (Knight,   1921,  
Keynes,  1936).  Future  outcomes  are  truly  unknown,  meaning  that  there  are  no  
probabilities  that  can  be  attached  to  them.    
Consequently,  Kalecki  assumed  that  investment  expenditure  is  mostly  financed  
internally,   in   contrast   to   Keynes   and   much   of   the   post-­‐‑Keynesian   tradition  
(Toporowski,   2012).   Investment   spending   is   self-­‐‑financing   for   capitalists   (or  
companies)   in   aggregate,   as   long  as   expenditure  on   capital   formation   is  high.  
This   situation   is   famously   illustrated   in   the   saying:   ‘Capitalists   get  what   they  
spend  and  workers  spend  what  they  get’.    
Under   such   circumstances,   companies’   demand   for   liquid   assets   –   or   to   use  
Keynes’s   terminology,   their   liquidity  preference   (Keynes,  1936)  –   is  a  result  of  
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uncertainty   in   the   marketplace.   Non-­‐‑financial   firms   could   strive   to   generate  
financial  income  because  it  is  less  uncertain  than  income  from  production:  
‘Suppose,   for   instance,   that   an   entrepreneur   fails   to   make   any   return   on   his  
business.  Now,  if  only  a  part  of  his  capital  is  invested  in  business  and  a  part  is  
held   in   first-­‐‑rate   bonds,   he  will   still   derive   some  net   income   from  his   capital’  
(Kalecki,  1991[1954],  p.  278).  
Indirectly   Kalecki   pointed   out   size   differences   among   firms   because   of   the  
importance  of  size  for  firms’  access  to  credit  and  capital  markets.  Building  upon  
Kalecki’s   (1937)   ‘principle   of   increasing   risk’,   the   heterogeneity   of   companies  
was  further  examined  by  Josef  Steindl  (1945a,  1945b),  who  focused  on  differing  
competition  patterns  across  businesses.    
Steindl,   an   Austrian   economist   and   Kalecki’s   colleague,   elaborated   the  
interaction   between   competitive   and   oligopolistic   sectors   in   the   economy,  
arguing  that  it  leads  to  the  ‘maldistribution  of  profits’  (Steindl,  1976[1952]).  The  
‘maldistribution   of   profits’   refers   to   a   situation   in   which   profits   are   re-­‐‑
distributed   through   the   pricing  mechanism   from   relatively  more   competitive  
sectors   in   the   economy   to   sectors   that   are   dominated   by   oligopolies   or  
monopolies.  Patterns  of  competition  are   identified  according   to  pricing  power  
of  firms.    
More   competitive   firms  have   by  definition  negligible   power   to  determine   the  
price   of   their   products,   meaning   they   are   price   takers.   Oligopolistically  
operating  companies  are  price  makers,  having  influence  over  their  commodity’s  
price.   Kalecki   (1991[1954])   coined   this   pricing   power   ‘degree   of   monopoly’,  
which  is  exercised  by  a  firm  in  relation  to  competitors  and  clients,  but  also  vis-­‐‑
à-­‐‑vis  its  workers.    
Since   oligopolistic   firms   have   by   definition   stronger   pricing   power,   they   can  
keep  their  wage  expenses  relatively  low  while  preserving  a  large  profit  margin,  
that   is   large  net   income  as  share  of   revenue.  This  depresses  workers’  demand  
relative   to  a   situation  where  higher  wages  would  be  paid.  Relatively   lowered  
demand  impacts  most  strongly  on  competitive  companies  since  –  by  definition  
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–  they  do  not  possess  pricing  power  and  must  reduce  prices  to  meet  declining  
demand.   Oligopolistic   firms   do   not   need   to   reduce   prices   (or   not   as   much),  
meaning   their   profit   is   relatively   less   affected,   leading   to   re-­‐‑distribution   of  
profits  from  competitive  to  oligopolistic  businesses.  Thus,  capitalists  might  get  
what  they  spend  in  aggregate,  but  some  of  them  will  get  less  and  some  will  get  
more  than  they  spend.          
Financial   operations   in   the   capital  markets   exaggerate   this   ‘maldistribution  of  
profits’  since  according  to  Steindl  ‘not  only  is  the  rate  of  internal  accumulation  
greater   in   the   oligopolistic   sector,   but   the   absorption   of   new   funds   by   share  
issue   is   incomparably   more   easy   there   than   in   the   sector   of   competitive  
industries’  (Steindl,  1976[1952],  p.  155).    
Alfred  S.  Eichner  pursued  a  similar  research  agenda  to  Steindl,  when  studying  
the   ‘megacorp’   (Eichner,   2008[1976]).   The   ‘megacorp’   is   defined   as   a   large  
multi-­‐‑plant   operation,   in   which   ownership   and   control   are   separated   and  
which,   importantly,   is   a   member   of   at   least   one   oligopolistic   industry.   This  
oligopoly   position   implies   that   the   ‘megacorp’   can   set   prices   according   to   a  
mark-­‐‑up   rule,   facing,   consequently,   a   different   set   of   price   curves   than   a  
competitive   firm   would.   Hence,   Eichner’s   work   mainly   dealt   with   the   large  
listed  corporation.    
With  respect  to  financial  operations  of  non-­‐‑financial  corporates  he  believed  that  
external  finance  would  be  sought  to  fund  investment  only  in  as  much  internal  
funds   were   not   sufficient.   The   larger   the   megacorp’s   ability   to   impose   a  
substantial  mark-­‐‑up   on   its   produce,   the   larger   retained   profits.   If   equity  was  
raised,   the   megacorp’s   would   attempt   to   keep   dividend   payments,   which  
competed  with   investment   for  corporate  resources,   to  a  minimum,  preventing  
disgruntled  shareholders  from  a  takeover  bid  (Fung,  1992).    
In  post-­‐‑Keynesian  analysis,   the   financial   investor   is   a   rentier,  depressing  non-­‐‑
financial   firms’   profits   and   by   extension   capital   investment   expenditure   and  
macroeconomic  growth.  In  Keynes’s  (1936)  analysis  the  rentier  is  a  functionless  
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investor,  who  generates  financial  income  from  his  capital  ownership,  not  being  
actively  involved  in  production.  In  that  sense  shareholders  are  rentiers.  Kalecki  
(1991[1954])   coherently   described   the   adverse   impact   of   rentier   profits   on  
investment,  stressing  that  rentier  savings  that  do  not  return  to  companies  will  
depress  corporate  profits  and  therefore  investment  and  growth:  
‘Let   us   assume   that  when   total   gross   savings   are   equal   to   depreciation,   some  
outside  current  savings,  which  we  call  “rentiers’  savings”  are  in  existence.  Thus  
the   “internal”   savings  of   firms   (equal   to  depreciation  minus   rentiers’   savings)  
are  below  the  depreciation  level,  which  tends  to  depress  investment  below  that  
level   as   well.   This   introduces   a   negative   trend   in   the   system’   (Kalecki,  
1991[1954],  p.  335).    
Therefore,   according   to   (traditional) 14   post-­‐‑Keynesian   theory   non-­‐‑financial  
companies  will   ‘borrow   only   to   the   extent   that   they   have   been   accumulating  
their  own  means  to   finance   investment’   (Lavoie,  1992,  p.  109).   Inspired  by  the  
principle   of   increasing   risk   (Kalecki,   1937)   and   Hyman   Minsky’s   Financial  
Instability   Hypothesis   post-­‐‑Keynesian   analysis   views   external   finance   –   be   it  
debt  or  equity  –  with  scepticism.  
In  his  Financial  Instability  Hypothesis,  Minsky  argued  that  non-­‐‑financial  firms  
used   financial   operations   primarily   to   finance   their   investment   in   productive  
assets.  In  the  course  of  the  business  cycle,  when  debt  burdens  of  non-­‐‑financial  
companies   increase,  deteriorating   financial  positions,   this   investment  becomes  
increasingly  speculative.  Speculative  in  the  sense  that  increases  in  cash  flow  or  
asset   price   become   necessary   to   pay   off   financial   commitments   entered   to  
produce   the   productive   assets.   Chapter   5   will   show   that   South   African   non-­‐‑
financial  corporations  also  engage  in  speculation  in  real  assets.  
Most   importantly,   Minsky   was   one   of   the   first   economists   to   highlight   the  
importance  of  balance  sheet  analysis  in  economics:  
‘In  a  capitalist  economy,  one  way  every  economic  unit  can  be  characterized   is  
by  its  portfolio:  the  set  of  tangible  and  financial  assets  it  owns,  and  the  financial  
liabilities  on  which  it  owes’  (Minsky,  1975,  p.  70).  
                                                                                                 
14  Post-­‐‑Keynesian  analysis,  which  is  not  part  of  the  financialisation  literature.  
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Here,  assets  and  liabilities  are  critically  intertwined  rather  than  independent  of  
each   other,   as   is   often   assumed   in   mainstream   analysis,   where   portfolios   of  
assets   are   chosen   regardless   of   liabilities   held.   The   balance   sheet   (or   more  
commonly,   the   client’s   net   worth,   which   is   understood   as   a   proxy   for   the  
balance   sheet)   figures   prominently   in  modern   credit   cycle  models   and   in   so-­‐‑
called   third   generation   currency   crisis  models   (see   chapter   3,   part   3.1.2.   for   a  
detailed   discussion).   While   balance   sheet   analysis   is   invoked,   the   approach  
taken  tends  to  be  highly  reductionist,  collapsing  the  balance  sheet  to  net  worth,  
that  is,  the  difference  between  total  assets  and  total  liabilities.          
By   contrast,  Minsky   did   not   reduce   balance   sheets   to   agents’   net   worth.   His  
Financial  Instability  Hypothesis  combined  the  Keynesian  notion  of  uncertainty  
(as  opposed  to  risk)  with  Kalecki’s  profit-­‐‑investment  nexus15  and  Schumpeter’s  
views16  on  finance,  while  taking  inspiration  from  Fisher’s  debt  deflation  theory  
(Toporowski,   2008).   In   Minsky’s   analysis,   companies’   balance   sheets   were  
central   because   they   revealed   the   interconnectedness   between   non-­‐‑financial  
firms’  financial  operations  and  their  productive  investment.  Non-­‐‑financial  firms  
finance  real   investment   through  operations   in   the   financial  markets,  obtaining  
funds   (or   cash   flow)   today,  while   creating   commitments   for   future   payments  
(liabilities).   These   funds   are   in   turn   reinvested   in   productive   capacity   –  
according   to   Minsky   –   creating   potential   future   receipts   (assets).   During  
economic  upswings  companies  would  build  up  debt,  triggering  recession  once  
corporate  cash  flow  could  not  service  this  debt  any  more  (Minsky,  1986).    
Importantly,  the  balance  sheet  becomes  a  link  between  the  past,  the  present  and  
the  future.  It  reflects  past  assets  purchased,  current  operations  and  cash  flow,  as  
well   as   payment   commitments   falling   due   in   the   near   and   distant   future  
                                                                                                 
15  Kalecki   understood   capitalists’   profits   as   reflux   of   their   investment   expenditure,  
which   is   similar   to   Keynes’s   concept   of   the   revolving   fund   of   finance   discussed   in  
chapter  1  above.  
16  In   Schumpeter’s   view,   finance   was   the   engine   behind   investment   –   and   business  
cycles   –   since   credit   allowed   entrepreneurs   to   introduce   new   technologies,   reaping  
supernormal  profits  (Schumpeter,  1983[1934]).  
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(through   current   and   long-­‐‑term  debt).   Thus,   balance   sheet   analysis   cannot   be  
undertaken  without  acknowledging  historical  time.  
Minsky’s   inspiration   was   Irving   Fisher’s   debt   deflation   theory   (Fisher,   1933),  
which   interpreted   the  Great  Depression   as   a   vicious   cycle   of   overly   indebted  
firms  attempting  to  pay  off  their  debt  and  while  doing  so  merely  increased  their  
own  debt   in   real   terms.   In   Fisher’s   theory,   a  mad   rush   to   liquidate   corporate  
assets   in   order   to  meet   debt   payments   lowers   prices   for  machinery,   reducing  
firms’   cash   flow   –   together  with   the   price   level   –   and  making   it   increasingly  
impossible   to   pay   off   debt   with   the   cash   coming   in.   Thus,   Fisher   had   the  
balance   sheet   and   also   non-­‐‑financial   firms’   cash   flow   (thus,   their   cash   flow  
statement)  in  his  mind’s  eye  when  formulating  his  debt  deflation  theory.  
Writing   in   the   Kaleckian   tradition,   Jan   Toporowski   (1993)   has   argued   that  
applying   the   liquidity   preference   to   corporate   balance   sheets   of   non-­‐‑financial  
firms   allows   us   to   understand   the   difference   between   entrepreneurial   and  
rentier   firms.   While   the   entrepreneurial   company   will   attempt   to   keep   its  
external   liabilities   –   debt   and   equity   –   to   a   minimum,   as   predicted   by   the  
principle  of  increasing  risk,  the  rentier  firm  is  overcapitalised,  counterbalancing  
this  burden  through  liquid  asset  holdings.  The  heightened  liquidity  preference  
of   rentier   firms   is   important   because   it   has   a   feedback   effect   onto   the   firm’s  
productive  operations,  since  real  and  financial  decisions  are  closely  intertwined  
on   the   corporate   balance   sheet.   Using   the   corporate   liquidity   preference,  
Toporowski  (1993)  argues  that  active  financial  operations  and  high  volumes  of  
debt   and   issued   equity   (in   contrast   to   retained   earnings),   characteristic   for  
rentier   firms,   can   reduce   corporate   investment   into   fixed   assets   in   favour   of  
liquid  asset  holdings.  This  happens  because  financial  investment  constitutes  an  
alternative  to  capital  investment  and  because  liquidity  has  to  be  increased  with  
rising  external  exposure  (that  is,  exposure  to  debt  plus  issued  equity),  tying  up  
internal   resources   as   liquid   holdings   in   order   to   keep   gearing   down,   which  
reduces  the  risk  of  insolvency  and,  at  the  extreme,  bankruptcy.  
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The  concept  of  overcapitalisation  (Toporowski,  2008a)  identifies  firms  that  hold  
substantial   liquid  assets  not   for  operating,   investing   in  or   financing   their   core  
business  activities,  meaning  production  or  service  provision  in  the  case  of  non-­‐‑
financial   firms,  but  rather  for  cash  management  and  financial   investment.  The  
main  motive   behind   their   holding  of   liquid   assets   is   the  desire   to   lower   their  
gearing,   that   is,   the   ratio   between   external   liabilities   (including   equity)   and  
liquid   assets.   This   is   important   since   the   valuation   of   assets   on   corporate  
balance  sheets  tends  to  fluctuate  strongly  over  the  course  of  the  business  cycle  
while   the   value   of   liabilities   remains   unchanged.   This   is   especially   visible   in  
companies’  goodwill,  as  already  pointed  out  by  Josef  Steindl  (1945b).    
Hence,  it  is  too  risky  for  listed  companies  to  finance  productive  investment  out  
of   external   funds   since   an   investment   failure   or   cycle-­‐‑induced   drop   in   asset  
values   could   push   a   company   into   technical   insolvency,   with   firm   liabilities  
exceeding   firm   assets   (Toporowski,   1993).   This   is   simply   a   balance-­‐‑sheet  
application  of  the  principle  of  increasing  risk.  Crucially,  the  rentier  firm  keeps  
its   gearing   down   through   amassing   liquid   assets,   rather   than   through  
abstaining  from  issuing  equity.          
The   concept   of   overcapitalisation   stresses   the   structural   interrelation   between  
assets   and   liabilities   on   the   corporate   balance   sheet.   In   that   sense   it   is   deeply  
influenced   by   Minsky’s   notion   of   firms   (and   economic   units,   in   general)   as  
balance  sheets.  These  structural  interrelations  can  arguably  account  for  some  of  
the   phenomena   observed   in   the   financialisation   literature.   Hence,   while  
individual,   group   and   class   interests   are   important   categories   of   analysis,   it  
should   not   be   forgotten   that   the   set-­‐‑up   of   the   balance   sheet   and   the   inherent  
nature  of  assets  and  liabilities  also  impact  companies’  financial  operations.    
The   three   questions   raised   in   the   introduction   (about   (1)   the   role   of   non-­‐‑
financial  transactions,  (2)  the  type  of  firm  considered  and  (3)  potential  reasons  
for   increase   liquid  asset  holdings  among  non-­‐‑financial   corporations),   can  now  
be  answered  in  summary:  
   72  
(1)   The   role   of   financial   operations   among   non-­‐‑financial   businesses   is  
interpreted   differently   by   Keynesian   and   post-­‐‑Keynesian   theory.   In   Keynes’s  
and  Minsky’s  (and  equally,  Eichner’s)  analyses  external  borrowing  is  crucial  for  
capital   formation.   Kalecki   highlighted   the   possibility   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms  
holding  on  to  safe  financial  assets  as  way  of  diversifying  their  income  sources.  
This   is   elaborated   upon   by   Toporowski,  who   put   forward   the   concept   of   the  
‘rentier   firm’.   Finally,   Steindl  pointed  out   that   financial   operations   (especially  
equity   issuance)  have   the  potential   to  exacerbate   the  maldistribution  of  profit,  
which  is  a  redistribution  of  profit  from  dynamic  competitive  non-­‐‑financial  firms  
towards  oligopolistic  non-­‐‑financial  businesses.    
(2)  The  Kaleckian  tradition,  specifically  with  the  work  of  Steindl,   is  one  of   the  
few  schools  of  thought  which  considers  the  heterogeneity  of  the  firm  as  central  
to   its   analysis.   Nevertheless,   much   post-­‐‑Keynesian   research   focuses   on   large  
listed  corporations,  the  so-­‐‑called  megacorps.  
(3)   In  Kalecki’s  view,  non-­‐‑financial   firms  would  attempt   to  hold   their  gearing  
ratio,   that   is,   the  share  of  borrowed  funds   to  own  liquid  assets,  down.  Hence,  
growing   liquid   asset   holdings  would  not   figure   in   this   framework.  However,  
the  rentier  firm  would  increase  its  financial  (and  liquid)  assets  volume  with  the  
aim  of  reducing  its  own  uncertain  profit  expectations  by  holding  a  diversified  
portfolio  of  financial  assets.    
Table 2.4. Summary theoretical micro perfective on finance, Keynes and the 
Kaleckians 
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2.2.3. The ‘financialised’ firm 
Financialisation   has   become   a   buzzword   well   beyond   the   academic   debate17  
since   the   term  was   coined   in   the   early   1990s.   There   are   competing   views   on  
where   the   term   originated:   in   Giovanni   Arrighi'ʹs   (1994)   The   Long   Twentieth  
Century 18   or   rather   with   Kevin   Phillip,   who   wrote   Boiling   Point   and  
subsequently   Arrogant   Capital,   which   devotes   a   key   chapter   to   ‘The  
Financialization  of  America’  (Foster,  2007).      
The   phenomenon   is   multifaceted,   explaining   why   the   established   working  
definition   sees   financialisation   broadly   as   ‘the   increasing   role   of   financial  
motives,   financial   markets,   financial   actors   and   financial   institutions   in   the  
operations   of   the   domestic   and   international   economies’   (Epstein,   2005,   p.   3).  
Thus,  while  there  is  broad  consensus  on  the  general  meaning  of  financialisation,  
there   are   diverging   views   on   how   it   has   influenced   non-­‐‑financial   businesses  
and  particularly  their  financial  operations.19  
Initial   impulses   for   the   financialisation   debate   can   be   found   in   the   structural  
economic  shifts  underway  in  OECD  countries  since  the  1970s.  These  include  the  
deregulation   of   financial  markets,   a  wave   of   financial   innovation,   changes   in  
corporate   governance,   and   increases   in   household   debt.   Macroeconomically,  
over   the   same  period  a   secular  decline   in   investment   rates  and  an   increase   in  
income  inequality  and  in  financial  instability  have  occurred.  
Some  of  the  earliest  work  on  financialisation  in  economics  was  undertaken  by  
the  French  Régulation  School  (see,  for  instance,  Chesnais,  1996).  According  to  the  
                                                                                                 
17  Even   the   business   journal   Forbes   has   lately   warned   of   financialisation   ‘running  
amok’  (Denning,  2014).  
18  Arrighi,  building  on  Braudel,  argued   that   financialisation  was   the   final   stage   in   the  
development   of   a   hegemonic   power   and   coincided   with   its   decline.   This   is   rather  
similar  to  Proudhon’s  understanding  of  the  role  of  finance  in  a  country’s  development.    
19  In  fact,  the  broad  consensus  is  so  broad  that  there  is  hardly  a  defined  meaning  of  the  
term  ‘financialisation’  (see  Seccareccia,  2013).  
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régulationnistes,   in   the  1970s  profound  changes   in  major  advanced  economies20  
(including  deregulation  and  information  technological  progress)  weakened  the  
Fordist  accumulation  regime,  which  had  thrived  during  the  post-­‐‑World  War  II  
boom,   encouraging   the   emergence   of   a   finance-­‐‑led   growth   regime   (Aglietta,  
1999;   Boyer,   2000).   Fordism  was   based   on   the  mass   production   of   consumer  
goods   and   durables,   supported   by   steady   growth   in   productivity   and  wages  
combined  with  a  labour  market  situation  close  to  full  employment.      
Within   the   Régulation   School,   Claude   Serfati’s   contributions   are   of   particular  
interest   to   this   thesis   (Serfati,   1996).   Serfati   analyses   the   changing   nature   of  
transnational   corporations   and   their   operations   (Serfati,   2008).  He  argues   that  
the  rise  of  transnational  companies  signifies  the  development  of  a  new  type  of  
capital.   Both,   the   Marxist   and   the   post-­‐‑Keynesian   approach   to   non-­‐‑financial  
companies   under   financialisation,   stress   the   conflicting   interests   between  
finance   and   industry.  While   Marxists   tend   to   see   financial   investment   as   an  
escape  for  productive  capital,  post-­‐‑Keynesians  interpret  finance  as  undermining  
productive  investment  (Lapavitsas,  2013).    
In   contrast,   Serfati   (2008)  –  writing   in   the  Marxist   tradition  –  understands   the  
increased   financial   activity   of   transnational   corporation   as   complementary   to  
rather   than   conflicting  with   their   productive   operations,   giving   rise   to   a   new  
type   of   ‘finance   capital’.   However,   Serfati’s   concept   is   the   inversion   of  
Hilferding’s   ‘finance  capital’  since   it  stresses   the  control  of  non-­‐‑financial   firms  
over   financial   resources.   With   this   understanding   of   large   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations,   an   increase   in   their   liquid  asset  holdings  would  be   the   result   of  
their  striving  for  larger  financial  power.      
Parallel   to   the  Régulation  School,  when  somewhat   later,  a  critical  management  
and  organisations   research   stream  emerged   (see  Lazonick  &  O’Sullivan,   2000;  
                                                                                                 
20  The  Régulation   School  has  mostly  been  careful   to   stress   the  particularity  of  national  
trajectories  –  especially  with  respect  to  labour  market  institutions,  the  rapport  salarial  –  
guarding  itself  against  over-­‐‑generalisation  (Grahl  &  Teague,  2000).  
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Froud,   Haslam,   Johal,   &   Williams,   2000),   highlighting   the   negative  
consequences   of   a   changing   corporate   governance   structure.   The   corporate  
finance   literature   hailed   the  mergers   and   acquisitions   boom  of   the   1980s   as   a  
victory   for   shareholders.   An   active  market   for   corporate   control,   induced   by  
frequent  takeovers  of  listed  companies,  was  believed  to  reduce  inefficiency  and  
managers’  waste  when  running  corporations.  Managers  were  now  forced  to  use  
firm   resources   ‘to   their   highest-­‐‑valued   use’   (Jensen,   1998,   p.   352,   as   cited   in  
Froud  et   al.,   2000).  This  apparently   solved,  or  at   least  greatly  attenuated,      the  
principle-­‐‑agent   problem   created   through   the   separation   of   ownership   and  
control  in  listed  companies,  as  discussed  in  part  2.1.2.  above.    
The   increased   importance   of   so-­‐‑called   ‘shareholder   value’   was,   however,  
hurting   corporate   long-­‐‑term   investment   expenditure   according   to   William  
Lazonick   and   Mary   O’Sullivan   (2000).   The   rise   of   shareholder   orientation  
among  non-­‐‑financial   corporations  was  arguably   the   result  of   the  deregulation  
of  financial  markets  and  financial  innovation.  
Particularly   in   the   US   and   UK,   the   phenomenon   of   stagflation   –   economic  
stagnation   coupled  with   high   inflation   levels   –   put   financial   institutions   that  
depended  on  low  but  stable  returns  from  financial  transactions  such  as  banks,  
savings   and   loan  associations,   insurance   companies   and  pension   funds  under  
pressure  to  generate  positive  returns  for  their  clients.  Seeking  to  support  these  
struggling   financial   institutions,   the   response   from   regulatory   authorities  was  
to  deregulate  and  enable  them  to  invest  substantially  in  equity  and  other  risky,  
but  more  profitable,  financial  securities,  such  as  junk  bonds,  i.e.  securities  rated  
below   investment   grade.   There   was   a   shift   in   the   main   income   source   of  
financial   firms  –  at   least   in   the  US  –  from  supporting   long-­‐‑term  investment   to  
trading  securities  (Lazonick  &  O’Sullivan,  2000).    
In  consequence,  firm  managers  were  forced  to  generate  shareholder  value,  that  
is,  to  maximise  the  shareholders’  dividend  receipts  and  capital  gains.  According  
to  Lazonick  and  O’Sullivan   (2000),   this  constituted  a  profound   transformation  
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in   the   investment   strategy   of   US   listed   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   from   a  
strategy  of  retain  and  reinvest  to  downsize  and  distribute.  Instead  of  investing  
and   hiring   with   a   long-­‐‑term   planning   horizon,   managers   now   focused   on  
maximising   their   companies’   equity   price   through   corporate   and   financial  
restructuring,   resulting   in   employee   lay-­‐‑offs   and   more   active   balance   sheet  
management,  for  example  with  the  help  of  share  buybacks.  
The   secular  growth   in   liquid  assets  on   listed  companies’  balance   sheets   is  not  
easily  compatible  with  the  increased  power  of  shareholders,  since,  according  to  
both   the   aforementioned   managerial   theories   of   the   firm   and   the   concept   of  
shareholder   value,   they  would   try   to   appropriate   these   resources.  Hence,   the  
shareholder   value   argument   does   not   sufficiently   enlighten   the   preference   of  
non-­‐‑financial  corporations  to  hold  liquid  assets  despite  conflicting  shareholder  
interests.    
More  important  for  this  thesis  is  the  financialisation  literature,  which  deals  with  
the   increase   in   financial   activity   among   non-­‐‑financial   companies   (Duménil   &  
Lévy,   2004,   Stockhammer,   2004,   Krippner,   2005,   Orhangazi,   2008,   Lapavitsas,  
2013).   Typically,   at   least   one   of   the   two   following   claims   are  made   about   the  
effects   of   financialisation   on  non-­‐‑financial   firms’   operations:   (1)  Non-­‐‑financial  
companies  are  forced  to  pay  out  large  and  increasing  shares  of  their  profits  to  
financial   rentiers,   including   shareholders   according   to   the   shareholder   value  
story  outlined  above;  and/or  (2)  non-­‐‑financial  businesses  increasingly  generate  
profit   from   financial   investment,   which   tend   to   be   short-­‐‑term   in   nature,   as  
opposed   to   long-­‐‑term   capital   investment.   Both   statements   are   put   forward   as  
explanations  for  declining  levels  of  fixed  capital  spending  by  the  non-­‐‑financial  
corporate  sector.  
However,  if  both  statements  are  true  (as,  for  example,  is  claimed  by  Orhangazi,  
2008)  and  non-­‐‑financial  firms  are  forced  to  pay  out  as  much  profit  in  dividends  
as   they   receive   in   financial   profits,   it   is   not   clear   why   corporate   capital  
investment  should  be  depressed.  With  respect  to  the  rentier  firm  (discussed  in  
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the   previous   section),   Toporowski   argues   that   if   all   equity   was   held   among  
listed  corporations  it  would  simply  redistribute  profit  among  them.  This  could  
smoothen  sectoral  profit  fluctuations  if  corporations  hold  a  diversified  portfolio  
of  equity  (Toporowski,  1993).    
Proponents   of   both   arguments   believe   that   non-­‐‑financial   firms   increased  
financial   transactions  have  adverse  effects  on  the  firms  themselves  and  on  the  
economy  at  large.  Economists  who  put  forward  the  first  argument  tend  to  write  
in   a   post-­‐‑Keynesian   tradition,   identifying   the   rentier   and   his   interests   as  
detrimental   to   production   and   productive   investment   (see,   for   instance,  
Stockhammer,   2004,   Orhangazi,   2008,   Duménil   &   Lévy,   2004).   Following  
Epstein’s  definition,  the  rentier  has  gained  increased  power  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  productive  
capital  due   to   financialisation.  Therefore,   the  non-­‐‑financial   corporation  suffers  
because   interest   and   dividend   payments   are   draining   its   retained   profits,  
limiting  their  possibility  to  invest.    
The  story  of  high  interest  payments  was,  of  course,  a  pertinent  one  for  the  major  
advanced   economies   during   the   1980s,   when   interest   rates   increased  
dramatically   during   the   Volcker   experiment.   They,   however,   came   down  
subsequently  as  inflation  decreased  over  the  1990s  within  the  OECD  world  and  
declined   to   very   low   levels   in   the   US   (commonly   assumed   to   be   the  
financialised   economy   par   excellence)   in   early   2000s.   Thus,   during   those   latter  
years   it   is   difficult   to   claim   that   non-­‐‑financial   firms   suffered   extraordinarily  
high   debt   servicing   cost.  More   fundamentally,   the   argument   depends   on   the  
assumption  that  non-­‐‑financial  companies  obtain  external  finance  to  undertake  a  
substantial  share  of  their  investment  and  are  typically  net  debtors.    
As  will   be   discussed   in  more   detail   in   chapter   6,   this   is   in   fact   not   the   case.  
Especially,   in   the  Anglo-­‐‑Saxon  economies   investment  expenditure   tends   to  be  
almost  entirely  funded  through  retained  profits  (see  Corbett  &  Jenkinson,  1996)  
and  this  trend  has  intensified  over  the  past  two  decades  (Lapavitsas,  2013),  the  
decades  during  which  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  allegedly  have  ‘financialised’.    
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Of   course,   it   could   be   countered   that   given   intensified   shareholder   value  
orientation   dividend   (rather   than   interest)   payments   have   increased   reducing  
corporations   re-­‐‑investable   resources.   This   view,   however,   assumes   that   non-­‐‑
financial   listed  corporations  do  not  hold  equity  themselves,  as  the  rentier  firm  
(Toporowski,  1993)  would.  Among  the  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  listed  on  the  
Dow   Jones   3021,   Karwowski   &   Shabani   (2013)   show   that   seven   out   of   26  
companies  hold  substantial  financial  assets.  Hence,  these  could  be  characterised  
as  rentier  firms.    
Andrew   Kliman   and   Shannon  Williams   (2012)   contest   the   idea   that   financial  
transactions   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms   in   the   US   undermine   capital   expenditure,  
arguing  that  financial  pay-­‐‑outs  –  that  is  mainly  dividends  and  interest  service  –  
are   financed   through   increased   borrowing.   The   general   fall   in   fixed   capital  
investment   is   in   fact   a   result   of   falling   company   profits   rather   than  
financialisation.   This   argument   is   in   line   with   the   second   statement   above,  
claiming   that   financial   investment   is   increasingly  undertaken  by  non-­‐‑financial  
firms   at   the   detriment   of   productive   investment,   has   been   put   forward   in   a  
Marxist   tradition.   Most   prominently   Greta   Kippner   (2005)   showed   that   non-­‐‑
financial   companies   in   the   US   increasingly   generate   income   from   financial  
investment.   The   share   of   portfolio   income,   that   is   financial   revenue,   in   total  
income   grew   fivefold   between   the   1950s   and   1980s.   By   2000,   non-­‐‑financial  
companies  in  the  US  generated  as  much  income  from  financial  transactions  as  
from  their  productive  operations.  According  to  Krippner,  this  was  a  clear  sign  
of  their  financialisation.      
The  Marxist  understanding  of  the  financialisation  of  the  non-­‐‑financial  firm  has  
to  be  seen  against  the  background  of  the  observed  fall  in  the  profit  rate  during  
the  post-­‐‑World  War   II   boom,   culminating   in   a  profitability   crisis   in   the   1970s  
                                                                                                 
21  The  Dow  Jones  30  index  was  first  published  in  1885.  It  contains  the  30  largest  listed  
US-­‐‑based   companies   have   traded   during   a   standard   trading   session.   Karwowski   &  
Shabani  (2013)  focused  on  the  26  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  traded  on  the  Dow  Jones  
30  during  2013.  
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(see,  for  instance,  Magdoff  &  Sweezy,  1987,  Arrighi,  1994,  Brenner,  2003).  Since  
profitability   of   production   decreased   with   the   end   of   the   Fordist   era  
(characterised   by   high   employment,   high   productivity   and   high   investment),  
productive  capital  had  to  look  for  alternative  sources  of  profit  (see,  for  instance,  
Husson,  2008).  
Financial   deregulation   –   which   was   in   the   interest   of   large   multinational  
corporations   that   needed   finance   across   borders   –   helped   to   overcome   the  
profitability   crisis,  while   empowering   finance   capital   and   coinciding  with   the  
emergence   of   a   ‘neoliberal’   ideology22  (Duménil   &   Lévy,   2004;   Fine,   2013).  
Subsequent  financial  innovation  provided  a  temporary  fix  for  capitalists’  profits  
while   exacerbating   systemic   contradictions   (Harvey,   2004)   –   such   as   falling  
wage   shares   in   the   face   of   rising   production   output   –   which   erupted  
intermittently,   culminating   in   the   global   financial   crisis   according   to   some  
authors  (see,  for  instance,  Panitch  &  Gindin,  2004).      
Some   authors   expect   the   financial   operations,   which   have   crept   into   non-­‐‑
financial  companies’  dealings,  to  be  of  a  speculative  nature.  This  suggestion  is  
often  made  with  regard  to  non-­‐‑financial  businesses  in  emerging  economies.  For  
instance,   Firat   Demir   (2007)   argues   that   financial   liberalisation   in   Argentina,  
Mexico   and   Turkey   has   induced   listed   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   in   these  
countries   to   turn   their   attention   towards   speculative   short-­‐‑term   investment   in  
financial   markets   at   the   cost   of   long-­‐‑term   capital   formation.  Maryse   Farhi   &  
Roberto   Borghi   (2009)   show   that   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   in   a   range   of  
emerging  markets  –  including  Brazil,  China,  South  Korea,  India,  and  Mexico  –  
have   suffered   substantial   losses   in   derivative   markets.   Thus,   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations  in  these  countries  appear  to  have  engaged  in  speculative  financial  
investment.  This  argument  has  also  been  made  for  South  Africa  (Marais,  2011,  
                                                                                                 
22  Duménil  &  Lévy  (2004)  interpret  neoliberalism  as  the  re-­‐‑emergence  of  the  hegemony  
of  finance  –  after  rules  regulating  financial  flows  under  Bretton  Woods  and  especially  
interest   rates   regulation  were   abandoned.  Generally,   neo-­‐‑liberalism   is   understood   as  
an  ideology  based  on  laissez-­‐‑faire  policies,  curtailing  government  intervention.    
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Ashman  &  Fine,  2013).  In  South  Africa  the  activity  of  the  large  company  groups  
–  including  first  and  foremost  Anglo  American  –  has  been  seen  as  major  driver  
of   financialisation.   These   company   groups   obtained   an   ever-­‐‑increasing  
dominance   over   the   South   African   economy   particularly   since   the   late   1970s  
(see  chapter  3).  With   the  re-­‐‑integration  of   the  South  African  economy  into   the  
global   financial   system   since   1994,   these   company  groups,   and   South  African  
corporations   in   general,   have   increasingly   become   involved   in   financial  
investment  at  the  expense  of  real  sector  investment  (Ashman  et  al.,  2013).  While  
not   empirically   demonstrated,   the   suspicion   emerged   that   much   of   this  
financial  investment  has  been  speculative.  Thus,  according  to  Ashman  and  Fine  
(2013,   p.   156)   financialisation   is   characterised   by   the   expansion   of   financial  
assets   relative   to   real   activity   and,   crucially,   ‘the   absolute   and   relative  
expansion  of  speculative  as  opposed  to  or  at  the  expense  of  real  investment’.      
Financial  liberalisation  plays  an  important  role  in  the  financialisation  processes  
taking  place  in  developing  and  emerging  economies,  since  it   is  the  integration  
into   global   markets   that   arguably   forces   domestic   non-­‐‑financial   firms   into  
financialised  investment  behaviour.  Correa,  Vidal,  &  Marshall  (2012)  argue  that  
the   regulatory   opening   of   trade   and   financial   markets   in   Mexico   has   forced  
large  local  companies  to  compete  with  global  multinationals.  Under  pressure  to  
keep   up   their   operations’   profitability   these   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   are  
pushed  towards  more  speculative  investment.      
Apart   from  engaging   in   speculative   financial  operations   themselves,  domestic  
non-­‐‑financial   companies   are   often   seen   as   passive   recipients   of   increased  
financial  flows,  at  the  mercy  of  speculative  activity  by  international  hedge  and  
private   equity   funds   (Chandrasekhar   &   Pal,   2006).   Financialisation   of   these  
firms   is   perceived   to   be   determined   from   outside,   caused   by   financial  
deregulation   and   capital   account   liberalisation.   The   results   have   not   been  
increased  investment  by,  and  facilitated  capital  market  access  for,  non-­‐‑financial  
firms   as   argued   by   vocal   mainstream   proponents   of   liberalisation   (especially  
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Levine,   2005),   but   rather   an   adverse   effect   on   companies’   financial   access  
(Rashid,  2013).      
Generally,  both  ideas,  namely  that  (1)  non-­‐‑financial   firms  need  to   increasingly  
yield   to   shareholder   demands   and   that   (2)   they   invest   more   and   more   into  
financial  assets,   coexist   in   the   financialisation   literature  and  are  often   invoked  
together   (see   Orhangazi,   2008).   However,   the   two   ideas   have   very   different  
implications   for   the   role   that   financial   transactions   play   in   non-­‐‑financial  
business   operations.   The   former   implies   that   non-­‐‑financial   business   is   at   the  
mercy   of   the   financial   investor,   while   the   latter   suggests   that   non-­‐‑financial  
companies  increasingly  become  financial  investors  themselves.    
Stockhammer  acknowledges  this  contradiction,  while  playing  it  down:  
‘While  there  is  broad  agreement  (in  heterodox  economics)  that  financial  motives  
and   actors   have   become   more   important   within   firms,   there   is   a   subtle  
difference  in  interpretation.  Firms  could  be  the  victims  of  institutional  investors,  
or  shareholder  value  orientation  could  be  a  strategy  of  increasing  exploitation’  
(Stockhammer,  2013,  p.  105).      
To  this  author  the  difference  in  interpretations  appear  rather  more  than  subtle,  
revealing   that,   despite   claims   to   the   contrary,   heterodox   economists’  
understanding  of   the  role  of   financial   transactions   in  non-­‐‑financial  businesses’  
operations  is  limited.  This  might  also  have  methodological  reasons.  Even  where  
firm-­‐‑level  data   is  employed  (such  as  by  Orhangazi,  2008)  underlying  business  
processes   often   remain   concealed,   since   firms   are   not   studied   in   qualitative  
detail  but  rather  treated  as  data  points  in  quantitative  exercises.  
To  come  back,  by  way  of  summary,  to  the  three  questions  (about  (1)  the  role  of  
financial   operations,   (2)   the  non-­‐‑financial   firms   in   the  analytical   focus  and   (3)  
the   potential   reason   for   increases   in   liquid   asset   holdings),   the   following  
answers  can  be  extracted  from  the  financialisation  literature:  
(1)   The   aim   of   financial   operations   of   non-­‐‑financial   businesses   has   moved  
increasingly  towards  income  and  profit  generation,  according  to  those  authors  
who  operate   in   a  Marxist   framework.  Writers   in   the  post-­‐‑Keynesian   tradition  
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assume   that   the   non-­‐‑financial   firm   is   a   net   debtor,   implying   that   financial  
transactions  are  (at  least  to  some  extent)  supporting  production.    
(2)  Similar  to  much  of  the  mainstream  literature,  the  analytical  focus  appears  to  
be   on   large   listed   corporations.   Some   firm   heterogeneity   is   introduced   in   the  
work  on  emerging  economies,   since  here   listed  domestic  corporations   interact  
with  large  multinational  companies.  The  small  and  medium-­‐‑size  firm  is  mostly  
absent,  however.    
(3)   The   increasing   presence   of   liquid   asset   holdings   on   non-­‐‑financial   firms’  
balance  sheet  is  not  easily  explained,  since  it  clashes  with  the  shareholder  value  
concept,  which  is  highly  influential  in  this  literature.  Shareholders  are  assumed  
to   push   for   dividend   pay-­‐‑outs,   which   eat   into   corporations’   re-­‐‑investable  
resources.   However,   if   non-­‐‑financial   business   is   understood   to   increasingly  
profit   from   financial,   potentially   speculative   investment,   higher   liquid   asset  
holdings  could  simply  be  a  result  of  this  new  investment  strategy.          
Table 2.5. Summary theoretical micro perspective on finance, financialisation 
approaches 
  
2.3. Summary and conclusion 
Corporate   finance   theory,   especially   in   its   early   general-­‐‑equilibrium   version,  
offers   little   guidance   on   non-­‐‑financial   companies’   financial   operations   and  
liquidity   holdings,   since   the   theory   is   more   interested   in   the   financial  
instruments   issued   by   large   corporations   than   in   non-­‐‑financial   businesses’  
financial   and   productive   dealings.   This   changes   somewhat   with   the  



















Marxist strand Replace%productive%operations Large%listed%
corporations
Financial%speculation
   83  
acknowledgement  of  asymmetric   information  and  other  market  frictions  (such  
as  transaction  costs  in  the  case  of  bankruptcy).    
The  empirical  literature  inspired  by  corporate  finance  is  extremely  eclectic  with  
regard  to  non-­‐‑financial  firms’  motives  to  hold  cash  and  cash  equivalents:  there  
is   the   tax   motive,   the   agency   motive   (both   inspired   by   corporate   finance  
theory),   but   also   the   transaction   and   the   precautionary  motive   adapted   from  
Keynes’s   liquidity   preference   theory.   The   precautionary   motive   figures  
prominently  in  empirical  studies,  but  there  does  not  seem  to  be  a  consensus  on  
how  to  define  or  measure  this  motive.  The  focus  of  analysis  is  mostly  on  large  
listed   non-­‐‑financial   companies.   The   heterodox   literature   possesses   a   range   of  
different  research  strands  as  is  shown  in  Table  2.6.  below.    
The  answers  to  the  three  questions  about  (1)  the  role  of  financial  operations  in  
non-­‐‑financial   companies,   (2)   the   type   of   the   non-­‐‑financial   firms   that   is   in   the  
analytical   focus   and   (3)   the   potential   reason   for   increases   in   liquid   asset  
holdings  vary  substantially  across  these  strands.    
It  should  be  noted  that  the  Kaleckian  tradition  is  the  only  one  which  explicitly  
deals  with   heterogeneous   firms,  while  most   other   research   agendas   focus   on  
large  corporations.  Many  heterodox  economists  were  (or  are)  sceptical  towards  
financial   dealings   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms,   suspecting   a   harmful   impact   on  
productive   operations   and   particularly   investment.   Thus,   the   speculative  
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Table 2.6. Summary of theoretical micro perspectives on finance 
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Chapter III: A Balance Sheet Approach to Financial 
Operations of Non-Financial Firms 
  
This  chapter  sets  out  the  balance  sheet  approach  to  financial  operations  of  non-­‐‑
financial  firms,  which  will  inform  the  empirical  microeconomic  analysis  of  this  
thesis.  The  three  questions  to  guide  the  microeconomic  analysis  formulated  in  
the  introduction  will  guide  this  chapter.  These  questions  are:  
(1)  What  is  the  role  of  financial  operations  in  non-­‐‑financial  companies?  (2)  What  
type  of  companies  are  in  the  analytical  focus?  (3)  What  explanation  is  given  for  
a  rising  cooperate  liquidity  preference?    
It   will   be   argued   that   mainstream   economics   balance   sheet   analysis   rarely  
accounts  for  the  actual  balance  sheet  since  it  mostly  focuses  on  net  worth,  that  is  
the   difference   between   total   assets   and   total   liabilities.   This   narrow   focus   is  
exacerbated   by   the   aggregate   perspective   usually   adopted,   either   assessing   a  
representative   firm   (or  household)  or   considering  all   firms   (or  households)   in  
aggregate  (see  Mishkin,  1978;  Bernanke  &  Gertler,  1995).  Mainstream  economics  
is   interested   in   the   amount   of   credit   a   firm   –   or   any   other   economic   entity   –  
might   be   able   to   raise   rather   than   in   understanding   the   financial   operations  
behind  companies’  balance  sheet  management.  
The  chapter  will  put  forward  an  alternative  balance  sheet  approach  to  avoid  the  
reductionist   treatment   of   the  balance   sheet.  This   approach   is   informed  by   the  
practice-­‐‑oriented   in-­‐‑depth   balance   sheet   analysis   carried   out   by   accountants.  
Therefore,   the   chapter   reviews   the  origins  of  balance   sheet   and   financial   ratio  
analysis,  as  they  are  carried  out  in  accounting.  Financial  ratios  are  inspired  by  
practical  considerations  and  part  of  modern  accounting,  but  mostly  absent  from  
economics   research.   Understanding   the   firm’s   balance   sheet   –   as   more   than  
merely   net   worth   –   sheds   light   onto   the   puzzling   phenomenon   of   rising  
liquidity  among  non-­‐‑financial  companies.    
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The  chapter  develops  a  methodology  based  on  financial  ratios  as  alternative  to  
net  worth  analysis.  This  is  applied  to  the  idea  of  overcapitalisation  –  introduced  
in  the  previous  chapter.  Here  it  is  argued  that  overcapitalised  firms  are  likely  to  
see   financial   investment   and   mergers   and   acquisitions   as   alternatives   to  
productive   investment   and   organic   firm   growth.   This   chapter   operationalises  
the   concept   of   overcapitalisation,   first,   by   using   conventional   financial   ratios  
and   subsequently,   by   suggesting   an   original   financial   ratio,   namely   the  
overcapitalisation   ratio   (OCR),   to   distinguish   between   different   types   of   non-­‐‑
financial  firms’  liquidity  preferences.  This  operationalisation  is  crucial  since,  on  
the  one  hand,  it  constitutes  one  of  the  original  contributions  in  this  thesis,  and  
on   the  other  hand,   it  provides   the  basis   for   the  empirical  analysis   that  will  be  
presented  in  chapter  4.      
Finally,   a   balance   sheet   approach   for   South  African   non-­‐‑financial   firms  must  
take   into   account   both   the   history   and   the   contemporary   realities   of   the  
country’s   corporate   landscape.   While   the   microeconomic   analysis   of   South  
African  non-­‐‑financial  companies   in   the   following  chapter  will   focus   to  a   large  
extent   on   listed   corporations,   small   and  medium-­‐‑sized   companies,   as  well   as  
household-­‐‑based  firm  activity,  will  be  considered  wherever  the  data  allows  for  
it.  To  make  an   informed   judgement  on   the   financial  position  of  South  African  
non-­‐‑listed  business  in  the  empirical  analysis  that  follows,  this  chapter  provides  
an  overview  of  the  structure  of  the  sector  (in  part  3.3).  
3.1. Balance sheet analysis in mainstream economics 
3.1.1. The origins of balance sheet analysis  
Records  of   the  use  of  balance   sheets  go  as   far  back  as   the   fourteenth   century.  
They  were   initially   solely   used   by   the   owners   of   the   counted   assets   (Brown,  
1978).   The   emergence   of   the   modern   firm   was   arguably   accompanied   by   its  
formalisation   into   a   balance   sheet.   For   instance,   Max   Weber   in   his   doctoral  
thesis   reasoned   that   the   legal   form   of   the   early   German   small   and  medium-­‐‑
sized  enterprise  emerged  when  German  family  communities   transformed   into  
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labour   communities   (Weber   &   Kaelber,   2003).   During   this   transformation  
relations   were   rationalised,   acknowledging   that   not   ties   of   kin   but   of  
functionality  defined   the  productive  unit.   Those  members   of   the  household   –  
including   non-­‐‑blood   related   individuals   such   as   craftsmen’s   apprentices   –  
became   part   of   the   labour   community,   an   early   manifestation   of   the   firm,  
having   legally   part   in   its   expenditure   and   acquisition.   As   consequence,  
relationships  had  to  be  rationalised  through  definition  and  delineation  of  assets  
and  liabilities.    
Hence,   accounting   techniques   had   to   be   introduced.   For   Weber   this  
rationalisation  is  at  the  origin  of  the  modern  central  European  firm  rather  than  –  
as   argued   by   legal   scholars   before   him   –   the   Southern   European   and  
particularly  Italian  commenda.  The  latter  was  in  most  cases  a  maritime  enterprise  
that  had  no  separate  legal  entity  from  its  owners,  which  in  Weber’s  eyes  was  a  
crucial   characteristic   of   the   modern,   capitalist   company   (Weber   &   Kaelber,  
2003).   Hence,  Weber   implicitly   grasped   the   importance   of   the   firm’s   balance  
sheet.      
His   implied   understanding   of   companies   as   balance   sheets   might   have   been  
inspired  by  the  creation  of  large  listed  companies  in  the  US  and  Europe,  which  
was  gaining  traction   in   the   late  19th  century.  The  compilation  of   financial  data  
similar  to  that  which  make  up  the  modern  balance  sheet  became  a  necessity  for  
these  listed  companies,  in  which  ownership  and  control  was  legally  separated,  
especially  once  they  took  on  external  liabilities  (Horrigan,  1968).    
The  growth  and  proliferation  of   large   listed   companies  had  as  a   corollary   the  
emerging   demand   for   corporate   financial   data.   In   the   US   commercial   banks  
began   requesting   financial   data   from   their   corporate   clients   as   early   as   the  
1870s,  establishing  it  as  a  practice  by  the  1890s  (Horrigan,  1968).  Credit  granting  
claimed  to  be  a  science  (Brown,  1978).  Thus,  the  so-­‐‑called  borrower’s  statement  
became   the   basis   for   this   supposedly   scientific   practice,  while   the   statement’s  
interpretation  to  establish  creditworthiness  was  at  its  core.    
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Cannon  presented  a  paper  in  1905  on  the  science  of  granting  credit,  which  put  
forward  new  analytical  tools  (Brown,  1978).  He  crucially  distinguished  between  
fixed   and   current   assets,   a   central   characteristic   of   the  modern   balance   sheet,  
and  formulated  some  of  the  first  financial  ratios.  Financial  ratios  relate  selected  
financial   indicators   to   one   another.   Using   financial   ratios,   one   intends   to  
generate  indicators  independent  of  firm  size  that  can  be  applied  across  different  
companies  and  industrial  sectors.  Financial  indicators  are  either  taken  from  the  
balance  sheet  –  yielding  static  ratios  –  or  the   income  statement  so  as  to  obtain  
dynamic   ratios.   A  mix   of   balance   sheet   and   income   statement   variables   also  
results   in   a   dynamic   financial   ratio   (Salmi   &   Martikainen,   1994).   Cannon  
applied  his  formulated  ratios  to  14  manufacturing  sectors  in  the  US,  generating  
one   of   the   first   examples   of   comparative   ratio   analyses.  During   the   1920s   the  
interest  in  financial  ratio  analysis  grew,  and  by  the  1930s  the  first  set  of  rules  for  
balance  sheet  standardisation  were  in  place  (Brown,  1978).    
The   current   ratio,   that   is   the   ratio   of   current   assets   to   current   liabilities1,  
established  itself  as  one  of  the  most  widely  used  financial  ratios  early  on,  in  the  
US  since  the  1890s.  The  current  ratio  was  adopted  by  US  commercial  banks  as  
their  main  assessment  tool  for  lending.  In  the  first  decade  of  the  20th  century  the  
convention   emerged   that   a   current   ratio   of   2,  meaning   the   volume  of   current  
assets  of  the  client  is  twice  as  high  as  their  current  liabilities,  was  perceived  as  
necessary   to  guarantee   financial   soundness.  The  2:1   current   ratio   requirement  
was  for  decades  unanimously  accepted  (Steffy,  Zearley,  &  Strunk,  1974;  Foulke,  
1978).  The  current  ratio  was  also  at  the  centre  of  one  of  the  first  examinations  of  
a   large  amount  of   corporate  balance   sheet  data,  namely  Wall’s  Study  of  Credit  
Biometrics  published  in  1919.  The  study,  undertaken  by  Wall  for  the  US  Federal  
Reserve  Bank,  was  a  compilation  of  financial  data  of  US  firms  from  the  files  of  
commercial  paper  brokers  (Wall,  1919).  
                                                                                                 
1  Current  assets  and  liabilities  refer  to  relatively  more  liquid  receipts  or  commitments,  
falling   due   within   a   year.   Current   assets   also   include   cash   and   its   equivalents,   i.e.,  
financial  instruments  with  a  maturity  of  three  months  or  less.  
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Hence,  balance  sheet  analysis  (especially  in  the  form  of  financial  ratio  analysis)  
developed  with  a  practical   focus:  on  the  one  hand,  creditors  and  shareholders  
consulted   financial   ratios   to   establish   the   soundness   of   clients’   financial  
positions.  On  the  other  hand,  ratio  analysis  was  promoted  as  tool  for  managers  
and   firm   owners   to   assess   their   company’s   operations   and   performance.  
Attempts  to  identify  financial  ratios  that  could  serve  as  early  warning  signs  of  
default   go   back   to   the   1930s   (see,   for   instance,   Smith   &   Winakor,   1935,   or  
Fitzpatrick,  1978).  Over  the  course  of  the  20th  century,  performance  prediction  –  
be   it  success  or  bankruptcy  –  remained  one  of   the  main  goals   tackled  by  ratio  
analysis   (see,   for   example,   Beaver,   1966,   as   cited   in   Horrigan,   1968;   Altman,  
1968;  Ohlson,   1980).   In   fact,   it   is   a   key   goal   of   such   analysis   until   today   (see  
Volkov  &  van  den  Poel,  2012;  Tserng,  Liao,  Tsai,  &  Chen,  2011;  Delen,  Kuzey,  &  
Uyar,  2013).    
Thus,   the   development   and   usage   of   financial   ratios   has   historically   been  
promoted  by  more  practically  and  empirically  oriented  researchers.  Managers  
and  accountants   customarily  use   financial   ratios.   Journals  publishing   research  
in   the   area   mostly   deal   with   accountancy,   business   studies   or   management.  
Among   the   top   100   cited   articles   listed   on   ISI   Web   of   Science/Knowledge  
containing   the   term   ‘financial   ratio’   in   the   titles   24   have   been   published   by  
journals  dealing  with  accounting  issues,  19  by  journals  around  business  studies  
and   (financial)   management   and   only   13   in   journals   dealing   with   finance   or  
financial   economics  more   broadly.   Interestingly,   health   economists   appear   to  
have  a  strong  interest  in  financial  ratios  as  performance  indicators  according  to  
the  top  100  cited  articles  (ISI  Web  of  Science,  2014).  
The  question  how  effective  and  reliable  financial  ratios  should  be  designed  has  
grown   in   importance   with   advances   in   econometric   methods   utilised   for  
economic  analysis.  Issues  of  proportionality  and  normality  of  ratios  have  been  
addressed   in   the   past   to   incorporate   ratios   into   sophisticated   regression  
techniques   (see   Salmi   &   Martikainen,   1994,   for   an   overview).   More   recent  
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developments   in   techniques   for   financial   ratio   analysis   include   cutting-­‐‑edge  
statistical   developments   such   as   Bayesian   statistics   (Gallizo,   Jiménez   &  
Salvador,   2002;   Gallizo,   Gargallo   &   Salvador,   2008;   Gargallo,   Salvador,   &  
Gallizo,   2008).   But   the   question   about   the   reliability   of   financial   ratios   goes  
beyond  technique.    
From   the   very   beginnings   of   balance   sheet   compilation   and   analysis   severe  
criticisms  were  expressed  concerning  their  limitations.  Most  important  for  this  
thesis   are   the   reservations   expressed   against   intangible   balance   sheet   items,  
which   are   commonly   described   by   the   caption   ‘goodwill’.   As   Leake   (1938)  
pointed  out  balance  sheet   items  broadly   fall   into  one  of   two  categories:   either  
material   things  such  as  plant,  machinery  and  inventories,  or   immaterial  rights  
to  profit  and  other  values  that  are  expected  to  rise  in  price  in  the  future.  Thus,  
goodwill   typically   contains   patents,   designs,   copyrights,   monopolies   of   any  
kind   and   leaseholds   that   a   company   possesses.   Employees’   contacts   and  
professional  influence  also  count  as  goodwill.  
Thus,   Leake   (1938)   warned   of   the   inflation   of   goodwill,   for   example,   when  
companies   acquire  mining   rights,   i.e.,   speculating   on  mineral   deposits   in   the  
ground.  Equally,  a  takeover  of  a  listed  company  could  inflate  goodwill  if  future  
returns   on   intangible   assets  were   valued   too   optimistically.   This   process  was  
commonly   known   as   overcapitalisation   and   rooted   in   the   exaggerated   prices  
paid  for  listed  corporations  in  takeover  bids.    
Other  dangers  of  financial  ratio  analysis  flagged  by  accountants  are  the  window  
dressing   of   financial   results   and   erroneous   interpretation   of   ratios.   Especially  
during   the   early   years   of   balance   sheet   compilation,   company   accountants  
possessed  much  discretion  when  producing  the  financial  statements.  Hence,  the  
problem  of  window  dressing,   i.e.  presenting  a  misleading  picture  of  company  
finances,  was  eminent  (Wall  &  Duning,  1928).  But  even  with  legal  requirements  
and   accounting   standards   in   place,   window   dressing   remains   a   concern   for  
some   commentators   (Tamari,   1978).   Once   again,   it   can   be   imagined   that   the  
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problem  is  more  pertinent  for  intangible  items  whose  value  has  to  be  estimated  
by  the  company.    
Finally,  the  warning  that  financial  ratios  are  merely  a  tool  rather  than  an  ends  in  
itself   is   common   place   among   accountants   (Steffy   et   al.,   1974;   Nelson,   1978,  
Pendlebury  &  Groves,  2004).  Financial  ratios  are  not  per  se  good  or  bad.  There  
are  hardly  any  ideal  levels  of  financial  ratios  that  firms  universally  should  strive  
towards.   Hence,   financial   ratio   analysis   only   works   in   conjuncture   with  
additional  information  about  the  assessed  company,  averages  of  the  industry  in  
which   it   operates,   and   developments   of   the   financial   ratio   over   time.   In   fact,  
financial   ratios  work  best  when   they  are  merely  understood  as   signals   to   flag  
problems.  Therefore,   ‘[r]atios  must  be  used  for  what  they  are  –  financial  tools.  
[…]  Ratios  must  be  linked  to  railroad  signals.  They  tell  the  analyst  to  stop,  look,  
and  listen’  (Nelson,  1978,  p.  50).    
In   the   eyes   of   accountants   the   entire   balance   sheet   including   the   qualitative  
information  must   be   examined   to   avoid   incorrect   reasoning   due   to   improper  
comparisons   or   a   disregard   of   a   company’s   trade’s   peculiarities.   In   fact,  
ignorance   about   a   firm’s   business   is   sometimes  perceived   to   be   as  much   of   a  
danger   in   financial   ratio   analysis   as  making   technical   errors  when   calculating  
ratios  (see  Morley,  1984).  
The  interest  of  economists  in  financial  ratios  –  and  in  financial  statements  more  
broadly   –   appears   limited.   The   controversy   around   the   compatibility   of   the  
internal  rate  of  return  and  the  accounting  rate  of  return,  fought  out  during  the  
1960s   and   1970s,   illustrates   this   limited   interest   and   maybe   also   a   certain  
contempt  of  the  economics  profession  for  accountancy  techniques  in  general.        
The  internal  rate  of  return  versus  accounting  rate  of  return  debate  addressed  at  
its  heart  the  question  whether  accountancy-­‐‑based  measures  are  compatible  with  
economic   theory.  Although   the   controversy   is   somewhat   dated,   it   reveals   the  
reservations   economists   entertain   against   practical   accountancy.   The   internal  
rate   of   return   is   used   by   in   economic   theory   to   assess   the   profitability   of   an  
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investment   project   and   calculated   discounting   the   returns   on   a   company’s  
investment.   In   contrast,   the   accounting   rate  of   return,  used  by  accountants,   is  
defined   as   the   funds   flow   from   operations   (less   depreciation)   divided   by   the  
book  value  of  capital.  Geoffrey  Harcourt  (1965)  discussed  the  discrepancy  of  the  
two  rates  and  came   to   the  conclusion   that   it  was  extremely  misleading   to  use  
the  accounting  rate  of   return   to  compare  profitability  across   firms   in  different  
industries   or   countries.   His   article   set   off   a   debate   that   persisted   for   two  
decades   (see   Luckett,   1984   for   an   overview),   leaving   the   question   how   to  
reconcile   the   internal   rate   of   return   and   the   accounting   rate   of   return  
unresolved.   The   dismissal   of   the   accounting   rate   of   returns   by   economists   is  
therefore  perceived   to   implicitly  accord   ‘very   little  value   for   [sic]   the   financial  
statements   annually   prepared   by   the   accounting   profession’   (Salmi   &  
Martikainen,  1994,  section  3.1.,  see  also  Fisher  &  McGowan,  1983).    
Admittedly,   financial   ratio   analysis   is  hardly  guided  by   theory,   resulting   in   a  
multiplicity   of   ratios   proposed   to   measure   liquidity   or   other   dimensions   of  
company   performance.   Instead,   ratio   analysis   appears   mainly   guided   by  
accounting   conventions.   This   weakness   explains   some   of   the   reservations  
economists  had  against  balance  sheet  analysis.  Mainstream  economists  do  not  
seem  to  have  paid  much  attention  to  financial  statement  data,  while  claiming  to  
scrutinise   an   aggregate   corporate  balance   sheet.  Where  balance   sheet   analysis  
has  been   invoked   in  economics,   it   typically  did  not   involve  a  consideration  of  
the   balance   sheet   as   such.   Instead,   as   indicated   above,  mainstream   economic  
models  tend  to  collapse  the  balance  sheet  of  an  economic  entity  to  its  net  worth.        
3.1.2. The concept of net worth 
The  mainstream  approach  to  balance  sheet  analysis,  which  appears  to  become  
more  popular  in  the  aftermaths  of  financial  crises,  centres  around  the  concept  of  
net  worth.  Net  worth  was  often  used  in  early  financial  ratio  analysis.  Alongside  
the  current  ratio,  it  was  repeatedly  identified  as  a  potential  indicator  of  financial  
distress  among  companies.  For  instance,  Fitzpatrick  (1978)  identified  net  worth  
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to  total  debt  as  best  predictor  of  company  failure.  Merwin  (1978)  provided  three  
such   predictors,   also   including   net   worth   to   total   debt   of   an   enterprise.  
Importantly  though,  among  accountants  a  single  ratio  would  not  be  examined  
in   isolation   from   other   financial   indicators   and   typically   not   without  
considering  qualitative  company  information.    
By   contrast,   the  utilisation  of  net  worth   in  mainstream  economic   theory   takes  
little   genuine   interest   in   the   balance   sheet   because   the   actual   assets   and  
liabilities  of  an  economic  entity  only  matter  indirectly.  Their  difference  –  the  net  
worth  –  is  what  matters.  This  is  problematic  since  a  very  large  company,  which  
is  highly   leveraged,  meaning   it  possesses   large  volumes  of   liabilities   to  match  
the  assets,  could  have  the  same  net  worth  as  a  small  firm  with  little  assets  but  
without   any   debt   on   its   balance   sheet.   Furthermore,   in   reality   not   only   net  
assets,  but  the  type  of  assets  that  a  company  holds  (and  their  liquidity)  matter.    
Two   equally   leveraged   firms   can   face  different   pressures  when   they   both   are  
required   to   settle   a   substantial   share   of   their   liabilities.   A   firm   that   is   awash  
with   liquid   assets   such   as   cash   and   government   bonds   can   either   use   cash  
directly  to  pay  off  its  debt,  or  utilise  its  liquidity  as  collateral  to  obtain  external  
finance   at   advantageous   conditions.   A   competitor   in   the   same   situation,   but  
with  an  illiquid  balance  sheet  might  face  insolvency,  if  it  cannot  sell  its  assets,  or  
even  bankruptcy,  if  it  is  forced  to  sell  them  much  below  book  value.  
The  importance  of  liquidity  on  balance  sheets  was  recognised  by  Mishkin  (1978)  
when   he   combined   the   life-­‐‑cycle   hypothesis,   put   forward   by   Ando   and  
Modigliani   (Ando   &   Modigliani,   1963),   with   the   liquidity   hypothesis,   in   the  
attempt   to   explain   determinants   of   household   aggregate   demand.   Mishkin  
utilised  net  worth  and  asset  liquidity  in  order  to  explain  the  strong  reduction  in  
household   demand   during   the   Great   Depression   and   the   persistence   of   this  
crisis.    
The   life-­‐‑cycle  hypothesis   states   that   consumption   is   a   function  of  households’  
net  worth   and   the   present   value   of   their   future   income.   Introducing  what   he  
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called  the  ‘aggregate  household  balance  sheet’  –  an  aggregate  balance  sheet  for  
all  households  –  Mishkin  (1978,  p.  919)  argued  that  households’   liabilities  and  
liquid  assets  should  also  be  taken  into  account.  Econometrically,  both  variables  
were   found   significant   in   explaining   household   aggregate   demand.  
Nonetheless,   it   is   not   surprising   that  Ando   and  Modigliani  did  not   introduce  
liquidity  into  their  life-­‐‑cycle  hypothesis.  In  a  world  where  the  present  value  of  
households’   future   incomes   can   be   calculated   easily   there   is   no   uncertainty.  
And  without  uncertainty  there  is  little  need  holding  cash  and  cash  equivalents  
since  future  income  and  expenditure  is  known  and  can  be  budgeted  for.    
The   concept  of  net  worth  has  gained   importance   in  economic  analysis  during  
the  1990s  and  2000s,  once  again  in  the  aftermath  of  financial  crises  in  advanced  
and  emerging  economies.  A   few  years  after   the  1987   financial   crisis,  Bernanke  
and  Gertler  (1989)  published  an  influential  paper  on  the  connection  between  net  
worth   and   economic   fluctuations.   It   was   subsequently   developed   into   the  
financial  accelerator  framework  (Bernanke  &  Gertler,  1995)  which  –  in  line  with  
the   New   Keynesian   persuasion   –   claimed   to   model   the   uncertain   world,   in  
contrast  to  earlier  work.    
Uncertainty  here   is   understood   as   a  disparity   in   information   amongst   agents,  
that  is,  asymmetric  information,  giving  rise  to  a  principle-­‐‑agent  problem.2  These  
asymmetries  arguably  explain  the  heightened  cost  of  external  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  internal  
finance   –   that   is   the   agency   cost   in   form   of   an   external   finance   premium   –  
because  the  borrower  (the  agent)  possesses  more  information  about  his  (or  her)  
opportunities,  characteristics  and  actions  than  the  lender  (the  principle).  In  this  
setting,   the   financial   accelerator   exacerbates   shocks   to   the   economic   system  
through  changes  in  credit  market  conditions,  affecting  the  balance  sheet  (or  net  
worth)  of  households  and  firms  (Bernanke  &  Gertler,  1995;  Bernanke,  Gertler,  &  
Gilchrist,  1999).    
                                                                                                 
2  There   is  no  space   for  power   in   the  story  about  asymmetric   information.  Hence,   it   is  
neglected  that  certain  agents  can  influence  information  creation  and  its  distribution.    
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Thus,   if   a   negative   (external)   shock   hits   the   economy,   individuals’   net  worth  
will   shrink,   weakening   their   financial   positions   and   discouraging   future  
spending,  which  intensifies   the   initial  negative  shock.   In  the  case  of  a  positive  
shock   expenditure   is   encouraged,   starting   an   economic   boom.   An   erosion   of  
asset   prices,   for   instance,   can   be   such   a   shock   since   collateral   value   is  
undermined.   Arguably,   companies   often   use   similar   collateral,   making   so-­‐‑
called  contagion  across  an   industrial  sector  or  even  across   the  entire  economy  
likely  (Kiyotaki  &  Moore,  2002).    
Similar  models  were  put  forward,  for  instance,  by  Kiyotaki  &  Moore  (1997)  and  
Kiyotaki  (1998).  The  perceived  strength  of  this  class  of  models  was  that  a  small  
exogenous  shock  could   trigger  a  business  cycle  swing   through  the  amplifying  
effect   of   the   credit   system,   i.e.,   the   so-­‐‑called   financial   accelerator.   Previously,  
models  depending  on  exogenous  shocks  like  real  business  cycle  models,  which  
identified  productivity  shocks  as  major  propagating  mechanisms,  struggled  to  
explain   strong   swings   in   economic   activity   in   the   absence   of   sizeable   shocks.  
Importantly,   the   trigger   for   economic   fluctuation   in  all   these  models   (see  also  
more  recently  von  Peter,  2005  and  Matsuyama,  2007)  is  an  exogenously  induced  
change  to  borrowers’  net  worth.  For  South  Africa,  Fourie,  Botha  &  Mears  (2011)  
undertook  an  econometric  exercise  to  show  that,  within  a  similar  model,  credit  
extension  is  a  business  cycle  indicator.    
For   emerging   economies,   the   concept   of   net   worth   has   been   employed   to  
explain   financial   crises.   In   the   aftermath   of   the   East   Asian   Crisis   of   1997-­‐‑98,  
economists  like  Krugman  proclaimed  that  models  of  currency  crises  so  far  had  
ignored   two   important   factors:   the   balance   sheet   and   cash   flow   (Krugman,  
1999).  What   sounded   like   a   serious   attempt   at   balance   sheet   analysis   (taking  
into  account  both  dimensions  of  the  financial  statements,  the  balance  sheet  and  
the   cash   flow   statement),   quickly   reduced   to   the   well-­‐‑known   net   worth  
assessment.    
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The  East  Asian  Crisis  took  most  of  the  economic  profession  by  surprise,  because  
until   then   orthodox   economic   wisdom   had   blamed   currency   crises   on  
unsustainable   fiscal   expenditure   by   governments   financed   through   public  
borrowing   denominated   in   foreign   currency.   But   the   East   Asian   countries  
affected  mostly  had  sound  public  financing  and  debt  positions.  In  Thailand,  for  
example,   where   the   crisis   of   1997-­‐‑98   started,   government   finances   were   in   a  
comparatively   good   shape   when   the   crisis   broke   out.   Until   1996,   the  
government  had  a  persistent  budget  surplus.  By  contrast,  domestic  companies  
had  borrowed   substantially   in  US  dollars   (Corsetti,  Pesenti,  &  Roubini,   1998).  
Therefore,   it  was  private-­‐‑sector  businesses   that   came  under  pressure   to   repay  
debt  once  export  earnings  stalled.  A  spiral  of  currency  and  debt  deflation  crisis  
unfolded.    
In   response,   the   so-­‐‑call   third   generation   currency   crises   models   had   to   be  
developed,   introducing   private   sector   indebtedness   as   an   important  
determinant   of   financial   fragility.   Thus,   the   balance   sheets   of   financial  
intermediaries   and   private   corporations   attracted   prominent   attention   from  
mainstream   economists   (see,   for   instance,   Krugman,   1999,   Mishkin,   2001,  
Eichengreen,  2004).  However,  the  story  that  was  once  again  boiled  down  to  an  
adaptation   of   the   net   worth   concept   as   trigger   of   financial   distress   (see  
especially   Mishkin,   2001).   In   the   context   of   emerging   markets,   the   external  
shock   that   can   hit   non-­‐‑financial   companies’   and   banks’   net   worth   is   a  
depreciation   or   unexpected   devaluation   of   local   currency.   Net   worth  
deteriorates   for   those  economic  units   that  have  borrowed   in   foreign  currency.  
Their   expenditure   slumps   in   consequence,   reducing   domestic   aggregate  
demand,   which   further   weakens   the   cash   flow   of   domestic   businesses.   An  
economic  crisis  unfolds.    
Actual  balance  sheets  have  little  to  do  with  the  macroeconomic  story  discussed  
in   third   generation   crises   models.   The   models   typically   address   a   country’s  
balance   sheet   (Eichengreen,   2004)   or   an   aggregate   corporate   balance   sheet  
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(Krugman,  1999,  Mishkin,  2001).  As  Gurley  &  Shaw  (1960)  already  pointed  out  
in   the   1960s,   excessive   aggregation   of   financial   positions   (for   example   when  
using  a  national  balance  sheet)  seriously  hampers  financial  analysis  (see  chapter  
5).   This   is   one   of   the   shortcomings   of   the   mainstream   treatment   of   balance  
sheets.   The   following   section   will   highlight   the   most   severe   limitations   of   a  
reductionist   approach   to   financial   statements   analysis   and   alternative  
approaches  which  can  overcome  these.          
3.1.3. Shortcomings of mainstream balance sheet analysis  
As  highlighted  in  the  discussion  above,  there  are  two  main  shortcomings  of  the  
mainstream  treatment  of  balance  sheets:  (1)  the  frequent  reduction  of  the  wealth  
of   information   provided   by   balance   sheets   to   net   worth   and   (2)   the   over-­‐‑
aggregation   of   individual   balance   sheets   into   a   single   balance   sheet  
representing  the  economy  as  a  whole,  non-­‐‑financial  companies  in  aggregate  or  
households  as  a  group.    
(1)  As  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  Minsky  supported  an  understanding  
of  economic  entities  as  balance  sheets.   Importantly,  he  did  not  reduce  balance  
sheets  to  agents’  net  worth.  In  Minsky’s  analysis,  companies’  balance  sheets  are  
central,   because  on   the  one  hand,   they   reveal   the   interconnectedness  between  
non-­‐‑financial   firms’   financial   operations   and   their   productive   investment.  On  
the  other  hand,  they  also  highlight  how  past  business  operations  are  linked  to  
present   cash   flow  and  up-­‐‑coming  payment   commitments.  Non-­‐‑financial   firms  
finance  real   investment   through  operations   in   the   financial  markets,  obtaining  
funds   (or   cash   flow)   today  while   creating   commitments   for   future   payments  
(liabilities).   According   to   Minsky,   these   funds   are   in   turn   reinvested   in  
productive  capacity  (assets)  creating  potential  future  receipts  (Minsky,  1986).    
Irving  Fisher’s  debt  deflation  theory  (Fisher,  1933)  was  a  major   inspiration  for  
Minsky’s   Financial   Instability   Hypothesis.   Fisher   understood   the   Great  
Depression  as  triggered  by  a  vicious  cycle  of  overly  indebted  firms  attempting  
to  pay  off  their  debt  and  merely  increasing  their  own  debt  in  real  terms,  while  
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selling  off  productive   equipment   for   ever-­‐‑falling  prices.   Firms’   cash   flow  was  
key  to  Fisher’s  theory:  a  rush  to  liquidate  corporate  assets  in  order  to  meet  debt  
payments  lowers  prices  of  machinery,  reducing  firms’  cash  flow  –  together  with  
the  price  level  –  and  making  it  increasingly  impossible  to  pay  off  debt  with  the  
cash  coming  in.  Hence,  from  an  accounting  perspective,  it  can  be  argued  that  –  
in  both  theories  –  the  analytical  emphasis  is  on  companies’  balance  sheets  and  
their   cash   flow,   thus,   the   entirety   of   the   corporate   financial   statement   rather  
than  merely  net  worth.    
Interestingly,   Bernanke   and   associates   (Bernanke,   1993,   Bernanke   et   al.,   1999)  
acknowledged   the   existence   of   Fisher’s   debt   deflation   theory   and   Minsky’s  
Financial   Instability   Hypothesis   in   passing   without   relating   it   much   to   their  
own   work.   This   is   somewhat   surprising   since   the   amplifying   impact   of   the  
credit  system  on  economic   fluctuations   is  as  much  the  basis   for  Bernanke  and  
Gertler’s  work  as  for  Fisher’s  and  Minsky’s.  More  sophisticated  reviews  of  the  
credit  cycle  literature  (such  as  von  Peter,  2005)  see  Fisher’s  and  Minsky’s  ideas  
as   predecessors   of   the   models   put   forward   by   Bernanke   and   associates.  
Bernanke,  however,  claimed  that  the  Financial  Instability  Hypothesis  relied  on  
the  irrationality  of  economic  agents,  implying  that  his  research  (which  assumes  
rational  agents)  was  superior  (Bernanke,  1983).  
Minsky   commented   on   Bernanke’s   work,   emphasising   that   it   was   not   the  
irrationality  of  agents,  which  brought  about  crisis  in  his  theoretical  framework.  
He  added  that  neither  does  asymmetric  information  generate  crises,  as  assumed  
in  the  New  Keynesian  world  of  Bernanke’s  financial  accelerator.  In  fact,  even  if  
information   were   symmetric   financial   instability   would   arise.   Thus,   ‘[f]or  
economics,   the   appropriate   question   is   how   do   rational   agents   behave   in   an  
irrational  world,  i.e.  a  world  they  do  not  fully  understand’  (Minsky,  1993,  p.  9),  
rather  than  asking  what  happens  if  borrowers  are  smart  and  bankers  are  dumb,  
which  underpins  the  asymmetric  information  paradigm  according  to  Minsky.  
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(2)   With   the   2007-­‐‑09   global   financial   crisis   attention   once   again   returned   to  
balance   sheet   analysis   inspired   by   Fisher’s   debt   deflation,   most   prominently  
with   Koo’s   comparison   between   the   Japanese   lost   decade   and   the   prolonged  
stagnation   in  major  advanced  economies   in   the  aftermath  of   the  2007-­‐‑09  crisis  
(Koo,   2011).   He   argues   that   we   are   currently   experiencing   a   balance   sheet  
recession.  Since  households,  businesses  and  governments  all  concurrently  focus  
on   paying   off   their   debt   there   is   no   engine   for   economic   growth,   forcing  
countries  further  into  stagnation.    
This   argument   echoes   Minsky’s   (Minsky,   1986)   and   Godley’s   (Wray,   2012)  
insights  that  not  all  economic  agents  can  deleverage  at  the  same  time,  making  
fiscal   stimulus   necessary   during   recessions.   Godley   developed   the   three  
balances   approach   to   illustrate   the   causal   relationship   between   the   fiscal   and  
the  trade  deficit  in  the  US.  Godley  believed  the  private  sector  was  typically  in  or  
close   to   balance   with   households’   and   non-­‐‑financial   firms’   saving  
approximately   equal   to   firms’   investment.   Under   this   assumption   a   potential  
trade   deficit   would   be   the   consequence   of   public   spending   in   excess   of   tax  
income,  the  so-­‐‑called  twin  deficits.  This  view  was  accepted  until  the  mid-­‐‑1990s  
when   the  private   sector   balance   began  deteriorating  visibly,   turning   from   the  
average  US  post-­‐‑war   surplus  position   into  a  deficit   by   the   early  2000s   (Shaik,  
2012).  
Koo’s  analysis  also  suffers   from  over-­‐‑aggregation  of  data,   treating  households  
and  businesses  either  as  one  giant  entity  or  as  a  representative  economic  agent.  
This  is  especially  problematic  in  the  face  of  vast  income  and  wealth  inequalities  
as   they   have   emerged   over   the   past   three   decades   or   so.   Hence,   genuinely  
acknowledging   the   importance   of   balance   sheets   rather   than   some   derivative  
indicator   like   net   worth   is   indispensable   to   arrive   at   meaningful   economic  
methods  and  analyses.    
Similarly,   the   extensive   literature   discussing   the   East   Asian   crisis   using  
mainstream  balance  sheet  (or  net  worth)  analysis  is  reductionist  in  that  it  does  
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not  acknowledge  industry  differences  or  firm  heterogeneity  (see  Krugman  1999;  
Mishkin   2001;   Eichengreen   et   al.   2003,   2005).   Mainstream   models   treat   non-­‐‑
financial   firms   like   one   big   balance   sheet   by   using   aggregate   data.   This   is  
particularly   inadequate   in   emerging   markets   where   the   corporate   sector  
contains   a   wide   range   of   very   different   firm   types,   varying   from   small  
subsistence  units   to   large  domestic   companies,  which   typically   operate   in   the  
shadow  of  giant  multinationals.    
As  argued  by  Cozzi  and  Toporowski  (2006)  for  the  East  Asian  crisis,  a  sectoral  
disaggregation   is   necessary   to   understand   the   complex   dynamics   underlying  
aggregate  figures.  Otherwise,  the  corporate  sector  is  either  treated  as  one  giant  
company   or   the   existence   of   a   Marshallian   representative   firm   is   supposed.  
Both   assumptions   would   be   problematic   in   the   context   of   an   advanced  
economy,   they   become   indefensible   for   an   emerging  market   such   as   the   East  
Asian  economies  or  South  Africa.    
The   idea   that   all   companies   behave   like   one   giant   enterprise   implies  
coordination   among   these   firms.   However,   as   was   argued   by   Tugan-­‐‑
Baranowsky3  (1901)   and  Kalecki   (1984[1967]),   among   others,   under   capitalism  
one  of  the  major  origins  of  crises  is  the  lack  of  coordination  among  companies  
in   their   investment   decisions. 4   In   emerging   markets,   large   parts   of   the  
population  are  typically  employed  in  the  labour-­‐‑intensive  (and  often  low-­‐‑skill)  
services   sector.   Here   coordination   is   further   hampered   by   the   substantial  
number  of  informal  firms,  which  are  often  operated  on  a  family  and  subsistence  
basis,  not  paying  tax  and  hardly  figuring  in  any  firm  censuses.  Thus,  it  is  highly  
misleading  to  assume  firm  coordination  in  emerging  economies.  
                                                                                                 
3  A   wide   range   of   different   spellings   of   Baranowsky’s   name   has   been   used   when  
translating   his   name   from   the   Cyrillic   alphabet.   Here   ‘Tugan-­‐‑Baranowsky’   will   be  
used.  This  is  the  spelling  used  on  the  German  translation  of  this  Theories  of  Trade  Cycles  
published  in  1901,  which  was  the  earliest  translation  of  the  book.  
4  Kalecki  (1984[1967],  p.  155)  noted  that  ‘capitalists  do  many  things  as  a  class,  but  they  
certainly  do  not  invest  as  a  class’.    
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Equally  difficult  would  be  to  apply  the  concept  of  a  ‘representative  firm’  to  an  
emerging   market   setting.   The   representative   firm   was   famously   used   by  
Marshall   (2013[1890])   in   his   Economic   Principles,   first   published   in   1890   and  
influential   until   this   day.  Marshall’s   ideas   about   the   representative   firm  were  
much   more   nuanced   than   the   modern-­‐‑day   use   of   the   mainstream   economic  
concept   could   suggest.   Marshall   stressed   that   the   representative   firm   was  
merely   a   means   to   generate   information   about   an   average   firm   in   a   given  
industry.  Generalisation   can  help   to  understand   the   average   forces   that   affect  
firms  according  to  Marshall.    
However,  Marshall’s  conceptualisation  did  not  lose  sight  of  firm  heterogeneity  
because   he   did   not   encourage   the   complete   reduction   of   actual   firms   to   the  
representative  firm.  In  fact,  he  suggested  using  a  couple  of  representative  firms  
depending  on  the  characteristics  of  a  large  number  of  firms  in  a  given  industry.  
Informality   complicates   the   identification   of  meaningful   representative   firms.  
The   spectrum   of   companies   operating   in   emerging  markets   reaches   from   the  
informal   units   to   large   domestic   and   even   bigger   international   non-­‐‑financial  
companies.  The  average  firm  size  might,   therefore,  be  completely  meaningless  
as   an   analytical   tool   since   the   segment   of   medium-­‐‑sized   firms   is   squeezed  
between  micro  firms  and  megacorps  such  as  is  the  case  in  South  Africa  where  
the   small   and   medium-­‐‑sized   enterprise   sector   is   marginalised   (Berry   et   al.,  
2002).   Additionally,   where   multinational   corporations   operate   the   difficulty  
would   arise   to   distinguish   between   domestic   and   global   operations   when  
attempting   to   generate   an   aggregate   balance   sheet   for   a   country   or   its   non-­‐‑
financial  companies  as  a  whole.  
Instead,   one   would   need   to   differentiate   types   of   representative   firms,   for  
instance,   the   large,   the   medium-­‐‑size,   the   small   and   even   the   micro  
representative  firms.  Here,  data  availability  and  the  difficulty  to  obtain  data  on  
informal  firms  are  strong  practical  limitations  to  this  methodological  approach.  
In  any  case,  assuming  one  aggregate  balance  sheet  for  all  national  or  nationally  
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operating   non-­‐‑financial   companies   will   strongly   limit   a   researcher’s  
understanding  of  non-­‐‑financial  firms’  operations.  
3.2. An alternative balance sheet approach 
The   balance   sheet   approach   used   in   this   thesis   is   an   alternative   to   the  
mainstream  approach  discussed  above.  It  considers  non-­‐‑financial  corporations’  
entire  balance  sheets,   instead  of  reducing  them  to  net  worth.  Furthermore,  the  
thesis  advocates  a  comprehensive  balance  sheet  approach  using  actual  balance  
sheet   information   as   it   is   compiled   in   firms’   annual   reports,   accompanied   by  
financial   statements   and   supplemented   by   notes   on   the   financial   statements.  
Financial   ratio   analysis   is   used   as   a   device   to   support   the   evaluation   of   non-­‐‑
financial   firms’   financial   transactions.  However,   as   advocated  by   accountants,  
financial  ratios  will  merely  figure  as  one  tool  in  a  broader  analytical  toolkit.      
The   proposed   alternative   balance   sheet   approach   attempts   to   overcome  
shortcomings   of   conventional   financial   ratio   analysis,  while  methodologically  
breaking   with   mainstream   balance   sheet   approaches.   The   former   will   be  
achieved  through  explicitly  guiding  financial  ratio  analysis  by  economic  theory;  
the   latter   by   disaggregating   the   concept   of   net   worth   and   reintroducing  
financial   ratio   analysis.   In   this   way,   the   proposed  method   of   comprehensive  
balance  sheet  analysis  constitutes  an  original  contribution  of  this  thesis.  
3.2.1. The overcapitalisation of non-financial firms 
One   of   the   major   shortcomings   of   financial   ratio   analysis   is   the   absence   of  
economic   theory   when   devising   ratios   from   financial   statement   items.   The  
alternative  balance  sheet  approach  suggested  here   is  guided  by  the  concept  of  
non-­‐‑financial   firms’   overcapitalisation   (Toporowski,   1993).   The   high   and  
increasing   liquidity   preference   among   non-­‐‑financial   companies   observed   in   a  
range   of  OECD   countries,   and   also   suspected   by   economic   commentators   for  
South   African   corporations,   is   a   sign   of   firms’   overcapitalisation.  
Overcapitalisation   identifies   firms   that   hold   substantial   liquid   assets   not   for  
operating,   investing  or   funding  of   their   core  business  activities,  but   rather   for  
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cash   management   and   financial   investment.   If   non-­‐‑financial   firms   are  
overcapitalised,   they   engage   in   financial   operations   to   acquire   rentier   income  
and/or   speculate   on   financial   and   productive   assets.   This   shows   up   in   a  
heightened  liquidity  preference.    
The  worry  about  the  overcapitalisation  of  companies  and  even  whole  industries  
emerged  around  the  turn  of  the  20th  century.  As  discussed  in  section  3.1.1.,  the  
intangible   character   of   listed   companies’   goodwill   was   a   concern   to   critical  
accountants   (see  Leake,   1938).   This  meant   that   goodwill,  which   represents   all  
patents,  copyrights,  mining  claims  and  any  other  basis  for  future  profits  could  
be   exaggerated.   This   happens   during   amalgamations,   i.e.,   mergers   and  
acquisitions,   of   listed   companies,   and   generally   when   listed   corporations   are  
bought   or   sold.   During   such   transactions   the   price   for  which   the   equity   of   a  
listed   company   changes   hands   reflects   expected   future   profitability,   because  
liabilities  and  equity  have  to  match  assets  (see  Figure  3.1.).  
If   the  equity  price  and  volume   for  which  a   listed  corporation   is   sold  are  high  
their  value  has  to  be  offset  by  intangible  assets,  that  is  total  assets  have  to  equal  
total  equity  plus  total  liabilities.  Historically,  the  concern  was  that:  
‘the   over-­‐‑capitalization   of   industry,   caused   by   the   common   practice   of  
capitalising,  in  the  form  of  fixed  shares,  an  amount  representing  the  computed  
value   of   goodwill,  must   often   operate   later   on   in   the   history   of   companies   to  
cause  such  high   levels  of  prices   for   the  products  as   to  be  destructive   to   trade,  
just   as   would   be   caused,   for   instance,   by   the   systematic   over-­‐‑staffing   of  
industry’  (Leake,  1938,  p.  viii).  
Hence,   the   common   view   was   that   –   as   Lenin   summarised   it   –   ‘this   “over-­‐‑
capitalization”   anticipated   the   monopoly   profits’   expected   to   be   reaped   in  
future  on  the  basis  of  the  patents,  mining  rights  and  whatever  else  was  counted  
as   goodwill   of   a   listed   company   (Lenin,   1975[1917],   p.   61).   Today,  
overcapitalisation  of  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  results  in  an  increased  desire  to  
hold   liquid  assets  on  their  part.  While  mainstream  economics  merely   includes  
cash   and   cash   equivalents   in   this   liquidity   preference,   highly   liquid   financial  
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assets   (even   if  with  a  maturity  period  of  more   than  three  months)  can  also  be  
included.  
  
Source:  Collier,  2012,  Deloitte,  2011.  
The  two  main  motivations  for  this  increased  liquidity  preference  are  given  in  (1)  
the   precautionary   motive,   mostly   advocated   by   empirical   corporate   finance  
studies   (and   also   mentioned   by   Kalecki)   and   (2)   the   speculative   motive,  
identified   as   a   major   aspect   of   non-­‐‑financial   companies’   financialisation   by  
heterodox  economists.  The  thesis  argues  that  both  motives  are  compatible  with  
non-­‐‑financial  corporations’  overcapitalisation  and,  in  fact,  they  often  cannot  be  
strictly  distinguished.  This  will  be  illustrated  in  chapter  4.    
Thus,   overcapitalisation   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms   increases   firm   heterogeneity  
among   listed   corporations.   Now,   not   only   size   and   competition   patterns   as  
suggested   by   Kalecki   and   Steindl,   respectively,   are   distinguishing  



























Figure 3.1. Schematic representation of the balance sheet of a listed 
corporation  
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management   and   investment   strategies   can   be   identified   among   listed   non-­‐‑
financial   corporations.  Namely,  non-­‐‑financial   corporates  can  be  categorised  as  
rentier  firms  or  as  entrepreneurial  firms  (Toporowski,  1993).    
Rentier   firms   do   not   simply   substitute   productive   for   financial   investment   as  
sometimes   suggested   by   the   financialisation   literature   (see   chapter   2).   In   fact,  
rentier  firms  choose  a  financial  strategy  to  deal  with  the  deficient  demand  and  
inherent  financial  fragility  which  have  been  exacerbated  in  advanced  economies  
over  the  past  three  decades  or  so.  The  emergence  of  the  rentier  firm  is  crucially  
linked   to   changing   financial   market   dynamics   in   the   second   half   of   the   20th  
century  that  led  to  the  inflation  of  financial  markets,  especially,  the  inflation  of  
equity  prices  in  capital  markets.    
The   origin   of   capital  market   inflation   (theorised  by  Toporowski,   2000)   can   be  
found  in  the  increasing  influx  of  liquidity  into  capital  markets  due  to  regulatory  
changes   and   the   growth   of   institutional   financial   investors,   such   as   pension  
funds,   in   many   advanced   economies   and   particularly   in   the   Anglo-­‐‑Saxon  
markets.   The   growth   of   pension   funds   made   the   overcapitalisation   of  
companies  via  share  issuance  easier,  since  institutional  investors  do  not  strive  to  
take   control   of   listed   companies.   Rather,   they   are   passive   investors.   Equally,  
with  the  introduction  of  non-­‐‑voting  shares,  ownership  could  be  diluted  without  
forgoing  control.  In  South  Africa,  where  issuance  of  non-­‐‑voting  shares  was  not  
common   until   the   1990s,   complex   pyramid   structures   to   control   listed  
corporations   emerged   to   preserve   control   while   overcapitalising   (see   section  
3.3.3.   below).   Crucially,   capital   market   inflation   was   a   consequence   of   rising  
saving   among   middle   class   households   after   World   War   II,   as   flagged   by  
Steindl.   This   leakage   of   funds   in   the   industrial   cycle   can   push   non-­‐‑financial  
firms  into  enforced  indebtedness  (Steindl,  1989).    
The  latter  is  a  situation  in  which  companies  cannot  recover  their  costs,  making  
losses   on   production   because   households   save   instead   of   spending.   As  
consequence,   non-­‐‑financial   businesses   reduce   investment   expenditure,   further  
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aggravating   losses   because   investment   constitutes   corporate   profits   in  
aggregate,  as  demonstrated  in  Kalecki’s  profit  equation  (see  Toporowski,  2003).  
This   is   the   Kalecki-­‐‑Steindl   theory   of   financial   fragility   (as   coined   by  
Toporowski,  2015).  
With  the  petering  out  of  the  economic  growth  spurt  of  the  1950s  and  ‘60s  –  the  
so-­‐‑called  Fordist  era,  characterised  by  high  output  and  productivity  growth  in  
advanced  economies  accompanied  by  almost  full  employment  and  steady  wage  
growth,   the   wage   bill   came   under   pressure   as   the   policy   priorities   of   full  
employment  and  steady  wage  growth  were  pushed  into  the  background.  Both  
developments   –   rising   middle   class   savings   and   slowing   growth   in   working  
class  income  –  put  non-­‐‑financial  business  more  at  risk  of  enforced  indebtedness.  
For  large  and  listed  companies  the  emergent  capital  market  inflation  offered  an  
alternative   strategy   to   avoid   balance   sheet   fragility   and   generate   profits.   In   a  
nutshell,   this   alternative   strategy   relies   on   taking   advantage   of   heightened  
volumes   of   liquidity   present   in   capital   markets   during   times   of   financial  
inflation.   An   important   symptom   of   this   behaviour   among   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations  is  their  overcapitalisation  (Toporowski,  2008a,  Toporowski,  2012).    
Firm  heterogeneity   is  crucial   in   this   theory  because  not  all  non-­‐‑financial   firms  
suffer  equally  from  enforced  indebtedness.  Oligopolistic  companies  will  be  able  
to  capture  a  substantial  share  of  total  profits  in  the  economy,  in  the  attempt  to  
ensure  their  own  profitability.  In  consequence,  if  total  investment  falls  short  of  
covering  the  saving  leakage,  it  will  be  competitive  and  most  likely  smaller  and  
medium-­‐‑sized   enterprises   that   will   suffer   a   financially   fragile   position   rather  
than  large  oligopolistic  non-­‐‑financial  business.  Ironically,  it  is  these  oligopolistic  
non-­‐‑financial   corporations   which   are   least   likely   to   fall   victim   to   enforced  
indebtedness,   while   being   the   most   likely   to   be   overcapitalised.   As   Steindl  
(1976[1952])   stressed,   oligopolistic   corporations  would  have   the  best   access   to  
capital  markets,  making   it  easy  for   them  to   issue  equity  during  equity  market  
booms.    
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But   there   also   is   firm   heterogeneity   among   listed   corporations.  Not   all   listed  
non-­‐‑financial   corporations   will   pursue   such   a   rentier   firm   type   business  
strategy.   As   Karwowski   &   Shabani   (2013)   show,   there   is   evidence   of  
overcapitalisation   among   the   top   30   Dow   Jones   (non-­‐‑financial)   companies.  
However,   not   all   of   them   are   identified   as   rentier   firms.   In   the   absence   of  
inflating   and   deflating   financial   markets,   most   non-­‐‑financial   businesses   were  
focusing  on  generating  profit  from  production,  while  keeping  their  exposure  to  
external   finance   –   particularly   equity   financing   –   relatively   low.   This   is   the  
definition   of   an   entrepreneurial   firm   (Toporowski,   1993).   There   are   both  
entrepreneurial   and   rentier   firms   among   the   Dow   Jones   Industrial   Average  
(non-­‐‑financial)  corporations.      
3.2.2. The gearing ratio 
The  gearing  ratio,  a  standard  accounting  ratio,  is  an  important  indicator  of  the  
soundness  of  companies’  financial  decisions.  From  a  Kaleckian  perspective,  the  
amount   of   own   assets   a   company   holds   limits   its   ability   to   acquire   external  
finance  at  advantageous  rates.  Hence,   the  higher  a  company’s  gearing,   that   is,  
its  debt   to   liquid  assets   ratio,   the  more  difficult   it  will  be   to   raise   credit   at   an  
affordable   cost,   as   creditors   see   the   enterprise   as   increasingly   risky   and  
recovering  their  funds  in  case  of  bankruptcy  as  increasingly  difficult.    
The  gearing  ratio  is  used  as  the  basis  to  devise  a  financial  ratio  that  can  identify  
overcapitalised   non-­‐‑financial   firms.   This   ratio   is   called   the   overcapitalisation  
ratio  (or  𝑂𝐶𝑅)  and  introduced  in  the  following  section.  Meanwhile,  the  gearing  
ratio  is  discussed  in  greater  detail  to  elucidate  its  theoretical  importance.    
The   gearing   ratio   g   (equation   3.1.)   brings   together   two   variables   crucially  
determining   the   financial   position   of   an   economic   entity:   indebtedness   and  
liquidity.   Recalling   Mishkin’s   (1978)   work   on   household   balance   sheets  
(mentioned  in  section  3.1.2.),   these  were  the  two  variables  found  significant  in  
explaining  household  aggregate  expenditure.  
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(3.1.)  𝑔 =   !!          where     D  =  total  debt  
                  L  =  liquid  assets  
Non-­‐‑financial   firms  –  be   they  rentiers  or  entrepreneurs  –  will  attempt   to  keep  
their  gearing  relatively  low  if  possible.  There  are  two  ways  to  achieve  this  aim:  
either  by  keeping  debt  (𝐷)  low  –  the  numerator  in  equation  3.1.  –  or  by  raising  
liquidity  (𝐿)  –   the  denominator.  Hence,   the  gearing   ratio   of   two   companies  A  
and  B  will  be  the  same  even  though  company  A  possesses  a  twice  as  large  debt  
burden  (2𝐷)  as  company  B  (𝐷),  if  A’s  liquid  assets  (2𝐿)  are  also  double  the  size  
of  B’s  liquid  assets  (𝐿):  
(3.2.)   𝑔! = !!!! = !! = 𝑔!  
Thus,   if   it   is   relatively   easy   to   raise   additional   funds   externally   –   such   as   for  
large   listed   companies   during   a   phase   of   capital   market   inflation,   when   the  
influx   of   liquidity   into   the   financial   markets   exceeds   the   new   issuance   of  
financial   paper   –   the   strategy   of   raising   additional   liquid   assets   becomes  
attractive  for  non-­‐‑financial  corporations.    
Rising  liquidity  on  non-­‐‑financial  corporations’  balance  sheets  might,  therefore,  
be  connected  to  the  wish  to  reduce  gearing  when  debt  volumes  rise,  resulting  in  
a  growing  share  of  liquid  assets  in  total  assets  (as  observed  by  Iskandar-­‐‑Datta,  
&  Jia  2012  for  the  US,  UK,  Australia,  Canada  and  Germany,  and  by  Bates  et  al.,  
2009   for   the  US).  Further,  non-­‐‑financial   companies  are   likely   to  hold   liquidity  
not  only  to  counter  debt  but  also  equity.  While  equity  is  not  a  liability,  it  shares  
certain  features  with  debt.  Certainly,  equity  does  not  have  to  be  repaid  by  the  
issuing   company,   since   the   investor   has   to   sell   the   shares   on   in   secondary  
markets   to  recover   the   initial   investment  plus  (minus)  a  potential  profit   (loss).  
Nonetheless,   listed   companies   are   expected   to   pay   dividends   and   sometimes  
also  to  buy  back  their  own  equity  to  stabilise  or  increase  the  share  price.    
From  a  balance  sheet  perspective  debt  and  equity  together  have  to  be  balanced  
by  assets.  This  can  be  demonstrated  using  a  schematic  representation  of  a  non-­‐‑
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financial   corporation’s   balance   sheet   as   presented   in   Figure   3.1.   above.   The  
schematic  balance  sheet   is  composed  of  assets   (left  column),  which  have  to  be  
matched  by  the  sum  of  liabilities  and  equity  (right  column).  Hence,  in  order  to  
avoid  a  mismatch  on  the  balance  sheet  (which  erodes  retained  profits  and  can,  
at   the   extreme   result   in   bankruptcy),   the   safest   use   for   new   funds   raised  
through  equity  are  liquid  assets.  This  is  the  case  because  liquid  assets  cannot  (or  
are   at   least  much   less   likely   to)   abruptly   lose   in   value   due   to   business   cycle  
swings   or   other   adverse   events.   Consequently,   holding   liquid   assets   is  much  
less  uncertain  than  engaging  in  investment  projects.  Given  the  increased  danger  
of   enforced   indebtedness   for   non-­‐‑financial   companies   since   the   1970s   or   so,  
uncertainty  of  investment  projects  is  likely  to  be  an  imminent  concern.    
Thus,   as   argued   above,   rentier   firms  hold   large   liquid   assets   to   counter   their  
liabilities.  This  leaves  us  with  the  question  why  they  obtain  increasing  volumes  
of   external   funds   in   the   first   place,   in   short:   why   are   firms   overcapitalising?  
Two   motives   are   at   work:   precaution   and   speculation.   Bringing   the   analysis  
back   to   the  historical   context   of   the   second  half   of   the   20th   century,   industrial  
circulation  was  facing  a  substantial  leakage  of  household  saving  (Steindl,  1982).  
Hence,  precaution  called  for  a  hedge  against  unforeseen  losses  from  production  
and   alternative   sources   of   cash   flow.  Liquid   assets   are   the  ultimate   insurance  
against  a  waning  cash  flow  and  unforeseen  expenses  since  they  can  be  instantly  
transformed  into  a  one-­‐‑off  cash  flow.    
Furthermore,  Kalecki   (1991[1954])   stressed   that   returns   on   government   bonds  
might   constitute   a   welcome   –   even   if   low-­‐‑yielding   –   stream   of   income   in   a  
situation  where  an  investment  project  went  wrong.  The  fact  that  safe  financial  
assets  –  such  as  government  securities  –  were  typically  (that  is,  given  a  regular  
yield  curve)  low-­‐‑yielding  constituted  another  reason  to  keep  external  liabilities  
to  a  minimum  during  Kalecki’s  times.    
As   Toporowski   (2005)   argues   it   was   Steindl   who   theorised   liquidity  
management  (and  overcapitalisation)  among  non-­‐‑financial  firms,  stressing  that  
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their   increased  need   for   liquidity  would  dampen   investment   spending.  Given  
future  payment  commitments,  non-­‐‑financial  companies  are  constrained  by  their  
liquidity   in  decisions  about   capital   investment.  Thus   in  order   to  keep  gearing  
down,   there   are   two   options:   either   liquid   assets   are   obtained   at   the   cost   of  
increasing   liabilities,   or   investment   spending   is   held   back.   Toporowski   (2005)  
calls  this  the  liquidity  preference  theory  of  investment.  Thus,  there  is  a  trade-­‐‑off  
between  liquidity  management  and  investment.    
This   thesis  will   argue   that   in   South  Africa   the  more   common  way   for   rentier  
firms  to  take  advantage  of  financial  markets  in  order  to  generate  profit  appears  
to   be   speculative   merger   and   acquisition   activity,   substantially   financed  
through   liquidity   held   on   the   balance   sheet.   Chapter   4   will   provide   the  
empirical   backing   for   this   hypothesis.  However,   it   is   important   to   define   the  
term   speculation,   since   as   chapter   4  will   reveal,   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   in  
South   Africa   tend   to   speculate   in   productive   assets   rather   than   in   financial  
investment,  as  often  claimed  in  the  financialisation  literature.    
3.2.3. Mergers and acquisitions  
As  pointed  out  by  Penrose  (2009,  p.  136),  the  mergers  and  acquisitions  activity  
of  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  does  not  have  to  be  unproductive,  ‘surrounded  by  
an  aura  of  monopoly,  collusion,  and  exploitation’  and  ‘haunted  by  the  ghosts  of  
financiers’.  Acquiring  or   selling  businesses  might   simply  be   a   consequence  of  
companies’   productive   profit-­‐‑seeking   in   a   competitive   market.   Similarly,   the  
term  speculation  as  used  in  economic  analysis  can  refer  to  a  productive  process.  
Schumpeter   (1939)   –   and   later   Minsky   –   understood   speculation   as   an  
entrepreneurial   and   innovative   act.   Schumpeter   (1933)   regarded   industrial  
activity  as  deeply  speculative,  driven  by  entrepreneurs  and  financed  by  credit.  
Their  activity  is  characterised  by  uncertainty  and  potential  failure.    
Similarly,  Minsky’s  work  (1986)  –  especially  the  two-­‐‑price  model  –  suggests  an  
interpretation  of  the  business  cycle  where  non-­‐‑financial  companies’  speculation  
on  the  price  of  productive  assets,  financed  by  bank  credit,  are  the  major  driver  
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behind   economic   fluctuations.   By   contrast,   this   thesis   will   embrace   Keynes’s  
(1936)  understanding  of  speculation,  which  defines  it  as  investment  for  capital  
gains.   Unlike   speculation,   enterprise   involves   investment   for   future   income.  
This   distinction   accommodates   Penrose’s   (2009)   views   on   mergers   and  
acquisitions,  since  she  argued  that  trades  in  business  units  would  take  place  if  
one   company   valued   the   future   income   stream   from   its   own   operations,   or  
those   of   a   subsidiary,   less   than   the   acquiring   corporation   does.   Hence,  
according   to  Penrose  mergers  and  acquisitions  are  productive  when  based  on  
calculations   about   future   business   income,   which   in   Keynes’s   terminology  
amounts  to  enterprise.    
The  rentier  firm  would  undertake  mergers  and  acquisitions  in  order  to  wait  for  
a   profitable   opportunity   to   restructure   and   resell   the   acquired   businesses,  
generating  a  one-­‐‑off  profit  rather  than  an  income  stream.  Thus,  rentier  firms  are  
likely   to   possess  much   larger   balance   sheets   than   entrepreneurial   companies,  
because   their   strategy   to   keep   down   gearing   is   to   counter   external   liabilities  
with  large  volumes  of  liquidity.  This  liquidity  can  then  be  used  for  mergers  and  
acquisitions   and   to   counter   any   evaporation   of   goodwill.   The   latter   is  
particularly  important  when  investing  into  assets  of  an  uncertain  value,  such  as  
mining   deposits,   but   would   also   apply   to   technological   or   pharmaceutical  
patents.      
In   order   to   further   illuminate   the   interaction   between   non-­‐‑financial   firms’  
financial   and   real   transactions   Locke   Anderson’s   balance   sheet   approach   is  
helpful   (Locke   Anderson,   1964).   According   to   Locke   Anderson   (1964,   p.   31),  
firms’   indebtedness  and   liquidity,  which   together   constitute   the  gearing   ratio,  
can  be  related  to  companies’  productive  operations  through  a  simple  formula:  
(3.3.)  𝐵 =   ∆𝐷∗ −   ∆𝐿  𝐵  refers   to   the   non-­‐‑financial   flow   within   a   non-­‐‑financial   corporation   for   a  
specific   period   p,   containing   the   sum   of   current   cash   payments   for   variable  
inputs,  capital  goods  and  dividends  less  the  sum  of  current  cash  receipts  from  
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sales   and   other   income   sources.  ∆𝐷∗  describes   all   non-­‐‑trade   outside   finance  
raised  during  p,  while  ∆𝐿  represents   the  change   in   liquid  assets  over   the  same  
time  period.   Importantly,  𝐷∗  also   includes   equity   as  part   of   the   firm’s   outside  
finance,  in  contrast  to  𝐷  used  in  equations  3.1.  and  3.2.  above,  referring  to  total  
debt.    
If   productive   operations   generate   sufficient   income   to   meet   current   cash  
payments   and   dividends,   that   is   if  𝐵 = 0,   additional   external   financing   is   not  
necessary  (∆𝐷∗ = 0)   as   long   as   the   company   does   not   increase   its   liquidity  
holdings   either  (∆𝐿 = 0).   If   total   income   exceeds   current   payment   obligations  (𝐵 < 0)  additional  liquid  assets  can  be  financed  internally  (∆𝐿 > 0).  These  two  
scenarios  would  correspond  to  Kalecki’s  assumption  that  firms  tend  to  finance  
their  operations  internally,  while  holding  reserve  accounts  of  retained  earnings  
in  liquid  form.    
However,   if  generated  income  falls  short  of  current  payments  (𝐵 > 0)  external  
financing   will   be   necessary  (∆𝐷∗ > 0).   From   the   Keynesian   perspective   this  
would   be   commonly   the   case   when   investment   expenditure   increases.   This  
view  is  also  shared  by  textbook  macroeconomics  (see  Mishkin,  &  Eakins,  2012),  
in  which  the  corporate  sector  is  understood  to  be  in  need  of  household  savings  
supplied   through   financial   intermediaries.   In   this   situation   a   rising   liquidity  
demand   by   non-­‐‑financial   business  (∆𝐿 > 0)  further   exacerbates   the   need   for  
external  finance.    
Locke  Anderson  described  the  corporate  operations  of  non-­‐‑financial  companies  
in  the  1950s  and  1960s.  Corporate  activity  has  changed  since  then,  as  argued  by  
heterodox  economists  (and  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter).  In  Toporowski’s  
(1993)   terminology,   Locke   Anderson’s   framework   centred   on   entrepreneurial  
firms   that   focus  on   trade  while  keeping   financial   transactions   to  a  minimum.5  
                                                                                                 
5  Locke   Anderson   (1964,   p.   35),   for   instance,   asserted   that   equity   issuance   by   listed  
manufacturing   firms  was   a  marginal  phenomenon  and   could   therefore   be   abstracted  
from  in  his  analysis.  
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For   this   type   of   firm   it   makes   sense   to   argue   that   companies   have   some  
minimum  level  of  liquidity  (𝐿!"#)  they  attempt  to  hold  and  a  maximum  level  of  
external   liabilities   (𝐷!"#∗ )   they  deem  safe.  This   is   simply  an  application  of   the  
principle  of  increasing  risk,  since  the  ratio  between  𝐷!"#∗   and  𝐿!"#  provides  the  
highest  gearing  ratio  acceptable  for  the  firm.  The  closer  companies  are  to  𝐷!"#∗ ,  
the  more  reluctant  they  will  be  to  increase  their  debt  burden  even  further  and  
the   less  favourable  borrowing  conditions  become  for  them.  Equally,   the  closer  
firms  are  to  the  minimum  threshold  of  liquidity  𝐿!"#   the  more  they  will  push  to  
raise   liquid   assets.   Hence,   flows   are   constrained   by   stocks   on   the   corporate  
balance  sheet.    
Liquidity  and  financing  considerations  have  a  profound  impact  on  a  company’s  
investment   expenditure.   At   least   for   the  medium   and   long   run   non-­‐‑financial  
companies’   investment   can   be   split   up   in   –   as   Locke   Anderson   termed   it   –  
controllable  and  non-­‐‑controllable  investment  (𝐵!   and  𝐵!,  respectively).    
(3.4.)  𝐵! + 𝐵! =   ∆𝐷∗ −   ∆𝐿  
Thus,  he  assumed  that  there  is  a  discretionary  and  a  non-­‐‑discretionary  share  in  
total  investment  expenditure.  This  view  takes  on  Kalecki’s  distinction  between  
the   investment   decision   and   actual   investment   expenditure.   Once   companies  
have   entered   an   investment   project   they   cannot   walk   away   from   it   without  
substantial   costs.   This   means   that   they   are   effectively   locked   into   their  
investment.    
Functions  f1  and  f2  in  Figure  3.2.  represent  this  relationship  between  controllable  
and  non-­‐‑controllable   investment  expenditure  for  an  average  plant.   Investment  
here   refers   of   course   to   productive   (and   not   financial)   investment,   i.e.  
equipment   and   any   other   expenses   necessary   for   a   plant’s   production  
operations.   The   functions   describe  B,   the   cash   outflow   necessary   for   a   firm’s  
operations,   and   BC,   the   share   in   this   flow,   which   can   be   controlled,   for   two  
different  companies,  firm  1  and  firm  2.  According  to  Locke  Anderson  company  
1   will   aim   to   reach   point   x2,   since   here   controllable   investment   spending   is  
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maximised   while   the   company’s   debt   burden   remains   unchanged.   The   line  
labelled  ∆𝐷!"# −   ∆𝐿!"#  represents   the   maximum   amount   of   cash   inflow   the  
company   can   generate   from   financial   operations,   while   observing   its   desired  
maximum  debt   levels   as  well   as   its   desired  minimum   levels   of   liquidity.   The  
functions   f1   and   f2   are  U-­‐‑shaped  because   initially   (i.e.   to   the   left  of  point  x2)   a  
reduction   in   the   share   of   controllable   cash   outflows   in   total   operational  
spending   will   reduce   the   operational   cost   of   the   company   (i.e.   B).   However,  
below  a  certain  share  (here  Z)  any  further  reduction  in  the  share  of  controllable  
spending   (in   total   investment   spending)  would   result   in   income   falling   faster  
than  costs  with  profits  suffering  (and  B  increasing).    
Figure 3.2. Trade-off between investment and liquidity 
  
Source:  Adapted  from  Locke  Anderson,  1964,  p.  36.  
If  B  exceeds  what  a  firm  can  generate  from  its  financial  operations  (represented  
by   the   line   labelled)   the   company   will   be   in   deficit.   This   is   the   case   for   the  
company  represented  by  f2,  let  us  call  it  company  2.  Thus,  company  2  has  to  run  
down  its  reserves  –  for  example  liquid  assets  –  to  cover  the  deficit.  Once  it  has  
run  out  of  reserves  and  other  marketable  assets  the  ultimate  consequence  of  the  
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aim  to  remaining  on  the  (∆𝐷!"# −   ∆𝐿!"#)  line  with  its  cash  outflows,  where  it  
balances  its   income  against   its  expenditure,  or  below  that   line.  Below  that   line  
(i.e.  in  the  blue  shaded  area)  company  1  increases  its  liquidity  holdings  because  
funds   raised   in   financial   transactions   exceed   what   is   dedicated   to   the  
nonfinancial  outflow  B,  meaning  operational  expenditure.  If  this  firm  operates  
anywhere   in   the   blue   shaded   area   in   figure   3.2.,   it   can   build   up  
overcapitalisation.    
If   we   assume   that   the   horizontal   line   (∆𝐷!"# −   ∆𝐿!"#)   denotes   financial  
transactions   necessary   to   run   productive   operations,   falling   below   point   x2  
means   for   the   firm   that   it   is   curtailing  production   in   favour  of   its   liquid  asset  
holdings.   Therefore,   Locke   Anderson   stressed   that   going   below   x2   would   be  
non-­‐‑optimal   for   firm   profits.   For   him   such   a   strategy   was   unattractive   since  
reducing   firm’s   controllable   expenditure,   as   share   in   overall   expenditure,   on  
operations  would   generate   progressively   less   profit,   and   finally   losses,   when  
pushed  below  x1.    
The   implicit   assumption   is,   however,   that   firms  will   aim   at  maximising   their  
controllable  investment  spending  by  expanding  productive  operations  through  
organic  growth,  financing  as  much  investment  spending  as  possible  (i.e.  aiming  
at  point  x2  in  figure  3.2.).  For  a  company  of  the  1960s  this  might  have  been  true.  
Nowadays,  large  listed  companies  –  and  especially  multinational  corporations  –  
often   grow   and   acquire   R&D   through   mergers   and   acquisitions   rather   than  
organically   (Serfati,   2008).   In   this   manner,   companies   outsource   (or   buy   in)  
specific  aspects  of  their  operations  –  for  example  R&D  in  the  technology  sector  
and  resource  exploration  in  the  mining  industry  –  to  smaller  enterprises.  Such  
behaviour  might  be  precautionary,  but  tends  to  have  a  speculative  dimension.  
Acquiring  businesses  and  their  assets  for  speculative  gains  (à  la  Keynes)  rather  
than  entrepreneurial   income  creation  (à   la  Penrose)   is  characteristic   for  rentier  
firms.  Such  a  growth  and  innovation  strategy  also  puts  a  stronger  emphasis  on  
controllable  investment  expenditure.    
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Takeover  activity  and  trade  in  business  units,  patents  and  other  R&D  might  be  
more   controllable  because   the   expenditure   that  underlies   these   transactions   is  
typically   one-­‐‑off   or   takes   place   during   a   limited   time   horizon.   This   is   an  
advantage   for   the   involved   non-­‐‑financial   corporation,   since   some   layers   of  
uncertainty   are   eliminated   –   investment   projects   often   take  much   longer   and  
absorb   more   funds   than   anticipated.   More   importantly,   in   highly   innovative  
industries   acquiring   a  developed   (or   even   semi-­‐‑developed)   product   or   patent  
reduces  the  probability  of  investment  failure.    
The  most  obvious  example  for  mergers  and  acquisitions  motivated  by  this  type  
of  risk  aversion  is   the  trade  in  mining  exploration  companies  that  has  become  
common   in   the   mining   industry   since   the   1990s,   as   will   be   discussed   in   the  
following   chapter.   Large   mining   companies   often   shy   away   from   direct  
exploration,   leaving   it   instead   to   smaller   listed   companies,   in   which   they  
sometimes   acquire   stakes   and   typically   buy   out   if   exploration   activity   is  
successful.   This   example   shows   that   precautionary   and   speculative   motives  
often  blur.  As  already  argued  by  Steindl  (1945),  large  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  
tend   to   be   more   cautious   because   they   do   not   need   to   undertake   risky  
investment   in   order   to   generate   sufficient   profit   for   survival,   as   smaller  
companies  are  often  forced  to  do.  Therefore,  investing  in  pre-­‐‑existing  business  
units   (through   mergers   and   acquisitions)   is   a   precautionary   strategy.   At   the  
same   time,   mergers   and   acquisitions   are   often   exercised   in   the   hope   of   an  
increase   in   the   value   of   the   acquired   asset.   In   South   Africa,   these   assets   are  
frequently  mines.      
The   reduced  uncertainty   comes   at   a   price   since   the   purchase   –   of   a   business,  
patent   or   else   –   has   to   be   paid   for   by   a   large   lump   sum.   Therefore,   shifting  
emphasis   onto   controllable   investment   and   reducing   uncontrollable  
nonfinancial   trade   flows   –   that   is   continuous   investment   outlay   –   requires   a  
higher  degree  of  liquidity.  Hence,  for  rentier  firms  there  is  no  optimal  level  of  
liquidity  as   suggested   in  Figure  3.2.,  where  profits   are  maximised   in  point  x2.  
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The  entrepreneurial  firm  supports  the  maximum  volume  of  business  operations  
in   that   point,   given   the   necessary   minimum   level   of   liquidity.   Since   rentier  
firms   also   obtain   profits   from   financial   operations   and   mergers   and  
acquisitions,   they  will  aim  at  a  much  higher   level  of   liquid  assets,  eliminating  
the  line  (∆𝐷!"# −   ∆𝐿!"#).    
Notably,   an   active   strategy   of   buying   and   selling   corporate   interest   blurs   the  
lines  between   financial   and  productive   investment.  According   to   the  UN,   if   a  
foreign   company   acquires   more   than   10%   of   another   corporations   ordinary  
shares  or  voting  power  it  is  counted  as  foreign  direct  investment,  i.e.  productive  
investment.  If  that  volume  is  smaller,  it  becomes  portfolio  investment,  which  is  
classified  as  financial.  The  chosen  threshold  appears  rather  arbitrary.    
3.2.4. A methodology to measure overcapitalisation 
In   line   with   an   alternative   and   comprehensive   balance   sheet   approach   the  
actual   financial   statement   will   be   in   the   centre   of   the   analysis   to   follow   in  
chapter  4.  This  section  proposes  two  financial  ratios  to  support  the  analysis  of  
overcapitalised  non-­‐‑financial   firms   in   South  Africa.   The   aim   is   to   reveal   their  
motivation   for   overcapitalisation,   which   according   to   mainstream   and  
heterodox   economic   literature   is  mainly   precautionary   or  mainly   speculative,  
respectively.  
Non-­‐‑financial  firms  that  are  overcapitalised,  engaging  in  financial  operations  to  
acquire   rentier   income   and/or   speculate,   will   tend   to   actively   acquire   liquid  
assets.   Therefore,   liquidity   ratios   can   be   used   to   detect   non-­‐‑financial   firms’  
overcapitalisation.  Conventionally,  there  are  three  main  liquidity  ratios  used  to  
assess   the   soundness   of   non-­‐‑financial   companies’   operations:   (1)   the   current  
ratio,   (2)   the  quick   ratio  and   (3)   the  cash  ratio.  The   focus  on  short-­‐‑term  assets  
and   liabilities   in   the   ratio   analysis   is   deliberate   since   long-­‐‑term   balance   sheet  
items   are   often   expressed   at   historical   cost,   introducing   problems   of   accurate  
valuation.   Current   balance   sheet   items   are   re-­‐‑valued   regularly,   and   are  
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therefore  a  fair  reflection  of  a  company’s  liquid  assets  and  short-­‐‑term  payment  
commitments.    
Historically,   the   current   ratio  measured  as   total   current   assets   to   total   current  
liabilities  was  the  first  financial  ratio  to  be  developed  and  utilised  for  financial  
transactions   (Horrigan,   1968).   However,   the   current   ratio   is   of   limited   use   in  
measuring   actual   liquidity   because   it   relates   total   current   assets,   including  
inventories,   account   receivables,   cash   and   cash   equivalents,   as   well   as   other  
current  assets  to  total  current  liabilities  (see  Figure  3.3.).    
In  the  course  of  the  business  cycle  inventories  and  receivables  might  turn  into  
illiquid  assets.  Similarly,  inventories  are  typically  built  up  in  the  early  phases  of  
an   economic   downswing   and   pile   up   during   a   recession,  when   by   definition  
demand  falls  substantially.  Therefore,  the  current  ratio  is  likely  to  overestimate  
the  actual   liquidity  of  a  company,  especially  during  a  cyclical  downturn.  This  
overestimation   was   recognised   in   the   convention   (widespread   among   U.S.  
banks   for   much   of   the   20th   century)   to   ask   for   a   current   ratio   of   2:1,   when  
assessing  a  borrower’s  creditworthiness  (Steffy  et  al.,  1974).      
Figure 3.3. Overview over the most common liquidity ratios 
  
Source:  Collier,  2012,  Delta  Publishing  Company,  2006.    
The  quick  ratio  resembles  the  current  ratio  closely,  with  the  decisive  distinction  
that   it   excludes   inventories   from   its   calculation   of   liquidity   (see   Figure   3.3.).  
However,  account  receivables,  which  mostly  refer  to  trade  credit  among  firms  
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might   similarly   become   effectively   non-­‐‑performing   loans   during   a   cyclical  
downturn.  During  a  business  cycle  bust,  debtors  might  not  be  able  to  pay  their  
commitments   because   they   are   facing   declining   demand   for   their   products,  
adversely   affecting   cash   flow.   Recognising   that   firms’   (and   households’)  
balance   sheets   are   interlinked   and   assets   are   simultaneously   liabilities,   it   is  
difficult  to  classify  inventories  and  receivables  as  liquid  assets.            
Therefore,   the   cash   ratio   is   the  most   suitable   conventional   accounting   ratio   to  
measure  a  firm’s  liquid  holdings,  since  it  takes  only  the  most  liquid  assets  into  
account,  namely   cash  and  cash  equivalents   (see  Figure  3.3.).  According   to   the  
International  Financial  Reporting  Standards   (IFRS)6  cash   refers   to   currency  on  
hand   and  demand  deposits  with   banks   and  other   institutions.  Other   types   of  
deposits  are  also  included  in  the  definition,  as  long  as  the  customer  may  place  
and  effectively  withdraw  funds  at  any   time  without  prior  warning  or  penalty  
(European  Commission,   2003).   Cash   equivalents   are   short-­‐‑term,   highly-­‐‑liquid  
investments   that   are   readily   convertible   to   known   amounts   of   cash,  meaning  
that   there   is   insignificant   risk   of   a   change   in   value   due   to   a   change   in  
underlying  asset  prices.  Short-­‐‑term  refers   to  a   time  period  of   three  months  or  
less   (European   Commission,   2003,   Deloitte,   2011).      Examples   of   cash  
equivalents  are  government  bonds  and  money  market  funds.  Typically,  equity  
is  not  classified  as  cash  equivalent  on  financial  statements  but  under  marketable  
securities  (Deloitte,  2011).      
(3.11.)  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜  =  !"#!  !"#  !"#!  !"!"#$%&'()!"#$%  !"##$%&  !"#$"!"%"&'   
The  distinction  between  positions,  which  are  held   for  operational,   investment  
or  financing  purposes  and  those  accumulated  to  simply  obtain  financial  profits  
                                                                                                 
6  IFRS  are  the  attempt  to  harmonise  financial  reporting  standards  across  the  European  
Union,  which  made   them   attractive   internationally   and   they  were   subsequently   also  
implemented   in   a   range   of   OECD   countries,   but   also   in   emerging   markets   such   as  
Brazil,  Russia  and  South  Africa.  They  are  sometimes  still  called  by  their  original  name  
(International   Accounting   Standards).   South   Africa   implemented   the   IFRS   in   2005  
(Collier,   2012;   van   Greuning,   2006,   for   South   Africa   see   UNCTAD   Trade   and  
Development  Board,  2007).  
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and   speculative  gains,   is  not   clear-­‐‑cut.  The   same   liquid  assets   can  be  held   for  
multiple  purposes.  They  could  be  acquired  to  generate  supplementary  financial  
or   speculative   income   (precautionary   and   speculative   motive).   Also,   non-­‐‑
financial   companies   are   in  need  of   liquid   assets   to   address   short-­‐‑falls   in   their  
cash   flow   during   re-­‐‑occurring   business   cycle   downswing,   that   is   out   of   a  
precautionary  motive.    
Some   authors   suggest   a   cash   ratio   of   around   20%   for   non-­‐‑financial   firms   is  
advisable   (Wöltje,   2012).   However,   conventions   and   levels   of   precaution   are  
likely   to   vary   from   country   to   country   and   industry   to   industry.   Therefore,  
picking   a   numerical   threshold   to   determine   non-­‐‑financial   firms’  
overcapitalisation  might  be  too  simplistic  –  if  easy  and  elegant  to  implement.    
A  sounder  approach  would  be  to  choose  a  relative  threshold.  Overcapitalisation  
highlights   the   blurring   boundaries   between   financial   and   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations.  Consequently,   a   liquidity   threshold  at  which   these   two   types  of  
corporations   cannot   be   distinguished   from   each   other   should   be   identified.  
Since  financial  firms  among  themselves  are  also  very  diverse,  some  average  of  
one   or   several   highly   liquid   financial   industries   could   be   found   as   liquidity  
threshold  for  overcapitalisation.      
Finally,   one   threshold   appears   to   offer   itself   readily   for   the   purpose   of  
identifying   a   speculative  motive   for   liquidity   demand   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms:  
the   cash   ratio   of   1   (or   100%).   Even   for   a   very   conservative   non-­‐‑financial  
company  holding  liquid  assets  beyond  the  volume  of  current  liabilities  cannot  
be   justified   by   the   precautionary   motive.   The   view   that   a   cash   ratio   of   1   is  
exaggerated   as   precautionary   measure   is   also   common   sense   among  
accountants  (Peavler,  2014).  
Strictly  speaking,  the  cash  ratio  does  not  capture  overcapitalisation  fully,  since  
it   does   not   contain   liquid   assets   and   investments,   which   are   undertaken   for  
longer  than  three  months.  These  are  often  referred  to  as  short-­‐‑term  investment  
or  marketable  securities,  classified  as  financial  investment  either  under  current  
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or  non-­‐‑current  assets.  In  the  case  of  current  assets  the  maturity  period  is  up  to  
one  year,  or  alternatively  the  company  has  the  intention  to  sell  the  asset  during  
that   period.   For   non-­‐‑current   assets   the  maturity  period   exceeds   one   year   and  
sometimes   –   such   as   in   the   case   of   marketable   securities   or   business   units  
acquired  and  held  for  sale  at  a  not  yet  specified  date  –  the  asset  does  not  mature  
at  all,  but  is  sold  on  subsequently.  It  is  important  to  include  these  investments  
to  avoid  understating  the  full  extent  of  a  firm’s  overcapitalisation.  
Hence,   to   measure   the   true   extent   of   overcapitalisation   an   overcapitalisation  
ratio  (𝑂𝐶𝑅)  has  to  be  constructed,  which  reveals  assets  that  are  held  to  generate  
financial   income   and/or   for   speculative   profit.   The  𝑂𝐶𝑅  relates   cash   and   cash  
equivalents   but   also  marketable   securities   and   other   financial   and  productive  
assets,  that  potentially  generate  rentier  income,  to  total  current  liabilities.    
(3.12.)  𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜  (𝑂𝐶𝑅)  =  !""#!"  !"#"$%&'#!  !"#$%"!  !"#$%&!"#$%  !"##$%&  !"#$"!"%"&'   
The   strength   of   the   𝑂𝐶𝑅   is   that,   in   contrast   to   liquidity   ratios,   it   also  
incorporates   long-­‐‑term   financial   investment,   which   would   be   part   of   a  
company’s   non-­‐‑current   assets.   In   this   sense,   the  𝑂𝐶𝑅  is   more   prone   to   the  
liquidity   illusion  (Nesvetailova,  2008)   than  the  cash  ratio,  since  some  financial  
investment  might  be  highly  liquid  during  times  of  capital  market  inflation  but  
become  illiquid  once  the  tide  turns  towards  a  financially  deflationary  situation.    
Nevertheless,  the  𝑂𝐶𝑅  can  help  us  to  measure  the  extent  of  non-­‐‑financial  firms’  
rentier   activity,   especially   since   the   ratio   is   aimed   at   including   financial   and  
productive   assets   that   non-­‐‑financial   companies   acquire   for   later   sale.   This  
means   the  𝑂𝐶𝑅  reflects   to  a   large  extent   companies’   intentions  declared   in   the  
financial   statement   and   its   construction   is   dependent   on   qualitative   financial  
analysis,   that   is   the  comprehensive  balance  sheet  approach,  and  lends   itself   to  
case  study  analysis.    
Admittedly,   a   high  𝑂𝐶𝑅  can   be   driven   by   varying   motives   of   non-­‐‑financial  
companies   to   hold   liquid   assets.   The   theoretical   discussion   in   the   previous  
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chapter   revealed   that  precaution  and   speculation  are   the   two  most   influential  
motives.  Equally,  industry-­‐‑specific  reasons  for  high  liquid  asset  holdings  could  
be  at  play.  Therefore,  in  the  following  chapter  the  𝑂𝐶𝑅  is  used  as  an  analytical  
tool  to  identify  potential  cases  of  company’s  involvement  in  rentier  investment.  
A  large  difference  between  the  cash  ratio  and  𝑂𝐶𝑅  for  a  given  firm  flags  such  an  
involvement.  Like  any  financial  ratio  it  will  have  to  be  supplemented  by  further  
qualitative   information.   Therefore,   the   reason   for   the   identified   companies’  
rentier  investment  is  analysed,  using  comprehensive  balance  sheet  analysis.  
Crucially,   the  next   chapter  will   show   large  volumes  of   liquid   assets   are   often  
held  by  companies  that  speculate  in  real  assets.  These  companies  buy  and  sell  
subsidiaries   to  generate  capital  gains.  Typically,   this  mergers  and  acquisitions  
activity   is   accounted   for  under  non-­‐‑current   assets  on   the  balance   sheet  where  
newly   acquired   (or   sold)   business  units   are  declared.  Often,   these   entities   are  
moved   to   the   current   assets   section   of   the   balance   sheet   when   mergers   and  
acquisitions  negotiations  are  under  way,  or   the  parent  company  has  signalled  
its   willingness   to   sell   the   unit.   Of   course,   as   pointed   out   by   Penrose   (2009),  
mergers   and   acquisitions   activity   does   not   automatically   imply   rentier   profit  
and  intent.    
However,  if  a  non-­‐‑financial  firm’s  𝑂𝐶𝑅  repeatedly  exceeds  its  cash  ratio  due  to  
both,   buying   and   selling   of   subsidiaries   this   is   evidence   of   speculation   on  
productive  assets   such  as   subsidiaries   and  other  business  units.   If   a   company  
aims   at   rapid   growth,   it  would   concentrate   on   acquisitions.  While   occasional  
sales   of   business   units   might   occur   due   to   changing   investment   strategies,  
falling   profitability   or   other   reasons,   frequent   buying   and   selling   practically  
equates  to  dealing  in  subsidiaries  to  make  a  capital  gain.    
Summarising,   two   financial   ratios   are   suggested   to   analyse   sectoral   and  
individual   balance   sheets,   namely   the   cash   ratio   and   the  𝑂𝐶𝑅,   which   will   be  
applied   to   the   South   African   economy   and   JSE-­‐‑listed   companies   in   the  
following  chapter.  
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(3.13.)  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜   =  !"#!  !"#  !"#!  !"#$%&'!()*!"#$%  !"##$%&  !"#$"!"%"&'   
(3.14.)  𝑂𝐶𝑅   =  !"#!  !"#  !"#!  !"#$%&'!()*!!"##$%&  !"#$#%"$&  !""#$"!!"!#$%%&!'  !"#$#%"$&  !""#$"!"#$%  !"##$!"  !"#$"!"%"&'   
The   comparison   of   the   cash   ratio   to   the   𝑂𝐶𝑅   will   reveal   how   much  
overcapitalisation   is   concealed   through   the   balance   sheet   structure   and  
presentation   of   financial   results.   In   chapter   4,   JSE-­‐‑listed   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations  will  be  assessed  for  overcapitalisation  using   these   two  suggested  
tools.   Importantly,   the   balance   sheet   analysis   does   not   stop   there,   but   only  
commences.  The  proposed   ratios  are  merely   instrumental   in   identifying   those  
non-­‐‑financial  corporations,  which  are  potentially  overcapitalised.  Subsequently,  
their  financial  statements  and  full  annual  reports  will  be  analysed  to  answer  the  
questions   formulated   in   the   previous   chapter:   (1)   What   role   do   financial  
operations   play   in   these   companies?   And   (3)   why   might   their   liquidity  
preference  have  increased  over  the  past  decades?    
Question   (2)   which   addresses   the   type   of   non-­‐‑financial   companies   that   are  
examined   can   be   answered   on   the   basis   of   the   chosen   methodology.   Such  
detailed   financial   statement   analysis   is   more   easily   conducted   for   listed  
corporations   than   other   companies,   due   to   the   legal   requirements   to   disclose  
information,   which   listed   businesses   face.   Nonetheless,   considerations   about  
firm  heterogeneity  are  an  important  aspect  of  balance  sheet  analysis.  Therefore,  
the  next   section  will   provide   an  overview  of   the   business   landscape   in   South  
Africa,  which  will  inform  the  empirical  analyses  of  chapters  4  and  especially  7.  
3.3. A balance sheet approach for South African non-financial firms 
As   pointed   out   in   section   3.1.,   financial   ratios   are   merely   analytical   tools.   In  
order   to   apply   them   correctly   the   researcher   requires   a   good   grasp   of   a  
company’s  business  and  the  peculiarities  of  its  trade  (see,  for  instance,  Morley,  
1984).   Since   the   author   is   proposing   to   use   financial   ratio   analysis   (alongside  
other   analytical   tools)   to   assess   whether   South   African   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations  are  overcapitalised,  knowledge  of  the  peculiarities  of  the  country’s  
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corporate   landscape   is   essential.   Therefore,   this   section  will   shed   light   on   the  
emergence   of   capitalist   enterprises   in   South   Africa   (in   part   3.3.1.).   Here,   the  
development   of   mining-­‐‑finance   houses   and   dominant   company   groups   was  
central   (part   3.3.2.).   South  Africa’s   economic   history   explains   the   presence   of  
large  monopolistic  companies   in   the  country  as  well  as   the  marginalisation  of  
small  and  medium-­‐‑sized  enterprises  (discussed  in  section  3.3.3.).    
3.3.1. The emergence of capitalist firms 
The   first   capitalist   companies   to   emerge   in   what   would   later   become   South  
Africa,   that   is,   companies   which   depended   on   wage   labour   on   a   substantial  
scale,  formed  in  the  mining  sector  towards  the  end  of  the  19th  century.  Prior  to  
that,   economic   production   in   the  Cape  Colonies  was   characterised  mostly   by  
subsistence  activity,  petty  commodity  producers  and  artisan  production.    
Cape   Town   was   founded   in   1652   by   the   Dutch   East   India   Company   (the  
Vereenigde  Oostindische  Compagnie  as   it   is  called   in  Dutch)  as  a  stopover  on  the  
way   from  Europe   to  East  Asia,   especially   Indonesia,  where   the   company  had  
established  trading  posts  in  the  early  17th  century.  During  most  of  the  17th  and  
18th   centuries   the   colony   ran   large   trade   deficits,   as   many   goods   had   to   be  
imported   from   Europe,   because   the   Dutch   East   India   Company   discouraged  
local   production   as   far   as   possible,   aiming   to   keep   competition   for   their  
companies  in  Holland  down  (Feinstein,  2005).  
Most  of   the  commercial  activity   took  place  along   the  coasts   in   the   two  British  
territories:  the  Cape  Colony  and  the  Natal  Colony.  The  hinterland,  in  contrast,  
was  sparsely  populated  by  Dutch-­‐‑origin   farmers   (the  Afrikaner  or  Boer),  who  
tracked   out   there   to   avoid   British   rule   (mainly   taxation   and   the   abolition   of  
slavery,  see  Sparks,  1990).  The  two  Afrikaner  territories,  the  Orange  Free  State  
and   the   South   African   Republic   (or   the   Transvaal),   emerged   in   the   arid   veld  
around  the  mid-­‐‑19th  century.    
Their   inhabitants   produced   most   of   their   food   and   clothing,   as   well   as  
household   products   such   as   soap   and   candles,   at   home   because   their   cash  
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incomes  were  too  meagre  to  purchase  these  goods  (Feinstein,  2005).  Thus,  there  
was   little   trade   activity   in   these   rural   territories.   In   fact,   they   were   so  
unattractive   economically   that   local   commercial  banks,  which  were   set  up   for  
the   first   time   in  1837   in  Cape  Town,  only  made   it   there  40  years   later   (Arndt,  
1928).7    
However,   when   gold   and   diamonds   were   discovered   in   the   Transvaal   and  
Orange   Free   State   in   the   second   half   of   the   19th   century,   economic   activity  
around   the   gold-­‐‑digging   town   of   Johannesburg   and   the   diamond   fields   of  
Kimberly  surged.  Consequently,  political  interest  in  the  resource-­‐‑rich  territories  
awoke  in  the  British  authorities.  It  took  two  wars  and  one  failed  insurrection  to  
bring   the   Afrikaner   republics   under   British   rule   by   1902.   In   1910,   all   four  
colonies:   the   Cape   Colony,   Natal   Colony,   the   Orange   Free   State   (the   Orange  
River  Colony  since  1902)  and  the  South  African  Republic  (the  Transvaal  Colony  
since  1902)  were  unified  to  form  the  Union  of  South  Africa,  a  dominion  of  the  
British  Empire.  
Mining   interests  were  not  only  decisive   in   the   formation  of   South  Africa   as   a  
state,  but  also  in  the  emergence  of  capitalist  labour  relations  (Turrell,  1987).  The  
diamond   and   gold   mines   required   vast   amounts   of   cheap   labour.   Large  
diamond   and   gold   mining   companies   emerged   in   the   late   19th   century,  
concentrating   the   majority   of   mining   claims   in   the   hands   of   a   few   mining-­‐‑
finance  houses  (Kubicek,  1979).  The  history  of  these  houses  and  their  interaction  
with  local  and  foreign  financial  institutions  is  discussed  in  detail  in  chapter  6.  
The  mining  groups  pushed  for  the  impoverishment  of  the  native  population,  to  
a  large  degree  stripping  them  of  the  means  of  subsistence  and  turning  them  into  
‘free’  wage   labourers.  The  Chamber  of  Mines,   formed   in  1887  and  until   today  
the  representation  of  mining  sector   interests,  was  instrumental   in  this  process.  
During   the   early   years   of   the   gold   rush   on   the   Witwatersrand   black   gold  
diggers   could   hold   mining   claims.   This   was   banned.   Land   was   increasingly  
                                                                                                 
7  See  chapter  6.  
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seized  from  black  farmers,  either  forcefully  or  under  the  cloak  of  taxation.  A  so-­‐‑
called  ‘hut  tax’  was  introduced  on  native  land,  which  these  subsistence  farmers  
increasingly   struggled   to  meet.  As   a   result   a   growing  number   of   black   South  
Africans  was   left  without  means,   forcing   them   into  wage   labour   in   the  mines  
(Innes,  1984).  
The  cost-­‐‑cutting  measures  of  large  mining  companies  like  Anglo  American  left,  
however,   little   room   for   small   and  medium-­‐‑sized   enterprises   to  grow  around  
the  mines,  where   a   rising  number   of  workers   congregated.  On   the   one  hand,  
black  miners  were  miserably  paid:   in   1911  white  miners   earned   twelve   times  
the  cash  wage  of  black  miners.  At  its  peak,  during  the  1970s,  the  ratio  of  white  
to  black  real  cash  wages  was  21:1  (Lipton,  1980).  Even  in  1975,  after  a  wave  of  
wage   increases   for   black   workers,   average   African   earnings   per   month   in  
agriculture,  mining,  commerce  and  government  were  substantially  below  R100,  
meaning   below   the   poverty   line   at   that   time,   defined   by   the   official  
Johannesburg  Household  Subsistence  Level  of  R120  (Keenan,  1983).  
On   the   other   hand,   most   goods   and   services   needed   by   black   miners   were  
provided   through   the   mining   groups.   Black   workers   were   housed   in   a  
compound,   which   effectively   operated   like   a   prison   (Innes,   1984).   Food   was  
provided   as   part   of   their   remuneration,   while   a   brewery   run   by   the   mining  
company  was  also  present  in  the  compound  (Limebeer,  1951).  Thus,  there  were  
very   limited   business   opportunities   for   traders   or   retailers   around   the   mine  
compounds.        
Much  of  the  early  capitalist  firms  that  formed  outside  of  the  mining  sector  were  
closely   linked   to   mining   activity.   The   big   mining   groups   financed   and   took  
direct   control   of   manufacturing   production,   which   fed   into   their   mining  
activity.  The  earliest  example  are  the  efforts  by  De  Beers  –  majority-­‐‑owned  by  
the  Anglo  American  group  –  to  establish  a  domestic  explosives  manufacturer  in  
the  1890s  (Innes,  1984).  This  was  done  to  once  again  cut  costs,  which  given  an  
internationally  set  gold  price  directly  translated  into  increased  profit.  
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At   the   turn  of   the  20th  century,  some  manufacturing  firms  were  present   in   the  
Transvaal,  in  proximity  to  the  mines,  which  were  able  to  produce  high  quality  
heavy  machinery  (and  other  metal-­‐‑works)  for  the  needs  of  mining  companies.  
Manufacturers   of   light   consumer   goods   (such   as   textiles,   leather   goods   and  
furniture)   emerged   during   World   War   I   as   South   Africa   was   cut   off   from  
European  imports  (Feinstein,  2005).  Thus,  the  first  significant  wave  of  small  and  
medium-­‐‑sized  enterprise  development   in  South  Africa  occurred  as  recently  as  
100  years  ago.  At  that  point  large-­‐‑scale  mining  activity  had  been  under  way  for  
thirty   years   or   so.   The   value   added   of   manufacturing   companies   was   low,  
because  most  of  the  inputs  had  to  be  imported  from  Britain.  Even  after  World  
War  I,  which  provided  an  impetus  to  local  manufacturing,  97%  of  material  used  
in   the  metal  and  engineering   industry   (the  single  biggest  area  of  employment  
outside  of  mining  at  that  point)  was  imported  (Magubane,  1990).      
Local   production   and   companies   experienced   a  major   stimulus   in   1924  when  
the   newly   elected   Pact   Government 8   adopted   a   manufacturing-­‐‑promoting  
policy   of   import-­‐‑substituting   industrialisation.   The   aim   of   the   policy   was   to  
create   large   numbers   of   jobs   in   manufacturing   for   unskilled   poor   white  
workers,  who  made  up  a  large  part  of  the  Pact  Government’s  electorate.  Thus,  
tariffs  for  many  imported  goods  (with  the  exception  of  raw  materials  needed  in  
mining   and   manufacturing)   were   either   introduced   or   raised   in   the   revised  
Customs  Tariff  Act  of  1925  (Feinstein,  2005).    
While   these   measures   helped   the   establishment   of   local   companies,   the  
industrial  policies  adopted  arguably  favoured  large-­‐‑scale  business.  This  became  
especially  evident  with  the  establishment  of  the  state-­‐‑owned  Electricity  Supply  
Commission  (ESCOM)  in  1923  and  the  creation  of  the  Iron  and  Steel  Industrial  
Corporation  (ISCOR)  in  1928  (Feinstein,  2005).  Both  supported  the  emergence  of  
large-­‐‑scale   capital-­‐‑intensive   producers   of   heavy  machinery.   Importantly,   both  
                                                                                                 
8   A   political   alliance   between   an   emergent   Afrikaner   bourgeoisie   and   Afrikaner  
working   class  was   the   basis   for   a   ‘pact’   between   the  National   Party   and   the   Labour  
Party  (Murray,  1982).  
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also   benefitted   mining   activity,   which   itself   is   energy-­‐‑   and   capital-­‐‑intensive,  
requiring  heavy  machinery  for  production.  
Therefore,  much  of   South  Africa’s  manufacturing   established   in   the   early   20th  
century   was   closely   linked   to   the   mining   industry.   This   changed   somewhat  
during   World   War   II,   which   once   again   resulted   in   a   complete   halt   of  
manufacturing   imports.   This   time,   however,   with   industrial   policies   in   place  
and   an   existing   (if   nascent)   consumer   goods   industry   present,   the  war   years  
proved   a   substantial   development   spur.   This   spilled   over   into   heavy  
manufacturing,   as   ammunition   and   other   war   equipment   was   produced   in  
South  Africa  (Feinstein,  2005).      
The   two   decades   after  World  War   II   were   characterised   by   strong   economic  
expansion  in  South  Africa,  favouring  growth  in  the  manufacturing  and  service  
industries.  The  number  of  small  non-­‐‑financial  companies  grew  strongly   in  the  
retail  sector,  even  including  growth  in  non-­‐‑white-­‐‑owned  businesses.  According  
to  official  government  statistics,   there  were  761  black-­‐‑owned  retail  outlets  and  
one  wholesaler  in  South  Africa  in  the  mid-­‐‑1940s.  By  the  early  1950s,  1,135  black-­‐‑
owned   retailers   and   21   black-­‐‑owned   wholesalers   existed.   In   contrast,   the  
number   of  white-­‐‑owned   retailers   in   the   early   1950s  was   twenty-­‐‑five   times   as  
high.   Other   non-­‐‑white   South   Africans   (especially   South   Africans   of   Indian  
decent)   were   somewhat   less   marginalised   in   business   than   black   South  
Africans.  Despite  this  racial  discrimination  the  number  of  black-­‐‑owned  (small)  
businesses   grew   dynamically   in   the   post-­‐‑war   era.   By   1960,   there  were   16,000  
black-­‐‑owned  retailers  (Mkele,  1960).  Of  course,  these  figures  remained  small  for  
a  country  with  an  estimated  population  of  around  17  million  people  in  1960.  
The  emergence  of  black  small  businesses  (or  petty  capitalists)  was  hindered  by  
legislation,   which   intended   to   limit   competition   for   white   businesses,   while  
keeping   the   black   population   out   of   the   cities,   where   they  were   regarded   as  
mere  ‘sojourners’  (Feinstein,  2005).  Under  apartheid,  from  the  1940s  onwards  it  
was   hardly   possible   for   black   South   Africans   to   own   land.   This   meant   that  
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entrepreneurs   did   not   have   the   possibility   to   use   property   as   collateral   for   a  
start-­‐‑up  loan,  for  instance.  The  Native  (Urban  Areas)  Consolidation  Act  of  1945  
severely   restricted   black   entrepreneurs’   opportunities   to   invest   or   access  
finance,   by   limiting   interest,   share   capital   or   deposits   of   ‘natives’   in   any  
financial  institution  to  not  more  than  20%  (Mkele,  1960).    
Unsurprisingly   and   intentionally,   apartheid   legislation   seriously   retarded   the  
development  of  non-­‐‑white  (and  especially  black)  business.  Since  black  workers  
only   earned   a   fraction   of   the   ‘white’   wage   (Feinstein,   2005),   there   was   little  
possibility   to   accumulate   capital   for   entrepreneurial   purposes   out   of   wage  
income.  Combined  with  the  exclusion  from  financial  intermediaries,  this  meant  
that   for   a   long   time  most   black   retailers   were   forced   to   concentrate   on   light  
consumer   goods,   such   as   food,   rather   than   white   goods   or   furniture,   which  
most  black  South  Africans  bought  from  ‘white’  businesses  in  the  towns  where  
they  spent  their  working  days  (Mkele,  1960).  Only  in  the  1980s  more  legal  space  
for  black  businesses  was  created  (Rogerson,  1987).  As  consequence,  by  the  late  
1980s  the  share  of  black  South  African  who  were  self-­‐‑employed  was  estimated  
to  be  merely  1.8%,  while   this  share  was  10.6%  among  white  South  Africa  and  
8.6%  among  South  African’s  of  Asian  descent  (Friedland,  1987).      
The   industrial   policy   of   the   apartheid   government   aimed   in   particular   at  
supporting   the   emergence   of   an   Afrikaner   capitalist   class.   The   Dutch-­‐‑origin  
population   was   traditionally   engaged   in   agriculture,   while   many   of   the  
industrial   interests   were   (at   least   perceived   to   be)   in   South   African-­‐‑British  
hands. 9   Financial   institutions   like   SANLAM   (Suid-­‐‑Afrikaanse   Nasionale  
Lewensassuransie  Maatskappy10,  established  in  1918)  and  Volkskas  (established  
in   1934)  were   founded   to   back   small   and  medium-­‐‑sized  Afrikaner   businesses  
                                                                                                 
9   Large   corporations   like   Anglo   American   or   General   Mining   were   backed   by  
international  (that  is  British,  American,  German  and  other  European)  investors,  while  
the   families   running   these   interests   (such   as   the  Oppenheimers   of   Anglo  American)  
were   of   European,   but   not   necessarily   British,   decent.   Anyone   who   was   not   an  
Afrikaner  seemed  to  have  been  labeled  as  foreign  or  British.      
10  The  South  African  National  Life  Assurance  Company.  
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(Magubane,  1990).  Nevertheless,  given   the  barriers   for  black  business  activity,  
apartheid   legislation   is   likely   to   have   seriously   hindered   the   development   of  
small   and   medium-­‐‑sized   enterprises   in   South   Africa,   explaining   the  
comparatively  small  size  of  the  sector  today  (see  section  3.3.3.).    
The   attitude   of   the   apartheid   government   towards  African   businesses,  which  
were  mostly  small  and   informal,  only  changed  when  South  Africa’s  economic  
decline  during  the  1980s  meant  that  employment  growth  stagnated  and  formal  
sector   employment,   especially   in   large-­‐‑scale   manufacturing,   contracted  
(Rogerson,   1987).   Then   informal   and   small   business   was   promoted   as  
employment   creators,   for   instance   through   the   launch   of   the   Small   Business  
Development   Corporation   in   1981,   which   had   the   mandate   to   assist   small  
entrepreneurs.  Previously,   informal  activity  was   illegally  undertaken   in  urban  
centres.   Despite   this   pragmatic   change   of   heart,   in   practice   the   support   from  
apartheid  authorities  was  undertaken  in  many  cases  grudgingly  (as  the  struggle  
of  black  hawkers  for  trading  space  in  most  towns  during  the  1980s  exemplifies,  
Rogerson,  1989).    
In   consequence,  many   black   businesses   remained   informal   and   non-­‐‑licenced.  
This   benefitted   formal   (mostly   white)   businesses,   which   often   subcontracted  
light   manufacturing   such   as   the   production   of   clothing,   furniture   and   metal  
goods  to  informal  manufacturers,  who  were  able  to  operate  without  adhering  to  
minimum   wage   and   work   place   regulations.   One   example   documented   in   a  
survey   on   small-­‐‑scale   industry   in   Katlehong   (situated   east   of   Johannesburg)  
during  the  mid-­‐‑1980s  is  that  of  a  small  packaging  firm,  supplying  the  US-­‐‑based  
multinational   firm   3M.   The   owner   of   the   small   business   was   a   previous   3M  
employee,  encouraged  by  3M  to  set  up  his  own  business.  Surveys  undertaken  
in  other  townships  (such  as  Orlando  West  in  Johannesburg)  suggest  similar  ties  
between  informal  and  formal  businesses  (Rogerson,  1987).          
The   interlocking   of   informal,   often   African-­‐‑owned,   small   non-­‐‑financial   firms  
and   established   formal-­‐‑sector   typically  white-­‐‑owned   non-­‐‑financial   companies  
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seems   especially   strong   in   the   brewing   and   distilling   sector.   Large   South  
African  companies   like  South  African  Breweries  used  shabeens,   informal  bars  
mostly  run  by  black  South  Africans,  as  distributional  channels  for  their  alcohol.  
This  informal  distributional  link  was  important  and  lucrative,  since  during  the  
1980s   40%   of   liquor   sales   in   South   Africa   were   deemed   to   happen   through  
informal   vendors   (Rogerson,   1987).   Similarly,   formal-­‐‑sector   retailers   and  
wholesalers  enlisted  informal  hawkers  to  sell  their  produce  (especially  clothing  
and   newspapers)   (Rogerson,   1989).   This   link   between   formal   and   informal  
business   means   that   a   significant   share   of   business   activity   was   undertaken  
through   informal   entrepreneurs   or   firms.   This   observation   will   be   important  
when  interpreting  the  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  data  in  chapter  7.      
3.3.2. The mining-finance houses and dominant company groups  
When  considering  large  businesses,  the  growth  of  the  1950s  and  ‘60s  appears  to  
have  induced  a  diversification  of  economic  activity  in  South  Africa,  at  least  on  
the  face  of  it.  As  documented  in  Table  3.1.,  by  1953  the  majority  of  corporations  
listed   on   the   South   African   stock   exchange   were   classified   as   industrial  
companies.   Between   the   early   1940s   and   the   early   1950s   the  number   of   listed  
industrial   corporations   grew   more   than   fivefold.   The   finance   industry   had  
experienced   an   even   stronger   listing   boom,   while   the   number   of   mining  





Source:  Andrews,  1975,  p.  122.  
Despite   this   apparent   shift   in   dominance   towards   industrial   activity   among  
listed   corporations,   many   of   the   supposed   industrial   firms   listed   were  
Table 3.1. JSE-listed corporations by sector, number and market value    
  
1932 1942 1953 1962 1974
Mining- 102 121 144 138 71
Finance 17 24 143 134 154
Industry 32 71 401 337 354
Mining- 200 728 1483 2731 9411
Finance 78 245 647 1708 6628
Industry 29 175 594 1055 3492
Market-value-(R-million)
Number-of-companies-listed
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effectively   part   of  mining-­‐‑finance   groups.   Fine   and  Rustomjee   (1996)   showed  
that   in   1990   mining   alone   contributed   12%   to   domestic   output,   while   South  
Africa’s  mineral   energy   complex,   that   is  mining   together  with  manufacturing  
and   energy   production   that   serve   as   immediate   inputs   to   mining   activity,  
generated   25%   of   GDP.   More   importantly,   much   of   South   African   business  
activity  is  undertaken  by  large  listed  corporations.    
The   first   listed   corporations   in   South   Africa   were   mining   companies.   The  
capital-­‐‑intensive   nature   of   mining   in   the   country   favoured   the   emergence   of  
large,  and  influential,  mining-­‐‑finance  houses.  Chapter  6  discusses  the  history  of  
these   mining-­‐‑finance   houses   in   detail.   Here,   their   connection   to   the   large  
company  groups  that  have  dominated  the  South  African  economy  until  recently  
(and  arguably  still  do,  if  to  a  lesser  extent)  will  be  traced.  
The   term   company   group   (much   like   mining-­‐‑finance   house)   has   a   specific  
connotation  in  South  Africa,  and  is  commonly  used  when  referring  to  one  of  the  
large  five  holding  companies  that  have  dominated  the  JSE  during  the  1980s.  As  
laid  out  in  the  1973  Companies  Act,  the  term  group  of  companies  describes  the  
existence   of   several   companies   that   are   associated   as   a   result   of   common   or  
interlocking   shareholdings.   A   group   of   companies   is   legally   understood   to  
share  management  and  policy  direction  through  a  shared  controlling  authority.  
This  definition  was  renewed  in  the  2008  Companies  Act,  which  further  added  
that  a  company  group  also  exists  where   the  same  or  related  persons  control  a  
number   of   companies,   even   if   the   firms   do   not   have   other   common   interest  
(Davis  &  Mongalo,  2013).  
Historically,  the  South  African  economy  has  been  moulded  by  large  diversified  
business   holdings   and   their   oligopolistic   competition   (see   Fine   &   Rustomjee,  
1996).  The  economic   slowdown  and  protracted   recession  of   the  1970s  and   the  
political   isolation   of   the   1980s   intensified   this   trend,   resulting   in   further  
centralisation   and   industry   concentration.  As  many  weaker   competitors  were  
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pushed   out   of   the   market   and   foreign   investors   exited,   domestic   firms   were  
often  bought  up  by  one  of  the  dominant  company  groups  (Innes,  1984).    
As  a   result,  more   than  80%  of   JSE-­‐‑listed   companies   –   as  measured  by  market  
capitalisation  –  were  owned  by  one  of   the  top  five  conglomerates  by  the  mid-­‐‑
1980s.   These   big   five   were:   Anglo   American/De   Beers,   Rembrandt/Remgro,  
SANLAM,  SA  Mutual/Old  Mutual  and  Liberty  Life/Standard  Bank.  Sometimes  
this  group  is  enlarged  by  Anglovaal,  becoming  the  big  six.  Anglo  American/De  
Beers  and  Anglovaal  can  be   traced  back  to   the  big   ten  mining-­‐‑finance  houses,  
which   emerged   in   the   beginning  of   the   20th   century,  due   to   the   large   scale   of  
financial   investment   required   for  diamond   and  gold   extraction   (see   chapter   6  
for   a   historical   exposition).   SANLAM,   Liberty   Life/Standard   Bank   and   Old  
Mutual   formed   as   South  African   institutional   investors   (insurers   and  pension  
funds),  while  Rembrandt/Remgro  grew  mainly  on   the  back  of   its   tobacco  and  
cigarette  production.  These  company  groups  diversified   into  a  broad  range  of  
economic   activity   in   South   Africa.   The   disinvestment   of   foreign   companies  
accelerated  during  the  1980s,  when  international  sanctions  were  imposed  onto  
South  Africa  due  to  its  racial  policies  (The  Commonwealth  Secretariat,  1989).    
During   the   1980s,   for   instance,   Anglo   American   owned   numerous   gold,  
diamond  and  other  mineral  mines  in  South  Africa,  while  holding  interest  in  the  
South  African  bank  FNB,  and  Anglo’s  Industrial  Corporation  (AMIC)  held  the  
group’s  manufacturing  interests  which,  for  instance,  included  Mondi  Paper  and  
South   African   Breweries.   The   mining   corporation   Gencor   (which   later  
unbundled   BHP   Billiton)   was   part   of   the   SANLAM   group   alongside   Trust  
Bank,   Santambank   and   Senbank.   At   the   same   time,   Rembrandt/Remgro   was  
involved   in  mining  –   through  Remgro  –  while  being   closely   connected   to   the  
South   African   commercial   bank   Volkskas,   and   SA   Mutual/Old   Mutual  
incorporated   Rand   Mines   as   well   as   Nedbank   under   its   umbrella,   a   large  
mining   company   and   bank,   respectively   (Fine   &   Rustomjee,   1996,   Chabane,  
Goldstein,  &  Roberts,  2006).    
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Figure  3.4.   shows   the   share  of   JSE-­‐‑market   capitalisation   the   top   five   company  
groups   controlled   through   their   ownership   of   other   listed   and   non-­‐‑listed  
companies.   Anglovaal   has   been   left   out   since   it   hardly   ever   controlled  more  
than   3%  of  market   capitalisation,   and   in   fact   ceased   to   exist   in   1997.  The   five  
company  groups  depicted  controlled  almost  90%  of  all  companies  listed  on  the  
JSE  between  the  late  1980s  and  the  mid-­‐‑1990s.  Importantly,  the  most  influential  
among  these  company  groups  has  been  and  remains  Anglo  American.  
Figure 3.4. JSE-market capitalisation of top 5 company groups, 1983-2012 
  
Source:  Rossouw,  van  der  Watt,  &  Malan,  2002,  Ashman,  Mohamed,  &  Newman,  2013,  
Makhaya  &  Roberts,  2014.  
The  dominance  of  these  company  groups  started  to  fade  during  the  late  1990s  
with  the  so-­‐‑called  unbundling  process.  Unbundling  refers  to  the  reorganisation  
of  large  South  African  companies  –  mainly  the  oligopolistic  company  groups  –  
after   the   end   of   apartheid.   Large   South   African   corporations   were   often  
characterised  by  pyramid  control  structures,  cross-­‐‑holdings  and  a  low  incidence  
of   change   in   corporate   control   (Malherbe  &  Segal,   2001).  The  declared  aim  of  
unbundling  was  to  simplify  company  structures,  which  were  meant  to  increase  
foreign   investors’   confidence   in   South   African   conglomerates.   An   important  




















































Liberty Life/Standard Bank 




   135  
discount  on   the   JSE  because  of   their  non-­‐‑transparent  organisational   structures  
(Davidson,   1997).   The   pyramid   structures   had   formed   to   preserve   the  
controlling   share   of   influential   shareholders   (often   families   like   the  
Oppenheimers   in   Anglo   American   or   the   Ruperts   in   Rembrandt/Remgro),  
while  avoiding  the  issuance  of  non-­‐‑voting  shares.  This  is  a  historic  specificity  of  
the  South  African  capital  market.11    
If  a  company  group  intended  to  raise  additional  funds  through  equity  issuance,  
a   new   corporate   entity   was   founded,   which   was   allocated   the   family’s   50%  
majority   shareholding   in   the   business   operations   of   the   actual   operating  
enterprise.   The   new   entity   was   then   floated   and   the   family   retained   a  
controlling   share   in   this   newly   founded   corporate   unit,   while   raising   capital  
through   the   sale   of   the   remaining   shares.   In   this   way,   the   controlling  
shareholders   had   diluted   their   ownership   of   the   underlying   business   to   25%,  
while   preserving   control   (Barr   &   Kantor,   1994).   This   practice   came   under  
criticism  during   the  1990s  since   it  differs   from  the  Anglo-­‐‑Saxon  convention  of  
establishing   large   holding   companies,   under   whose   umbrella   the   individual  
business   units   that   are   part   of   the   group   are   run.   In   this   alternative   model,  
control   is   preserved   through   the   issuance   of   non-­‐‑voting   shares.   The   South  
African  corporate  architecture  of   listed  companies  was  further  complicated  by  
the   fact   that  a   listed  company  also  had   stakes   in  non-­‐‑listed  businesses,  which  
were   wholly   owned   by   the   company   group,   often   through   a   web   of  
complicated  pyramid  holdings.    
It   is   questionable   how  much   of   a   discount   there   really  was   on   South  African  
corporate   shares.   The   argument   that   South   African   corporations   could   raise  
capital   more   cheaply   in   domestic   and   international   markets   if   ownership  
structures   were   simplified   rested   on   the   claim   that   the   asset   values   of   these  
companies  were  above  their  market  capitalisation.  The  market  capitalisation  of  
                                                                                                 
11  Similar   corporate  ownership  arrangements   can  be   found   in  Sweden  and  some  East  
Asian  countries.  
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the   top   layer   of   these   pyramids   was   contrasted   with   the   individual  
capitalisations   of   listed   companies   that   were   part   of   the   group   plus   the  
management’s   valuation   of   company   assets   (Barr   &   Kantor,   1994).   The   latter  
was   solely   based   on   manager’s   estimates   how  much   unlisted   wholly   owned  
companies  were  worth.  These  estimates  were   taken  at   face  value   for   lack  of  a  
better   pricing   method.   However,   these   estimates   might   of   course   have   been  
erroneous.  Moreover,  managers  had  an  intrinsic  interest  to  value  their  assets  as  
highly  as  possible  to  portray  the  company  group  as  a  profitable  investment  to  
their  shareholders.    
Nevertheless,   the   argument   that   unbundling   would   increase   corporation’s  
share  prices  became  a  powerful  justification  for  the  split-­‐‑up  of  these  groups  and  
the  abolishment  of  pyramid  structures  among   large  holding  companies.  Thus,  
at  the  end  of  the  1980s  7%  of  all  companies  listed  on  the  JSE  were  characterised  
by  pyramid  ownership  arrangements,  while  the  share  declined  to  3%  by  the  late  
1990s   (Malherbe   &   Segal,   2001).   The   implicit   promise   underlying   the  
unbundling  process  was  one  of  increased  competition  and  higher  investment  in  
the  South  African  economy,  if  the  domestic  dominance  of  the  groups  could  be  
reduced.  The  idea  was  that  more  diversified  ownership  would  increase  market  
competition.   In   addition,   the   higher   share   prices   expected   to   be   fetched   by  
South  African   listed   companies  would   increase  domestic   investment   by   these  
groups,  since  their  cost  of  external  capital  would  be  reduced.  
The   debate   exemplifies   the   belief   that   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   use   their  
financial   dealings   to   support   productive   operations,   and   especially   for  
investment   funding.   As   will   be   shown   in   chapter   7,   much   of   South   African  
investment   (in   aggregate)   was   historically   financed   internally   rather   than  
through  borrowing  or  share  capital.  This  has  changed  somewhat  since  the  end  
of  apartheid,  but  the  shift  has  been  more  towards  bank  loans  rather  than  capital  
markets  as  source  of  funding.  
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Overall,   the   big   five   internationalised   during   the   1990s,   buying   assets   and  
incorporating   companies   abroad   while   selling   off   their   non-­‐‑core   business  
interests   in   South   Africa.   Table   3.2.   summarises   the   developments   in   the  
holdings  of  the  big  five  company  groups,  comparing  their  ownership  structure  
in   the   late   1980s   to   that   of   2014.   The   table   provides   information   on   the   five  
company   groups’   origins   (in   columns   two   and   three)   as   well   as   their  
subsidiaries   in   the   late  1980s   (columns   four,   five  and  six)  and   today   (columns  
seven  and  eight).  These  five  company  groups  are  Anglo  American,  Rembrandt  
(later  Remgro),  SANLAM,  SA  Mutual  (later  Old  Mutual)  and  Liberty  Life.  Data  
for   1988   were   compiled   by   Isaacs   (2014)   based   on   Chabane,   Goldstein,   &  
Roberts   (2006)   and   Fine  &   Rustomjee   (1996).   Recent   data   are   based   on   INET  
BFA   (2015).   It   goes   beyond   the   scope   of   this   thesis   to   discuss   the   business  
histories   of   these   five   in  more  detail.  Crucially,   the  big   five,  which   controlled  
close   to   90%   of   all   JSE-­‐‑listed   companies   during   the   late   1980s,   have   since  
unbundled  and  refocused  on  their  core  business.  
This   means   that   they   transformed   themselves   from   highly   diversified  
conglomerates,   often   holding   financial,   mining,   industrial   and   business  
interests,  into  more  specialised  groups  with  a  strong  international  orientation  in  
their  operations  (see  also  Verhoef,  2010  for  a  discussion  of  this  trend).  Another  
political   promise   of   unbundling   was   that   more   diversified   ownership   would  
also   mean   more   inclusive   ownership   for   black   South   Africans.   Unbundling  
became  a   tool  of  black  economic  empowerment   (BEE).  Thus,   in   the   late  1990s  
black-­‐‑owned  holding  companies  were  set  up,  which  borrowed  in  order  to  debt-­‐‑
finance  the  acquisition  of  corporate  interests.  The  South  African  financial  press  
estimated  that  BEE  ownership  of  JSE-­‐‑listed  shares  increased  from  0.5%  in  1995  
to   somewhere   between   6%   and   20%   by   1998   (Carmody,   2002).   According   to  
INET   BFA,   a   financial   investment   intelligence   company,   the   1998   figure   was  
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much  lower  (9.6%)12  than  this  optimistic  estimate.  Unbundling  suited  the  large  
South  African  company  groups.  On  the  one  hand,  profits  from  selling  off  non-­‐‑
core   assets   could   be   transferred   abroad.   This   fitted   neatly   into   the   business  
strategies   of   Anglo   American,   BHP   Billiton   (formerly   part   of   the   SANLAM  
group)   and   Old   Mutual,   which   all   transferred   their   primary   listing   to   the  
London  Stock  Exchange  around  the  turn  of  the  millennium  (Malherbe  &  Segal,  
2001).13    
Pádraig   Carmody   (2002)   argues   that   unbundling   helped   South   African  
company   groups   reduce   their   exposure   to   the   volatile   South   African   capital  
market,   while   making   their   shares   more   attractive   for   investment   funds  
through   a  membership   in   the   Financial   Times   Stock   Exchange   100   index,   for  
instance.   How   successful   black   economic   empowerment   through   equity  
investment   on   the   JSE   really  was   is   contested.  Anglo  American,   for   instance,  
offloaded   Johannesburg   Consolidated   Investments   (JCI),   which   originated   as  
one  of  the  old  mining-­‐‑finance  houses,  to  a  BEE  investor  group  in  1995,  when  a  
high   share   price   could   be   obtained.   Three   years   later   share   prices   had  
plummeted  as  consequence  of  the  East  Asia  crisis,  and  Anglo  American  bought  
back  two  of  the  more  lucrative  gold  mines  from  Johannic,  controlled  by  the  BEE  
holding  company  New  African  Investment  Limited  (Carmody,  2002).  The  share  
of  JSE-­‐‑capitalisation  controlled  by  black  investor  groups  never  rose  above  10%  
(peaking  in  1998  at  9.6%)  and  has  dropped  to  3.9%  in  2012  (Rossouw  et  al.,  2002,  
Ashman   et   al.,   2013).   BEE  has   been   heavily   criticised   for   favouring   few  well-­‐‑
connected   black   (and   mostly   male)   entrepreneurs.   A   broad-­‐‑based   black  
economic  empowerment  policy  was  enacted  in  2003,  aiming  beyond  ownership  
at  increasing  employment,  skills  and  community  development  to  benefit  a  large  
number  of  previously  disadvantaged  South  Africans  (Iheduru,  2008).            
                                                                                                 
12  The   difference   in   these   estimates   derives   from   equity   price   fluctuations.   In   April  
1998,  shares  of  Johnnic  (controlled  by  the  BEE  group  New  African  Investment  Limited)  
were  traded  at  ca.  R70.  A  few  months  later  the  share  price  crashed  to  R21  (Bond,  2005).  
13  So  did  South  African  Breweries,  the  first  industrial  company  to  list  on  the  JSE.    
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Table 3.2. The big five company groups: Comparing 1980s and 2014 ownership structure 
  
Established Short.history Mining Industrial Finance South.Africa
Anglo.
American
Established in South 
Africa in 1917 by 
Ernest Oppenheimer, 
listed on the JSE the 
same year with 
substantial backing 
from US investors.  
Dominant mining finance house since 1920s. 
Diversified investment since 1960s, owning up 
to 60% of JSE-listed companies by late 1980s. 
Unbundled in late 1990s: In 1999 Anglo 
American Corporation of South Africa and 
Minerco Societe Anonyme merged. Primary 
listing was moved to London (LSE), secondary 
listings on the JSE, Swiss SWX and FSTE 100 
and on Botswana and Namibian Stock 
Exchanges since 2001.
Anglo Gold, 




First National Bank, 






Anglo Coal, De Beers 
(1926), Kumba Iron 
Ore,
Rembrandt Established in South 
Africa in 1948, listed 
on the JSE in 1956. 
Rembrandt was 
restructured in 2000 
and renamed to 
Remgro, listed on the 
JSE in September 
2000.
Initially dealing with tobacco & cigarettes. 
Diversified in 1970s. In 1988 local & overseas 
interests separated by founding Compagnie 
Financiere Richemont AG (Swiss-listed). In 1995 
Richemont & group consolidate interests in 
tobacco (Rothmans International), which merged 
with British American Tobacco (BAT) held by 
group and Richemont. In 2000, restructuring: 
split into Remgro & VenFin. VenFin retained 
communication/technology investments. BAT 






Merchant Bank, Rand 




VenFin                 
Associates (<50%): 
Grinrod Limited, 





SANLAM Estbalished in South 
Africa in 1918 with the 
aim to promote 
Afrikaner economic 
interest. 
Established with aim to increase Afrikaner 
participation in commerce & industry. In 1940, 
SANLAM founded Federale Volksbeleggings 
(Federal People's Investments) & in 1945 
Bonuscor, both finance houses, with aim to 
support Afrikaner business interest. Together, 
the three took over mining interests in 1953 to 


















Established in 1845. 
The origins of 
Nedbank can be 
traced back to the 
foundation of the 
Cape of Good Hope 
Bank, established in 
1831.
Old Mutual is one of the oldest and today also 
largest financial group in South Africa with global 
assets and operations. The group unbundled it 
non-financial interests during the 1990s. In 
1999, the company relocated headquarters to 
London, demutualised and listed on the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE). 






Nedbank, Nedfin, UAL 
Mutual Bank, Perm 
Building Society





Established in 1862 
as the first foreign 
bank present in South 
Africa.
The group's origins go back to the Standard 
Bank of British South Africa, which started 
operations in 1862. By 1926, it was one of the 
three big banks that dominated the Union of 
South Africa. Today Standard Bank is one of the 
'big four' alongside ABSA, First National Bank 
and Nedbank. Liberty Life was founded in 1957. 
It was acquired by Standard Bank in 1999, when 
listed on the JSE.
Standard Bank, 
Standard Merchant 
Bank, Stannic, Liberty 
Life
Liberty Holdings, The 







Australia: Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Holdings Limited                                                                                                            
Brazil: Anglo American Fosfatos Brasil Limitada, Anglo American 
Minério de Ferro Brasil SA, Anglo American Nióbio Brasil Limitada, 
Anglo American Níquel Brasil Limitada, Anglo Ferrous Brazil SA, 
Chile: Anglo American Norte SA, Anglo American Sur SA                                                                                                                                                                                           
Associates (<50%): in Anguilla, Australia and Colombia 
UK: Remgro Continental Limited (Jersey), Remgro USA Limited 
(Jersey), IPI (Overseas) Limited - Jersey, IPROP Holdings Limited - 
British Virgin Islands, VenFin Holdings Limited (Jersey)
Europe: Sanlam Netherlands Holdings Bv                                                                                                           
Asia: Pacific & Orient, Shriram Capital, Shriram Financial Ventures 
(Chennai) PVT
Africa: Old Mutual Life Assurance Co (Namibia) Ltd (Namibia), Old 
Mutual Zimbabwe Limited                                                                                                                         
US: Acadian Asset Management LLC (USA), Barrow, Hanley, 
Mewhinney & Strauss LLC (USA), Old Mutual (US) Holdings Inc 
(USA)                                                                                                                   
Europe & rest of the world: 5 subsidiaries; Nedbank has another 
8 subsidiaries in Africa and 3 in the UK.
Africa: CfC Stanbic Holdings Limited (Kenya), SBN Holdings Limited 
(Namibia), Standard Bank Swaziland Ltd (Swaziland), Standard Lesotho Bank 
Ltd (Lesotho), CfC Stanbic Bank Limited (Kenya), Stanbic Bank Botswana Ltd 
(Botswana), Stanbic Bank Ghana Ltd (Ghana), Stanbic Bank Tanzania Limited 
(Tanzania), Stanbic Bank Zambia Ltd (Zambia), Stanbic Bank Uganda Ltd 
(Uganda), Stanbic IBTC Bank PLC (Nigeria), Stanbic IBTC Holdings PLC 
(Nigeria), Standard Bank (Mauritius) Limited (Mauritius), Standard Bank de 
Angola S.A. (Angola), Standard Bank Ltd (Malawi), Standard Bank Namibia 
Limited (Namibia), Standard Bank RDC S.A (D R Congo), Standard Bank 
s.a.r.l (Mozambique), Standard Bank Trust Co (Mauritius) Ltd, Stanbic 
Investment Management Services (EA) Limited, Standard Insurance Limited 
Swaziland, STANLIB Lesotho (Pty) Ltd, Stanbic Investment Management 
Services (Proprietary) Limited (Botswana), STANLIB (Swaziland) Proprietary 
Limited, STANLIB Namibia (Pty) Limited, Stanlib Namibia Unit Trust 
Management Company Limited                                                                                                         
Europe: 11 subsidiaries in UK, Jersey, Isle of Man,                                                                                                                
Rest of the world: Standard Merchant Bank (Asia) Ltd Singapore, Standard 
New York, Inc (USA); Liberty Life has another 16 subsidiaries across Africa.
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3.3.3. Firm heterogeneity in South Africa 
As  a  consequence  of   these  historical  developments  the  South  African  business  
landscape   is  very  diverse  and  dominated  by  extremes.  On   the  one  end  of   the  
spectrum,  large  global  multinationals  have  developed  (such  as  Anglo  American  
or   BHP   Billiton).   On   the   other   end,   there   are   very   small   enterprises   and  
survivalist   economic   activity.   Towards   the   end   of   the   1990s,   more   than   one  
quarter   of   South   African   jobs   was   either   of   a   survivalist   nature   or   in   (often  
informal)  companies  employing  not  more  than  ten  people  (Berry  et  al.,  2002).        
In   South  Africa,   small   non-­‐‑financial   firms   are   classified   into   small,  micro   and  
medium  enterprises   (SMMEs).  According   to   the  South  African  National  Small  
Business  Act  of  1996,  micro  enterprises  employ  five  workers  or  less,  very  small  
companies   between   six   and   ten   (or   20  depending   on   the   branch   of   industry),  
small   firms   from   ten   (or   20)   up   to   50   workers,   medium-­‐‑sized   corporations  
between  50   and  120   (or   200)  workers,  while   everything  above   this  number  of  
workers   is   a   large   corporation.   The   World   Bank’s   SME   (small   and   medium  
enterprise)   department   uses   a   similar   definition,   according   to   which   micro  
enterprises   employ   up   to   10   people,   small   firms   up   to   50   and  medium-­‐‑sized  
companies  up  to  300   (Ayyagari,  Beck  &  Demirgüç-­‐‑Kunt,  2003).  The  difference  
in   the   upper-­‐‑end   cut-­‐‑off   of   these   two   definitions   shows,   however,   that   size  
categories  are  somewhat  arbitrary.    
Micro   enterprises   in   South   Africa   are   typically   regarded   as   survivalist.  
Survivalist  activity  by  definition  generates   income  below  the  poverty   line  and  
includes  hawkers,   vendors   and   subsistence   farmers   (Berry   et   al.,   2002).  Micro  
enterprises  in  South  Africa  are  legally  defined  as  operating  below  the  national  
tax  registration  limit  and  employing  not  more  than  five  workers  (South  African  
President’s  Office,  1996).  Furthermore,  the  South  African  Department  for  Trade  
and  Industry  understands  micro  enterprises  to  be:    
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‘very  small  businesses,  often  involving  only  the  owner,  some  family  member(s)  
and  at   the  most  one  or   two  paid  employees.  They  usually   lack  “formality”   in  
terms  of  business  licenses,  value-­‐‑added  tax  (VAT)  registration,  formal  business  
premises,   operating  permits   and  accounting  procedures.  Most  of   them  have  a  
limited   capital   base   and   only   rudimentary   technical   or   business   skills   among  
their  operators’  (The  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry,  1995,  pp.  9-­‐‑10)    
As  highlighted  in  this  definition,  size  alone   is  not  a  good  guide  to  distinguish  
between  firm  types;   legal  status,  administrative  and  technical  abilities  held  by  
firms  are  also  distinct   characteristics.  Survivalist   firms,   for   instance,  are  based  
on   self-­‐‑employment   as   a   survival   strategy   for   those  members   of   an   economy  
that   cannot   find   other   means   of   generating   income   (OECD,   2012).   These  
activities   hardly   produce   the   necessary   income   to   ensure   the   survival   of   the  
individual,  who   is   involuntarily   self-­‐‑employed  and  would   take  on  alternative  
employment  (in  the  formal  sector)  if  possible.    
Estimates  of  the  number  of  SMMEs  present   in  South  Africa  vary  strongly.  For  
the  year  2000,  official  data  sources  (such  as  Statistics  South  Africa  and  Ntsika,  
the   government’s   enterprise   promotion   agency)   put   the   number   of   informal  
enterprises  in  South  Africa,  that  is  survivalist  and  micro  activity,  at  somewhere  
between  650,000  and  more  than  1.1  million  units.  Private  sector  estimates  were  
much  higher,  ranging  up  to  2.3  million  informal  firms  (Berry  et  al.,  2002).  The  
majority  of  this  very  small-­‐‑scale  activity  is  believed  to  take  place  in  the  service  
industry  (Devey,  Skinner,  &  Valodia,  2006).    
By  turnover,  in  2002  the  largest  category  among  non-­‐‑VAT  registered  businesses  
operated  in  the  wholesale  and  retail  trade,  catering  and  accommodation  sectors  
(Lehohla,  2002).  The  majority  of  non-­‐‑registered  business  activity  is  undertaken  
by   black  women,  mostly   in   a   one-­‐‑person   enterprise,   or  with   the   help   of   one  
other  ‘employee’  (often  a  family  member),  and  is  in  the  majority  of  cases  (63%)  
operated   from   home   (Lehohla,   2002a,   Lehohla,   2002b).   Thus,   most   of   these  
unregistered,   informal  activities  are  likely  to  be  survivalist  or  a  supplement  to  
other  household  income.  As  consequence,  it  is  difficult  to  quantify  the  economic  
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activity,  let  alone  the  balance  sheets,  of  these  small  firms  and  survivalist  units.  
On   the   one   hand,   there   is   hardly   any   data   available;   on   the   other   hand,   the  
resources   of   these   enterprises   are   often   indistinguishable   from   the   household  
(or  households)  they  are  supporting.    
Hence,   all   these   survivalist,   very   small   and   informal   firms   are   effectively  
household-­‐‑based  firms.  These  non-­‐‑financial  firms  have  very  limited  assets  and  
are  unlikely  to  make  up  more  than  a  small  fraction  of  the  financial  transactions  
of   non-­‐‑financial   business,  when   considering   the   entirety   of   these   transactions  
for   South   Africa.   Self-­‐‑employed   professionals   such   as   architects   and  medical  
doctors  would   fall   into   this   category,   too.   This   latter   group   is   probably  more  
distinct  in  wealthier  economies,  and  has  only  begun  to  emerge  on  a  larger  scale  
in  South  Africa  relatively  recently.    
It  is  often  lamented  that  a  strong  core  of  medium-­‐‑sized  companies  is  missing  in  
South   Africa.   In   comparison   to   other   developing   and   emerging   economies  
South  Africa  has  a  weak  small  and  medium-­‐‑sized  enterprise  sector  (Berry  et  al.,  
2002).  Market  domination  by   large  corporations   limits   the  growth  possibilities  
of  small  and  medium-­‐‑sized  firms.  In  the  2005  South  African  Innovation  Survey  
one   third   of   all   small   and  medium-­‐‑sized   companies   questioned   listed  market  
dominance   of   a   competitor   as   major   obstacle   to   innovation   (CeSTII,   2006).1  
Despite   unbundling   among   large   listed   corporations   since   the   1990s,   that   is,  
despite   the   sale  of  non-­‐‑core  business   subsidiaries  by   large  diversified  holding  
companies,  concentration  and  monopoly  profits  appear  to  have  remained  high  
in   South  African   industries   (Aghion,   Braun,  &   Fedderke,   2006).  Monopolistic  
competition   in  many   sectors   is   often   blamed   for   hampering   informal   activity  
(despite  high  unemployment  and  poverty  rates,  see  Neves,  Aliber,  Mogaladi,  &  
Toit,  2009).    
                                                                                                 
1  The  survey  covered  313  non-­‐‑financial  companies  in  total,  of  which  217  were  small  and  
medium-­‐‑sized.  
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Since   informal  businesses  are  mostly  poor   in  assets,   they  are  unlikely   to  have  
contributed   much   to   the   observed   high   –   and   potentially   rising   –   liquidity  
preference   among   non-­‐‑financial   companies.   Equally,   the   small   and   medium-­‐‑
sized   company   sector,  while   providing   a   large   share   of   jobs   in   South  Africa,  
appears  to  be  squeezed  by  large  companies’  monopoly  profits.   In  1999,  micro,  
very  small  and  small  enterprises  were  estimated  to  account   for  almost  30%  of  
South   African   employment,   while   large   companies   provided   around   45%   of  
jobs.  However,   in   terms  of  GDP   large   firms  were  believed   to  contribute  more  
than  65%  in  2000,  with  the  three  small  business  categories  not  even  generating  
20%  (the  difference  is  made  up  by  medium-­‐‑scale  business)  (Southall,  2004).  
Thus,   it   is   likely   that   large   (and  especially   listed)  corporations  account   for   the  
bulk   of   the   financial   transactions   by   non-­‐‑financial   businesses.   According   to  
other  estimates,  JSE-­‐‑listed  corporations  account  for  almost  60%  of  the  country’s  
GDP  (Malherbe  &  Segal,  2001).  Given  their  good  access  to  financial  markets  and  
bank  borrowing  (see  Barth,  Li,  Lu,  &  Yago,  2010),  they  are  likely  to  drive  trends  
in  financial  operations  among  non-­‐‑financial  businesses.        
3.4. Summary and conclusion 
This  chapter  has  proposed  an  alternative  balance  sheet  approach  to  analyse  the  
financial   dealings   of   South   African   non-­‐‑financial   firms.   This   approach   goes  
beyond   the   mainstream   focus   on   individual   or   aggregate   net   worth,   which  
disregards  the  size  of  a  balance  sheet,  netting  out  assets  against  liabilities.  This  
thesis  argues  that  true  balance  sheet  analysis  must  include  the  assessment  of  the  
full  set  of  financial  statements  of  a  company,  that  is  balance  sheet  and  cash  flow  
statement.   This   also   includes   the   notes   to   the   financial   statements,   which  
contain   essential   information   about   companies’   financial   positions.   For   a   full  
picture,  the  qualitative  information  available  in  companies’  annual  reports  also  
has  to  be  considered,  if  with  some  caution.  
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However,  detailed  annual  report  and  financial  statement  analysis   is  extremely  
time   consuming.   Therefore,   this   chapter   proposes   a   methodology   to   identify  
overcapitalised   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   using   conventional   financial   ratios,  
namely   using   the   cash   ratio.   Overcapitalised   non-­‐‑financial   firms   avail  
themselves  of  larger  volumes  of  liquid  assets  than  would  be  necessary  for  their  
productive  operations.    
The  answer  question  (1),  the  precautionary  and  the  speculative  motives  to  hold  
cash  and  other   liquid  assets  are   the  most  popular  motives  among  mainstream  
and   heterodox   economists.   The   interaction   between   these   two   motives  
theoretically   informed  the  overcapitalisation  ratio,  developed  by  the  author.   It  
is  suggested  to  use  a  simplified  ratio  for  the  initial  screening  of  firms,  namely  a  
cash   ratio   of   unity   and   more,   to   identify   potentially   overcapitalised   firms.  
Subsequently,   the   overcapitalisation   ratio   is   carefully   constructed   from   the  
balance  sheet  of  these  companies,  accounting  for  all   (potentially)   liquid  assets,  
not  just  cash  and  cash  equivalents.            
In   response   to  question   (2)   it  has   to  be  noted   that   the  proposed  methodology  
aims   at   listed   corporations.   This   limitation   is   owed   to   the   limited   amount   of  
data   available   for   non-­‐‑listed   corporations,   who   do   not   publish   financial  
information,  while  listed  companies  are  legally  obliged  to.  However,  given  the  
importance  and  size  of   the   listed  corporate  sector   in  South  Africa  this   focus   is  
justified.  Listed  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  are  likely  to  account  for  a  large  share  
of   liquid   assets   held   among   non-­‐‑financial   firms   in   the   country,   because   very  
small   and   survivalist   firms   are   typically   cash   strapped,   while   the   small   and  
medium-­‐‑sized  company  sector  is  relatively  small.  Thus,  when  investigating  the  
financial   dealings   of   non-­‐‑financial   business   in   South   Africa,   the   majority   of  
these  transactions  are  likely  to  be  undertaken  by  listed  companies.      
Nonetheless,   firm   heterogeneity   will   be   considered   wherever   possible   in   the  
following   chapter,  which   analyses   financial   operations   of   South  African   non-­‐‑
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financial  companies  from  the  microeconomic  level.  Chapter  7  complements  this  
analysis   by  providing   a  macroeconomic  perspective.  Contrasting   between   the  
findings   in   chapter   4   and   chapter   7   will   therefore   allow   for   the   inference   of  
insights  about  the  financial  positions  of  small  and  medium-­‐‑sized  companies  in  
South  Africa.  Question  (3)  will  be  explored  in  the  following  chapter.          
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Chapter IV  Balance sheet analysis of JSE-listed non-
financial firms 
  
This  chapter  applies  the  alternative  balance  sheet  analysis  presented  in  the  last  
chapter   to   non-­‐‑financial   firms   listed   in   South   Africa,   namely   on   the  
Johannesburg   Stock   Exchange   (JSE).1  The   three   previously   outlined   questions  
will  guide   the  analysis,   addressing   (1)   the   role  of   financial  operations   in  non-­‐‑
financial   companies,   (2)   the   type   of   companies   in   the   analytical   focus   and   (3)  
explanations  for  a  rising  corporate  liquidity  preference.      
The  literature  review  (in  chapter  2)  has  shown  that  question  (1)  is  answered  in  
favour   of   either   a   precautionary   or   a   speculative  motive   to   hold   liquidity   by  
non-­‐‑financial   firms.   This   chapter   will   implement   the   comprehensive   balance  
sheet   analysis   discussed   previously   (see   chapters   1   and   3)   to   assess   the  
importance   of   these   two  motives,   but   also   to   allow   for   alternative   hypothesis  
generation.   Given   the   nature   of   available   firm-­‐‑level   data   for   South   Africa,  
question  (2)  has   to  be  answered   in   favour  of   listed  non-­‐‑financial  corporations,  
that  is,  large  listed  businesses.  This  limitation  will  be  rectified  somewhat  in  the  
macroeconomic   analysis,   where   firm   heterogeneity   will   be   explicitly  
incorporated  when  examining   changing  patterns  of   companies’   financing  and  
investment  behaviour.      
A   detailed   exposition   of   the   data   and   sources   used   will   be   presented   first.  
Subsequently,   evidence   that   there   has   been   a   tendency   towards  
overcapitalisation  among  JSE-­‐‑listed  non-­‐‑financial  corporations,  at  least  since  the  
end   of   apartheid,   will   be   discussed.   For   this   purpose,   sectoral   data   of   listed  
firms  are  used.  While  some  sectors  –  such  as  basic  resource  extraction  –  appear  
prone   to   high   liquidity   preferences   in   general,   most   others   historically   held  
                                                                                                 
1  Some  of  the  findings  presented  below  have  been  discussed  by  the  author  elsewhere  in  
an  abbreviated   form,  with  an  exclusive   focus  on   the   financial  dealings  of   the  mining  
industry  (see  Karwowski,  2015).  
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much   smaller   volumes   of   liquidity   on   their   balance   sheets.   Nonetheless,   the  
analysis  will  show  that  both  industrial  and  mining  sectors  have  experienced  a  
pronounced  rise  in  liquidity  volumes  in  the  New  South  Africa  (at  least  among  
listed  firms).    
Reviewing  the  evidence  on  a  firm-­‐‑by-­‐‑firm  basis,   this  chapter  will  demonstrate  
that  the  precautionary  motive  is  an  important  driver  of  liquidity  preference,  but  
also,   more   importantly,   that   overcapitalised   firms   have   a   strong   speculative  
motive   to   hold   on   to   liquid   assets.   As   discussed   in   the   previous   chapter,  
financing  mergers  and  acquisitions  is  an  important  (speculative)  reason  to  hold  
liquidity.   It   is   striking   that   simple   precaution   –   rather   than   intentional  
speculation  by  a  non-­‐‑financial  corporation  –  can  turn  a  company  into  a  rentier  
firm.  By   contrast,  non-­‐‑financial   firms   that  might   appear   to  have  a   speculative  
motive  for  their  liquidity  holdings,  speculate  in  real  assets  rather  than  financial  
ones.    
From   an   emerging   market   perspective,   what   comes   out   of   this   study   is   that  
non-­‐‑financial  businesses  in  these  economies  are  likely  to  have  (country-­‐‑)specific  
reasons   that   are   shaped   by   domestically   dominant   industries   to   hold   on   to  
liquidity:   there   is   evidence   that   resource-­‐‑extracting   companies   –   and  
particularly  firms  engaged  in  resource  exploration  –  have  an  especially  strong  
desire  to  hold  liquidity  because  of  the  inherently  speculative  character  of  their  
operations.   Since  many   emerging  markets   possess   large   extractive   industries,  
corporations  exploiting  domestic   resources  are   likely   to   impact   the  amount  of  
liquid  assets  present  in  emerging  economies  and  how  they  are  turned  over.    
Thus,  increased  mergers  and  acquisitions  activity  together  with  rising  efforts  of  
mining  and  mining  exploration   companies   in  South  Africa  provide   important  
clues   as   to   why   the   liquidity   preference   might   have   increased   among   South  
African  non-­‐‑financial  listed  corporations.  On  the  one  hand,  the  integration  into  
the  world   economy  after   the   end  of   apartheid   appears   to   have   sparked  more  
mergers  and  acquisitions,  with  listed  (holdings)  companies  choosing  strategies  
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that  allow   for  easy  buying  and  selling  of   subsidiaries.  On   the  other  hand,   the  
local   and   global   mining   industry   underwent   important   changes   during   the  
1990s2,  stimulating  exploration  activity,  which  due  to  its  inherently  speculative  
nature   requires   large   volumes   of   initial   liquidity.   These   two   trends   are   not  
always   easily   distinguishable.   Therefore,   the   following   sections   review   firm-­‐‑
level  information  in  detail  to  establish  the  different  influences,  be  they  domestic  
developments   and  policy  decisions   or   global   trends,   on   JSE-­‐‑listed   companies’  
desire  to  hold  liquid  assets.  
4.1. Data and methodology 
The  analysis   in  this  chapter  is  based  on  firm-­‐‑level  data  taken  from  INET  BFA,  
formerly  McGregor   BFA3,  which   is   a   private   database   offering   South  African  
and   African   financial   and   economic   data   (INET   BFA,   2014).   INET   BFA   is   a  
commercial   database   mainly   serving   clients   in   the   finance   industry,   that   is,  
financial  investors.  These  commercial  clients  are  likely  to  focus  on  real-­‐‑time  and  
historical   equity   price   data.   This   part   of   the   INET   BFA   data   service   is   most  
certainly   highly   lucrative   and   therefore   likely   to   be   better   serviced.   The  
historical   balance   sheet   data   required   for   this   thesis   appeared   to   be   less  well  
maintained.   As   consequence,   the   database   was   extremely   unreliable   when  
online  downloads  of  large  datasets  were  undertaken.    
This  might  have  been  a  side  effect  of  the  distance  between  the  data  provider  (in  
Cape  Town)  and  the  author  (using  facilities  in  London),  as  sometimes  claimed,  
when   consulting   with   INET   BFA   representatives.   More   likely,   however,   a  
university   subscription   generates   a   much   smaller   cash   flow   than   corporate  
clients  do,  resulting  in  better  technical  and  personal  support  for  those  clients  in  
comparison  to  university  researchers.  Hence,  while  the  balance  sheet  data  used  
in  this  thesis  was  extracted  from  the  database,  this  proved  to  be  difficult  since  
                                                                                                 
2  See  Bridge,  2010  on  the  changing  global  picture.  
3  McGregor  BFA  can  be   traced  back   to   the  Bureau   for  Financial  Analysis,   founded  at  
the   University   of   Pretoria   in   1965.   In   2014   McGregor   BFA   purchased   I-­‐‑Net   Bridge,  
established  in  1990,  together  forming  INET  BFA  (2014).    
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the   source   is   not   set   up   to   provide   balance   sheet   figures   on   a   large   scale.   In  
consequence,  it  was  extremely  time  consuming,  entailing  many  failed  attempts  
because  of  technical  and  connectivity  problems.    
Furthermore,  INET  BFA  does  not  provide  meta  information  on  data  gathering  
and  cleaning.  Balance  sheets  are  standardised  when  entered  into  the  database.  
The   author   frequently   enquired   about   standardisation   rules,   but   was   not  
provided   with   satisfactory   information.   Similarly,   it   is   not   entirely 4   clear  
whether  sectoral  balance  sheets  provided  by  INET  BFA  are  consolidated  in  such  
a   way   to   avoid   double   counting   of   assets   (which   can   occur   when   company  
groups  and  individual  member  firms  are  both  listed  on  the  JSE).  
Thus,   the  author  decided  to  use  all  data  provided  by  INET  BFA  with  extreme  
caution  and  focus  the  empirical  analysis  on  official  balance  sheet  data  published  
by   the   listed   companies.   This   approach   has   the   advantage   to   provide   more  
quantitative   and   qualitative   depth.   The   balance   sheet   and   the   cash   flow  
statement   are   parts   of   each   listed   corporation’s   annual   report.   They   are   the  
centrepieces   of   the   financial   statement   published   in   the   annual   report.  
Importantly,  the  financial  information  goes  well  beyond  the  line  items  provided  
on  the  balance  sheet  and  in  the  cash  statement.    
The  database  contains  detailed   financial   statement   information   for  all   the   JSE-­‐‑
listed  companies  since  1990,  and  for  major  listed  companies  as  far  back  as  1970.  
This   includes   all   firms   that   have   been   delisted   after   1990,   and   some  
corporations   that   were   delisted   before   that   time.   Hence,   the   coverage   is  
considered   complete   after   1990   and   substantial   for   the   years   1970   to   1990  
(Roomaney,   2014).   Due   to   this   difference   in   data   quality   the   chapter   will  
distinguish  between  these  two  periods,  and  the  focus  of  the  analysis  will  be  on  
                                                                                                 
4  In  reply  to  a  detailed  enquiry  concerning  potential  double  counting  in  the  INET  BFA  
database,   a   firm   representative   claimed   that  double   counting  would  not  occur   in   the  
database   (Roomaney,   2014).  Given   the   commercial   character   of   the   database   and   the  
chosen  formulation  of  the  reply,  the  author  was  not  convinced.    
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the  New  South  Africa  and  data   since  1994,  which   is   compared   to   longer-­‐‑term  
trends  and  older  figures  where  necessary.    
The  data  work  for  this  chapter  was  carried  out  between  January  and  September  
2013   and   covers  data  up  until   2012.  The  data   available   for   the  period  1994   to  
2012  is  the  full  population  of  JSE-­‐‑listed  companies,  rather  than  merely  a  sample.  
The  documents  and  sources  that  were  consulted  cover  the  INET  BFA  database,  
which  produces  standardised  firm-­‐‑level  and  sectoral  balance  sheets  as  well  as  
cash   flow   statements.   Further,   all   available   annual   reports   listed   in   the   INET  
BFA   online   library   were   studied   in   conjuncture   with   the   circulars   and   stock  
exchange   news   service   (SENS)   releases.   INET   BFA   prides   itself   on   having  
recorded  all   annual   reports   of   JSE-­‐‑listed   corporations   that  have  been   released  
since   1990.   Where   available,   additional   documentation   was   consulted,   either  
from  the  corporations’  webpages,  or  from  other  investor  information  platforms,  
such  as  ShareData.    
The  INET  BFA  database  provides  data  for  825  non-­‐‑financial  firms  listed  at  the  
JSE  between  1970  and  2012,  and  for  795  non-­‐‑financial  businesses   for   the  years  
between   1994   and   2012.   Non-­‐‑financial   corporations   are   categorised   into   nine  
different  industrial  sectors,  namely:  (1)  basic  materials,  (2)  consumer  goods,  (3)  
consumer  services,   (4)  healthcare,   (5)   industrials,   (6)  oil  &  gas,   (7)   technology,  
(8)   telecommunications   and   (9)   utilities.   Table   4.1.   shows   the   number   of   non-­‐‑
financial  firms  contained  in  the  dataset  by  sector.  These  firms  have  been  listed  
at  the  JSE  at  least  for  one  year  during  the  periods  1970  to  2012  (column  2)  and  
1994  to  2012  (column  3),  respectively.    
Thus,  there  are  five  dominant  non-­‐‑financial  industries  represented  on  the  South  
African   stock   exchange,   namely,   in   order   of   size:   industrials,   basic  materials,  
consumer   services,   consumer   goods   and   technology.   Healthcare,  
telecommunications,   oil   &   gas   and   utilities   are   relatively   small   JSE-­‐‑listed  
sectors,  because  the  number  of  firms  listed  under  these  labels  has  not  exceeded  
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21.  Two  firms  could  not  be  classified  by  sector  and  are  therefore  accounted  for  








Source:  INET  BFA,  2013.  
Of   course,   finance   also   constitutes   a   sector   to  which   JSE-­‐‑listed   companies   can  
belong,   taking   the   total   number   of   sector   classifications   part   of   the   South  
African   capital  market   to   ten.   These   sectors   can   be   further   divided   into   sub-­‐‑
groups,  which  are   specified   in  Table  A.1.   in   the  Appendices  at   the  end  of   the  
thesis.   As   of   April   2013,   there   were   370   listed   firms   on   the   JSE,   with   a   total  
market   capitalisation   of   R7.8   trillion   (ShareData,   2013),   while   South   African  
gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  amounted  to  around  R3  trillion  in  2012  (National  
Treasury,  2013).  
The   methodology   used   here   can   be   classified   as   a   mixed   method   approach  
(Johnson,   Onwuegbuzie,   &   Turner,   2007)   since   elements   of   qualitative   and  
quantitative   research   are   combined   to   obtain   a   better   understanding   of   the  
corporate  liquidity  preference.  This  methodology  has  been  chosen  purposefully  
in   the   light  of   strongly  varying   findings  about   corporate   liquidity  holdings   in  
                                                                                                 
5  Sector  classifications  are  provided  by  the  INET  BFA  database  in  accordance  with  JSE  
listings.  The   classification  of  delisted   firms   is  not  provided  and  has   to  be  established  
from   qualitative   information   –   such   as   annual   reports.   This   has   been   done   by   the  
author,   using   the   INET   BFA   database   in   conjunction  with   ShareData   (2013)   and   the  
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studies  that  focused  only  on  quantitative  (regression)  analysis,  as  discussed  in  
chapter  2  (see  in  particular  Table  2.1.).    
Therefore,   descriptive   statistics   of   balance   sheet   positions   have   been   used   to  
define   volumes   of   liquidity   among   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   on   a   sectoral  
level.  Subsequently,  firm-­‐‑level  data  has  been  analysed  to  identify  non-­‐‑financial  
firms   with   particularly   strong   liquidity   preferences.   In   order   to   understand  
their  motivations   and   financial   operations,   quantitative   information   from   the  
financial   statements  has  been  combined  with  qualitative   research,   resulting   in  
132  cases  of  JSE-­‐‑listed  non-­‐‑financial  businesses.    
Wherever   balance   sheet  positions  were   assessed,   the   consolidated  group  data  
were  considered,  rather  than  the  positions  for  individual  firms.  This  means  that  
subsidiaries   and   associates   were   also   taken   into   account.   Subsidiaries   are  
companies   in   which   more   than   50%   of   voting   shares   are   controlled   by   the  
holding   company,  while   businesses   qualify   as   associates   if   between   20%   and  
50%  of  their  stock  is  held  by  another  company.  This  is   important  especially  in  
assessing   companies’   control   over   liquid   assets.   The   consolidated   position  
proportionally  reflects  liquidity  held  by  subsidiaries  and  also  that  of  associates.  
An  in-­‐‑depth  summary  of  these  firm  profiles  can  be  found  in    
Table   4.4.   in   part   4.4.   below.   They   cover   information   about   firms’   activity,  
incorporation  and  stock  exchange  listings,  as  well  as  their  current  listing  status  
and  –   if   listed  –   JSE  market   capitalisation   (as  of  April  2013).  Furthermore,   the  
case   studies   contain   an   assessment   of   companies’   cash   flow   statements,  
identifying  the  main  sources  of  cash  flow.  Firm  profiles  are  discussed  in  more  
detailed  in  section  4.4.  below,  while  an  aggregate  and  a  sectoral  assessment  of  
corporate  liquidity  holdings  by  JSE-­‐‑listed  companies  is  provided  in  sections  4.2.  
and  4.3.,  respectively.    
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4.2. Balance sheet analysis: The aggregate perspective    
As   discussed   in   chapter   3,   it   is   problematic   to   assume   homogeneity   or  
coordination  within  the  corporate  sector  of  an  economy  –  even  if  we  exclusively  
deal  with  listed  companies.  Therefore,  the  following  brief  analysis  is  not  meant  
to  be  an  account  of  the  macroeconomic  level  –  which  will  be  dealt  with  in  detail  
in  chapter  7  –  but  rather  a  first  indicator  of  developments  in  corporate  liquidity  
among  non-­‐‑financial  firms  listed  in  the  South  African  capital  market.    
The   two  measures  of   corporate   liquidity   chosen   for   this   research  are   the   cash  
ratio   and   the   overcapitalisation   ratio   (𝑂𝐶𝑅).   The   reasons   for   this   choice   –   as  
explained   comprehensively   in   chapter   3   –   are   that   the   former   ratio   is   easily  
obtained,  while  not  strictly  reflecting  the  entirety  of  a  firm’s  liquidity,  whereas  
the  latter  ratio  reflects  actual  corporate  liquidity  more  correctly,  but  is  also  more  
difficult   to   generate.   A   combination   of   these   two   is   able   to   provide   a   more  
complete  picture  at  the  firm  level.  However,  at  the  aggregate  level  we  have  to  
take  recourse  to  the  more  easily  obtainable  indicator:  the  cash  ratio.    
Therefore,  Figure  4.1.  shows  the  unweighted  average  cash  ratio,  that  is  the  ratio  
of   cash   and   cash   equivalents   to   total   current   liabilities,   for   all   non-­‐‑financial  
firms  in  the  set  of  JSE-­‐‑listed  companies  available  from  INET  BFA.  In  the  early  
1970s   the   average   cash   ratio   for   JSE-­‐‑listed   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   was  
around  15%.  Since  then,  there  has  been  a  secular  rise  in  the  cash  ratio  with  the  
average   exceeding   100%   by   2012.   This   means   that   by   2012   non-­‐‑financial  
businesses  listed  on  the  JSE  on  average  had  enough  cash  and  cash  equivalents  
available  to  pay  down  their  entire  short-­‐‑term  debt,  while  retaining  some  of  this  
liquidity.  As  stated  above,  data  for  before  1994  is  less  reliable  than  for  the  later  
years,   because   the   coverage   of   firm  data  has   been   regarded   as   complete   only  
since   1994.  Despite   large   fluctuations   in   the   aggregate   cash   ratio   of   JSE-­‐‑listed  
firms   a   clear   upward   trend   can   be   identified,   especially   since   the  mid-­‐‑1990s,  
which   is   the   time  period   for  which  data   quality   is  more   reliable.  An  upward  
trend  can  also  be  observed  between  1994  –  marked  by   the   red  vertical   line   in  
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Figure  4.1.  –  and  2012,  with  the  average  cash  ratio  increasing  from  around  85%  
in  the  late  1990s  (that  is  1995-­‐‑1999)  to  more  than  130%  for  the  2000s.    
Figure 4.1. Unweighted average cash ratio of JSE-listed non-financial firms 
 
Source:  Author’s  calculations  based  on  INET  BFA,  2013.  
The   observed   rise   has   neither   been   smooth   nor   gradual;   rather   the   ratio   has  
fluctuated   violently,   potentially   also   reflecting   political   unrest   in   apartheid  
South   Africa   and   economic   crises   in   the   New   South   Africa.   In   1976,   non-­‐‑
financial   corporations   stocked   up   on   cash,  maybe   in   response   to   increasingly  
intense   protest   against   the   apartheid   regime   and   its   attempt   –   among   other  
assaults  on  the  non-­‐‑white  population  –  to  impose  Afrikaans  as  main  language  
of  education.  This  culminated   in   the  Soweto  Uprising  on  16   June  1976  during  
which  20,000  students  took  to  the  streets  and  up  to  700  were  killed  as  result  of  
police  violence.    
The   precautionary   motive   might   have   prevailed   amongst   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations,   which   chose   to   hold   on   to   cash   rather   than   invest   during  
politically   turbulent   times.   This  was   certainly   exaggerated   by   the  Blocked   (or  
Dual)   Rand   system   introduced   in   1960   with   the   aim   to   strengthen   South  
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withdrawal  of  capital  from  the  domestic  market  difficult,  trapping  liquid  funds  
on  companies’  domestic  balance  sheets.  Likewise,  the  end  of  the  1980s  saw  high  
cash   ratios   among   JSE-­‐‑listed   firms.   This   period   was   characterised   by  
increasingly   difficult   access   to   international   financial   markets,   due   to   high  
interest  rates  in  major  OECD  countries,  and  high  levels  of  debt  owed  by  South  
African  corporations  and  the  government   (Padayachee,  1991).   It  also  heralded  
the   end   of   apartheid   as   South   Africa   became   internationally   increasingly  
isolated  due  to  its  racist  political  system.  
Financial   liberalisation  in  the  South  African  economy  was  triggered  by  the  De  
Kock  Commission  of  Inquiry  into  the  Monetary  System  and  Monetary  Policy  of  
South  Africa  established  in  1978.  The  three  reports  produced  by  the  commission  
set  in  motion  a  deregulation  and  liberalisation  process  similar  to  those  observed  
in   the   US   and   UK   economies.   For   instance,   exchange   controls   on   foreign  
residents  were  abolished  by  1983.  The  Dual  Rand  system  was  fully  abandoned  
by  1995  (SARB,  2015).  Thus,  since  then  assets  from  sales  of  foreign-­‐‑owned  assets  
in   South   Africa   are   freely   transferable   abroad.   Some   capital   controls   on  
domestic   firms   and   residents   remain   in   place   until   today.   Nevertheless,   the  
controls   are   unlikely   to   account   for   the   extent   of   overcapitalisation   and   the  
strength  of  corporate  liquidity  preference  present  in  South  Africa.    
On   the  one  hand,   capital   account   regulation  has  been  progressively   eased   for  
the  corporate  sector  over  the  past  two  decades.  Since  2013  listed  (and  since  2014  
also  unlisted)   companies  can   incorporate  an  entity   to  act  as  holding  company  
for  off-­‐‑shore  activities.  This  holding  company  is  not  subject   to  capital  controls  
and   the  South  African  parent   company   can   transfer  up   to  R2  billion  per  year  
into  the  holding  company.  In  fact,  the  parent  company  can  apply  to  transfer  up  
to  25%  of  its  market  capitalisation  into  this  holding  company,  if  this  is  deemed  
to  be  beneficial  to  South  Africa  (SARB,  2015).    
On   the   other   hand,   whatever   capital   controls   remained   in   place   appear  
practically  ineffective,  as  illegal  capital  flight  from  South  Africa  is  estimated  to  
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have  averaged  12%  of  GDP  between  2001  and  2007,  peaking  at  20%  in  the  latter  
year  (Ashman,  Fine,  &  Newman,  2011).  If  capital  controls  had  a  decisive  impact  
on  firms’  liquidity  preference  the  aggregate  cash  ratio  (portrayed  in  Figure  4.1.)  
should   exhibit   a   secular  decline   over   the   1990s   and   2000s,  when   the   financial  
account   was   gradually   opened   up   in   South   Africa   as   part   of   a   wider   trend  
towards   financial   liberalisation.6  Yet,  what   is   observed   is   exactly   the   opposite  
trend.    
In   the  New  South  Africa  –   since  1994  –   sharp   increases   in  average  cash  ratios  
among  non-­‐‑financial  businesses  appear  to  mirror  economic  disturbances,  such  
as   the   1996,   1998   and   2001   currency   crises   (Knedlik,   2006),   which   were  
accompanied   by   rises   in   average   cash   holdings   on   corporate   balance   sheets  
among   JSE-­‐‑listed   firms.  The  global   financial   crisis  of  2007/08  coincided  with  a  
surge   in   average   cash   positions   in   2007,   most   likely   as   a   consequence   of  
liquidity  drying  up  in  international  financial  markets.    
The   thesis   will   shed   more   light   on   the   macroeconomic   dynamics   and  
consequences   of   the   rising   corporate   liquidity   preference   in   chapter   7.  
Meanwhile,   this   chapter,   dealing   with   corporate   liquidity   preference   from   a  
firm-­‐‑level   perspective,   will   attempt   to   disaggregate   the   rising   trend   in   cash  
holdings  among  JSE-­‐‑listed  non-­‐‑financial  corporations,  accounting  for  sector  and  
firm  specificities.  Therefore,   the  next   section  presents   a   sectoral   assessment  of  
the  corporate  liquidity  preference.    
4.3. Balance sheet analysis: The sectoral level 
Acknowledging   differences   among   industries   and   the   influence   of   industry-­‐‑
specific   factors   on   holdings   of   liquidity,   average   cash   ratios   have   been  
                                                                                                 
6  Today,   capital   controls   on   individuals   and   companies   resident   in   South   Africa   are  
relatively   limited.  Since  2003,  companies  can   invest  up  to  R1  billion  per  year  without  
any   restriction,  doubling   the  previous   threshold   (SARB,   2015d).   Sums  exceeding   that  
threshold  have  to  be  authorised.  Given  that  large  South  African  companies  like  Anglo  
American   or   Old  Mutual   (formerly:   SA  Mutual)  moved   their   headquarters   overseas  
without  problems,  capital  controls  are  a  policy  tool  strongly  circumscribed  in  use  and  
effectiveness.      
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calculated  for  the  ten  industries  making  up  the  classifications  of  JSE-­‐‑listed  firms  
(see  Table  4.2.).  The  table  also  shows  average  cash  ratios  for  selected  sub-­‐‑sectors  
in   the   basic   materials   and   finance   industries.   Both   industries   are   large,  
containing   a   number   of   sub-­‐‑sectors   characterised   by   varying   liquidity  
preferences,  which  necessitated  further  disaggregation.    
Table 4.2. Average cash ratios by sector and selected sub-sector 
  
Source:  INET  BFA,  2013.  
The  periodisation  used  in  the  table  is  broadly  based  on  socio-­‐‑economic  events,  
although  it  has  to  be  acknowledged  that  some  variability  and  a  different  period  
classification   might   be   possible.7  The   apartheid   government   was   increasingly  
criticised   internationally   during   the   1960s   and   1970s,   but   only   came   under  
severe  political  and  economic  pressure  in  the  1980s.  The  arms  embargo  by  the  
UN  Security  Council  against   the  apartheid  regime  did  not  become  mandatory  
until   1977,   that   is,   until   after   the   Soweto   Uprising   in   1976.   In   1985,   the  
                                                                                                 
7  Some  authors  (Dollery,  2003)  would  argue  that  1975  (or  1976)  was  a  more  appropriate  
year  to  start  the  periodisation,  since  political  unrest  and  the  country’s  economic  decline  
started  in  the  mid-­‐‑1970s.  On  the  other  hand,  according  to  other  commentators  1970  is  a  
landmark  for  the  economy  because  the  physical  volume  of  gold  output  peaked  in  that  
year,  heralding  the  long-­‐‑term  decline  of  the  economy  (Jones,  2002).  
Sub$Sector 1970$1979 1980$1993 1994$1999 2000$2007 2008 2009$2012 1994$2012
Basic6materials
Forestry6&6Paper 11.0% 10.7% 21.2% 24.4% 14.2% 20.7% 22.1%
Industrial6Metals 7.7% 22.9% 39.3% 41.8% 66.9% 36.9% 41.3%
Chemicals 15.7% 2.8% 11.0% 21.2% 9.1% 18.0% 16.7%
Mining
Coal 13.0% 26.8% 51.3% 9.0% 0.8% 41.0% 28.7%
Diamond6&6Gemstones n/a 34.8% 38.0% 99.1% 15.3% 16.3% 58.0%
General6Mining 24.6% 72.7% 52.4% 22.0% 24.2% 43.5% 36.2%
Platinum6&6Precious6Metals 12.2% 33.5% 34.5% 18.1% 23.9% 18.9% 23.8%
Gold 3.4% 4.3% 25.6% 24.7% 12.7% 43.3% 28.3%
Consumer6Goods 3.9% 9.0% 19.0% 26.3% 19.5% 19.8% 22.3%
Consumer6Services 8.3% 13.0% 27.1% 31.1% 25.9% 23.0% 27.9%
Finance
Banks n/a 10.5% 4.4% 7.2% 3.0% 3.2% 7.4%
Financial6Services 30.0% 44.4% 18.6% 14.4% 9.2% 8.8% 27.7%
Insurance 0.1% 19.6% 77.1% 26.8% 10.5% 9.4% 38.2%
Investment6Instruments 3.6% 59.3% 67.8% 96.2% 23.4% 29.2% 69.3%
Real6Estate 17.0% 103.3% 97.6% 30.2% 13.9% 9.7% 46.3%
Healthcare n/a 82.4% 3.9% 28.5% 19.7% 29.0% 20.4%
Industrials 10.1% 16.3% 20.8% 21.5% 323.1% 27.3% 32.7%
Oil6&6Gas n/a 22.3% 51.5% 16.6% 13.1% 41.9% 28.3%
Technology 0.7% 8.9% 54.0% 45.1% 36.4% 34.3% 45.2%
Telecommunication 127.5% 37.7% 28.5% 17.5% 35.6% 32.2% 25.0%
Utilities n/a n/a 20.5% 69.3% 2.4% 18.8% 44.9%
For6NFFs:6Cash6ratios6of650%$99%6are6marked6in6yellow.
For6NFFs:6Cash6ratios6of6100%6and6more6are6marked6in6red.
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Commonwealth   introduced   the   first   limited   economic   sanctions   against   the  
country   (The   Commonwealth   Secretariat,   1989).   The   following   year   the   US  
Congress   passed   the   Comprehensive   Anti-­‐‑Apartheid   Act   imposing   sanctions  
and   demanding   the   release   of  Nelson  Mandela.   Consequently,   the   1970s   and  
the  decade  before   the  end  of  apartheid   (1980-­‐‑1993)  are   treated  as   two  distinct  
periods.  
The   post-­‐‑apartheid   years   between   1994   and   1999   are   characterised   by   the  
attempt   to   reconcile   the   country   under   Nelson   Mandela’s   presidency.   The  
global  economic  upswing  of   the  early  2000s   (2000-­‐‑2007)   followed,   resulting   in  
high  GDP   growth   in   South  Africa.8  The   boom  was   brought   to   an   end   by   the  
repercussions  of  the  2007/08  global  financial  crisis,  exaggerating  the  slow-­‐‑down  
in  domestic  growth.  South  Africa  plunged  into  a  severe  recession  by  the  end  of  
2008,  which  is  treated  as  distinct  event.  The  country  then  recovered  to  moderate  
growth   levels,   defining   the   latest   period   (2009-­‐‑2012).   At   the   time   of   data  
collection  only  sporadic  firm-­‐‑level  data  were  available  for  2013,  explaining  the  
cut-­‐‑off  point  (namely  2012)  for  analysis.  
Table   4.2.   uses   two   thresholds   to   determine   non-­‐‑financial   corporations’  
overcapitalisation,   i.e.   the   situation   in   which   non-­‐‑financial   firms’   liquidity  
holdings   exceed   what   would   be   necessary   for   productive   operations,   as  
explained   in   chapter   3.   One   threshold   has   been   already   identified   in   the  
preceding  chapter,  namely  the  absolute  threshold  for  strong  overcapitalisation:  
(1) Companies   with   a   cash   ratio   of   100%   and   more   will   be   classified   as  
strongly   overcapitalised   because   they   could   pay   off   their   entire   short-­‐‑
term   debt,   while   still   retaining   highly   liquid   assets   on   their   balance  
sheets.  Given  the  cost  of  borrowing  and  forgone  productive   investment  
opportunities,   it   does   not   seem   likely   that   a   non-­‐‑financial   corporation  
would  hold  more  than  the  equivalent  of  its  total  current  liabilities  due  to  
concern   about   its   short-­‐‑term   liabilities.   Therefore,   anything   beyond   a  
                                                                                                 
8  Growth  was  4.4%  annually  on  average  SARB  (2013).  
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cash   ratio   of   100%  might   be   induced   by   the   speculative   motive.   Cash  
ratios  above  this  threshold  are  highlighted  in  red  in  the  above  figure.    
The  second  threshold  is,  as  suggested  in  chapter  3,  a  relative  threshold.  For  this  
purpose  Table  4.2.  also  includes  the  finance  industry  and  its  sub-­‐‑sectors.    
(2) Firms   with   a   cash   ratio   of   50%   and   up   to   99%   are   considered  
overcapitalised.  This  second  threshold  is  based  on  the  sectoral  analysis  of  
the  South  African  economy,  presented  in  Table  4.2.  For  the  years  1994  to  
2012  JSE-­‐‑listed  financial  companies  with  the  largest  holdings  of  cash  and  
cash  equivalents  relative  to  current  liabilities  on  average  have  cash  ratios  
exceeding   50%   in   aggregate.   The   three   financial   sub-­‐‑sectors   with   the  
highest   liquidity  preference  have  an  (unweighted)  average  cash  ratio  of  
51.3%.   The   three   sub-­‐‑sectors   are   insurance,   real   estate   and   investment  
instruments,  covering  companies  that  typically  deal  in  equity,  currencies  
and  real  estate.  This  second  threshold  is  important  because  it  marks  the  
level   at   which   the   distinction   between   financial   and   non-­‐‑financial  
companies  begins  to  blur.  According  to  economic  theory  (and  the  minds  
of   policy   makers),   financial   and   non-­‐‑financial   businesses   are  
fundamentally   different.  Hence,   this   threshold   is   used   to   identify   non-­‐‑
financial  firms  as  overcapitalised.  Cash  ratios  between  50%  and  99%  are  
highlighted  in  yellow  in  the  table  above.    
The   final   column   in   Table   4.2.  provides   average   aggregate   cash   ratios   for   the  
period   1994   to   2012.   These   are   the   years   for   which   comprehensive   data   are  
available   from   INET   BFA   and   will   therefore   be   the   focus   of   this   analysis.  
Abstracting   from   financial   companies,  only  diamond  and  gemstone  mining,   a  
sub-­‐‑sector  of   the  mining   industry,   shows  average  aggregate  cash   ratios  above  
the   overcapitalisation   threshold   (of   50%)   for   the   entire   period.   Notably,   the  
technology   industry   comes   close   to   the   threshold,  with   an   average   aggregate  
cash   ratio   of   45.2%.   Assessing   individual   periods,   other   resource   extracting  
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sectors   –   such   as   coal,   general   mining   and   oil   &   gas   –   also   stand   out   as  
overcapitalised  (according  to  the  50%  threshold).    
Extremely   high   aggregate   cash   ratios   in   2008   can   be   found   for   the   industrial  
metals  and  industrials  industries.  Strong  overcapitalisation  was  detected  in  the  
latter,  where   the   aggregate   cash   ratio  was  way  beyond   the   100%   threshold  at  
323%  in  2008.  Both  cases  seem  to  be  a  function  of  the  2007/08  financial  crisis  and  
an   exception   for   these   sectors,  which   otherwise   consistently   show   cash   ratios  
below  both  thresholds.    
The   healthcare,   utilities   and   telecommunications   industries   also   appear  
overcapitalised   (according   to   the   50%   threshold)   on   average   for   individual  
periods.9  However,  as  documented  in  Table  4.1.  above,  a  very  small  number  of  
non-­‐‑financial  corporations  is  listed  on  the  JSE  in  these  three  sectors.  Therefore,  
it   is   generally   more   important   how   corporate   liquidity   preferences   have  
developed   in   the   five  main   industries   that   contain   the  bulk  of   JSE-­‐‑listed  non-­‐‑
financial  companies.  These  are:   industrials,  basic  materials,  consumer  services,  
consumer  goods  and  technology.    
Figure  4.2.  shows  the  development  of  aggregate  cash  ratios  in  these  industries  
for  the  period  1994  to  2012.  It  reveals  that  the  basic  materials  sector  has  been  a  
major   driving   force   behind   the   overall   increase   in   the   corporate   liquidity  
preference  among  JSE-­‐‑listed  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  (as  already  documented  
in  Figure  4.1.   further  above).  Further,   it   is   striking   that   the   consumer   services  
sector  also  has  a  persistently  high  –  even   though   fluctuating  –  aggregate  cash  
ratio.  Holdings   of   highly   liquid   assets   in   the   consumer  goods   and   industrials  
industries  have  been  more  moderate  and  stable,  as  confirmed  by  the  aggregate  
average   (for   1994-­‐‑2012)   of   22%   and   33%,   respectively,   provided   in   Table   4.1.  
above.    
                                                                                                 
9  Telecommunications  in  1970-­‐‑1979,  healthcare  in  1980-­‐‑1993  and  utilities  in  2000-­‐‑2007.  
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The   technology   sector   is   an   interesting   case,   because   the   aggregate   cash   ratio  
here  (close  to  50%)  has  been  relatively  high  over  the  entire  period  (1994-­‐‑2012),  
but   generally   declining   after   its   peak   in   the   late   1990s.   This   peak   is   likely   to  
reflect   developments   in   the   US   stock   markets   in   the   run-­‐‑up   to   the   dot-­‐‑com  
bubble,  when   listed   technology  companies   could  easily  access   liquidity   in   the  
capital  market  without  driving  down  their  share  prices.    
Figure 4.2. Aggregate cash ratios for selected sectors, 1994-2012 
  
Source:  Author’s  calculations  based  on  INET  BFA,  2013.  
It  is  important  to  note  that  for  all  five  of  these  industries  the  average  cash  ratio  
in   the   New   South   Africa   (referring   to   1994-­‐‑2012)   more   than   doubled   in  
comparison   to   the   last   decade   under   the   apartheid   regime   (1980-­‐‑1993).  Table  
4.2.  documents  how  the  average  aggregate  cash  ratio  rose  from  9%  during  the  
final  years  of   apartheid   (1980-­‐‑1993)   to  more   than  22%   for   the   two  subsequent  
decades  (1994-­‐‑2012)   in  the  consumer  goods   industry,   from  13%  to  almost  28%  
in  consumer  services,  from  16%  close  to  33%  in  JSE-­‐‑listed  industrial  companies  
and   from   9%   to   more   than   45%   in   the   technology   sector.   Of   course,   these  
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This   development   has   been   favoured   by   easing   inflationary   pressures   during  
the   1990s,   in   comparison   to   the   high-­‐‑inflation   environment   governing   South  
Africa   in   the   late   1980s.   Nevertheless,   the   relationship   between   liquidity  
preference  and  inflation  is  not  straightforwardly  inverse,  since  periods  of  high  
inflation   in   South   Africa   have   coincided   with   increasing   levels   of   corporate  
liquidity  holdings  among  JSE-­‐‑listed  companies,  such  as   in  the  early  1990s  and  









Source:  Author’s  calculations  based  on  INET  BFA,  2013.  
Assessing  the  number  of  overcapitalised  non-­‐‑financial  firms  by  sector  confirms  
the  observations   from  the  calculation  of  average  aggregate  cash  ratios:  among  
the   larger   JSE-­‐‑listed   sectors   there   are   two  which   stand   out   as   industries  with  
high  numbers  of  overcapitalised  non-­‐‑financial  corporations.  As  shown  in  Table  
4.3.  these  are  the  basic  materials  and  the  technology  sector.  Some  40%  of  all  oil  
&   gas   firms   listed   on   the   JSE   have   cash   ratios   that   are   on   average   above   the  
100%  threshold,   implying  they  are  strongly  overcapitalised.  Even  at   the   lower  
(50%)   threshold   60%   of   all   JSE-­‐‑listed   oil   &   gas   companies   come   up   as  
overcapitalised.  
However,   this   observation   is   put   into   perspective   when   one   considers   the  
absolute  number  of  oil  &  gas   companies   in   the  dataset.  There  are  merely   five  
50%+ 100%+
Basic+materials 41% 28% 187
Consumer+goods 20% 5% 96
Consumer+services 25% 11% 170
Healthcare 24% 14% 21
Industrials 19% 9% 229
Oil+&+gas 60% 40% 5
Technology 42% 21% 73
Telecommunications 30% 20% 10
Utilities 50% 0% 2
Unclassified 0% 0% 2
Total 28% 15% 795
Cash+ratio+ofSector Number+of+firms
Table 4.3. Number of overcapitalised NFFs by sector, 1994-2012 
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firms.  Hence,   the   sector   alone   is   unlikely   to   drive   the   larger   phenomenon   of  
rising  liquidity  preferences  among  JSE-­‐‑listed  companies.  As  is  discussed  in  the  
following   section,   the   oil   &   gas   industry   shares   specific   characteristics   with  
mining  of  basic  materials  –  namely  the  necessity  for  resource  exploration  –  that  
induces  firms  in  both  sectors  to  amass  liquidity.  
Considering  average  cash  ratios  over   the  period  1994  to  2012,  28%  of  all  basic  
materials   firms   were   strongly   overcapitalised,   exhibiting   cash   ratios   of   100%  
and  more.  This  percentage  is  almost  twice  as  high  as  the  15%  of  total  JSE-­‐‑listed  
non-­‐‑financial   companies,   which   on   average   were   strongly   overcapitalised  
during  those  years.  Apart  from  the  oil  &  gas  sector,  this  is  the  industry  with  the  
highest   incidence   of   strong   overcapitalisation,   followed   by   the   technology  
sector   where   more   than   one   fifth   of   all   listed   companies   have   cash   ratios   of  
100%  and  more  on  average  for  the  years  1994  to  2012.    
Utilising  the  lower  threshold  of  50%  –  which  indicates  overcapitalisation  rather  
than   strong   overcapitalisation   –   similar   percentages   of   technology   companies  
(42%)  and  basic  materials  firms  (41%)  listed  on  the  JSE  count  as  overcapitalised.  
Nevertheless,   basic   materials   is   a   larger   industry   on   the   JSE   –   including   187  
companies   in   comparison   to   73   technology   firms   for   the   years   1994   to   2012   –  
which  means   that   in   absolute  numbers   there  were  more  overcapitalised  basic  
material  producers  on  the  South  African  stock  exchange.  Once  again,  the  oil  &  
gas  sector  has  a  higher  share  of  overcapitalised  firms  (60%).  The  same  is  true  for  
the   aggregate   of   utility   companies   (50%).   Nevertheless,   the   small   number   of  
companies   listed   in   these   sectors   makes   this   fact   less   important   in  
understanding  the  broader  trend.  
As   explained   in   the   previous   chapter,   the   cash   ratio   cannot   fully   account   for  
overcapitalisation  and  is  therefore  simply  an  indicator  for  detecting  instances  of  
overcapitalisation.   It   cannot   be   used   to   assess   the   full   extent   or   origins   of  
overcapitalisation.   Therefore,   a   relatively   crude   measure   such   as   the   period  
average   cash   ratio   is   sufficient.   It   serves   only   to   highlight   the   most   extreme  
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cases.   Extreme   in   the   sense   that   non-­‐‑financial   firms   are   either   consistently  
overcapitalised,  or  overcapitalised  only  for  a  few  years,  but  at  a  very  high  level.  
Therefore,  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  that  have  a  long  listing  history,  with  cash  
ratios  that  are  above  the  overcapitalisation  threshold  only  for  a  couple  of  years,  
will  not  be  singled  out  as  overcapitalised.  By  contrast,  non-­‐‑financial  firms  listed  
at  the  South  African  stock  exchange  for  a  short  period  of  time,  with  instances  of  
either  repeated  or  extremely  high  overcapitalisation  will  attract  attention,  since  
their  listing  history  is  dominated  by  high  cash  ratios.    
Having   detected   overcapitalised   non-­‐‑financial   companies,   a   much   more  
detailed  analysis  using  the  𝑂𝐶𝑅,  that  is,  the  amount  of  all  liquid  assets  as  share  
of  total  current  liabilities,  is  necessary  to  assess  its  actual  extent.  The  reasons  for  
overcapitalisation   can   best   be   established   through   in-­‐‑depth   company   case  
studies.  Therefore,  the  next  section  will  introduce  balance  sheet  analysis  at  the  
firm   level.   For   this   purpose   all   strongly   overcapitalised   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations  will   be   first   identified  and   subsequently   examined   in  detail.  The  
first   exercise  will   be   undertaken   quantitatively,   using   the   cash   ratio,  whereas  
the   second   assessment   relies   on   in-­‐‑depth   mixed-­‐‑method   research,   evaluating  
both  quantitative  and  qualitative  data  available  mainly  from  corporate  annual  
reports.  
4.4. Balance sheet analysis: The firm level  
Using  the  strong  overcapitalisation  threshold  –  represented  by  an  average  cash  
ratios  of  100%  or  more  –  119  strongly  overcapitalised  non-­‐‑financial  firms  can  be  
identified   for   the   years   from  1994   to   2012.  As   one   should   recall   these   are   the  
years  for  which  comprehensive  data  are  available  from  INET  BFA.  Another  13  
cases  can  be  discerned  for   the   longer  period,  covering  1970   to  2012.  These  are  
included  to  obtain  a  more  complete  picture  of  what  drives  corporate   liquidity  
preferences  in  South  Africa.    
The  higher   threshold   for   strong  overcapitalisation  has  been  used   to  make   the  
exercise  manageable,  while  also  giving   it  meaningful  boundaries.  This   section  
   165  
will   present   information   obtained   through   the   detailed   study   of   132   non-­‐‑
financial   companies.   If   the   lower   threshold   was   used   –   that   is   average   cash  
ratios   of   50%   and   higher   –   243   corporations   would   have   to   be   analysed  
quantitatively  and  qualitatively,  which  would  have  been  beyond   the   scope  of  
what  is  feasible  for  a  PhD  thesis.    
Nonetheless,   it   is   important   to   remember   that   the   phenomenon   of  
overcapitalisation   is   not   limited   to   the   132   cases  presented  here,   and   also  not  
necessarily  limited  to  the  243  cases  identified  by  the  lower  threshold,  since  the  
cash   ratio   does   not   account   for   liquid   assets  with   a  maturity   period   of  more  
than  3  months.  Instead,  the  100%  threshold  identifies  the  most  noticeable  cases  
of   overcapitalisation.   For   April   2013,   strongly   overcapitalised   non-­‐‑financial  
companies   accounted   for   6.2%   of   total   JSE-­‐‑market   capitalisation,   with   the  
percentage   increasing   to   11.3%   for   overcapitalised   non-­‐‑financial   corporations.  
However,   it  should  be  kept   in  mind  that   the  financial  sector   in   its  broad  form  
(that   is,   as   FIRE)   accounts   for   a   large   portion   of   JSE   market   capitalisation,  
namely  for  between  one  fifth  and  one  quarter.          
While   this   section   deals   with   firm-­‐‑level   analysis,   the   industry   specific  
circumstances  of   these  companies  are  of  course  kept   in  mind.  As  discussed   in  
chapter   3,   sound   balance   sheet   analysis   (i.e.   what   the   author   labels  
‘comprehensive  balance  sheet  analysis’)  must  pay  attention  to  industry-­‐‑specific  
factors   that   impact   firms’   operations.   Thus,   it   will   be   shown   that   mining  
companies   and   especially   exploration   companies   have   strong   reasons   to   hold  
large   volumes   of   liquidity   due   to   the   inherently   speculative   nature   of   their  
activity.   Table   4.4.   provides   detailed   information   for   the   132   overcapitalised  
non-­‐‑financial   companies,   summarising   information   about   their   activities,  
incorporation   and   any   foreign   stock   exchange   listings,   as  well   as   the   current  
listing   status   and   –   if   listed   –   market   capitalisation   in   April   2013.   Further,   a  
comment   section   contains   any   additional   information   that   is   important   to  
understand  the  companies’  operations  and  business  history.    
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JSE market capitalisation (April 2013)




The company received administrative and technical support 
from JCI through a management contract. The contract 
went over to Western Area Limited as JCI restructured. 
Finally, the company was acquired by JCI to to enhance its 
mineral rights portfolio through the introduction of a BEE 
partner.




Investment holding company with interest only in UT 
Worldwide Inc. which is a supply chain solutions provider.
Incorporated in the British Virgin Islands in 1987.
Dividends received from UT Worldwide Inc.
Chrometco*Limited*
(Chrometco)
Copper, cobalt, manganese and iron ore exploration and 
mining.
Incorporation/ listing Incorporated in South Africa in October 2002, listed on the 
JSE AltX in August 2005.
The company has been concentrating on mining exploration 
until 2011 when mining operations at Rooderand Chrome 
began. Main income sources have been financial income 
(since 2008 when interest rates on liquid assets were 
changed from 0% to a variable rate) and sales/management 
of mines.
R41 million (rank 348 out of 370 listed companies).
Village*Main*Reef*Limited*
(Village) Since 2010: after the reverse takeover of Simmer & Jack 
Mines Limited activities are mining of gold, platinum and 
other minerals.




Investor and financial education, in 2000 transformed into a 
property trading business.
Incorporated in South Africa in July 1998 as Africa's Best 39 
Limited, renamed to World Educational Technologies in July 
1998, listed on the JSE in September 1998.
No income from operations. Listing in 1999 generated 
funds, further income from disposal of listed investments, 
subsidiaries and businesses.
The company is a merger of seven companies - namely 
Stock Market Investors Club, World Equity Network, 
DataShare and Trade Triggers, Three C Systems, Manning 
Software, Alexander Frances Consultants and Stock Market 
Solutions - dealing with stock market education, investment 
research and IT development. The oldest of these 
companies were incorporated in the late 1980s.
Delisted in November 2001 after disposal of all major 
assets and acquisition of property portfolio.
Barnato*Exploration*Ltd Mining exploration.
Delisted in December 2004 after merger with Supply 
Solutions Limited.
Incorporated in South Africa in 1988, listed on the JSE in 
1988.
Irregular income from operations, funded through loans 
from JCI.
The company generates income solely through its financial 
investments.
Company*profile
Until 1995: gold mining; 1995-2010: income from asset 
sales and limited interest on liquid assets; since 2010: 
mining operations.


































Mineral mining and exploration.
Incorporated in South Africa. 
Interest and dividends received.
The company was acquired by Randgold & Exploration 
which was then integrated into JCI Limited to simplify the 
holding structure.
The company started unbundling in the late 1990s to 
increase the value of group assets, total unbundling and 
subsequent liquidation was decided in 2001. Litigation 
procedures around CNA, a part of the group, delayed the 
unbundling until 2009 when the acquisition of PBT Group 
was decided instead of liquidation.
Delisted from the JSE in November 2010 after acquiring 
PBT Group and changing name to PBT Group.
Sasani'Limited Investment holding company with interest in the media 
sector.
Formerly Crendell Investment Corporation, listed on the 
JSE in January 1997.




Gold and uranium exploration.
Incorporated in South Africa in December 2002, listed on 
the JSE in April 2006, secondary listing on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange in January 2008.
Gold exploration but not mining itself, implying the main 
income sources are sales/management of mines. 
R338 million (rank 257 out of 370 listed companies).
Wooltru'Limited Investment holding company with interest in consumer 
goods as well as property owning, letting and development.
Incorporated in South Africa and listed on the JSE in July 
1936.
Income from operations until early 2000s when the total 
unbundling was initiated and the company disposed of its 
profitable listed and unlisted investments, making losses on 
operations but profits through deinvesting. 
Mature mining company; Genbel and subsequently Genbel 
Securities was the majority shareholder and also acts as 
administrator. After Randex converted major mineral rights 
into shareholdings and anticipating the sale of Randex's 
remaining mineral rights the company was converted into a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Genbel Securities - a financial 
investment company - and delisted.
Delisted in May 1997 after becoming a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Genbel Securities.
Progress'Industries Clothing ad textile manufacturing.
Incorporated in South Africa in 1945.
Until 1994: operations, subsequently: interest-bearing 
investment.
Company'profile
Randex'Ltd Gold and other mineral mining and exploration.
Incorporated in South Africa.
Mining operations, investment in other mining companies 
and lease of mining rights.
Delisted in November 2003 after acquisition of Free State 
Development & Investment Corporation by Randgold & 
Exploration.
Between 1970 and 1994, the company had an average 
cash ratio of 1.4%. The high cash ratio in 1995 was the 
result of the liquidation of PK&T, the company's main 
subsidiary.
JSE listing suspended in November 1994, delisted in 
September 1996.
In 1995, the company unbundled its investment in Saflife 
Ltd and Hosken Consolidated Investments, turning into a 
cash shell in 1996. In 1997, the company started acquiring 
media companies.
Delisted in October 2005.






JSE market capitalisation (April 2013)
Kiwara)Plc Activity Base metal exploration.
(Kiwara) Incorporation/ listing
secondary listing on the JSE in April 2008.
Cash flow sources
Comments
Avgold)Ltd Gold mining, development and exploration.
Incorporated in South Africa in November 1990 as Target 
Exploration Company Limited, listed on the JSE in December 
1996, listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange.
Income from operations, disposal of mining assets, financial 
investment and rights offers.
The company was incorporated to reorganise the mining 
assets of Anglovaal, the company's controlling shareholder. 
These assets are Hartebeestfontein and Loraine mines, 
Target, Sun Oribi and ETCons. 
No operating income, limited interest on liquid assets, 
financing through equity issuance.
In 2009 Kiwara had difficulties raising capital. The 
International Financial Corporation of the World Bank Group 
agreed to purchase shares for cash worth 6 million US dollar 
(with an option on further 9 million US dollar).
Company)profile
Primary listing on the London Stock Exchange (AIM),
Delisted in May 2004 after the acquisition of Avgold by 
Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited.








JSE market capitalisation (April 2013)
African)Eagle)Resources Activity Mineral exploration.
(AER) Incorporation/ listing
Cash flow sources
JSE market capitalisation (April 2013)
Coal)of)Africa)Resources Activity Coal exploration and mining.
(Coal)of)Africa) Incorporation/ listing
Cash flow sources






R187 million (ranked 284 out of 370 listed companies).
No operating income yet, income from dividends and interest.
Capricorn Investment Holdings was listed as financial 
company on the JSE. At the point of reverse acquisition 
Capricorn was merely a cash shell, not possessing any 
business operations. The acquisition of Western Utilities 
Coporation was financed by equity issuance.
Incorporated in the UK in 1996. Primary listing on the London 
Stock Exchange (AIM), secondary listing on the JSE (AltX) in 
August 2007.
Acquisition and disposal of subsidiary companies/mines, no 
income from mining operations, financed through equity 
issuance.
Sephaku)Holdings)Limited (Industrial) mineral exploration, development and investment.
Incorporated in South Africa as Zeranza in February 2005, 
renamed to Sephaku Holdings Limited in May 2005, listed on 
the JSE in August 2009.
Delisted in February 2010 after acquisition of Kiwara by First 
New Quantum.
No operating income, financing initially through equity 
issuance and subsequently long-term debt.
R1,306 million (rank 196 out of 370 listed companies).
Kibo)Mining)Plc
No operating income, limited current liabilities, no non-current 
liabilities, financed through equity issuance.
155 million Rand (ranked 296 out of 370 listed companies).
Gold and nickel exploration.
Incorporated in Ireland in 2008. Primary listing at the London 
Stock Exchange (AIM) since 2010, secondary listing at the 




Established by a reverse take over of Western Utilities 
Corporation by Capricorn Investment Holdings (incorporated 
in 1987, listed on the JSE in January 1988) in April 2012.
Incorporated in 1979 in Australia. Primary listing on the 
Australian Stock Exchange in 1980, secondary listings on the 
London Stock Exchange (AIM) in 2005 and on the JSE in 
November 2006.
Since 2007 Coal of Africa has been making losses on 
operations financed through equity issuance, current and non-
current liabilities. It has also been very active in acquisition 
and disposal of subsidiary firms.
R1,898 million (ranked 174 out of 370 listed companies).
JSE market capitalisation (April 2013) R94 million (ranked 317 out of 370 listed companies).




























Gold exploration and mining.
Established in South Africa in 1887, listed on the JSE in 1924 and 
the LSE.
No income from operations since early 1990s (except 2002-03, 
2007-08), strong growth in investment expenditure since 2006, 
financed through equity and (mostly long-term) borrowing.
Mining assets have been declining in volume and quality. Simmer & 
Jack have been exploring and acquiring mining assets.
JSE listing suspended in December 2012, delisted in April 2013.
Investment holding company with interest in consumer goods and 
services.





Gold mining operations ceased in October 1968, the company 
acquired additional investment in coal and base metal companies in 
1970.
Delisted in 1998 after acquisition of Oceana Investment 
Corporation by Park Lawn Limited.
Company(profile
No operating income, financing through equity issuance.
The balance sheet had to be reduced in 2009 and operations 
reoriented towards exploration and more involvement of joint 
venture partners due to lacking capitalisation.
R111 million (rank 308 out of 370 listed companies).
Tawana(Resources((Tawana) Mineral and diamond exploration.
Incorporated in Australian in November 1998, listed on the ASX in 




Incorporated in South Africa in October 1996, listed on the JSE in 
October 1997.
Some income from operations (2001, 2002), otherwise financed 
through share issuance and long-term borrowing.
The company was set up with the purpose to explore and develop 
the Corridor Sands Project. Once this was achieved, the company 
was liquidated.




Until 1968: gold mining, subsequently: investment and share 
dealing company with interest in basic materials, mainly metal.
Incorporated in South Africa in February 1933 as Vogelstruisbult 
Gold Mining Areas Ltd, renamed to Vogelstruisbult Metal Holdings 
Ltd in 1970, listed on the JSE, listed on the LSE.
JSE market capitalisation (April 2013)
Activity
Cash flow sources





JSE market capitalisation (April 2013)
Until 2004: fruit production and export, since 2005: operational 
income from diversified investment and active use of financial 
operations (share issuance and borrowing).
R1,487 million (rank 189 of 370 listed companies).
Delisted from the JSE in September 2009.
(Halogen(Holdings(Societe(
Anonyme(
Until 2007: gold mining in Zimbabwe, 2007-2009: operation of a 
chain of pubs through Heartstone Inns Limited.
Incorporated in Luxembourg as Falcon Investments in 1992, listing 
on the JSE in 1993, also listed on the Luxemburg and Zimbabwe 
Stock Exchange, renamed to Falcon Investment Holdings Societe 
Anonyme in 2001, renamed to Halogen Investment Holdings 
Societe Anonyme in 2005.
Gold mining, disposal of production assets and (once-off)mineral 
exploration project in Chile.
Since 2000 gold mining was loss-making in Zimbabwe because of 
hyperinflation, government controls on foreign exchange and the 
overvaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar. As consequence, 
operations were closed down and assets sold to Central African 
Gold in 2007. The subsequent investment in a UK-based pub chain 
operator failed and the corporation was liquidated and delisted in 
2009.
Delisted in June 2000.
Afrocentric(Investment(Corp Until 2004: fruit production and export, since 2005:  diversified 
investment holding (electronics, communication industry, health 
care services)
Incorporation/ listing Incorporated in South Africa in February 1988 as WB Holdings 
Limited, listed on the JSE in 1988. Controlling ownership changed 
in 2005 when the company transformed into AfroCentric Investment 
Corporation.
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Company*profile
The JSE listing was suspended in October 2003, liquidated and 
delisted in November 2005.
First Uranium was set up to develop Simmer & Jack Mines' 
uranium resources, bringing in equity finance from the TSX. 
Simmer & Jack own 67.2% in First Uranium. Forecasts were too 
optimistic. The company had to be recapitalised in 2010. Following 
the reverse take-over of Simmer & Jack by Village Reef First 
Uranium's assets were sold to AngloGold Ashanti Limited and Gold 
One International in 2012.
R3,003 million (rank 148 out of 370 listed companies).
Delisted June 2000 after a merger with Trans Hex Group Limited 
which made Ocean Diamond Mining a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Trans Hex.
Delisted in April 2006 after VenFin was acquired by Vodaphone Plc.
Investment holding company with interest in technology and 
telecommunications and some investment in financial services.
Came out of the Rembrandt Group when the latter was restructured 
in September 2000, listed on the JSE in September 2000.
Operations.
Rembrandt Group was mainly dealing with tobacco and cigarettes. 
During the 1970s the group diversifies. In 1988 local and overseas 
interest were separated through the founding of Compagnie 
Financiere Richemont AG (Swiss-listed). In 1995 Richemont and 
the group consolidate their respective interests in tobacco 
(Rothmans International), which merged with British American 
Tobacco held by the group and Richemont. In 2000, Rembrandt 
Group was restructured and split into Remgro and VenFin. VenFin 
retained Rembrandt's communication and technology investments. 
BAT was unbundled in 2008.
R41 million (rank 349 out of 370 listed companies).
Income from operations until 2003 when Super Group acquired the 
company in a rescue bid.
The company was actively acquiring subsidiaries before it suffered 
losses in trading and required a rescue bid.
The company disposed of all its copper mining assets in Zambia in 
2009, becoming a cash shell. Subsequently, the company acquired 
ACU, a public limited company incorporated in England and listed 
at the LSE (AIM) and Botswana Stock Exchange. ACU explores 
and develops copper deposits in Botswana.
R301 million (rank 259 of 370 listed companies).
Development of uranium and gold mines in South Africa.
Incorporated in Canada in September 2005, listed on the TSX in 
December 2006, secondary listing on the JSE in March 2007.
No income from operations, high investment expenditure, financing 
through equity and holding company.
DNA*Supply*Chain*Investments Logistics and supply chain services.
Incorporated in 1987, acquired by Lenco Investment Holdings and 
listed on the JSE in November 2000.
ZCI*Limited
VenFin*Limited
Diamond exploration and mining.
Incorporated in the Island of Guernsey in 1983 as Ocean Diamond 
Mining Limited, all assets were transferred to Ocean Diamond 
Mining South Africa Limited in December August 1991, listed on the 
JSE in January 1992 and secondary listing on the Namibian Stock 
Exchange in January 1994.
Income from operations. 
In 1997 the company diversified operations into Angola.
Gold exploration and mining.
Emerged when BMA Gold (incorporated in August 2000 in 
Australia) acquired Aflease Gold (South Africa), listed on the ASX in 
March 2009, secondary listing at the JSE since February 2010 
(March 2009 - January 2010: primary JSE listing).
No income from operations (except 2010-11), high investment 
expenditure, financed through equity and borrowing.
The company emerged as combination of several ailing mining 
companies, namely the South African Sub-Nigel Gold Mining 
Company (listed on the JSE in 1960) which acquired East Rand 
gold assets of Uranium One Africa in 2006, forming Aflease Gold 
Ltd. in 2009 Aflease was acquired by the Australian BMA Gold. 
Gold One International was delisted in January 2014 after its 
Holding company of a copper producing and mineral exploration 
and development group of companies.
Incorporated in Bermuda in November 1969 as Zambia Copper 
Investments. The company was renamed to ZCI in May 2010, 
Loss-making operations since late 1990s with few exceptions 
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Company*profile
Delisted in February 2001 after acquisition of Smacsoft Group by 
AFA Systems.
Delisted in August 2001.
Smacsoft*Group*Ltd Software development.
Incorporated in South Africa in July 1996 as Smacsoft (Pty) Limited, 
renamed to Smacsoft Group in February 1999, listed on the JSE in 
March 1999.
Operations and equity issuance.
The company also owns a property portfolio.
Delisted in July 2004 after group restructuring. Relisting of Net1 




Investment holding company with interest in consumer goods.
DJI Clothing, renamed to Pacific Asia Investments in December 
1996, when the Malaysian company Mycom took control of the 
holding company.
Operations and loans from holding company.
The company also owns a property portfolio.
Stantronic*Group*Holdings*Ltd Holding company with interest in electrical and electronic 
businesses.
Listed on the JSE in June 1997.




Investment holding company with interest in IT services.
Incorporated in South Africa as Javelin Housing (Pty) Ltd in May 
1997, renamed to Net1Applied Technology Limited in September 
1997, listed on the JSE in December 1997.
Operations.
The holding company also owns financial services providers.
Lydenburg*Platinum
Benguela*Concessions*Ltd Diamond exploration.
Incorporated in South Africa in June 1988, listed on the JSE in 
1989.
No income from operations, financed through equity issuance.
N/A.
Delisted in June 1996 as result of Lydenburg Platinum's 
unbundling.
Operations and trade in investments.
The company ubundled in 1996. As result shareholders received 
shares in the following companies: Rustenburg Platinum Holdings, 
Potgietersrust Platinum. Lebowa Platinum Mines, Lydenburg 
Exploration, and Benguela Concessions.
Investment holding company with interest in platinum mining and 
mining exploration.
Listed on the JSE, London Stock Exchange and NASDAQ.
Maranda*Mines*Limited Mining.
N/A.
Delisted from the JSE in April 2007.
Rare*Earth*Extraction*Company Developing a rare earth plant.
Incorporated in South Africa in 1989, listed on the JSE in 1994.
No or modest income from operations, finance through equity and 
long-term debt.
A protracted legal case was made between 1999 and 2002 to wind 
down operations due to non-profitability. The company struggled 
raising sufficient capital for the project, being also adversely 
affected by fluctuating prices for rare earth products.
Stocks*Hotels*&*Resorts Operation of high-end hotels and restaurants.
Incorporated in South Africa in 1996, listed on the JSE in February 
1997.
Some income from operations, high investment expenditure, 
financed through equity and long-term borrowing.
Limited information available.
Delisted from the JSE in June 2007. As of 2011 the company 




Delisted in June 2001.
Operations and equity issuance.
Stantronic came out of Gentech, which was a subsidiary of Altron. 
Gentech became a cash shell in 1996, after selling off all its assets. 
Subsequently, it was restructured and renamed to Stantronic in 
1997.
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Delisted in June 2002.
Suncrush,Ltd Investment holding company with interest in consumer goods.
Operations.
Suncrush distributed its investment in South African Breweries and 
Amalgamated Beverage Industries Limited to its shareholders and wound 
up its operations.
Intervid,Ltd IT services.
Incorporated in South Africa as Industrial Park Security Specialists CC, 
renamed to Intervid Limited in July 1999, listed on the JSE in August 1999.
Loss-making operations financed through equity issuance.
Investment holding company with interest in IT services.
Incorporated in South Africa as Unitrade 286 (Pty) Ltd in April 1998, 
renamed to ValueCom Holdings Ltd in June 1998, listed on the JSE in July 
1998.
Delisted in June 2001 after voluntary liquidation.
Delisted from the NYSE MKT in February 2013, suspended JSE listing.
Incorporated in Canada in March 1986 as Sentinel Resources Ltd, primary 
listing on the TSX in September 2003, secondary listing on the NYSE MKT 
in July 2003, secondary listing on the JSE in October 2006.
No income from operations between 2006 and 2010, high investment into 
equipment and mining assets financed through equity.
Great,Basin,Gold,
Limited
Acquisition, exploration and development of mining property
The company operates mining projects in the US and Africa. In South Africa 
it fully owns the Burnstone gold mining project where operations were 
suspended in September 2012 due to the company's inability to continue 
funding the projects working capital. Cash flow breakeven could have been 
achieved in May 2013. 
ValueCom,Holdings,
Ltd
R212 million (rank 275 of 370 listed companies).
Delisted in August 2004 after the acquisition of Intervid Ltd by VenFin.
Loss-making operations.
Owns 50% of a property company.
Diamond production was hampered by limited access to finance due to 
difficult conditions in international financial markets and lack of economic 
viability of projects due to low diamond prices.
Delisted from the JSE in November 1998.
Company,profile
DiamondCorp,Plc Diamond mining.
Incorporated in the UK in March 2005, listed on the LSE AIM in February 
2007, inward listing on the JSE in March 2008. Both are primary listings.
No operating income, financing through equity issuance.
R660 million (rank 231 of 370 listed companies).
The business grew significantly through acquisitions of South African 
companies of which some where incorporated as far back as the 1980s 
(Vehicle Delivery Services Limited: 1988, RFB Logistics Limited: 1991), but 
also organically.
Mainly income from operations, financial operations focus on borrowing with 
limited equity issuance.
Incorporated in South Africa in March 1998 as Lexshell 145 Investment 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd, converted into a public company in May 1998, listing on 
the JSE in May 1998 as Venmil, renamed to OneLogix Group Ltd in 
September 2000.
Supply chain management and logistics fulfilment services.OneLogix,Group,
Limited




Incorporated in Canada, listed on the TSX in November 2005, secondary 
listing on the JSE in April 2006.
No operating income, financing through equity issuance and short-term 
borrowing.
TEAL was set up to explore African Rainbow Mining's (ARM) Southern and 
Central African mining assets. ARM owns 65% of TEAL. The company ran 
into funding difficulties and was liquidated, while its assets were transferred 




Incorporated in October 1998 as Moneyline 921 Ltd, renamed to National 
Sporting Index Ltd in March 1999, listed on the JSE in May 1999.
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Delisted in January 2001 after the acquisition of FASIC by FAL.
The operational focus shifted from Mexico to South Africa in 1999. A joint-
venture with Anglo Platinum (in which Atlatsa is the controlling partner) over 
Lebowa Platinum Mines has been entered in 2009.
FASIC*Ltd Consumer goods production.
Until 2011: manufacturing of electromagnets, rewinding of motors and 
wholesale of electrical and related equipment, after: financial services.
Incorporated in South Africa in October 1987 as Cenmag Holdings Limited, 
JSE listing in February 1988, renamed to Capricorn Investment Holdings in 




In 1999, the major FASIC became the major shareholder of the company 
which was formerly known as The Lion Match Company by purchasing 
70.1% of interest in the company from South African Breweries who 
assumed control in 1987.
Operations, limited financial operations focused on borrowing.
Atlatsa*Resources*
Corporation






Investment holding company with interest in consumer services.
Incorporated in South Africa in August 1935, listed on the JSE.
Operations. 
The company, which uses to be a publishing and printing company, became 
a cash shell after distributing listed investment in MIH Holdings and M-Cell 
Ltd in specie to its shareholders. The company was delisted due to non-
compliance with JSE listing regulations and relisted as Portcullis Investment 
Holdings in 2000 after acquiring Deel-Smith & Co.
Incorporated in South Africa in 1905 as The Lion Match Company, listed on 
the JSE in 1926, renamed to FASIC Ltd in July 1999 after restructuring.
Operations. 
Delisted from the JSE in January 2012.
The company has been a holding company with interest in wholesaling of 
electrical and related equipment, manufacture and servicing of 
electromagnets and motor rewinding since 1987. In 2010, the company 
became a cash shell after disposing of its assets due to declining 
profitability. It was renamed to Capricorn Investment Holdings in January 
2011. After the acquisition of Western Utilities Corporation the company was 
renamed to MRI Limited in June 2012.
R444 million (rank 246 out of 370 listed companies).
Hotels, infrastructure, natural resources, support services, transportation.
Company activity can be traced back to the London and Rhodesian Mining 
Company starting operations in 1909. Lonrho Africa Plc came into existence 
in 1998 through a demerger from the original companies' mining operations 
which were transformed into Lonmin. The company changed its name into 
Lonrho Plc in May 2007. Primary listing at the LSE and secondary listing at 
the JSE, both in May 1998.
While operations were profitable during the 1990s they have been making 
losses since 2008. Losses and investment were financed through equity 
and borrowing.
After the demerger in 1998 the company pursued a strategy of downsizing 
African operations, which has been changed in 2005 to rebuilding the 
company's brand and reputation in Africa. 
Loss-making operations, albeit decreasingly so, financed through equity 
and sale of equipment in recent years.
R112 million (rank 307 of 370 listed companies).
Gold exploration companies in South Africa with the intention of gold 
production.
Incorporated in South Africa in June 2007 as result of the restructuring of 
the Rand Quest Syndicate Group, which was established in 2003 as 
unlisted Australian public company, primary listing at the LSE in November 
2007, secondary listing at the JSE in November 2007.
No income from operations, high investment into equipment finance through 
equity.
Company*profile
Incorporated in Canada in April 1983 as Anooraq Resources Corporation in 
May 2012, since the reverse take-over in 2004 of the BEE entity Pelawan 
Investments, the latter has been the Statutory Shareholder (min. 52% 
ownership), renamed to Atlatsa Resources Corporation in May 2012, 
primary listing at the TSXV, secondary listings at the NYSE MKT and at the 
JSE in December 2006.
No income from operations, high investment into equipment financed 
through borrowing (also from Anglo Platinum).
R1,192 million (rank 200 of 370 listed companies), delisted from the JSE in 
July 2013 after the company was acquired by FS Africa Limited.
Delisted in July 2000 after distributing the listed investment it held to 
shareholders, becoming a cash shell.
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Until 1999: finance to unlisted companies likely to seek 
listing at the JSE, 2000-2003: financial intermediary, since 
2004: support services, automotive component, 
information technology, financial services.Incorporated in South Africa in March 1998 as Legacy 
Ventures, JSE listing in August 1998, rename to Financial 
Insourcing Specialists Limited in 2000, renamed to 
Profitable operations since 2000.
In 2004 the company decided to broaden investment 
changing its JSE listing from financials to support 
services. In 2010, the investment strategy was changed to 
focus on intellectual products rather than hard assets. The 
company has been disposing of automotive investment 
R252 million (rank 267 of 370 listed companies).
Afgem+Limited Coloured gemstone exploration, mining, beneficiation and marketing.
Incorporated in South Africa in April 1998, listing at the 
No income from operations (with the exception of 2001, 
2002) financed through equity.
All tanzanite assets were sold to TanzaniteOne SA in 
2004. The company acquired diamond assets from 
Canadian listed company Rex Diamond Corporation 
Limited. After operational problems all diamond mining 
assets were disposed of to MEEPO Investment 
Consortium Limited and voluntary winding-up procedures Deli ted from the JSE in August 2009.
NetActive+Ltd IT services.Incorporated in South Africa in September 1994 as 
Dateline Forwarding Services PWV (Pty) Limited, 
renamed to NetActive Internet in December 1996, listed 
on the JSE in April 1999.
Irregular income from operations, funded through equity 
issuance and sale of businesses.






Asbestos exploration and mining.
Incorporated in South Africa in 1970.
Income from disposal of assets.Active mining operations were discontinued in 1997 and 
disposal of assets as well as rehabilitation of mining areas 
followed. The company held 33% interest in Msauli Asbes 









Software and services business providing tailor-made 
software solution.
Incorporated in South Africa in June 2004 as Dingekile 
Investments (Pty) Limited, renamed to Dynamic Visual 
Technologies Holdings (Pty) Limited in April 2005, 
converted into a public company in July 2007, renamed to 
DTH Dynamic Technologies Holdings Limited in October 
2008, listing at the JSE (AltX) in November 2007.
Profits from operations, initially (2007) a large 
shareholders' loan was granted but paid back shortly, 
using funds from equity issuance.
The overcapitalisation of the company seems to be a 
result of the issuance of equity since raised funds were 
kept on the balance sheet as cash.
Delisted from the JSE in September 2010 after the 
acquisition of DTH by Xantha Properties. 
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Company*profile
Owns property operations, share portfolio and casinos.
Delisted in February 2001.
Platmin*Limited Mineral exploration, development and production.
Incorporated in Canada in 2003, primary listing on the 
TSX in August 2006, listing on AIM in August 2006, 
secondary listing on the JSE in July 2009.
No income from operations, strong capital investment 
expenditure financed through equity.
The company delisted from the TSX and JSE voluntarily 
since management believed that the share price did not 
reflect the company's value.




2000-2005: financial services, since 2005: mineral 
exploration and mining. (Note: Overcapitalisation occurred 
after 2005.)
Incorporated in South Africa in February 1998 as Financial 
Market Dealers (Pty) Limited, changed into a public 
company in June 2000 and renamed to Proper Holding 
Limited, renamed to Proper Group Limited in October 
2000, listing on the JSE in November 2000, reverse take-
over of Miranda Mineral Holdings in December 2005.
No income from operations, acquisition of mining assets 
financed through equity and shareholder loans.
By its very nature Miranda Mineral's operating strategy 
does not generate cash flow from operations. Miranda 
Mineral does neither explore nor mine its asset actively 
but searches for a joint venture partner to do this, after 
acquiring the exploration and mining rights. 
R142 million (rank 302 of 370 listed companies).
Delisted in February 2001 after disposal of all Acumen 
assets to Adcorp.
Fralex*Ltd Investment holding company with interest in construction 
materials and mining services.
Incorporated in South Africa, listed on the JSE.
Dividends on investments and investment trade.
Fralex held a single investment in Fraser Alexander 
Limited. Both companies were listed on the JSE. In 1999, 
Fralex unbundled and passed its interest in Fraser 
Alexander on to its shareholders, becoming a cash shell.
Monex*Ltd Construction, real estate development and consumer 
services related to the leisure industry.
Incorporated in South Africa as Ilco Homes Limited, 
renamed to Monex Limited in 1995, listed on the JSE.




Training and outsourcing services.
Incorporated in South Africa as Amberon Investments 
(Pty) Ltd in June 1996, renamed to Boston City Campus 
(Pty) in October 1996, renamed to Acument Holdings Ltd 
in April 1999, listed on the JSE in June 1999.
Income from operations. High investment expenditure 
finance through long-term borrowing and equity issuance.
The company disposed of all its operating assets and 
entered voluntary liquidation.
Irregular income from operations, funded through equity 
issuance.
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Company*profile
Delisted in October 1999 after acquisition of West Rand 





Gold exploration and mining.
Incorporated in South Africa, listed on the JSE, the London 
Stock Exchange and the Paris Bourse.
Trade in listed investment and businesses.
Mining operations of the company go back to the 1880s, 
most assets were depleted or sold off by 1992. In 1994 
management changed and new assets were acquired from 
First Westgold Mining Limited.
In 1997 after disposing of all its trade marks and business 
operations the company became a cash shell.
Delisted from the JSE in September 2007 after the 
acquisition of Brandcorp Holdings by Mainstreet 565.
Emergent*
Properties*Limited
Delisted from the JSE in January 2013 after the acquisition 




Investment holding company, until 2002: focusing on 
financial services, media, communications services and 
technology, since 2003: media and communication 
services.
Incorporated in May 1993 as Metlife Investments Holdings 
Limited, renamed to New Africa Investments Limited in 
August 1994, listing on the JSE in August 1994.
Profit-making operations financing strong investment 
expenditure with additional cash flow from equity and 
borrowing until 2003. Since 2004 loss-making operatings 
but profitable divestiture and settlement of outstanding 
debt.
NAIL was one of the first major BEE-controlled investment 
holding companies. In 2004 it was acquired by the Tiso 
Consortium which initiated the disposal of all assets.
Manufacturing and marketing of knitwear.
Operations began in 1952, listed on the JSE in 1969.
Income from operations and use of long-term borrowing 
when operations were loss-making (1999, 2002-03).
In 2006 the company disposed of all its knitwear business 
to concentrate on property investment, effectively 
becoming a cash shell. Since acquiring a property portfolio 
failed subsequently, the company remained a cash shell 
and had to be delisted.
Delisted from the JSE in 2007 due to non-compliance with 
JSE listing requirements.
The founding of Eland Platinum was prompted by Eland 
Mines' (formerly Tropical Trading 390 Pty Limited) 
acquisition of the Elandsfontein Platinum Project.
Eland*Platinum*
Holdings*Limited
Platinum exploration and mining.
Incorporated in South Africa in August 2005 as Nungu 
Trading 500 Limited, renamed to Eland Platinum Holdings 
Limited in October 2005, listing on the JSE in March 2006.
No income from operations, strong capital investment 
expenditure financed through equity.
Delisted from the JSE in November 2007 after Eland 




Before 1997: supermarket franchise business, after: 
investment holding company whose subsidiaries are 
specialist distributors of branded consumer products.
Incorporated in South Africa in March 1987 as Bloch 
Limited, after change of control in June 1997 renamed to 
Brandcorp Holdings Ltd in October 1997, listed on the JSE 
in 1992.
Income from operations.
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R1,114 million (rank 206 of 370 listed companies).
Development and mining of platinum group metals.
Incorporated in Canada in 2003, primary listing on the TSX, 
listing on AIM, secondary listing on the JSE in May 2007.
Mostly profit-making operations, strong capital investment 
expenditure financed through cash flow, maturing short-
term investment and equity.
The company has substantial short-term investment unlike 




Gold mining and mine restoration activities.
Incorporated in South Africa in 1949, listed on the JSE in 
1949, listing on the LSE in September 1949, subsequent 




No income from operations, financed by disposal of mining 
assets and subsidiaries.
The company operates a gold mine in the Klerksdorp area 
in South Africa. Underground mining operations ceased in 
1992. Subsequently surface rock dumps were treated until 
this also became uneconomical in 1995. The company 
continued operating with a focus on disposal and 
rehabilitation of assets. Until 2005, the company had been 
carrying out pumping activity for Hartebeestfontein Gold 
Mining (a subsidiary of DRDGold Limited). When these 
operations were liquidated the company board requested 
the suspension of the JSE listing and liquidation. 
Delisted in April 2009 due to lacking compliance with JSE 
listing requirements. Earlier delisting and liquidation were 
opposed by the Department of Water and Forestry and 
Anglo American Ashanti who demanded the company to 
continue rehabilitation works. 
Energy,Africa,Ltd Oil and gas exploration.
Incorporated in South Africa in July 1995 as Infront Sixty 
One Investments (Pty) Ltd, listed on the JSE and the 
Luxembourg Stock Exchange in March 1996.
Mostly from operations, supplemented by long-term 
borrowing and equity issuance.
Operations were loss-making (disregarding exploration 
costs written down) during most of the 1990s.
Delisted in July 2004 after acquisition of Energy Africa Ltd 
by Tullow Oil plc.
R23,045 million (rank 55 of 370 listed companies).
The JSE listing was prompted by a reorientation towards 
South African assets which ceased to be the case when 
the main South African mine (Dominion Uranium) was put 
on care and maintenance in 2008. Uranium One Africa was 
sold subsequently. The JSE listing remained in place 
despite neither operations nor assets of the group in South 
Africa.
No income from operations, strong capital investment 
expenditure financed through equity and borrowing.
Uranium,One,Inc Uranium exploration and mining.
Incorporated in Canada in January 1997 as Southern 
Cross, primary listing on the TSX in 1997, reverse take-
over by Aflease Gold and Uranium Resources Limited in 
December 2005, renamed to SXR Uranium Once Inc, 
secondary listing on the JSE in December 2005.


































The majority of liquid assets is held in foreign currency 
which is explained by the company's strong focus on US 
operations.
Incorporated in Australia in 2001 as Witkop Mining Limited, 
renamed to Washington Resources Limited in November 
2005, primary listing on the ASX in November 2005, 
reverse takeover of Ferrum Metals in December 2009, 
renamed to Ferrum Crescent Limited, secondary listing on 
AIM in December 2010, listing on the JSE in June 2011.
No income from operations, strong investment activity 
financed by share issuance.
The company disposed of all its Australian interests prior to 
November 2010 and refocused on its South African iron ore 
interests.
Delisted from the JSE in January 2006 after the acquisition 




Incorporated in South Africa in 1995 as Bumperprops, 
which was a close company operating as a media 
placement agency, in July 1997 the close company was 
converted into a private company, VM Value Marketing 
(Pty) Limited, in March 1999 the company was converted 
to a public company and listed on the JSE in April 1999 as 
Interconnective Solutions Limited, renamed to Foneworx 
Holdings Limited in November 2006.
Income from operations supplemented by substantial long-
term borrowing during the late 1990s and infrequent (2008, 
2013) but large share issuance.
R151 million (rank 297 of 370 listed companies).
Ferrum/Crescent/
Limited
Mineral exploration and development.
The group used to have highly diversified industrial interest 
including holdings in financial companies. There were 
disposed off during the 2000 when a strategic reorientation 
took place to refocus the business of supply chain services.
R75 million (rank 327 of 370 listed companies).
R7,505 million (rank 108 of 370 listed companies).
IT services.
Incorporated in South Africa in August 1998, listing on the 
JSE in November 1998.
Profit-making operations, equity increasingly a source of 
finance since 2005.
Cash is held for dividend payments, share buy backs and 
acquisitions.
IT services.
Incorporated in South Africa in June 1997 as Ixchange 
Technology Holdings Limited, listing on the JSE in 
September 1997, renamed to Frontrange Limited in 
January 2002.
Profit-making operations except for 2002 when losses were 
financed through an increase in minority interest.
Supply chain management business, retail supply chain 
activities, automotive and fleet management. 
Incorporated in June 1943 in South Africa as Barnetts 
Group Limited, listed on the JSE in 1987, after disposing of 
all shares in subsidiaries 1994 the remaining cash shell 
acquired Basil Green Auto and was renamed to Motolink in 
1995. After the merger with Super Group it was renamed to 
Super Group in September 1996.
Income from operations, borrowing and active share 
issuance between 2005 and 2010.
In the understanding of management excess funds are well 
managed since they are placed at favourable interest rates 
(Annual Report 2006).
R265 million (rank 263 of 370 listed companies).
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Income from operations supplemented by borrowing 
and share issuance.
Cash and cash equivalents are held to generate 
income given high interest rates but also to provide a 
'war chest' for business acquisitions (Annual Report 
1998).
After disposal of all assets in May 2011 the company 
was delisted in October 2011.
Ucs(Group(Limited IT investment holdings company.
Incorporated in SA in 1978 as Universal Computer 
Services, listed on the JSE in September 1998.
Gold, uranium and platinum group metals mining.
Listed on the JSE in 1932 as East Daggafontein Mines, 
renamed to Mvelaphanda Holdings after East 
Daggafontein Mines acquired all assets of Mvela 
Resources (incorporated in South Africa in 1980) in 
April 2002, merged with Rebserve in December 2004 to 
form Mvelaphanda Group Limited.
Income from operations infrequently supplemented by 
borrowing and share issuance.
Delisted from the JSE in June 2011 after disposing of 
assets and declaration of a special dividend to all 
ordinary shareholders.
Thabex(Limited
Delisted from the JSE in December 2011 after the 





Cash and cash equivalents are held for business 
acquisitions and as leverage to obtain credit for 




Incorporated in South Africa in 1994, listed on the JSE 
in April 1999.
Income from operations infrequently supplemented by 
borrowing and share issuance.
Cash and cash equivalents are held for business 
acquisitions (Annual Report 2000).
Oil exploration.
Incorporated in South Africa in April 2002 as Wild Rush 
Trading 12 Limited, listed on the JSE in November 
2003.
No income from operations financed through share 
issuance and some borrowing.
Limited information available.
Delisted from the JSE in July 2013 due to lacking 
compliance with JSE requirements.
JSE listing suspended in September 2004 due to 
irregularities in financial reporting, delisted in June 
2007.
Mineral exploration and mining.
Incorporated in South Africa in February 1988 as Nico 
Platinum Mines (Pty) Limited, renamed to Southern 
Platreef Mining Company (Pty) Limited in August 1989, 
listing on the JSE in May 1990, delisting from the JSE 
in May 1996, renamed to Thabex Exploration Limited in 
June 1996, listing on the JSE in November 1997 after 
restructuring. 
Mostly loss-making operations financed through 
disposals of businesses and share issuance.
The company struggled to raise funds for mining 
exploration.
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Company*profile
Gold and uranium ore mining.




Naspers was one of the major shareholders in M-Web. 
Since the funding situation for internet companies 
deteriorated during the early 2000s, it was decided that 
M-Web's listing on the JSE was terminated by Naspers 
buying out the remaining shareholders.




Security technology and services.
Incorporated in South Africa in 1997 as Amalgamated 
Motor Holdings Limited, renamed to Convergent 
Network Limited in 1998, listed on the JSE in 1998, 
renamed to Tisec Limited in 1999 and subsequently 
moved to 'Financial Services', renamed to 
Amalgamated Economic Corporation in 2005 and 
moved to 'Electronic and Electrical Equipment'.
Income from operations supplemented by borrowing 
and infrequent share issuance.
Delisted in September 2002 after acquisition of Servest 
Holdings by a consortium around AMB Partners.
IT services.
Incorporated in South Africa in March 1997 as Guid Hall 
No. 5 Investment Holding Company (Pty) Ltd, acquired 
by MIHH, renamed to Computer Configurations (Pty) 
Ltd in July 1997, renamed to M-Web Holdings in 
February 1998, listed on the JSE in March 1998.





Incorporated in South Africa as Fluval (Pty) Ltd in 
February 1986, renamed to The Publishing Company 
Ltd in June 1986, listed on the JSE in November 1986, 
renamed to Publico Holdings Ltd, acquired entire 
capital of Servest (Pty) Ltd in August 1998, renamed to 
Servest Holdings Ltd.
Operations, active equity issuance during late 1990s.
In 1997, the company disposed of its investment in 
Kagiso Media Limited (formerly Publico Ltd), becoming 




Income from operations supplemented by sales of 
businesses, equity investment and share issuance as 
well as option premiums. 
The company was incorporated after Johannesburg 
Consolidated Investment (JCI) Company Limited 
acquired prospecting rights over and a mining lease for 
assets in the Westonaria District in South Africa. JCI 
was the main shareholder and held a management 
contract with the company.
Delisted from the JSE in March 2007 after acquisition of 
Western Areas Limited by Gold Fields Limited.
The company is a subsidiary fully owned by 
Amalgamated Appliance Holdings Ltd which is listed at 
the JSE with a market capitalisation of R777 million. 
The holding company was very strongly overcapitalised 
between 2009-2013.
R168 million (rank 287 of 370 listed companies).
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Company*profile
Delisted from the JSE in September 1998 after 
becoming a wholly-owned subsidiary of Medi-Clinic.
According to the prelisting statement of the company 
major mining companies have tended to scale down in-
house exploration activities, funding or acquiring 
exploration companies. Therefore, the company's 
strategy is to achieve a favourable exit either through a 
sale of mining assets or through joint venture 
agreements with major mining companies. 
RBPlat was created from the restructuring of the 
Bafokeng Rasimone Platinum Mine (BRPM) Joint 
Venture between Royal Bafokeng Holdings and Anglo 
Platinum Limited. The restructuring resulted in the 
ownership and control of the mining operations of the 
joint venture vesting in the RBPM, via its subsidiary 
RBPlat.
R8,431 million (rank 100 of 370 listed companies).
R416 million (rank 260 of 370 listed companies).
Royal*Bafokeng*
Platinum*Limited
Mining of platinum group metals.
Incorporated in South Africa in July 2008, listing on the 
JSE in November 2010.
Income from operations, strong investment activity 




Mineral exploration and mining.
Incorporated in England and Wales in 2002, listing on 
AIM of the LSE, listing on the JSE in November 2006.
No income from operations, strong investment activity 
funded through share issuance.
Aukland*Health*Ltd Healthcare.
Incorporated in South Africa in 1987 as Aukland 
Investments Limited, listed on the JSE, renamed to 
Aukland Health Limited in February 1998.
Some income from operations, otherwise financed 
through share issuance and borrowing.
The company possesses a property subsidiary, Aukland 




Investment holding company with interest in consumer 
goods.
Incorporated in South Africa as First SA Food Holdings 
Ltd in 1996, listed on the JSE in June 1997, renamed to 
First Lifestyle Holdings Ltd in January 1999.
Operations. 
The company's assets were sold off and voluntary 
liquidation was entered since the major shareholder, 
Leisureplanet, decided to deinvest refocusing on the IT 
sector.
Delisted from the JSE in December 2000 after 
acquisition of First Lifestyle Holdings by Ethos Private 
Equity Limited.
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Company*profile
R122 million (rank 305 of 370 listed companies).
Going back to SAB&T Ubuntu which was incorporated 
in SA in 1994, the holdings company was incorporated 
in September 2006 as Abrina 4166 Limited, renamed to 
SAB&T Ubuntu Holdings Limited in October 2006, 
listed on the JSE in November 2006, acquired by 
SIMEKA in 2008, renamed to Morvest Business Group 
in 2010 after two BEE partners (BEECo and MANCo) 
acquired together 12.8% of the group's interest.
Operations.
The company is very strongly overcapitalised only in 




Diversified investment holding company.
Going back to Rembrandt Group Limited, established in 
South Africa in 1948, listed on the JSE in 1956. 
Rembrandt was restructured in 2000 and renamed to 
Remgro, listed on the JSE in September 2000.
Cash flow from operations, subsidiary trade and share 
issuance.
Rembrandt Group was mainly dealing with tobacco and 
cigarettes. During the 1970s the group diversifies. In 
1988 local and overseas interest were separated 
through the founding of Compagnie Financiere 
Richemont AG (Swiss-listed). In 1995 Richemont and 
the group consolidate their respective interests in 
tobacco (Rothmans International), which merged with 
British American Tobacco held by the group and 
Richemont. BAT was unbundled in 2008.
R83,905 million (rank 20 of 370 listed companies).















R43 million (rank 347 of 370 listed companies).
Income from operations, when operations were loss-
making in 2000 share were issued and loans raised.
IT investment holding company.
Going back to March 1993 when Prime Support (Pty) 
Limited was incorporated (central operating subsidiary 
of Synergy Group in 1999), Synergy Holdings Limited 
was incorporated in July 1995, listed on the JSE in April 
1999, renamed to SilverBridge Holdings which was 
created by a reverse takeover of Synergy by SDT 
Financial Software Solutions (Pty) in November 2006.
In 2006, the company sold of its entire assets in 2005 
effectively becoming a cash shell. 
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Income from operations.
The company holds 72.62% or ordinary and 51.94% of 
"N" ordinary shares of Rex Trueform Clothing Company. 
This means that their balance sheets are extremely 
similar.




Listed on the JSE and the Namibian Stock Exchange in 
May 1995.
Operations.
Gold Fields of South Africa Ltd, which is incorporated in 
South Africa, is the holding company through Wal 
Holding AG, incorporated in Switzerland.




Investment holding company in consumer services.
Incorporated in South Africa in September 1889 as 
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company Ltd, 
restructured in 1995 into three companies: Johannic 
Industrial Corporation, AngloAmerican Platinum 
Corporation Limited and JCI Limited. Johannic Industrial 
Corporation Limited was listed on the JSE in January 
1995, renamed to Johannies Industrial Corporation Ltd 
in May 1995, renamed to Johnnic Holdings Ltd in May 
2000.
Operations.
The company actively invested in marketable equity and 
owned a property portfolio through Johannic Properties.
Delisted from the JSE in September 2008 after 
acquisition of Johnnic Holdings Limited by Mercanto, a 





Holding company with controlling interest in Rex 
Trueform Clothing Company.






Incorporated in South Africa in 1973, listed on the JSE in 
November 1997.
Operations.
Owns property investment operations.
Delisted from the JSE in October 2003 after acquisition 
of Wetherly's Investment Holdings Ltd by Ellerine 
Holdings Limited.
Delisted from the JSE in August 1997 after Consolidated 




Investment holding company with passive interest in 
gold and other mineral mining and exploration.
Incorporated in South Africa in November 1981 as Enyati 
Resources Limited, renamed to Johannesburg Mining 
and Finance Corporation in October 1987, renamed to 
Consolidated Mining Corporation Limited in December 
1989.
Operations.
In February 1996, the company unbundled Egoli and 
South East Rand Gold. The unbundling took place in 
specie whereby shareholders received interest in 
subsidiaries of this company, which ceased to be part of 
Consolidated Mining Corporations Ltd. The remaining 
cash shells of subsidiaries were sold off and released 
funds were used for investment in mining companies.
































Delisted from the JSE in December 2004 after minority 




Incorporated in South Africa, listed on the JSE in 
November 1986.
Operations.
Since 1989 South African Breweries were the major 
shareholder, controlling 60.7% of interest. Liquid assets 
of the company were deposited with Sabfin, a subsidiary 
of SAB. The company also owns property investment 
operations.
Delisted in January 1999 after the acquisition of Da 




Incorporated in South Africa in 1943, listed on the JSE in 
1968.
Operations and trade in investments.
Part of the Rembrandt Group. Part of the Rembrandt 
Group. Rembrandt Group was mainly dealing with 
tobacco and cigarettes. During the 1970s the group 
diversifies. In 1988 local and overseas interest were 
separated through the founding of Compagnie 
Financiere Richemont AG (Swiss-listed). In 1995 
Richemont and the group consolidate their respective 
interests in tobacco (Rothmans International), which 
merged with British American Tobacco held by the group 
and Richemont. In 2000, Rembrandt Group was 
restructured and split into Remgro and VenFin. BAT was 
unbundled in 2008.






Operations and trade in investments.
Part of the Rembrandt Group. Rembrandt Group was 
mainly dealing with tobacco and cigarettes. During the 
1970s the group diversifies. In 1988 local and overseas 
interest were separated through the founding of 
Compagnie Financiere Richemont AG (Swiss-listed). In 
1995 Richemont and the group consolidate their 
respective interests in tobacco (Rothmans International), 
which merged with British American Tobacco held by the 
group and Richemont. In 2000, Rembrandt Group was 
restructured and split into Remgro and VenFin. BAT was 
unbundled in 2008.
Incorporated in Canada in July 1961, primary listing on 
the JSE and secondary listing on the London Stock 
Exchange.
Operations and trade in investments.
N/A.
R358 million (rank 254 of 370 listed companies).
Apparel retailing and property.
Incorporated in South Africa in 1937, listed on the JSE in 
1945.
Operations.
African And Overseas Enterprises Ld holds 72.62% or 
ordinary and 51.94% of "N" ordinary shares of the 





Delisted from the JSE in September 2000.
Manufacturing.






































Delisted from the JSE in September 2000.
Provider of a universal electronic payment system.
Incorporated in the US in 1997, operations going back to 
1989, listed on the Nasdaq in 2006, secondary listing on 
the JSE in August 2008.
Income from operations supplemented by share 
issuance.
The company was awarded a (South African) 
government tender to distribute social grants in 2013.
Diversified conglomerate.
Incorporated in South Africa in 1952, listed on the JSE in 
1956.
Operations and trade in investments.
Part of the Rembrandt Group. Rembrandt Group was 
mainly dealing with tobacco and cigarettes. During the 
1970s the group diversifies. In 1988 local and overseas 
interest were separated through the founding of 
Compagnie Financiere Richemont AG (Swiss-listed). In 
1995 Richemont and the group consolidate their 
respective interests in tobacco (Rothmans International), 
which merged with British American Tobacco held by the 
group and Richemont. In 2000, Rembrandt Group was 
restructured and split into Remgro and VenFin. BAT was 
unbundled in 2008.
Operations were loss-making. Finally, in 2012 a creditor 
has perfected a cession of debtor while the company 
also received liquidation applications.
JSE listing suspended in May 2012. The company was 
liquidated in July 2012.
Cash and cash equivalents are needed for acquisitions. 
The aftermath of the financial crisis was seen as 
opportunity for acquisitions (Annual Report 2011).
R1,133 million (rank 205 of 370 listed companies).
Manufacturing.
Incorporated in South Africa in October 2000, listed on 
the JSE in November 2006.
No income from operations, investment financed through 
sale of financial assets, share issuance and borrowing.
Incorporated in 1980 in South Africa as ARB Industrial 









Established in 1997, incorporated in South Africa in 
December 1998 as Lexpub 4 Investment Holdings Ltd., 
renamed to Moneyweb Holdings in May 1999, listed on 
the JSE in June 1999.
Income from operations, trade in businesses and share 
issuance. 
Cash and cash equivalents are held out of precaution 
and for acquisitions ("take bets", Annual Report 2012).





R3,769 million (rank 134 of 370 listed companies).
Mining of platinum group metals.
Incorporated in Bermuda in 1999, listed on the LSE in 
1999, listed on the ASX in September 1999, listed on the 
JSE in December 2004.
Income from operations supplemented by share 
issuance and borrowing.
According to the company cash and cash equivalents 
will not be held unnecessarily on the balance sheet but 
redistributed to shareholders. 










































Limited information available. 
The company held mature mining assets in 1995 with an 
estimated life span of 24 months. The company's assets 
were acquired by Simmer and Jack Mines and 




Operations and disposal of assets.
Mining operations were discontinued at the end of May 
2001.
Delisted.
Going back to Blue Label Investments which was 
incorporated in South Africa in May 2001, restructured 
and renamed to Blue Label Telecoms in 2007, listed on 
the JSE in November 2007.
Income from operations supplemented by share 
issuance and borrowing.
In 2007, Microsoft acquired ca. 12% of Blue Label 
Telecoms interest and the two companies announced to 
jointly pursue preferred partnership initiatives in 
developing economies.
R4,958 million (rank 123 of 370 listed companies).








Operations and active share issuance.
AdaptIT became a black-empowered company in 2007 
after AdaptIT and InfoWave, a black-owned company 
providing web solutions, merged to form AdatIT 
Holdings.
R244 million (rank 269 of 370 listed companies).
Operations.
The company is a small ('junior') coal producer.






Incorporated in South Africa in 1994 as Zenith, listing on 
the JSE, JSE listing suspended between 2000 and 2003, 
renamed to Yomhlaba in 2004, listing on the JSE in 
November 2004, JSE listing suspended in March 2005, 
renamed to South African Coal Mining Holdings Limited 
in 2007, listing on the JSE in August 2007.





IT services and telecommunications.
Limited information available. 
The company held mature mining assets in 1995 with an 
estimated life span of 24 months. The company's assets 
were acquired by Simmer and Jack Mines and 
subsequently by Village Main Reef in 2011.
Delisted in September 1997.
Gold mining.Buffelsfontein.Gm.Co.
Ltd No information available.
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AdaptIT became a black-empowered company in 2007 after 
AdaptIT and InfoWave, a black-owned company providing web 
solutions, merged to form AdatIT Holdings.




Incorporated in South Africa in September 1998 as AdaptIT.
Operations and active share issuance.
No further information available.
No further information available.




Until 2003 accounting practice illustrated that in-house 
financial services amounted to a substantial share in group 
assets (ca. 10-30%) and operating income (ca. 10%). Altron 
securitised the entire portfolio of the subsidiary Fintech, 
engaged in the financing and administration of leasing office 
equipment which the group itself is producing. Fintech was 
sold in 2006.  
N/A.
Delisted from the JSE in May 1999 due to a merger with Anglo 
American Corporation of South Africa to establish Anglo 
American plc.
Company+profile
Delisted from the JSE in October 2010.
Until 2004: the marketing of stallion shares and services, with 
subsidiaries engaged in breeding of thoroughbred horses for 
resale, the racing of thoroughbred horses and farming 
activities; since 2004: diamond mining.
Incorporated in South Africa in 1983 as Oakfields 
Thoroughbreds and Leisure Industries Limited, JSE listing in 
January 1988, renamed to Goodhope Diamonds Limited in 
2004.
Increasingly loss-making operations (with exceptions) financed 
through borrowing and other financial obligations in recent 
years.
After an unsuccessful attempt to enter the Asian market for 
thoroughbred horses the company shifted activities into 
diamond mining. Mining operations had to be stopped due to a 
legal dispute. In order to settle liabilities the company tried to 







No further information available.
JSE listing suspended in September 1995, delisted in 
November 1998.
Investment holding company.
Forerunner company (Allied Electric) was incorporated in 
South Africa in 1965. Allied Technologies (Altech) was listed at 
the JSE in 1975.
Income from operations, trade in businesses and share 
issuance. 
Incorporated in Luxembourg, listed on the JSE, the 





The company also operates an investment fund, Karos 
Property Investment Fund.
Delisted in November 2001.
Gazankulu+Gold+
Holdings+Ltd
7,107 million Rand (ranked 110 out of 370 listed companies).





Cash flow sources N/A.
Comments N/A.
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Activity N/A.
Incorporation/ listing N/A.
Cash flow sources N/A.
Comments N/A.
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Company*profile
Incorporated in South Africa in 1949, listed on the JSE in 1981.
N/A.
N/A.
Delisted from the JSE in July 2003.
R10,625 million (rank 89 of 370 listed companies).
Manufacture, distribution and trade of chemicals, mining 
explosives and accessories, fertilizers and speciality fertilizers.
Incorporated in South Africa in 1953 as Omnia Farm Services, 
listing at the JSE in January 1980.
Strong operating gains, rising capital investment expenditure (due 
to expanding operations) mainly financed through internal cash 
flow and borrowing rather than equity.
Well established supplier and manufacturer of chemicals. The 
company was strongly overcapitalised during the 1970s but had 












Created in May 1999 as combination of Anglo American 
Corporation of South Africa and Minerco Societe Anonyme, listed 
on the LSE in May 1999, secondary listings on the JSE and the 
Swiss SWX, listed on the FSTE 100 in June 1999 and on the 
Botswana and Namibian Stock Exchanges in June 2001.
R53 million (rank 341 of 370 listed companies).
Mineral mining.
Delisted from the JSE in December 1997 after unbundling.
Huntcor Consumer goods production.
Incorporated in South Africa, listed on the JSE.
N/A.
Huntcor was part of the HLH Group. In 1997, it distributed its 
interest in HLH and Rainbow Chicken Limited to its shareholders 
in specie and subsequently delisted.
The single most influential South African conglomerate at least 
until the mid-1995.
R317,297 million (rank 5 of 370 listed companies).
Income from operations, trade in businesses and share issuance. 
Hotel operations.
Incorporated in 1946 as Bristol Industrial Corporation Ltd, listed on 
the JSE in 1947, after a reverse take-over by Don Apartments 
(founded in 1988) and restructuring, renamed to The DON Group 
Ltd. in November 1994.
Income from operations has been declining during the late 2000s 
and had to be supplemented by borrowing, including a loan from 
the Industrial Development Corporation.
The company became a cash shell after disposing of its property 
portfolio in 2013. The JSE listing was suspended in February 
2014 since the company failed to acquire any operational assets. 
The decision was made to repurchase all company shares and to 
delist the company subsequently.
Mining of platinum group metals, gold and diamonds and 
significant interests in coal, base and ferrous metals, industrial 
minerals and forest products.
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Non-­‐‑available   information   is   indicated   with   ‘N/A’.   Instances   of   missing  
company  information  occur  exclusively  for  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  that  were  
delisted  during   the   1990s.  Hence,   their   listing   is   likely   to   have   fallen   into   the  
time  period   1970-­‐‑1990   (or   earlier),  which   is   not   entirely   covered   by   the   INET  
BFA   database.   To   represent   the   findings   of   the   detailed   analysis   that   was  
conducted   by   the   author   a   two-­‐‑pronged   approach   is   used:   first   detailed   case  
studies  of   the   top  20  overcapitalised  companies  are  presented.  The  amount  of  
case   studies   (that   is   the   number   20)   was   not   arbitrarily   chosen.   Case   study  
research  is  typically  regarded  to  lose  depth  when  going  much  beyond  a  dozen  
cases  (Gerring,  2007).  As  will  be  discussed  below,  the  chosen  20  cases  at  closer  
examination  boil  down  to  14.    The  following  section  then  deals  with  the  types  of  
liquidity  preference  among   the  20  most   strongly  overcapitalised  non-­‐‑financial  
corporations.   These   are   the   JSE-­‐‑listed   non-­‐‑financial   companies   with   the   20  
highest  average  cash  ratios  for  the  period  1994  to  2012.  The  second  prong  of  the  
analytical   approach   used   here   is   a   categorised   representation   of   the   full  
company  survey  (all  132  cases),  using  15  categories  identified  as  critical  through  
qualitative  data  analysis.  This  categorised  account  of  the  qualitative  findings  is  
presented  in  Table  4.5.,  once  again  for  the  top  20  companies.    
The   table   gives   an   overview  of   the   sectors,   in  which   the   overcapitalised  non-­‐‑
financial   companies   are   listed.   As   described   in   the   sectoral   analysis   above,   a  
large  share  of  these  non-­‐‑financial  companies  are  either  listed  as  basic  materials  
producers   –   and   in   fact,   mainly   mining   corporations   –   or   as   industrials  
companies.  Therefore,  firms  have  been  categorised  either  as  mining  companies,  
industrials  or  non-­‐‑mining   firms.  The   last   label   implies   that   the   companies  are  
neither  mining  nor  industrial  corporations.  
Furthermore,   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   are   classified   either   as   young   or  
established   firms.   Companies   which   are   no   older   than   10   years   qualify   as  
young.   This   is   in   line   with   the   World   Bank’s   categorisation   of   firm   age  
(Ayyagari,   Beck,   &   Demirgüç-­‐‑Kunt,   2003).   Since   2012   is   the   last   year   in   the  
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dataset,  firms  that  were  incorporated  in  2002  or  later,  and  were  still  in  existence  
in   2012,   show   up   as   young.   Delisted   firms,   which   are   labelled   with   a   ‘D’   in  
column  5  of  Table  4.5.,  are  considered  young  companies  if  their  life  span  from  
incorporation  to  delisting  did  not  exceed  10  years.  These  companies  might  have  
carried  on  operating  after  their  delisting.    
However,  this  cannot  be  tracked  with  available  data.  In  most  cases,  companies  
delist  because  they  are  acquired  by  another  corporation  and  absorbed  into  the  
latter’s   company   structures.   Hence,   for   the   purpose   of   this   thesis,   the   data  
available   show   these  non-­‐‑financial   corporations’  operations  during   their   early  
years,  justifying  the  young  firm  label.  The  subsequent  columns  reflect  findings  
from   cash   flow   statement   analysis,   namely   the   regularity   of   cash   flow   from  
operations.  Cash  flow  statements  typically  contain  three  components:  net  cash  
from  operations,  net  cash  from  investment  activity  and  net  cash  from  financing  
activity.  These  three  are  then  summed  up  to  give  the  overall  change  in  the  cash  
position  for  a  company   in  a  given  accounting  year.  The  analysis  here  assesses  
whether   and   how   reliably   the   surveyed   companies   can   generate   positive   net  
cash   flow   from   their   business   operations.   This   provides   an   indication   of   cash  
flow  volatility.    
In  column  6,  firms  are  assessed  as  to  whether  they  are  able  to  generate  regular  
positive  net   cash   flow   from  operations   (labelled  with   ‘yes’   in  Table  4.5.),   only  
irregular  positive  net  cash  flow  from  operations  (‘irregular’),  or  no  positive  net  
cash   flow   from   operations   (‘no’).   No   positive   net   cash   flow   means   the   firm  
either  does  not   generate  profit   or   runs   a   loss.   In   the   latter   case,   the   company  
will   have   to   run  down   existing   stocks   (of   liquid   assets)   to   cover   these   losses.  
Therefore,   the   reliability   of   net   cash   flow   from  operations   can   be   expected   to  
affect   non-­‐‑financial   companies’   liquid   asset   holdings.   Firms   experience  
irregular   positive   cash   flow,   if   at   least   half   of   the   years   for   which   financial  
information  is  available  show  either  no  profit  or  a  loss.    
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mining young no x active x x
nonBmining young D no x x
mining established D irregular x x




mining established D yes x
nonBmining established D yes x
nonBmining established D not'since'
early'2000s
x active x x x x
nonBmining established D yes x active x x x
mining young no active x x
mining established D no x x
mining established D yes x active x x x
mining young D no x x x
mining young no x
mining young no x x
mining established no x active x x x
mining established no x active x x x
industrials young no
mining established D irregular'
since'early'
1990s
x active x x x
nonBmining established D irregular x
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Non-­‐‑financial  companies  with  no  or  negative  net  cash  flow  for  more  than  three  
quarters  of   the  years   for  which  data  are  available  qualify   for   the   label   ‘no  cash  
flow  from  operations’.  Companies  can  draw  on  their  liquid  assets  if  operational  
cash  flow  is  absent.  Hence,  the  subsequent  two  categories  assess  firms’  liquidity  
holdings.   Firms   are  marked   as   holding   substantial   financial   investment   if   their  
overcapitalisation  ratio  (𝑂𝐶𝑅)  is  more  than  twice  as  high  as  their  cash  ratio.  This,  
of   course   is   a   very   conservative  measure   for   overcapitalisation,   indicating   that  
more  liquid  assets  are  held  in  types  of  financial  investment  than  in  cash  and  cash  
equivalents.  Companies   for  which   the  difference  between   the  𝑂𝐶𝑅  and   the  cash  
ratio  is  marginal  –  that  is,  it  does  not  exceed  10%  of  the  cash  ratio  –  are  classified  
as  holding  mostly  cash.            
The   next   two   columns   provide   information   about   the   companies’   attitude  
towards   mergers   and   acquisitions   (M&A).   As   argued   in   chapter   3,  
overcapitalisation   can   be   the   outcome   of   firms’   speculative   investment  
behaviour,  which   focuses  on  acquiring   subsidiary   companies   and   selling   them,  
or   their  assets,  on  at  an   increased  price.  This   is  speculative   if   the  company  was  
not  acquired  for  future  income,  but  merely  to  realise  a  gain  in  its  market  value,  
which  means  its  equity  price  if  it  is  a  listed  company.  Hence,  the  ultimate  aim  of  
the  merger   or   acquisitions   in   such   a   case  was   a   capital   gain   rather   than   future  
income  in  production.      
It   is   not   easy   to   identify   this   process.   Typically,   mergers   and   acquisitions   are  
declared   in   listed   firms’   financial   information.1  However,   what   happens   to   the  
acquired  assets  subsequently  cannot  always  be  traced  in  the  cash  flow  statement.  
Therefore,   the   information   below   only   classifies   a   non-­‐‑financial   company   as  
trading   subsidiaries   if   there   are   at   least   two   instances   in   the   firm’s   cash   flow  
                                                                                                 
1  In   Table   4.5.,   a   non-­‐‑financial   firm   is   labeled   as   actively   engaging   in   mergers   and  
acquisitions  if  there  are  at  least  two  instances  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  documented  in  
the   company’s   cash   flow   statement.   It   is   assumed   that   one-­‐‑off   transactions   are   not  
sufficient  to  qualify  for  this  label.    
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statement  where  a  subsidiary  (or  a  productive  asset  such  as  a  mine)  is  declared  as  
sold.   In   this   sense,   column   10   (subsidiary   trade)   is   a   subcategory   of   column   9  
(M&A  strategy).   If  a  company  simply  declares  an  active  M&A  strategy  without  
acting  on  it  (yet),  this  will  show  up  in  column  9.  Similarly,  mergers  or  subsidiary  
purchases  are  captured  under  the  ‘M&A  strategy’  heading,  but  not  as  subsidiary  
trading.   So,   the   characteristic   ‘subsidiary/productive   asset   trading’   aims   at  
identifying  a  speculative  motive  among  the  top  20  overcapitalised  non-­‐‑financial  
firms.   By   contrast,   firms   that   have   an   active  mergers   and   acquisitions   strategy  
might   pursue   growth   and/or   diversification   of   their   internal   capabilities   to  
enhance  their  competitive  stance  in  the  industry.  In  this  case,  they  would  in  fact  
hold   liquidity   on   their   balance   sheet   based   on   a   finance  motive,   targeting   the  
takeover  of  another  company  with  the  aim  of  generating  more  income  from  the  
targeted  firm’s  assets  than  the  firm  would  be  able  to  achieve  itself  in  future.    
In  a  Penrosian  and  Keynesian   sense,   this  would  be  an  entrepreneurial  mergers  
and   acquisitions   strategy   (Penrose,   2009).  However,   if   corporations  have   active  
mergers   and   acquisitions   strategies,   and   simultaneously   engage   in   frequent  
selling  off  of  subsidiaries,  this  implies  that  they  have  a  tendency  to  acquire  other  
companies  with  the  intension  of  generating  a  speculative  profit.  The  speculative  
profit  arises  from  a  value  gain  in  the  assets  that  are  part  of  acquired  firms,  rather  
than  a  profit  generated  in  production.    
The   three   columns   marked   ‘Substantial   financial   investment’,   ‘M&A   strategy’  
and   ‘Subsidiary/productive  asset   trading’   in  Table  4.5.  are   really  at   the  heart  of  
the   analysis   presented   here,   as   they   link   the   theoretical   propositions   of   the  
previous   chapter   to   the   evidence   gathered   through   the   detailed   study   of  
company   profiles.   If   a   non-­‐‑financial   firm   is   labelled   as   having   substantial  
financial   investments,   its   liquidity   goes   well   beyond   its   cash   holdings.   This  
means  the  firm  is  holding  financial  investment  such  as  corporate  bonds  or  equity,  
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generating  rentier  income  in  the  form  of  dividends  and  interest  payments  and/or  
capital  gains,  if  these  financial  assets  can  be  sold  after  rising  in  price.    
With   the   former   type   of   income   –   dividends   and   interest   payments   –   firms’  
motivation   to   hold   these   liquid   financial   assets   is   precaution,   generating  
additional  cash  flow  in  case  productive  operations  are  disappointing.  However,  
this  motivation   can   easily   transform   into,   or   coexist  with,   a   speculative  motive  
when  the  financial  assets  in  question  are  held  to  speculate  on  a  capital  gain.  
The  last  six  columns  provide  further  information  about  the  characteristics  of  the  
overcapitalised   non-­‐‑financial   companies,   which   include   some   South   Africa-­‐‑
specific  dimensions.  Among  the  overcapitalised  mining  corporations,  companies  
involved  in  mining  exploration  are  prevalent.  Therefore,  column  eleven  indicates  
whether  the  non-­‐‑financial  corporation  in  question  is  an  exploration  company.  
Some  other  reoccurring  features  among  overcapitalised  non-­‐‑financial  companies  
are   noteworthy:   some   of   them   are   diversified   holding   companies   with  
subsidiaries  operating  in  two  or  more  different  industries;  they  are  also  listed  on  
at   least   one  more   stock   exchange   abroad;   they   have   been   a   cash   shell   at   some  
point   during   their   existence,   meaning   they   did   not   possess   any   operational  
assets;   they   engage   in   profitable   real   estate   investment;   or   they   have   been  
unbundling   assets,  which   refers   to   the   sale   of   non-­‐‑core   businesses   by   strongly  
diversified  conglomerates,  a  process  that  gained  traction  in  South  Africa  during  
the  late  1990s.  The  last  five  columns  deal  with  these  different  characteristics.    
It  should  be  highlighted  that  the  attribute  ‘cash  shell’  is  most  often  the  outcome  
of  another  companies’  mergers  and  acquisitions  strategy,  since  the  company  that  
turns   into  a  cash  shell   typically  will  have   just   sold  off   its  operations   to  another  
business.   In   this   sense,   it   is   (just   like   unbundling)   a   symptom   of   large  
corporations  buying  and  selling  their  subsidiaries,  be   it   for  speculative  gains  or  
with  the  intention  of  generating  an  income  stream.  
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As   stated   above,   the   aim   of   this   chapter   is   to   identify   the  motives   behind   the  
liquidity   preference   of   overcapitalised   JSE-­‐‑listed   non-­‐‑financial   corporations.  
Thus,  the  analysis  attempts  to  reveal  why  these  non-­‐‑financial  firms,  which  have  
ready   access   to   the   South   African   capital   market,   hold   such   large   volumes   of  
liquid  assets  relative  to  their  short-­‐‑term  debt  financing  needs.  Before  highlighting  
the  particular  features  of  all  132  overcapitalised  firms,  the  top  20  overcapitalised  
non-­‐‑financial   companies   and   their   liquidity   preferences   will   be   discussed   in  
detail,   which   constitutes   the   first   part   of   the   aforementioned   two-­‐‑pronged  
analysis.  
4.4.1. Types of liquidity preferences among the top 20 strongly overcapitalised 
non-financial firms 
4.4.1.1.  The  sectoral  breakdown  
For   the   period   1994   to   2012,   the   top   20   strongly   overcapitalised   non-­‐‑financial  
firms  reaffirm  results   from  the  sectoral  analysis   (see  section  4.3.):  13  of   these  20  
were   listed   as   basic  materials   producers,   all   of  which  were  mining   companies.  
The   only   company   among   these   20   listed   under   industrials,   namely   Mine  
Restoration  Investments  (MRI),  is  also  closely  related  to  mining  activity  because  
it  deals  with  the  decontamination  of  depleted  mining  assets.    
It  appears  that  many  of  the  companies  in  the  full  set  of  strongly  overcapitalised  
non-­‐‑financial   corporations   that   are   listed   as   industrial   corporations   have   had  
major  mining   interests   in   the   past.   One   such   example   is   Lonrho.   Lonrho   only  
demerged   from   its   mining   interests,   which   are   now   part   of   Lonmin,   in   1998.  
Alternatively,  the  label  ‘industrials’  often  serves  as  a  catch-­‐‑all  category  for  highly  
diversified  company  groups  like  Remgro  (formerly  Rembrandt),  which  possesses  
industrial   subsidiaries   alongside   interest   in   healthcare   providers   and  
telecommunications  companies.    
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Therefore,  sector  classifications  –  and  especially  the  ‘industrials’  label  –  should  be  
treated  with  caution  (Fine  &  Rustomjee,  2006).  For  the  current  analysis  the  sector  
classifications  provided  by   INET  BFA  –  which  always   refers   to   the  most   recent  
sector  qualification  of  the  listed  corporation  –  will  be  retained  and  supplemented  
by   insights   from   the   company   profiles   assembled,   if   it   becomes   necessary   to  
decide   about   a   company’s   industry   status.   The   problem   of   industry   affiliation  
does   not   only   concern   industrial   and  mining   corporations.   In   fact,   it   can   be   as  
fundamental   as   the   question   whether   a   company   should   be   classified   as   a  
financial  or  a  non-­‐‑financial  business.  The  remaining  six  companies  in  the  top  20  
are   all   listed   as   consumer   goods   or   consumer   services   companies,   with   the  
exception  of  World  Education  Technologies,  which  figures  under  ‘technology’.    
However,  the  latter  corporation  was  effectively  a  property  investment  company,  
while  another  company  in  this  sample  –  United  Service  Technologies  –  engaged  
in  pure  financial  investment.  World  Education  Technologies  acquired  a  property  
investment  portfolio  in  2000  before  delisting  in  2001.  United  Service  Technologies  
in   turn   had   no   productive   operations   of   their   own   until   2004   –   when   it   was  
delisted  –  instead  merely  receiving  income  in  its  role  as  a  holding  company  from  
financial  investment  in  a  single  company,  namely  UT  Worldwide  Inc.,  which  is  a  
supply   chain   solutions   provider   and   by   itself   not   overcapitalised.   Thus,   both  
companies   are   strictly   speaking   part   of   the   finance,   insurance   and   real   estate  
(FIRE)  sector,  rather  than  non-­‐‑financial  firms.    
It   is   important   to   note   that   this   analysis   is   only   able   to   identify   misleading  
industry   affiliations   effectively   because   of   the  qualitative   examination   that  was  
undertaken   in   the  detailed   company   studies.   Simple   regression   analysis  would  
not   be   able   to   pick   up   these   subtleties,   potentially   also   generating  misleading  
results.   For   Progress   Industries   and   Oceana   Investment   Corporation   detailed  
qualitative  data  were  not  available  because  their  delisting  took  place  during  the  
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early  1990s.2  Finally,  Wooltru  Limited  and  Sasani  Limited  were  both  engaged  in  
unbundling,  which  explains  their  high  cash  ratios.  Wooltru  was  in  the  process  of  
a   protracted   selling   of   assets   and   liquidation   between   2001   and   2009,   while  
Sasani   unbundled   successfully   by   1996,   becoming   a   cash   shell.   It   subsequently  
acquired  media   industry  assets   (in  1997),  but   finally  delisted  by   the  mid-­‐‑2000s.  
Unbundling   refers   to  a  process  during  which   large  holding   companies   sold  off  
non-­‐‑core  business  assets,  mainly  during  the  1990s  and  early  2000s,  after  the  end  
of  the  country’s  economic  isolation  (see  chapter  3,  part  3.3.).  In  these  transactions,  
holding  companies  were  effectively  selling  off  their  subsidiaries.    
As  described  in  chapter  3,  the  emergence  of  highly  diversified  conglomerates  and  
the   concentration   of   business   interests   (especially   among   the   group   of   big   five  
companies3)  was  a  consequence  of  historical  developments  in  South  Africa.  In  an  
attempt  to  raise  stock  market  valuation  and  reduce  exposure  to  the  South  African  
economy,   large  corporations   reorganised   their   complex  business   structures  and  
sometimes  even  moved  their  primary  listings  abroad  (Carmody,  2002).  
The   internationalisation  of   South  Africa’s   formerly  dominant   company  groups,  
and   similarly   the   internationalisation  of   corporate   ownership   in   the   country,   is  
also  visible  when  scrutinising  the  major  shareholders  behind  the  top  20  strongly  
overcapitalised   firms.   Only   two   of   three   (United   service   Technologies   Ltd,  
Wooltru   Limited   and  Coal   of  Africa)   are   partly   owned   by   one   of   the   big   five.  
However,   the   shares   held   by   Old   Mutual   and   Anglo   American   in   the   three  
named  companies  do  not  exceed  15%  and  therefore  do  not  constitute  controlling  
share  ownership   (INET  BFA,  2015).  One  should  remember   that  at   the  height  of  
                                                                                                 
2   Progress   Industries   were   suspended   from   the   JSE   in   1994   and   delisted   in   1996.  
Qualitative   data   are   not   available   for   the   years   before   1994,   explaining   why   there   is  
limited   information   on   Progress   Industries.   Oceana   Investment   Corporation   was  
delisted   in   1998   after   Park   Lawn   Limited   acquired   the   company.   There   are   neither  
financial  statements  nor  annual  reports  available  for  Oceana  Investment.    
3   As   explained   in   the   previous   chapter   these   are:   Anglo   American/De   Beers,  
Rembrandt/Remgro,  SANLAM,  SA  Mutual/Old  Mutual  and  Liberty  Life/Standard  Bank.    
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their  dominance  90%  of   total   JSE  capitalisation  was  controlled  by  these  groups.  
Hence,   among   JSE-­‐‑listed   companies   the   lack   of   a   link   to   one   of   these   groups  
would  be  an  exception  rather  than  the  rule.  Nevertheless,  the  share  of  JSE-­‐‑listed  
companies  controlled  by   the  big   five  has  since  diminished   to  hardly  more   than  
20%  by  2012  (Makhaya  &  Roberts,  2014).    
Overall,  mining  companies  dominate  the  top  20  of  strongly  overcapitalised  non-­‐‑
financial   companies   listed   on   the   JSE.   Therefore,   it   is   important   to   explain   the  
motives   behind   their   liquidity   preferences.   It   is   striking   that   these   mining  
companies  are  mostly  engaged  in  resource  exploration.  Some  of  them  were  long-­‐‑
established   companies   which   were   delisted   in   the   1990s   –   namely   Barnato  
Exploration,   Free   State   Development   and   Investment   Corporation   (hereafter  
referred   to  as  Fredev)  and  Avgold  –  while  many  are  emerging  exploration  and  
mining-­‐‑cum-­‐‑exploration  firms,  namely  Chrometco,  Witwatersrand  Consolidated  
Gold  Resources  (hereafter  referred  to  as  Wits  Gold),  Kiwara,  Sephaku  Holdings  
Limited  (hereafter  Sephaku),  Kibo  Mining  and  African  Eagle  Resources  (AER).    
Typically,   they   focus   on   resource   exploration,   rather   than   actually   engaging   in  
income-­‐‑generating   mining   activity.   As   consequence,   their   net   cash   flow   from  
operations   is   either   all   together   absent   or   irregular.   Thus,  Wits   Gold,   Kiwara,  
Sephaku,  Kibo  and  AER  were  not   able   to  generate  positive  net   cash   flow   from  
mining   operations.   The   same   is   true   for   the   delisted   exploration   companies  
Barnato  and  Fredev,  that  had  either  irregular  or  no  positive  operational  net  cash  
flow  (and  in  these  cases  even  gross  cash  flow),  and  became  reliant  on  interest  and  
dividend  payments  as  well  as  external  financing  (see  Table  4.5.).  Chrometco  only  
started   actual   mining   activity   in   2010   with   no   steady   net   cash   flow   from  
operations  prior  to  that  date.  
Understandably,   firms   that   are   uncertain   about   when   they   will   be   able   to  
generate   positive   (or   any)   cash   flow   from   operations,   while   facing   large  
unexpected   (and   in   fact   expected)   expenses   –   for   example,   on   capital-­‐‑intensive  
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mining  and  exploration  works  –  will  keep  large  sums  of  liquid  assets  to  be  able  
to   meet   future   payment   commitments.   Hence,   their   liquidity   preference   is  
precautionary   to   some  extent,  because,  as  pointed  out  by  Minsky   (1976),   liquid  
assets   serve   as   insurance.   These   firms’   financial   positions   are   hedged   by   large  
volumes  of   liquid  assets.  However,  at   the  same  time  it  can  be  argued  that   their  
mining  operations  are  inherently  speculative,  since  they  depend  on  the  increase  
in  the  asset  value  on  their  balance  sheet,  which  is  pursued  through  exploration.    
The   impact   of   uncertain   cash   flow   on   the   corporate   liquidity   preference   is  
exemplified   in   the  experience  of  another  non-­‐‑financial  company  among  the   top  
20:  Sephaku.  The  company  was   incorporated  in  South  Africa   in  2005,   listing  on  
the   JSE   in   2009.   Sephaku   is   attempting   to   enter   the   South   African   cement  
industry,  which  is  perceived  to  be  a  mature  sector,  dominated  by  few  producers  
(Sephaku  Holdings  Ltd,  2009b).    
Nevertheless,  given  growing  infrastructure  and  residential  construction  in  South  
Africa  Sephaku  argued  that  current  domestic  capacity  would  not  suffice  to  meet  
future  demand   (Sephaku  Holdings  Ltd,  2009a).  The  economic  viability  of   these  
expectations   was   validated   in   2013   through   a   large   long-­‐‑term   loan   (that   is,  
Sephaku  securing  external  funding),  jointly  granted  to  Sephaku  by  Nedbank  and  
Standard   Bank   (Sephaku   Holdings   Ltd,   2013).   The   company   reported   its   first  
gross   profit   from   operations   (of   R15.6  million)   in  March   2013   for   the   previous  
nine   months.   As   a   consequence,   the   company’s   cash   ratio   reduced   drastically  
from  2,500%  in  2012  and  an  average  of  more  than  1,000%  for  the  period  2009  to  
2012   to   24%   in   2013   (INET   BFA,   2013).   Thus,   once   funding,   and   subsequently  
cash  flow,  were  secured  thanks  to  a   long-­‐‑term  financing  commitment  from  two  
large   banks   and   successfully   launched   mining   operations,   respectively,  
Sephaku’s   precautionary   motive   lost   urgency.   This   does   not   mean   that   going  
forward   the   company’s   liquidity   preference   will   remain   low.   Even   if   mining  
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operations   are  profitable,   Sephaku  might  develop   a   speculative  motive   to  hold  
liquidity  with  the  intention  of  buying  and  selling  mining  assets.    
Non-­‐‑financial   corporations   can   use   their   liquid   funds   to   acquire   other   mining  
companies   and   assets,   trading   them  with   a   view   to   cashing   in   on   capital   and  
asset   value   gains.   In   the   case   of  mining   companies,   their   profits   often   depend  
crucially  on   the   rise  of   their   subsidiaries’   (equity)  price,  which   is   influenced  by  
international  mineral  prices.  For  example,  a  rising  gold  price  will  induce  a  price  
rise   in   gold  mining   assets,   ceteris   paribus   increasing   the   value   of   a   gold-­‐‑mining  
subsidiary.   Recently,   research   has   suggested   that   prices   in   international  
commodity  markets   inflate   as   they   become   targets   of   financial   investment   and  
new   financial   instruments,   such   as   commodity-­‐‑linked   derivatives   (see,   for  
example,  Flassbeck,  2012  and  Ashman,  Mohamed,  &  Newman,  2013).  This  means  
commodity   markets   are   likely   to   become   increasingly   prone   to   price   inflation  
(and  deflation),  similar  to  price  dynamics  experienced  in  equity  markets.    
Abstracting   from   these   claims   that   commodity   markets   are   financialised,   the  
mere  rise  in  commodity  prices  due  to  rising  demand  has  a  similar  effect,  because  
increased  prices  for  minerals  raise  the  value  of  mining  rights  and  deposits.  Thus,  
the  mid-­‐‑1990s  saw  a  boom  in  global  investment  into  mineral  exploration  (Bridge,  
2004)  and  so  did  the  early  2000s  in  the  run  up  to  the  crisis.    
Trades   in  mining   assets   among  mining   companies  might   involve   the   sale   and  
purchase   of   listed   equity,   but   does   not   have   to   do   so   necessarily.   Individual  
mines  are  sometimes  connected  to  distinct  subsidiary  firms.  These  firms  might  be  
listed   or   not.   If   they   are   listed,   equity   will   be   purchased   when   another  
corporation  acquires  the  firm.  Otherwise  –  if  the  firm  is  not  listed  –  its  ownership  
will  be  sold  to  the  acquiring  corporation.  In  the  former  case,  it  is  apparent  how  a  
capital  gain  can  be  achieved:  as  the  firm  is  listed,  an  inflating  equity  market  can  
raise  its  price  to  a  level  where  it  becomes  profitable  for  the  holding  company  to  
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sell  it.  Arguably,  a  capital  gain  can  also  be  generated  from  a  non-­‐‑listed  company,  
if  the  holding  company  treats  its  subsidiary  like  an  asset  held  for  sale.      
4.4.1.2.  Changes  in  the  role  of  mining-­‐‑finance  houses      
Mining   exploration   activity   is   inherently   speculative   and   also   very   capital-­‐‑
intensive.  Historically,  the  mining-­‐‑finance  houses  funded  these  operations  out  of  
their  abundant  cash  flow.  In  fact,  a  major  function  of  the  mining-­‐‑finance  houses  
was   the   provision   of   financial   and   scientific   expertise   to   the   mines   and  
exploration   projects,   which   were   part   of   the   company   group.   In   this   way,  
economies  of   scale   could  be  achieved,   since   the  cost  of  highly  specialised  skills  
that  mining  projects  only  need  at  certain  points  in  their  life  cycle  could  be  carried  
by  a  large  number  of  mines.    
Up  until  the  mid-­‐‑20th  century  the  typical  financing  structure  for  a  new  mine  was  
organised   in   such   a   way   that   the   mining-­‐‑finance   house   carried   out   the  
exploration,   taking   on   risk   and   initial   costs.   Once   mineral   deposits   were  
confirmed   and   mining   rights   secured,   a   mining   company   was   founded   and  
floated  on  the  JSE.  Part  of  the  raised  capital  was  used  to  acquire  the  mining  rights  
from  the  mining-­‐‑finance  house,  by  way  of  compensation  for  its  initial  exploration  
risk   and   the   costs   incurred.   The   remaining   funds   were   utilised   for   mine  
development  (Hagart,  1952).  
These   financing   patterns   changed   fundamentally   during   the   1950s   as  
institutional  investors  increasingly  entered  the  equity  markets.  Their  priority  was  
to   reduce   the   risk   of   their   financial   investments.   Thus,   newly   floated   mining  
companies  were  not  attractive  because  they  were  too  uncertain  an  investment.  In  
response,  mining-­‐‑finance  houses  stepped  in,  taking  exploration  activity  and  mine  
development   onto   their   balance   sheets   (Hagart,   1952).   This   reduced   risk   and  
made   mining   operations   more   attractive   for   institutional   investors,   since  
investing  in  a  mining-­‐‑finance  house  meant  that  highly  speculative  and  uncertain  
   202  
activity   like   exploration   was   fully   compensated   by   the   large   portfolio   of  
operating  and  profit-­‐‑making  mines  the  house  possessed.        
This  traditional  role  of  South  African  mining-­‐‑finance  houses  changed  during  the  
1990s,  when  large  mining  groups  like  Anglo  American  offloaded  their  non-­‐‑core  
operations.   This   appears   to   have   included   exploration   companies.   Thus,   as  
observed  by  Jubilee  Platinum  –  a  young  and  small  mining  exploration  company,  
which  was  among  the  129  surveyed  non-­‐‑financial  JSE-­‐‑listed  firms  –  large  mining  
houses  have  started   to  outsource   the  more  risky  exploration  activity.  However,  
this  appears  to  be  a  global  trend,  as  stressed  by  the  London-­‐‑based  (but  also  JSE-­‐‑
listed)  mining  exploration  company:  
‘Since  the  mid-­‐‑nineties,  major  mining  companies  have  tended  to  scale  down  their  
in-­‐‑house   exploration   activities   and   have   instead,   either   funded   exploration  
companies   or   acquired   companies   who   have   made   a   significant   discovery’  
(Jubilee  Platinum  PLC,  2006,  p.  5).    
The   strong   presence   of   exploration   companies   on   the   JSE   in   the   New   South  
Africa  also  appears  to  be  a  result  of  this  structural  change.  South  Africa  counts  as  
one  of   the   traditional   investment   targets   in   the  global  mining   industry   (Bridge,  
2004).  Moreover,   a   listing  on   the   JSE  –  given   its  historical   emergence  as   capital  
market   to   fund  mining  activity  –   is   recognised  as  a  strategic  benefit   for  mining  
companies.  
In   the   sample  of   the   top  20   strongly  overcapitalised   firms,   12  out  of   13  mining  
companies   maintained   exploration   activities,   half   of   which   were   incorporated  
after   1994   and   had   no   regular   income   from   operations,   mainly   focusing   on  
exploration.   Their   ownership   structures   seem   to   reflect   this   shift   in   the   role   of  
mining  finance  houses.  Only  two  out  of  the  12  mining  companies  that  undertook  
exploration   were   fully   owned   by   a   large   mining   corporation,   which   acted   as  
mining   finance   house,   providing   expertise   and,   crucially,   funding.   These   two  
were  Barnato  (fully  owned  by  Johannesburg  Consolidated  Investments,  JCI)  and  
Wits  Gold  (owned  by  Sibanye  Ltd,  which  in  turn  is  part  of  the  Gold  Field  Group  
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incorporated   in   the   late   1960s).   All   other   exploration   (or   mining-­‐‑cum-­‐‑
exploration)   companies   relied   on   capital   market   financing   and   multiple  
shareholders,  taking  up  smaller  volumes  of  their  stocks.      
In   contrast   to   large  mining   houses  with   strong   financial   positions   and   regular  
cash   flow,   younger   and   smaller  mining   enterprises   in   South  Africa   struggle   to  
obtain   external   finance.   For   South   African   mining   companies,   this   has   been  
further  exacerbated  since  the  isolation  of  the  South  African  economy  ceased  with  
the   end   of   apartheid   and   the   onset   of   financial   liberalisation.   As   result,   large  
South  African  institutional  investors  (like  Old  Mutual,  formerly  SA  Mutual)  have  
reoriented  their  investment  strategy  towards  the  global  market.  
‘It   remains   extremely   difficult   to   raise   funds   for   exploration   and   small  mining  
projects   in   South   Africa.   Institutional   investors   during   past   decades   had   the  
benefit  of  investing  in  large  mining  and  mining  finance  companies  in  a  relatively  
isolated  economy’  (Thabex  Exploration  Limited,  1998,  p.  2).  
In   the   past,   large   mining   houses   taking   on   exploration   activity   were   able   to  
reduce   liquid   assets   held   on   their   balance   sheet   through   economies   of   scale.  
These   companies   tended   to   be   highly   profitable   with   strong   cash   flow   and  
abundant   retained   earnings.   Simultaneously,   they   were   always   able   to   access  
external  finance  if  necessary,  due  to  their  strong  links  to  financial  institutions  at  
home   and   abroad,   while   backing   their   liquidity   demands   with   large   balance  
sheets.    
Therefore,  the  withdrawal  of  large  mining  corporations  from  exploration  is  likely  
to  have  contributed  to  an  increasing  liquidity  preference  in  the  mining  industry  
globally.  The  exploration  companies’  business  model,   in  turn,  depends  on  asset  
value  appreciation  and  is  therefore  risky  and  speculative  in  nature.  International  
resource  prices  dictate  what  quantity  and  quality  of  mineral   resources  must  be  
found   to   justify   exploration   and   ultimately   mining   activity.   Exploration  
companies   are   aware   that   their   activity   is   highly   speculative,   as   the   following  
quote  shows:  
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‘Mineral   exploration   is   highly   speculative   due   to   a   number   of   significant   risks,  
including   the  possible   failure   to  discover  mineral  deposits   that   are   sufficient   in  
quantity   and   quality   to   justify   the   completion   of   pre-­‐‑feasibility   or   feasibility  
studies’  (Wits  Gold,  2007,  p.  21).  
4.4.1.3.  Speculation  in  mining  subsidiaries  
Among   the   thirteen   mining   companies   in   the   top   20,   there   are   at   least   four  
exploration  or  exploration-­‐‑cum-­‐‑mining  companies  that  appear  to  hold  cash  and  
cash  equivalents  well  in  excess  of  their  current  liabilities  (with  hardly  or  no  non-­‐‑
current   liabilities   on   their   books),   and   are   actively   trading   in   subsidiary  
companies.  In  Table  4.5.  these  exploration  companies  are  characterised  by  no  or  
irregular  cash  flow  combined  with  active  subsidiary  trade  (see  columns  6,  10  and  
11).  The   four  are:  Chrometco,  AER,  Coal  of  Africa  and  Simmer  and   Jack.  Their  
liquidity   preference   is   likely   to   be   influenced   by   the   desire   to   acquire   new  
subsidiaries   quickly,  while   avoiding   illiquidity   due   to   the   lack   of   regular   cash  
flow  from  operations.    
Chrometco’s   gamble   over   their   Rooderand   Chrome   subsidiary   is   a   fitting  
illustration   of   how   an   exploration   company   can   generate   capital   gains   on   its  
mining   assets.   In   2006,   Rooderand   Chrome   was   acquired   by   Chrometco   for   a  
R600,000  cash  payment  and  a  share   issue  worth  R2million.  As  part  of   the  deal,  
Chrometco  agreed  to  buy  back  the  shares  a  year  later  (Chrometco  Limited,  2007).  
Subsequently,  in  2007,  Rooderand  Chrome  was  sold  to  Deco  Metal,  an  Austrian  
mining  company,  for  R62million.  At  that  point  Chrometco  had  made  some  minor  
investments   into   the   mining   site,   effectively   generating   a   profit   of   more   than  
R50million.   This   profit   was   made   against   the   background   of   the   global  
commodity  boom,  allowing  Chrometco  to  make  a  capital  gain  on  the  subsidiary.    
However,   the  case  also  illustrates  that  one  and  the  same  asset  –  or  subsidiary  –  
can   be   acquired   for   both   asset   price   speculation   and   production;   and   how   the  
investing   company’s   intentions   can   change   over   time.   The   sale   of   Rooderand  
Chrome   was   conditional   on   the   renewal   of   mining   rights   and   Chrometco  
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shareholders’   approval.   Initially,   a  management   agreement  was   put   into   place  
between  Chrometco  and  Deco  Metal,  according  to  which  Deco  Metal  would  lease  
the  mine   for   an   annual   payment   of   R13  million.   The   contract   intended   to   run  
over  five  years  until  2011  when  the  mine  was  meant  to  go  over  into  Deco  Metal’s  
possession  given  the  fulfilment  of  all  sale  conditions  (Chrometco  Limited,  2008).  
Yet,  in  2011  –  after  a  revaluation  of  the  mining  asset  –  Chrometco’s  shareholders  
decided  against  a  sale  because  the  asset  value  had  increased  (Chrometco  Limited,  
2011).   This   means   that   the   capital   gain   generated   through   the   sale   agreement  
made  in  2007  was  deemed  insufficient  a  selling  price  by  2011  given  subsequent  
developments  in  commodity  prices.  Shareholders  believed  the  exploitation  of  the  
asset  by  Chrometco  would  yield  larger  profits  than  the  intended  sale,  which  was  
cancelled  as  consequence.    
Importantly,   the   management   contract   had   provided   vital   cash   flow   during   a  
period,  in  which  Chrometco  was  facing  losses  from  its  (non-­‐‑mining)  operations.  
After   re-­‐‑acquisition   of   the   asset   the   project   suffered   a   severe   setback   in   2012  
when   international   chrome   prices   declined   substantially,   making   large-­‐‑scale  
mining   of   chrome   at   Rooderand   economically   unviable   (Chrometco   Limited,  
2012).    
Hence,   financed   by   capital   markets   —   namely   through   equity   issuance   —  
Chrometco   was   able   to   acquire   a   mining   asset   in   the   attempt   to   make   a  
speculative   profit,   i.e.   selling   it   on   after   a   value   gain.   This   is   speculation   à   la  
Keynes  (1936),  since  the  profit  on  the  investment  was  gained  through  a  price  rise,  
rather   than   through   an   income   stream   generated   by   productive   operations.  
Crucially,  the  speculation  and  the  capital  gains  realised  were  connected  to  a  real  
asset  rather  than  financial  instruments.  
The  fact   that  Chrometco  finally  decided  against   this  option,  and  for   investment  
into   actual   mining   operations,   exemplifies   the   close   connection   between  
speculative   and   entrepreneurial   activity.   Equally,   this   means   that   liquidity  
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motives   can   be   closely   intertwined.   Chrometco’s   motivation   to   hold   large  
volumes   of   liquid   assets  was   simultaneously   precautionary   –   since   operational  
cash   flow  was  absent  –  and  speculative  –  since   they  were  used   to   finance  asset  
acquisitions  that  could  generate  capital  gains.      
4.4.2. Types of liquid assets held among the top 20 strongly overcapitalised non-
financial firms  
Another  important  observation  from  the  top  20  sample  is  that  the  types  of  liquid  
assets  held  by   strongly  overcapitalised  non-­‐‑financial   firms  vary   strongly.   Some  
companies   hold   mostly   cash   and   cash   equivalents   on   their   balance   sheets.  
Among   the   top   20,   this   was   the   case   for   four   firms,   namely   the   three  mining  
companies   Chrometco,   Kiwara   and   AER   as   well   as   World   Educational  
Technologies,  whose   status   as   a   non-­‐‑financial   company   is   doubtful,   as   argued  
above.  World  Education  Technologies  appears   to  have  amassed   liquidity   in   the  
form  of  cash  in  order  to  transform  itself  into  a  property  investment  company  in  
the  early  2000s,  before  subsequently  delisting.    
More  generally,   it   seems   that  young  companies  often  hold  on   to  cash  and  cash  
equivalents   (column   8   in   Table   4.5.),   while   more   established   strongly  
overcapitalised   non-­‐‑financial   firms   typically   invest   into   more   sophisticated  
financial  assets  (column  7  in  Table  4.5.).  Both  Chrometco  and  Kiwara  are  young  
mining   exploration   firms   according   to   classifications   employed.   It   seems   that  
generating  cash  flow  through  liquidity  management  becomes  more  important  for  
firms  over  time.  Chrometco,  which  incorporated  in  South  Africa  in  2002,  changed  
its  liquidity  management  style  over  time.  Maintaining  a  focus  on  cash  and  cash  
equivalents,   the   company   shifted   its   cash   reserves   from   a   zero   to   a   variable  
interest  rate  arrangement  in  2008.  The  observation  that  there  is  a  divide  between  
young   and   established   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   in   their   type   of   liquidity  
management   (that   is,   cash   versus   financial   investment)   will   also   become   clear  
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when  assessing  the  full  set  of  strongly  overcapitalised  non-­‐‑financial  firms,  i.e.  all  
129  companies,  further  below.    
At   the   extreme,   financial   investment   undertaken   by   a   non-­‐‑financial   company  
might  turn  the  company  into  a  financial  rentier,  when  all  productive  operations  
cease   and   only   financial   income   is   generated.   This   has   happened   among   the  
companies   in   the   top   20   sample,   for   example   to   Village   Main   Reef   Limited  
(hereafter  referred  to  as  Village).  Village  is  a  well-­‐‑established  South  African  gold  
mining   company.   It   was   incorporated   in   1934   but,   by   1995,   had   to   cease   gold  
extraction   due   to   waning   profitability.   Subsequently,   the   corporation  
concentrated   on   winding   down   operations.   Yet,   its   large   volume   of   financial  
assets,  including  cash  and  cash  equivalents,  as  well  as  funds  invested  into  a  mine  
rehabilitation  fund,  allowed  the  company  to  survive  for  another  15  years  without  
generating   profits   from   actual  mining   operations.  Hence,  Village   turned   into   a  
pure   rentier   firm.   Gold   production   was   only   resumed   in   2010   after   the  
acquisition  of  Simmer  &  Jack’s  mining  assets.  This  case  demonstrates  that  even  a  
purely   precautionary   motive   –   in   contrast   to   outright   speculation   –   behind  
corporate   liquidity   preference   can   turn   an   entrepreneurial   non-­‐‑financial  
company  into  a  rentier  firm.      
Importantly,  Village’s  liquidity  holdings  helped  raise  sufficient  external  funds  for  
a  reverse  takeover  of  Simmer  &  Jack  in  2011.  By  2012  Village  had  acquired  all  of  
Simmer  &  Jack’s  mining  assets.  This  transaction  left  only  a  cash  shell  of  Simmer  
&  Jack,  which  itself  was  one  of  the  oldest  South  African  mining  ventures,  going  
as  far  back  as  1887.  Given  the  declining  volume  and  quality  of  Simmer  &  Jack’s  
mining  assets  and  their  inability  to  consistently  generate  profits,  Simmer  &  Jack  
abandoned   their   mining   activities,   delisting   from   the   JSE   in   April   2013.  
Nevertheless,   an   analysis   of   the   company’s   cash   flow   statements   shows   that  
equity   finance   also   prolonged   their   life   span,   generating   cash   inflows   when  
regular  operations  were  making  losses.  Similarly,  Coal  of  Africa  –  an  Australian  
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mining  business  incorporated  during  the  late  1970s  –  has  used  capital  markets  to  
finance   the   acquisition   of   new   mining   assets,   in   response   to   declining  
profitability  of  their  Australian  operations.    
Mature  companies  –  even  if  in  their  decline  –  will  rarely  go  bankrupt  quickly  due  
to   the   size   of   their   accumulated   assets.   Lacking   a   productive   outlet,   financial  
income   is   likely   to   increasingly   dominate,   demonstrating   once   again   the   close  
interconnectedness  of  real  and  financial  activity  in  non-­‐‑financial  companies.  The  
situation   of   Randex   during   the   1990s   is   another   case   in   point.   The   company’s  
mining  rights  became  a  purely  financial  asset,  once  mining  operations  ceased  to  
be   profitable.   This   development   was   strengthened   by   the   fact   that,   for   years,  
Randex   had   been   acquiring   shareholdings   in   mining   companies   instead   of  
investing  into  its  own  mining  operations.  During  the  1990s,   it  was  decided  that  
Randex   would   sell   off   its   shareholdings   in   other   South   African   mining  
companies.   In   the   process   Genbel   Securities,   a   financial   company,   acquired  
Randex’s  remaining  mining  assets  with  the  intention  of  finalising  the  assets  sale.  
Consequently,  Randex  delisted  from  the  JSE  in  May  1997.    
Thus,   this  case  once  again   illustrates  how  closely   intertwined  financial  and  real  
activity   can   be  within   non-­‐‑financial   companies.   Originally   a  mining   company,  
Randex  increasingly  transformed  itself  into  a  financial  investment  firm,  receiving  
income   only   as   dividends   and   interest   payments,   rather   than   from   operations.  
Ultimately,  the  firms  itself  was  reduced  to  a  financial  asset  when  it  was  acquired  
by   a   financial   corporation,   which  wanted   to   reap   capital   gains   from   Randex’s  
shareholdings.  
The  distinction  between  holding  cash  and  cash  equivalence  and  other   financial  
instruments   as   liquid   assets   can   be   highlighted   by   the   difference   between   the  
cash   ratio   and   the  OCR   calculated   for   a   firm.   This   has   been   done   for   all   129  
companies  surveyed.  Tables  4.3.  and  4.4.  below  illustrate  the  ratios  for  the  top  20  
strongly   overcapitalised   non-­‐‑financial   firms   listed   on   the   JSE.   There   are   six  
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companies  that  have  a  noticeably  higher  OCR  than  cash  ratio.  These  are  Barnato  
Exploration   Ltd,   United   Service   Technologies,   Village   Main   Reef   Limited,  
Progress   Industries,   Fredev   and   Simmer   and   Jack   Mines.   For   all   of   these  
companies   the   difference   is  made  up   by   investment   in   other   companies’   listed  
and  unlisted  shares.  Importantly,  mining  companies  also  hold  liquidity  for  mine  
rehabilitation   as   liquid   assets   on   their   balance   sheet.   This   raises   their   liquidity  
further,  but  is  by  no  means  the  main  source  of  overcapitalisation.    
Figure 4.1. Cash ratios and OCRs for top 10 strongly overcapitalised non-financial 
firms 
  
Source:  Author’s  calculations  based  on  annual  reports  retrieved  from  INET  BFA,  2013.  
For   instance,   for  Simmer  and  Jack  Mines   the   investment   in   their  environmental  
fund   was   worth   less   than   7%   of   their   shareholdings   in   associated   companies  
during  the  years  2009  and  2010.  Simmer  and  Jack  Mines  purchased  and  disposed  
of  mining  assets   and   subsidiaries   regularly  during   the  period  1994   to   2010,   for  
which   there   is   information.  This  distinction  between  holdings  of   cash  and  cash  
equivalents   and   (potentially)   liquid  holdings  of   financial   assets   is   illustrated   in  
the   following   survey   of   the   132   strongly   overcapitalised   companies   when  
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Figure 4.2. Cash ratios and OCRs for top 11-20 strongly overcapitalised non-
financial firms 
  
Source:  Author’s  calculations  based  on  annual  reports  retrieved  from  INET  BFA,  2013.  
4.4.3. Findings from the full set of 132 company profiles 
After   this   initial   look   at   the   motivations   behind   strongly   overcapitalised   non-­‐‑
financial   firms’   liquidity  preferences  –  discussed   in   the  previous   two  sections  –  
let  us   turn   to   the   full   population  of   strongly  overcapitalised   firms.   It   has   to  be  
stressed   that   from   a   statistical   perspective   this   thesis   is   not   dealing   with   a  
representative  sample  since  the  database  used  provides  a  full  population  of  JSE-­‐‑
listed   firms   (at   least   since   1994).   This   means   that   inferential   statistics   are   not  
necessary,  as   the  entire  population  can  be  observed  and  population  parameters  
can  be  directly  measured,  rather   than   inferred  from  estimated  sample  statistics.  
Instead,  descriptive  statistics  are  used   to  describe   the  characteristics  of  strongly  
overcapitalised  non-­‐‑financial  corporations.    
Table   4.6.   summarises   qualitative   findings   for   the   subgroup   of   overcapitalised  
firms.  The  firm  characteristics  listed  in  the  table  correspond  to  columns  3  through  
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Remgro/Rembrandt   group,   which   was   mentioned   as   one   of   the   major   South  
African  company  groups  in  the  previous  chapter.  As  has  been  explained,  South  
African  companies  used  to  have  complex  ownership  structures,  meaning  nested  
layers  of  listed  holding  companies  within  one  corporation,  to  avoid  the  reduction  
of   control  when   issuing   additional   shares.   Therefore,   after   a   closer   look   at   the  
132,   they  can  be  consolidated   to  129  companies,   treating  Rembrandt  Beherende  
Beleg   Bpk,   Remgro   Limited,   Tegniese   &   Ind   Beleggings   Bpk   and   Tegniese  






















Source:  Author’s  calculations  based  on  INET  BFA,  2013.  
The  data  set  contains  57  mining  companies,  21  industrial  companies  and  52  non-­‐‑
mining  companies.  Since  one   firm   transformed   from  a  mining   to  a  non-­‐‑mining  
enterprise  during  its  listed  existence  it  was  accounted  for  twice,  bringing  the  total  



























   212  
count   to   130   instead   of   129.   As   observed   throughout   this   chapter,   mining  
companies  play  a  driving  role  in  the  rising  corporate  liquidity  preference  among  
JSE-­‐‑listed   non-­‐‑financial   corporations,   since   almost   half   of   all   strongly  
overcapitalised  non-­‐‑financial  companies  are  mining  corporations.  
A  quarter   (32   firms)  of  all   strongly  overcapitalised  non-­‐‑financial   companies  are  
young  firms  of  less  than  10  years  of  age.  Two  thirds  of  the  companies  (86  firms)  
identified  as  strongly  overcapitalised  non-­‐‑financial  firms  are  not  listed  on  the  JSE  
anymore.  More  than  half  (65  firms)  of  the  companies  in  the  data  set  have  regular  
positive  cash  flow  from  operations.  However,  that  also  means  that  the  other  half  
(61   firms)   either   do   not   have   positive   cash   flow   from   operations   (49   firms)   or  
have  very   irregular  operational   cash   flow   (12   firms).  Perhaps  unsurprisingly,   a  
substantial  number  (32  companies)  among  this  latter  group  is  made  up  of  young  
firms,  which  are  likely  to  struggle  initially  in  establishing  profitable  operations.  It  
might   therefore   be   reasonable   to   assume   that   their   behaviour   is   driven   by  
precaution.    
However,   a   closer   look   reveals   that   among   these   32   young   companies  without  
regular   cash   flow,   14   run   exploration   activities.   This   is   surely   connected   to   the  
global  commodity  price  boom  of  the  early  2000s,  which  made  mining  exploration  
more  lucrative.  As  shown  in  the  previous  section,  exploration  necessitates  large  
volumes   of   liquidity,   due   to   its   inherent   uncertainty.   Simultaneously,   resource  
exploration  possesses  a  speculative  dimension,  introducing  a  speculative  motive  
to  non-­‐‑financial  firms’  liquidity  preference.  Therefore,  it  is  important  to  note  that  
more   than   one   quarter   of   strongly   overcapitalised   non-­‐‑financial   businesses   (37  
firms)  are  engaged  in  resource  exploration.    
This  result  is  certainly  conditioned  by  South  Africa’s  natural  resource  wealth  and  
unlikely   to  be   the  case   in  advanced  economies.  However,   similar   situations  are  
likely   to   be   found   in   other   resource-­‐‑rich   emerging   economies   with   relatively  
sophisticated   capital   markets.   This   is   the   first   major   finding   of   the   qualitative  
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case   study   analysis:   in   emerging   markets   such   as   South   Africa   resource-­‐‑
extracting   corporations   might   drive   a   rising   trend   in   corporate   liquidity  
preferences.   Structural   changes   within   the   mining   industry   during   the   1990s  
(discussed  in  the  previous  section)  appear  to  further  favour  this  trend.    
One   can   now   ask   what   type   of   liquid   assets   these   firms   hold.   Non-­‐‑financial  
companies   with   mostly   cash   and   cash   equivalents,   rather   than   substantial  
financial  investments,  on  their  balance  sheets  –  of  which  there  are  31  in  the  data  
set   –   appear   to   hold   these   as   a   type   of   insurance   to   cover   future   payment  
commitments.  More   than   half   of   these   firms   (namely   17)   actually   do   not   have  
positive  operational  cash  flow.    
It   also   seems   that   a   disproportionate   share   of   young   companies   (11   out   of   32  
young   companies)   choose   cash   as   their   form   of   liquidity.   Very   few   young  
companies  substantially  invest  into  financial  instruments.  Therefore,  the  majority  
of   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   that   manage   their   liquidity   through   financial  
investment   (48   out   of   52)   are   in   fact   established   companies.   This  might   be   the  
case   because   they   have   more   experience   in   managing   firm   liquidity,   and  
therefore  branch  out   into  instruments  that  have  the  potential  not  only  to   insure  
against  unforeseen  expenditure,  but  also  to  generate  a  positive  cash  flow.  Hence,  
the   second   finding   is   that   established   companies   are  more   likely   to   invest   into  
financial   instruments.  This  means  as  businesses   in  emerging  economies  mature  
they  might  develop  an  increasing  interest  in  financial  investment.  
Furthermore,   almost   half   of   the   non-­‐‑financial   firms   in   the   data   set   (55   firms)  
follow  an  active  mergers  and  acquisitions  strategy  in  order  to  grow.  In  this  sense,  
their  liquidity  preference  is  motivated  by  the  need  to  finance  potential  company  
takeovers.  This  can  be  equated  to  Keynes’s  finance  motive.  Yet,  an  active  mergers  
and   acquisitions   strategy   can   also   take   on   speculative   dimensions   when  
subsidiary   companies   are   traded  with   the   intention   of   achieving   capital   gains.  
Some  20%  of  the  non-­‐‑financial  companies  in  the  data  set  actively  sell  subsidiary  
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companies.  Therefore,  the  third  finding  –  which  was  discussed  in  more  detail  in  
the   previous   section   –   is   that   some   overcapitalised   non-­‐‑financial   companies  
speculate  on  capital  gains   in  productive  assets.  This  point  has  been  stressed  by  
other  authors  before  (Crotty,  2003).  However,  it  is  remarkable  since  there  seems  
to  be  an  explicit  expectation  in  parts  of  the  financialisation  literature  (see  Demir,  
2007)  that  financial  investment  by  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  will  be  speculative.  
In  fact,  it  seems  that  fewer  companies  appear  to  follow  a  speculative  motive  with  
their   liquidity   holdings   than   some   authors  who   are   part   of   the   financialisation  
debate  seem  to  suggest.      
For   a   relatively   small   share   (13   firms)   of   the   assessed   companies  
overcapitalisation  occurred  in  the  process  of  selling  off  all  their  assets.  This  is  the  
other  side  of  an  active  mergers  and  acquisitions  strategy,  namely  the  perspective  
of   the   selling   company.   In   many   of   these   firms,   overcapitalisation   was   a  
persistent  phenomenon,  which  did  not  exclusively  depend  on  their  status  as  cash  
shell.  The   same   is   true   for  non-­‐‑financial   companies   engaged   in  unbundling   (10  
firms),  especially  since  half  of  them  (5  firms)  became  cash  shells  in  the  process.    
This   author   suggests   that   finance   –   and   specifically   overcapitalisation   –   can  
enable   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   to   speculate   in   productive   assets   –   such   as  
mines,   patents   or   subsidiary   firms.   By   contrast,   financial   prudence   can   lead   to  
situations  in  which  non-­‐‑financial  companies  hold  on  to  financial  investment  out  
of   precaution,   reaping   rentier   income.   At   the   extreme,   if   all   other   sources   of  
income   dry   out,   the   non-­‐‑financial   business   can   become   a   pure   rentier   firm,  
surviving   exclusively   thanks   to   financial   income.  At   that   point,   the   firm  might  
have   the   appearance   –   and   the   stock   market   listing   –   of   a   non-­‐‑financial  
corporation,   but   effectively   operates   like   a   financial   firm.   Once   again,   it   is  
noteworthy   that   there   is   no   intention   to   undertake   speculative   financial  
investment   on   the   part   of   the   company.  Hence,   simple   precaution   can  make   a  
non-­‐‑financial   firm   into   a   financial   rentier.   Only   20   non-­‐‑financial   firms   have  
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amassed  liquidity  while  having  business  interests  in  the  FIRE  sector,  or  with  the  
intention   to   move   into   real   estate   investment.   These   are   the   sectors   where  
speculative   profit   is   typically   located.   Property   and   equity   investments   are  
activities  in  which  profits  tend  to  be  based  on  asset  price  increases.  Especially  in  
the  UK   and  US   –   but   also   in   South  Africa   –  markets   for   real   estate   have   been  
inflating  alongside  capital  markets  over  the  past  decades.  
Finally,   it   should   be   stressed   that   overcapitalisation   is   not   a   side-­‐‑product   of   a  
specific   type   of   organisational   structure,   for   example,   of   a   diversified   holding  
company  with   interest   in   several   industries.  Not   all   overcapitalised   companies  
are   diversified   holding   companies.   Similarly,   it   is   not   the   case   that   only   firms  
with   access   to   domestic   financial  markets,   facing   capital   controls   that   regulate  
how   they   can  withdraw   funds   from  South  Africa,  have  been  affected.   In   fact   a  
quarter   of   all   strongly   overcapitalised   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   possess   a  
foreign  stock  exchange  listing,  and  could  therefore  use  firm-­‐‑internal  bookkeeping  
to  transfer   funds  abroad  if  desired.  The  question  how  the  heightened  corporate  
liquidity   preference   affects   the   South   African   economy   as   a   whole   will   be  
addressed   in   the   following   chapters   (5-­‐‑7)   of   this   thesis,   which   deal   with   the  
macroeconomic  perspective.  
4.5. Summary and conclusion 
This   chapter   addresses   two   questions   that   were   formulated   to   guide   the  
microeconomic  analysis  in  this  thesis:  (1)  What  role  do  financial  operations  play  
in   the   dealings   of   non-­‐‑financial   businesses?   And   (3)   Why   has   the   liquidity  
preference  of  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  increased  in  South  Africa  over  the  past  
decades?  The  missing  question  not  addressed  here  (namely,  (2)  what  type  of  non-­‐‑
financial   companies   does   the   analysis   target)   was   answered   in   the   previous  
chapter   setting   out   the  methodology   of   an   alternative   balance   sheet   approach,  
which  can  be  best  implemented  for  large  listed  corporations.    
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(1)  The  motive   for  holdings   large  volumes  of   liquid  assets  vary  among   the  132  
examined   cases 4 .   Both   precautionary   considerations   as   well   as   speculative  
intentions  are  present  among  these  non-­‐‑financial  firms.  What  the  close  study  of  
financial  processes  within  these  non-­‐‑financial  firms  shows  is  that  the  distinction  
between  productive  and  speculative  activity  is  often  blurred.  A  major  reason  for  
non-­‐‑financial  corporations  to  hold  large  amounts  of  cash  is  the  ability  to  acquire  
business  interests,  be  they  subsidiary  company  or,  in  the  case  of  a  resource-­‐‑rich  
economy  like  South  Africa,  mines.  These  acquisitions  can  be  made  either  with  the  
intention  of  generating  cash  flow  from  operations,  or  to  reap  profits  from  value  
gains  in  the  acquired  business  assets.  Almost  half  (55)  of  all  examined  companies  
showed  signs  of  speculation  in  subsidiary  trading.    
This  type  of  activity  is  speculation  in  real  rather  than  financial  assets  as  much  of  
the   financialisation   literature   predicts,   especially   in   the   context   of   an   emerging  
market   like   South   Africa.   Among   those   132   companies,   101   hold   considerable  
financial  assets  when  accounting  for  liquid  financial  investment,  rather  than  cash  
and   cash   equivalents.   Thus,   for   52   of   these   non-­‐‑financial   companies   the  𝑂𝐶𝑅  is  
twice   as   large   as   their   cash   ratio,   indicating   that   they   generate   rentier   income.  
The  precautionary  motive,  in  which  financial  assets  are  merely  held  to  generate  a  
complementary  cash  flow,  can  turn  a  firm  into  a  financial  investor  and  therefore  
rentier.   Such   cases   illustrate   that   productive   and   financial   operations   are   often  
closely   intertwined.   Established   companies   are   more   likely   to   diversify   their  
liquidity   holdings   into   financial   investment,   suggesting   that   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations  might  turn  to  financial  investment  as  they  mature.    
(2)   Generally,   the   rising   liquidity   preference   among   South   African   listed   non-­‐‑
financial  corporations   is  greatly   influenced  by  the  country’s  specific  geographic  
location   and   mineral   endowments.   Thus,   much   of   financial   dealings   by   non-­‐‑
financial   business   is  undertaken  among  mining   companies,   the   industry  which  
                                                                                                 
4  When  accounting  for  pyramid  structures  the  group  of  firms  shrinks  to  129  companies.  
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has   fundamentally   moulded   the   economy   since   the   early   beginnings   of  
capitalism   in   the   territories   that   later   became   South  Africa   (see   chapter   6   for   a  
detailed   historical   overview).   A   change   in   financing   patterns   among   the   large  
mining-­‐‑finance  houses  during  the  1990s  has  resulted  in  a  large  number  of  mining  
exploration   companies,   which   are   forced   to   finance   themselves   outside   of   the  
mining-­‐‑finance  houses’  structures.    
As   a   consequence,   these   highly   risky   and   speculative   (even   though  potentially  
productive)   business   units   have   attempted   to   raise   capital   on   the   JSE.   Large  
company   groups   like   Anglo   American   could   take   advantage   of   economies   of  
scale   in   their   provision   of   liquidity   to   a   large   number   of   exploration   projects,  
reducing   the   overall   demand   for   liquidity.   By   contrast,   those   individual  
businesses   are   often   small   in   scale   and   need   to   overcapitalise   substantially   to  
ensure  their  survival  until  exploration  is  successful  and  they  can  sell  their  mining  
right,  or  even  until  the  mine  development  stage  is  completed.  
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Chapter V: Literature Review: The Role of Finance in the 
Macro Economy 
  
To  identify  the  interaction  of  non-­‐‑financial  firms’  financial  operations  with  the  
macro   economy,   this   chapter   will   review   the   most   salient   theoretical  
contributions  on  the  role  of  the  financial  system  in  the  economy.  The  aim  is  to  
carve  out  economists’   theoretical  understanding  of  how  financial  markets  and  
non-­‐‑financial  business  interact  on  the  aggregate  level.  While  the  first  part  of  the  
thesis  centred  on  the  firm  (that  is,  the  micro  level),  the  following  analysis  takes  
on   the   macroeconomic   lens.   Since   the   author   has   a   Kaleckian   view   on   the  
economy,  micro  and  macro  dynamics  are  believed  to  be  closely  interlinked.    
Three  concrete  questions  will  guide  this  review:  (1)  What  is  the  macroeconomic  
role  of  financial  institutions?  (2)  What  (or  who)  drives  credit  extension?  And  (3)  
how   are   non-­‐‑financial   companies   as   a   whole   positioned   vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis   financial  
institutions?  The  last  question  is  one  of  agency  or,  if  one  wants,  power:  Who  is  
the  more  powerful  party  in  the  interaction  between  financial  intermediaries  and  
non-­‐‑financial  businesses?    
Since   this   chapter   deals  with  macroeconomic   considerations   the   issue   of   firm  
heterogeneity  will   inevitably   be   left   aside   for   now.  Accounting   for   small   and  
medium-­‐‑sized  enterprises   (SMEs)   in   this   type  of  analysis   is  a  worthwhile   task  
for  further  research.  The  topic  of  SMEs  will,  however,  be  mentioned  in  the  next  
two  chapters,  wherever  it  is  essential  for  the  analysis.  
In  mainstream  analysis   the   functions  of   the  actual   financial   system   frequently  
appear   to   be   defined   negatively,   against   the   benchmark   of   an   imagined  
perfectly   functioning   financial   system.   Hence,   an   important   focus   of   the  
mainstream   review   (in   part   5.1.)   will   be   on   the   role   of   finance   in   economic  
development  and  market  failures  in  financial  markets.  Economic  operations  are  
allegedly   hampered   due   to   financial   imperfections.   Identifying   which  
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operations   exactly   are   understood   to   be   impaired   offers,   by   implication,   a  
response   to   the  questions   about   the   role   of   financial   institutions   in   the  macro  
economy.    
Another   clarification   is   necessary   at   this   point;   namely,   what   is   meant   by  
‘finance’.  In  economic  theory  the  term  ‘financial  market’  or  ‘financial  system’  is  
typically   used   in   a   generic   way,   referring   to   the   most   important   financial  
institutions   and   structures   in   an   economy.   Often   this   seems   to   suggest   that  
financial   structures   are   relatively   homogenous   across   countries.   In   the  
following  the  terms  will  be  used  in  a  broad  sense  embracing  all  financial  actors  
and   institutions,   however,   with   a   focus   on   the   financial   entities   that   most  
frequently   interact  with  non-­‐‑financial  business.  This   emphasis   stems   from   the  
belief   (outlined   at   the   beginning   of   chapter   1)   that   non-­‐‑financial   companies  
drive   economic   activity   through   their   investment   behaviour.   The  
acknowledgement  that  financial  structures  differ  significantly  across  economies  
is   picked   up   as   a   central   theme   in   the   following   chapter’s   discussion   on   the  
bank-­‐‑based-­‐‑market-­‐‑based  dichotomy.        
The   review   presented   here   will   show   that   finance   has   seemingly   become  
increasingly   important   in   mainstream   economic   theory.   While   financial  
structures  and   institutions  were  of  no   importance   in  marginalist   thinking  and  
the  economic  orthodoxy  of  the  1950s  and  ‘60s  (discussed  in  part  5.1.1.),  financial  
variables   crept   slowly   into   economic   thinking,   establishing   a   prominent   role  
within   development   thinking   by   the   1980s   (in   part   5.1.2.).   Finally,   the   rise   of  
New   Keynesian   thought   identified   financial   markets   as   common   sources   of  
economic   friction   (discussed   in   part   5.1.3.).   Despite   this   theoretical   evolution  
there  has  been  no  progress  on  how  financial  markets  are  believed  to  work  (and  
modelled):  the  mainstream  paradigm  remains  (for  the  most  part)  stuck  with  the  
loanable  funds  model.    
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In   heterodox   economic   theory,   finance   plays   an   active   role   and   money   is  
endogenously   created  by  banks.1  The  chapter  will  distinguish   three  heterodox  
traditions:   the   German-­‐‑speaking   one   (part   5.2.1),   the   Keynesian   and   post-­‐‑
Keynesian   one   (part   5.2.2.)   and   the   recent   financialisation   approaches   (part  
5.2.3.).    
The   German-­‐‑language   tradition   is   extremely   rich   in   substance   and   variety,  
resulting   in  different  answers   to   the  question  who  drives   the   credit   cycle  and  
where  agency  is  to  be  found.  Importantly,  from  this  tradition  an  active  role  for  
non-­‐‑financial   corporations  can  be  deduced.  This  view  contrasts  with  Keynes’s  
ideas,  where  the  agency  is  with  the  financial  institutions,  but  is  revived  in  parts  
of  the  post-­‐‑Keynesian  tradition  (especially  around  Kalecki).  Keynes’s  emphasis  
on   the   agency   of   financial   institutions   lives   on   in   today’s   financialisation  
literature,  where  non-­‐‑financial  companies  are  mostly  passive  victims  of  changes  
in   financial   markets.   As   always,   there   are   exceptions   and   the   Regulationist  
school  is  an  important  one.    
This  chapter  has  a  strong  focus  on  the  history  of  economic  thought.  Its  findings  
are,  however,  not  merely  of  historical  interest.  With  respect  to  its  understanding  
of   the   role   and  workings   of   financial   markets,   current   mainstream   economic  
thought   appears   caught   up   in   some   version   of   the   loanable   funds   theory.  
Reviewing  historical   contributions   in  monetary   economics   can  help  move   the  
debate   beyond   this   ossified   consensus,   without   having   to   reinvent   existing  
theory.   It   is   particularly   striking   how  well-­‐‑developed   the   theoretical   grasp   of  
credit  was  among  German-­‐‑language  economic  scholars  of  the  late  19th  and  early  
20th  century.  Hence,  an  important  and  original  contribution  of  this  thesis  is  the  
summary   of   contemporary   and   historical   economic   literature   on   the   role   of  
finance  in  the  economy.  
                                                                                                 
1  While   some   branches   of   heterodox   economics   embrace   the   loanable   funds   theory,  
such  as  Austrian  and  neo-­‐‑Austrian   thought   following  von  Mises,  much  of  heterodox  
thought  is  built  on  the  idea  of  endogenous  money.  
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5.1.  The role of finance in mainstream economic theory 
The  role  of  money  and  finance  has  changed  over  time  in  mainstream  economic  
thought.   While   many   of   the   classical   economists   treated   money   (and   by  
extension,  finance)  as  an  unimportant  ‘veil’,  the  mainstream  position  has  shifted  
slowly   towards   emphasising   the   significance   of   the   financial   system   in   the  
preservation   of   wealth,   intermediation   of   savings   and,   more   recently,  
management  of   risk.  Since   the   role   that  modern  economic   theory  attributes   to  
finance   in   the   overall   economy   remains   limited   to   financial   intermediation  
between   household-­‐‑savers   and   firm-­‐‑investors,   along   with   information  
gathering,  monitoring  and  risk  management  tasks,  most  of  this  thinking  is  stuck  
in  the  loanable  funds  framework.    
5.1.1. The economic orthodoxy of the post-World War II era and its origins 
After   World   War   II,   an   economic   consensus   emerged   which   assigned   only  
limited  importance  to  financial  variables.  In  fact,  it  tied  in  with  the  classical  idea  
of  money  as  a  ‘veil’.  The  concept  of  the  veil  of  money,  concealing  real  economic  
activity,   can   already   be   found   in   the   writings   of   classical   economists   whose  
analysis   focused  on  the   (imagined)  barter  economy.  A  major  representative  of  
this  orthodox  consensus  on  the  macro   level   is   the  Solow-­‐‑Swan  growth  model.  
Over   time,   real   balances,   that   is   households’   real   stock   of   money,   was  
introduced  into  macroeconomic  models  in  a  weak  attempt  to  acknowledge  the  
existence  of  money.    
5.1.1.1.  Money  as  a  ‘veil’  in  classical  economic  thought          
Ricardo,   for   instance,   put   forward   his   famous   principle   of   comparative  
advantage   in   such   a   framework.   Another   influential   idea   –   supported   by  
prominent   classical   economists   like   Ricardo   and   (albeit   less   strongly)   Mill  
(Snowdon  &  Vane,  2005,  Schumpeter  &  Schumpeter,  1986)  –   formulated   for  a  
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barter  economy  was  Say’s  Law2,  which  essentially  states  that  supply  creates  its  
own  demand  in  the  market.  Hence,  if  aggregate  demand  and  aggregate  supply  
are   always   equal,   as   suggested   by   Say’s   Law,  money   is   simply   a   convenient  
medium  of  exchange   that   solves   the  well-­‐‑known   ‘double  coincident  of  wants’  
problem.    
However,   it   was  Walras  who   fundamentally   shaped   the   view   that   finance   is  
negligible   by   adopting   a   general   equilibrium  approach   to  money   and   finance  
(Schumpeter  &  Schumpeter,  1986).  Walras  treated  money  as  numéraire,  that  is,  
as   accounting   unit   in   the   tatônnement   process,   which   is   the   procedure   that  
gradually  establishes  the  market-­‐‑clearing  price  for  all  commodities,  resulting  in  
general   equilibrium.   Formally,   it   does   not   matter   whether   this   numéraire   is  
money  or  any  other  good,  such  as  cigarettes,  which  sometimes  do  play  the  role  
of   commodity   money.   Therefore,   in   the   formalisation   of   his   ideas   Walras  
divided  the  prices  of  all  goods  by  the  numéraire,  simplifying  his  mathematical  
problem   while   eliminating   money   from   the   equation.   Walras’s   thought   has  
been  highly   influential   in   20th   century   economics,  most  notably   in  Arrow  and  
Debreu’s  general  equilibrium  model  and  Lucas’s  real  business  cycle  (Snowdon  
&  Vane,  2005).  Money  or  finance  figures  in  neither  of  them.        
The  classical  understanding  of   inflation  also  supports   the  view  of  money  as  a  
‘veil’.  According   to   a   simple   version   of   the   quantity   theory   of  money   (which  
nowadays  is  the  one  economics  students  are  taught)  any  increase  in  the  volume  
of   money   will   translate   into   a   proportional   rise   of   the   price   level,   if   output  
remains   unchanged,   with   the   velocity   of  money   assumed   to   be   fixed.   Under  
these   assumptions,   nominal   prices   do   not   matter   because   only   relative   (and  
therefore  real)  prices  determine  equilibrium.      
                                                                                                 
2  In  Say’s  words:   ‘A  product   is  no  sooner  created,   than   it,   from  that   instant,  affords  a  
market  for  other  products  to  the  full  extent  of  its  own  value…the  mere  circumstance  of  
the  creation  of  one  product  immediately  opens  a  vent  for  other  products’  (Say,  1834,  p.  
138).  
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5.1.1.2.  The  Solow-­‐‑Swan  growth  model  
Against   this   intellectual   background,   one   of   the   most   influential  
macroeconomic   models   of   the   20th   century   was   developed,   completely  
abstracting   from   financial   factors:   the  Solow-­‐‑Swan  growth  model.  The  Solow-­‐‑
Swan  (or  neoclassical)  growth  model  was  the  equilibrium  response  to  Harrod’s  
(Harrod,   1939)   demonstration   that   the   stability   of   growth   in   capitalist  
economies   is   on   a   knife-­‐‑edge.   The   slightest   deviation   from   the   very   narrow  
equilibrium  path  –  determined  by   the   savings   rate,   the   capital   to  output   ratio  
and   population   growth   –   results   in   ever-­‐‑intensifying   booms   or   busts.3  This  
perception   of   inherent   instability   was   at   odds   with   the   feeling   of   many  
economists  during  the  1950s  that  growth  is  steady  most  of  the  time  and  not  ‘a  
miraculous  stroke  of  luck’  (Solow,  1988).    
The  Solow-­‐‑Swan  model  embodies  neoclassical  growth  theory  and  the  belief   in  
the   self-­‐‑equilibrating  power  of   capitalist   economies.  At   its   core   the  model  has  
an   aggregate  production   function  where   output  per  worker   is   determined  by  
saving  per   head,  which   is   assumed   to   automatically   translate   into   capital   per  
head.  In  steady  state,  the  growth  rate  is  determined  by  the  population  growth  
rate   (assumed   to   be   equivalent   to   the   growth   rate   of   the   workforce)   with  
unchanging   income   per  worker.   Output   is   some   generic   good,  which   can   be  
used   for   consumption   and   production.   Hence,   economic   units   must   be  
household-­‐‑firms,   allocating   income   per   head   between   consumption   and  
savings.  There  is  no  money  and  therefore  no  nominal  prices  in  the  basic  model  
(see  Solow,  1956).    
While   orthodox   Keynesian   thought,   at   that   time,   was   more   critical   in   its  
assessment   of   the   economy’s   ability   to   run   smoothly   without   government  
intervention,   it  did  not  give  much  more  attention   to   financial   institutions  and  
transactions   than   its   neoclassical   counterpart.   In   fact,   orthodox   Keynesian  
                                                                                                 
3  A  similar  growth  model  was  put  forward  by  Domar.    
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growth   models   often   used   some   version   of   the   Solow-­‐‑Swan   framework   (see  
Stein,   1970   for  an  overview  of  monetary  growth  models  dominant  during   the  
1950s  and  60s).  
A  major  point  of  criticism  towards  orthodox  macro  models  was  their  excessive  
aggregation  and  simplification  (Gurley  &  Shaw,  1960).  Thus,   John  Gurley  and  
Edward   Shaw   argued   that   the   aggregation   of   economic   sectors   becomes   a  
severe   problem   when   money   in   the   economy   is   not   only   outside   money,  
meaning   fiat   money   issued   by   the   monetary   authorities,   but   also   (and  
potentially   mainly)   inside   money   issued   by   commercial   banks   against   other  
parties’  debt.    
It  is  important  to  note  here  that  the  concept  of  inside  money  accepts  commercial  
banks’  ability   to   issue  money  ex  nihilo,   that   is,   the  endogeneity  of  money.  The  
idea  that  banks  create  money  was  present  in  economic  theory  (across  schools  of  
thought)   until   the   1960s   (Chick,   2005).   Thereafter,   it   was   purged   as   it   was  
incompatible   with   the   orthodox   monetarist   conviction   that   the   state   alone  
determines  the  money  supply.      
Since   inside   money   –   and   one   should   add   financial   instruments   here   –   is  
someone’s  asset  while  simultaneously  figuring  as  someone  else’s  liability,  gross  
rather   than   net   (aggregated)   positions   are   important   in   the   macro   economy.  
Otherwise,  money   and   financial   instruments   are   netted   out   on   the   aggregate  
balance  sheet.  Therefore,  Gurley  and  Shaw  (1960)  advocated  a  prominent  role  
for   flow  of   funds  and   sectoral   analyses,   since   they  are   the  only   tools   that   can  
reveal  the  importance  of  the  financial  sector.    
Today   this   criticism  appears   very   intuitive   given   large  volumes   of   household  
debt  matched  by  corporate  savings  in  many  advanced  economies.  Considering  
the  aggregated  balance  sheet  for  the  economy  (or  the  private  sector),   this  debt  
disappears  because   it   is  balanced  by  private  assets.  Nevertheless,  households’  
large   debt   burden   has   had   a   profound   impact   on   these   advanced   economies,  
reducing  consumption  expenditure  while  dampening  economic  growth.  Gurley  
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and  Shaw   (1960)  did  not  discuss   the   implications  of   changes   in  private-­‐‑sector  
financial   stocks   (such   as   household   debt)   for   real   (rather   than   financial)  
economic   activity.   Their   motivation   seemed   to   be   an   appraisal   of   monetary  
policy,  against  the  consensus  of  their  times  that  fiscal  policy  should  be  the  main  
policy   tool.   Significant   household   savings   and   indebtedness   is   a  more   recent  
phenomenon,  which  excuses  this  omission.      
5.1.1.3.  Introducing  real  balances  
In  the  absence  of  a  disaggregated  approach,  money  and  monetary  phenomena  
could   only   be   introduced   into   the   mainstream   Solow-­‐‑Swan   model   in   a   very  
clumsy   way,   namely   through   the   concept   of   real   balances.   Money   balances  
were  assumed  to  be  held  by  household-­‐‑firms  in  the  model.  If  prices  are  flexible  
and   markets   perfectly   competitive,   if   inflation   expectations   are   rational,   if  
government   purchases   do   not   alter   relative   demand   for   consumption   and  
investment,   and  without   the  money   illusion,  money  would   be   neutral   in   the  
sense   that   there   is   no   impact   on   real   variables   from   inflation   or   deflation  
(Gurley  &  Shaw,  1960).    
In  the  neoclassical  model  with  money  neutrality,  issuance  of  additional  money  
by   the   government   results   in   a   rising   price   level,  which   erodes   real   balances  
held  in  the  economy.  Consequently,  the  real  balances  of  households  and  firms  
fall  below  desired  levels,  and  households  demand  additional  money,  restoring  
their  equilibrium  levels  of  real  balances.  The  extraordinary  result  here  is  that  in  
the   face   of   inflation  households  will  want   to   hold  more  nominal  money   than  
before  the  deterioration  of  their  currency’s  purchasing  power.    
In  contrast,  in  monetary  growth  models  commonly  discussed  during  the  1960s  
(Stein,   1970),   money   is   mostly   not   neutral   because   the   very   restrictive  
conditions  outlined  above  do  not  hold.  Thus,  with  rising  inflation  the  price  level  
would  grow,  eroding  households’  real  balances,  which  would  result  in  reduced  
consumption   expenditure   because   of   deteriorating   household   wealth.  
Conversely,   deflation   would   increase   household   wealth,   resulting   in   higher  
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consumption.  This  is  the  income  effect  of  changing  real  balances.  These  results  
are  weakened  if  money  present   in   the  economy  is  mainly   inside  money,  since  
any  positive  wealth   effect  here   also  generates   a   corresponding  negative   effect  
onto  the  debtor  (Stein,  1970).    
Considering   non-­‐‑financial   firms   in   the   model,   their   investment   is   allocated  
between  capital  goods  and  real  balances.  Hence,  if  money  balances  are  growing  
in  real  value,  firms  might  have  an  incentive  to  shift  investment  from  capital  to  
financial  paper  (such  as  government  bonds,  for  example,  as  suggested  by  James  
Tobin,   1965).   This   is   the   substitution   effect.   In   Keynesian   monetary   growth  
models  of   the  1950s  and  60s,   the   substitution  effect  played  an   important   role,  
demonstrating   that  high   interest   rates   can  be  detrimental   to  economic  growth  
since   they   can   subdue   capital   investment   (Tobin,   1965).   By   contrast,   in  
neoclassical  and  monetarist  models   the  substitution  effect   is  offset  by  a  strong  
income   effect,   resulting   in   an   overall   positive   growth   impact   of   rising   real  
balances.    
The  introduction  of  real  balances  in  the  monetary  growth  model  appears  more  
aimed  at  appraising  the  importance  of  monetary  policy  than  at  the  significance  
of   the   financial   system   as   a   whole.   Even   Gurley   and   Shaw’s   critical   work  
(Gurley  &  Shaw,  1960)  primarily  demonstrates  that  money  matters,  because,  if  
inside   and   outside  money   co-­‐‑exist,  monetary   policy   can   change   the   financial  
portfolios  of  firms  and  households  (which  are  assumed  to  hold  outside  money  
alongside   financial   paper).   This   upsets   the   initial   equilibrium   because   the  
relationship   between   outside   and   inside  money  might   have   changed.   In   this  
situation,   households   would   strive   to   re-­‐‑establish   their   desired   financial  
portfolios   (and   the   initial   ratio   of   money   to   financial   paper),   triggering  
inflationary   or   deflationary   dynamics   for   the   relevant   financial   asset   classes.  
Importantly,   Gurley   and   Shaw   (1960)   argued   that   price   rigidities   or   other  
market  imperfections  are  not  necessary  to  show  these  results.      
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5.1.2. The ‘financial repression’ hypothesis and its critique 
5.1.2.1.  Shaw’s  and  McKinnon’s  work  
Shaw’s  (1973)  work  laid  the  foundation  for  the  ‘financial  repression’  hypothesis,  
which   is   prominently   associated   with   his   and  McKinnon’s   (1973)   name.   The  
‘financial  repression’  hypothesis  states  that,  contrary  to  Keynesian  orthodoxy,  it  
is  not  too  high  but  too  low  interest  rates  that  dampen  capital  investment.  Their  
hypothesis  was  developed  in  the  context  of  developing  economies,  which  were  
assumed  to  have  fragmented  and  underdeveloped  financial  systems.    
Shaw   (1973)   and   McKinnon   (1973)   explicitly   attacked   Keynes’s   call   for   the  
euthanasia  of  the  rentier  (Keynes,  1936)  and  Tobin’s  warning  (Tobin,  1965)  that  
physical   capital   competes   with   financial   instruments   that   serve   as   store   of  
value,   that   is   the   substitution   effect   explained   above.   Crucially,   government  
intervention  into  the  financial  sector  through  interest  rate  ceilings  and  sectoral  
credit   allocations   arguably   distorted   the   price   mechanism,   allocating  
investment   expenditure   into   the   wrong   projects   and   resulting   in   (too   much)  
inefficient  investment.    
While  Shaw  (1973)   stressed   the   importance  of   financial   institutions   in  pooling  
surplus  household  savings  and  channelling  them  to  investing  firms,  McKinnon  
believed   that   in   developing   economies   economic   units   (‘household-­‐‑firms’)  
financed   investment   internally.   In   both   versions   of   the   ‘financial   repression’  
hypothesis  the  financial  sector  has  the  role  of  mobilising  savings  for  investment  
purposes,   thereby   accelerating   economic   growth.   The   difference   is   that   in  
Shaw’s   model   higher   deposit   rates   increase   households’   savings,   which   are  
subsequently   used   to   extend   credit   to   investing   companies.   This   is   the   debt-­‐‑
intermediation   view   of   finance   according   to   Shaw   (1973).   In   McKinnon’s  
version   household-­‐‑firms   also   increase   saving   which   they   can   then   use  
themselves   for   future   investment.  While   Shaw   suggested   that   higher   interest  
rates   would   increase   economic   growth   due   to   rising   investment   volumes,   in  
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McKinnon’s  view  accelerated  growth  was  not  merely  achieved  through   larger  
investment  volumes  but  through  increased  efficiency  of  investment  projects.    
According   to   McKinnon,   household-­‐‑firms   often   invest   in   inefficient   projects  
because   they   lack   alternative   means   of   saving.   In   consequence,   higher   long-­‐‑
term   profits   might   be   foregone   because   firms   cannot   afford   to   accumulate  
sufficient   finance   necessary   for   technological   upgrading.   Instead   these   firms  
keep  on  expanding  existing  (backward  and  inefficient)  production  capacity  out.    
Additionally,  a  low  interest  rate  might  result  in  capital-­‐‑intensive  production  in  
developing  economies,  which  tend  to  have  an  abundant  labour  force.  The  result  
is   the  adoption  of   inadequate  production   techniques  and  high  unemployment  
due   to   distorted   interest   rates.   Therefore,   McKinnon   stressed   the   impact   of  
higher   interest   rates  on  economic   efficiency.  This   is   sometimes  also   called   the  
total  factor  productivity  channel  (Ang,  2008).  
In   this   sense,   McKinnon   was   mostly   preoccupied   with   the   preservation   of  
wealth  as  the  main  function  of  the  financial  system  in  the  economy.  Facilitating  
investment   becomes   a   mere   consequence   of   wealth   preservation,   just   like  
investment   appears   a   mere   consequence   of   savings   in   much   of   mainstream  
economic  thought.    
Shaw’s   view   on   finance   in   the  macro   economy   has   become   today’s   standard  
textbook   approach:   the   simplest   understanding   of   the   role   of   financial  
institutions   that   is   offered   in   mainstream   economic   textbooks   (Mishkin   &  
Eakins,  2012)  is  that  of  financial  intermediaries.  In  the  macro  economy  financial  
institutions   –   be   they   financial   markets   or   banks   –   intermediate   between  
households  and  non-­‐‑financial  firms.  While  the  former  are  believed  to  generate  a  
financial   surplus,   the   latter   are   characterised   as   deficit   sector,   not   capable   of  
retaining   sufficient   earnings   to   finance   all   desired   corporate   investment.  
Financial   institutions   then   simply   channel   surplus   savings   towards   the  deficit  
sector.    
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5.1.2.2.  McKinnon-­‐‑Shaw  financial  development  models  and  policy  
recommendations  
Being   familiar   with   the   complex   and   fragmented   nature   of   developing  
economies,  neither  Shaw  nor  McKinnon  formalised  their  views  on  finance  and  
development.  A  range  of  formal  models  was  subsequently  developed  by  other  
economists   and   became   known   as   McKinnon-­‐‑Shaw   financial   development  
models   (see   mainly   Kapur,   Mathieson,   Gablis   and   Fry   as   discussed   by   Fry,  
1988).  In  the  process,  the  core  of  the  ‘financial  repression’  hypothesis  seemed  to  
be   reduced   to   a   loanable   funds   argument   (see   especially   figure   IV.1   in   Shaw,  
1973,  p.   82  and   figure  1.4.   in  Fry,   1988,  p.   16).   In   this   framework,   supply  and  
demand   of   loanable   funds,   meaning   the   supply   of   savings   and   demand   for  
credit,   yield   an   equilibrium   interest   rate.   Interest   rate   ceilings,   as   adopted   by  
many   developing   economies   after   de-­‐‑colonisation   in   their   efforts   to   promote  
industrial   investment,  would   impede   the  efficient  allocation  of   loanable   funds  
through  the  price  mechanism,  if  set  below  the  equilibrium  interest  rate.  
The   loanable   funds   theory   does,   at   least   on   the   face   of   it,   appear   to   be   the  
dominant   financial   framework   in   much   of   development   economics.   The  
founding   father   of   the   discipline   –   Lewis   (1954)   –   stressed   the   importance   of  
increasing  saving  rates  in  developing  societies  in  order  to  boost  investment  and  
push   development.   The   two-­‐‑gap   model,   which   is   based   on   a   simple  
rearrangement  of  the  national  accounting  identity,  stresses  the  foreign  exchange  
and   the   saving   gaps   as   constraints   to   growth   and  development.   The  Harrod-­‐‑
Domar  model,  in  its  simplified  policy  application,  has  been  used  to  argue  that  
higher   saving   rates   are   required   to   increase   growth.  Hence,   there   is   a   strong  
conviction   in   ‘old’   development   economics   that   it   is   savings   that   cause  
investment.   Lewis   (1954),   in   fact,   explicitly   rejected   Keynesian   (alongside  
neoclassical)  thought  as  analytical  framework  for  developing  countries.  Keynes,  
so  Lewis  argued,  assumed  the  abundance  of  capital  and  land,  which  would  be  
an  incorrect  characterisation  for  developing  economies.  
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Based   on   the   simplified  McKinnon-­‐‑Shaw  model,   the   consensus   emerged   that  
low   real   interest   rates   were   the   actual   impediment   to   growth   in   developing  
countries,  while  ‘investment  opportunities  were  abound  here’  (Fry,  1988,  p.  19).  
This  view  became  especially  popular  over  the  1970s  when  high  inflation  rates  in  
many   advanced   and  developing   economies   resulted   in   low   real   interest   rates  
given  fixed  nominal  interest  rate  caps.  This  was  believed  to  dampen  investment  
and  growth  because   low  real   interest  would  discourage  savings.   Interestingly,  
even   the   proponents   of   the   ‘financial   repression’   argument   had   to   admit   that  
empirical   studies   showed  a  very  weak   response  of   saving   rates   to   changes   in  
interest   rates   (Shaw,   1973,   Fry,   1988).   Nevertheless,   it   was   suggested   that  
financial   repression   contributed   to   the   fragmentation   of   financial   markets   in  
developing   economies,   reducing   household   saving   in   general   (McKinnon,  
1973).  
The   prescribed   policy   response  was   financial   liberalisation.   Lifting   repressive  
government  policies  and  allowing  market  forces  to  mobilise  and  allocate  credit  
would   allegedly   result   in   higher   growth   rates   due   to   strengthened   financial  
intermediation  (à  la  Shaw)  and/or  better  utilisation  of  savings  (à  la  McKinnon).  
This  process   of   financial  development   is   generally   called   financial  deepening,  
meaning   the   accelerated   growth   of   money   and   credit   volumes   in   relation   to  
GDP  growth.  To  summarise  the  argument  in  Shaw’s  words:  
‘The  essence  of  financial  liberalization  and  deepening  is  release  of  real  rates  of  
interest   to   disclose   the   scarcity   of   savings   and   to   stimulate   saving,   to   raise  
accessible   rates   of   return   on   investment,   and   to   discriminate  more   effectively  
between  investments’  (Shaw,  1973,  p.  77).  
5.1.2.3.  Criticisms  of  the  ‘financial  repression’  hypothesis  
The  McKinnon-­‐‑Shaw  type  financial  development  models  were  mainly  criticised  
from  two  camps.  On  the  one  hand,  so-­‐‑called  new  or  neo-­‐‑structuralists  argued  
that  after  financial  liberalisation  growth  in  formal  credit  could  come  at  the  cost  
of   vanishing   informal   sector   credit,   shrinking   the   total   volume   of   external  
finance  available  for  investment  purposes  (van  Wijnbergen,  1983).  On  the  other  
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hand,   the   New   Keynesian   school   warned   that   asymmetric   information   and  
other   market   failures   could   result   in   credit   rationing   regardless   of   legislated  
interest   rate   ceilings   (Stiglitz   &  Weiss,   1981).   The   latter   view   is   prevalent   in  
arguments  on  the  role  of  finance  in  development  until  today.    
Both   criticisms  did  not   break  with   the   fundamental   assumption   that   financial  
markets   and   institutions   operate   in   a   loanable   funds   framework.   Hence,   the  
most  prominent  role  assigned  to  finance  in  the  macro  economy  remained  one  of  
financial   (or,   using   Shaw'ʹs   terminology,  debt)   intermediation,   in  which  banks  
and   the   capital   market   channel   surplus   funds,   believed   to   be   saved   by  
households,   towards   non-­‐‑financial   firms   investing   in   production.   The   current  
mainstream   view   is   essentially   the   same,   complicated   by   the  monitoring   and  
risk  management  duties  of  financial  intermediaries.  
The  credit  rationing  argument  was  most  influentially  put  forward  by  Stiglitz  &  
Weiss  (1981).  In  a  formal  principle-­‐‑agent  model  the  authors  showed  that  credit  
volumes  might  not  be   constrained  by   ‘repressive’  government   intervention   in  
the   financial   markets,   but   by   limited   information   combined   with   risk.   If   the  
quality  of  borrowers  cannot  be  observed,  a  rise  in  interest  rates  in  response  to  
excess  demand  for  credit   results   in  adverse  selection,  meaning   that  borrowers  
with   safe   investment   projects  will   withdraw   leaving   only   risky   clients   in   the  
credit  market:  
‘Increasing   interest   rates   or   increasing   collateral   requirements   could   increase  
the  riskiness  of  the  bank’s  loan  portfolio,  either  by  discouraging  safer  investors,  
or   by   inducing   borrowers   to   invest   in   riskier   projects,   and   therefore   could  
decrease  the  bank’s  profits’  (Stiglitz  &  Weiss,  1981,  p.  408).    
Hence,   increasing   interest   rates   do   not   linearly   correspond   to   rising   bank  
profits.   Stiglitz   &   Weiss   (1981)   argued   that   the   bank’s   expected   returns   as  
function   of   the   interest   rate   charged   are   in   fact   an   inverted   U-­‐‑curve.   This  
depends   on   the   assumption   that   higher   interest   rates  will   increasingly   attract  
more   risky   (and   less   risk-­‐‑averse)  borrowers,   for  whom  profits  will  be   large   in  
the  case  of  success.  Higher  (potential)  profitability,  however,  comes  at  the  cost  
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of  a  higher  probability  of  failure.  Thus,  banks  by  themselves  might  ration  credit  
at   an   interest   rate   below   the  market-­‐‑clearing  one   (rather   than  being   forced   to  
ration  it  through  nominal  interest  rate  caps)  in  order  to  avoid  adverse  selection.  
Once   again,   the   volume   of   credit   available   to   the   economy   is   assumed   to   be  
determined  by  the  stock  of  loanable  funds.  More  generally,  the  proposed  model  
is   a  mere   extension  of   the   loanable   funds  model  because   it   simply   introduces  
one  market  imperfection  (namely  risk)  into  the  framework.  Hence,  without  risk  
under   perfect   information   the   interest   rate   mechanism   could   in   fact   allocate  
savings   efficiently   to   the  most  profitable   investment  projects,   as   suggested  by  
Shaw  and  McKinnon.    
The  imperfect  information  view  on  financial  intermediation,  therefore,  holds  on  
to   the   loanable   funds   framework.   It   is   implied   that   loanable   funds   are  
exogenously   given   to   the   bank   and   cannot   be   influenced   directly.   Stiglitz   &  
Weiss  (1981)  state  that  an  increase  in  the  supply  of  loanable  funds  would  raise  
the   volume   of   available   credit   at   the   given   interest   rate.   In   their   influential  
paper   it   remains   unclear   how   the   supply   can   be   increased.   Typically,   the  
presumption   is   that   either   monetary   policy   (raising   money   supply)   or  
household   behaviour   (raising   the   saving   rate)   can   increase   the   supply   of  
loanable  funds.  
5.1.3. The emergence of the current consensus 
5.1.3.1.  Financial  deepening  revived  
The  current  consensus  on  the  role  of   finance   in   the  economy  is  shaped  by  the  
idea   of   asymmetric   information.  However,   the   legacy  of   ‘financial   repression’  
and  especially  the  policy  recommendations  linked  to  the  hypothesis  also  figure.  
This  is  particularly  clear  in  the  finance-­‐‑development  nexus,  which  is  discussed  
next.    
Levine  &  King’s  work  in  the  1990s  revived  decades  of  theoretical  debate  around  
financial  deepening,  and  sparked  a  large  econometric  literature  on  the  impact  of  
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financial  development  on  growth.  The  dominant  policy  recommendation  of  this  
research  was   in   the   spirit   of   the   ‘financial   repression’   hypothesis,   advocating  
the  liberalisation  of  financial  markets  as  a  growth-­‐‑enhancing  policy.  This  was  in  
line   with   the   shift   in   development   thinking   towards   neoliberal   Washington  
Consensus  policies   advocating  no   (and  with   the  post-­‐‑Washington  Consensus,  
limited)  state  intervention  during  the  1980s.      
The  revived  financial  deepening  story  was  complicated  by  the   introduction  of  
imperfect   information  and  other  market   frictions,   such  as   transaction  costs.   In  
fact,  it  has  been  argued  that  the  existence  of  these  imperfections  is  the  origin  of  
financial  institutions  (see  Santomero,  1984)  since  under  perfect  information  and  
with   costless   contract   enforcement   individuals   could   arguably   lend   directly  
among   themselves.   Given   market   imperfections   financial   institutions   are  
thought  to  have  the  following  functions  in  the  economy  (Levine,  2005):  
1. Produce  information  and  allocate  scarce  funds;  
2. Monitor  investment  and  exert  control  over  corporations;  
3. Handle  risk;  
4. Mobilise  savings;  
5. Facilitate  trade  of  goods  and  services;  
Fundamentally,   the   financial   system   is   still   perceived   as   an   intermediary  
between  households  who  save  and  non-­‐‑financial  firms  who  invest.  Therefore,  it  
is   meant   to   mobilise   savings   (function   4),   which   it   then   allocates   efficiently  
through   the   price   mechanism,   using   information   that   financial   institutions  
collect  about  borrowers  (function  1).  This  is  necessary  because  the  interest  rate  
itself   cannot   identify   the   most   profitable   investment   projects   given   risk  
(function  3).  Due  to  moral  hazard  information  generation  is  not  only  an  ex  ante  
job,  but  has  to  be  carried  out  throughout  the  investment  process  (function  2).    
Function  3  was  upgraded  in  importance  in  the  late  1990s/early  2000s  (see  Allen  
&   Santomero,   1997   and   Allen   &   Santomero,   2001)   because   the   imperfect  
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information  story  as  rational  for  financial  intermediation  was  losing  credibility.  
Due   to   improvements   in   information   technology   and   advances   in   financial  
deregulation,   transaction   costs   and   information   asymmetries   in   financial  
intermediation  were  reduced  since  the  1970s  (Allen  &  Santomero,  2001).  During  
the   same   period   the   size   and   profits   of   the   financial   industry   increased.   If  
market   frictions   were   the  main   justification   for   financial   institutions   to   exist,  
these   developments   were   puzzling.   The   handling   of   risk   (reducing   and  
smoothing  it)  was  therefore  put  at  the  centre  of  the  raison  d’être  of  the  finance  
industry.          
This  more  complex  perspective  on  finance  rests  –  despite  the  complications  –  on  
the   loanable   funds   model   of   financial   institutions,   since   credit   rationing   is  
defined   in   relation   to   a   riskless   loanable   funds   market   as   explained   above.4  
Given   these   five   functions,   the   unrestrained   activity   of   financial  markets   and  
financial   deepening   in   Shaw   and   McKinnon’s   spirit   were   long   seen   as  
guarantors  of  growth   (see  von  Pischke,   1991  and  von  Pischke,   1997).  The   five  
functions   of   the   financial   system   listed   above   are   regularly   cited   as   the  
consensus   view   on   how   modern   financial   markets   work   and   why   they   are  
important  (see  Stiglitz,  1998;  Trichet,  2010;  and  Lapavitsas,  2013).  
5.1.3.2.  Today’s  consensus  in  historical  perspective  
Therefore,  the  loanable  funds-­‐‑cum-­‐‑imperfect  information  view  on  finance  is  the  
current   consensus   in   economic   thinking   and   policy.   Interestingly,   within   the  
mainstream  discourse  Keynesian  economic  teaching  is  often  seen  as  the  reason  
why  finance  has  not  been  attributed  a  more  prominent  role  in  (macroeconomic)  
models   until   recently.   The   cautious   attitude   of  Keynesian   economists   such   as  
                                                                                                 
4  The  understanding  of  financial   institutions  such  as  banks  as  mere  intermediaries  for  
loanable  funds  has  clearly  not  changed.  Allen  &  Santomero  (2001,  p.  273),  for  instance,  
stress   that:   ‘[a]t   the   center,   of   course,   financial   systems   perform   the   function   of  
reallocating   the   resources  of   economic  units  with   surplus   funds   (savers)   to   economic  
units  with  funding  needs  (borrowers)’.    
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Tobin  towards  finance  has  been  interpreted  as  a  neglect  of  financial  structures  
in  Keynesian   thought   in   general   (see   von  Pischke,   1997;   Stiglitz,   1998).  While  
the   criticism   is   valid   for   some   parts   of   Keynesian   teaching   (most   notably   so-­‐‑
called   orthodox   Keynesianism,   which   was   mainstream   economic   thinking  
during  the  1950s  and  1960s),  it  would  be  incorrect  to  attribute  it  to  other  strands  
of  Keynesianism  (especially  the  post-­‐‑Keynesian  school).  Joan  Robinson  -­‐‑  widely  
regarded   to   be   the   mother   of   post-­‐‑Keynesian   thinking   –   is   often   attacked  
fiercely  for  allegedly  diminishing  the  role  of  finance.    
In   the   mainstream   discourse,   Robinson’s   work   on   finance   has   often   been  
reduced   to   the   oft-­‐‑quoted   statement   that   ‘where   enterprise   leads,   finance  
follows’   (Robinson,   1954,   p.   86).   This   remark   was   stylised   into   ‘demand-­‐‑
following’   versus   ‘supply-­‐‑leading’   finance   by   Patrick   (1984[1966])   (see   also  
Arestis,   Nissanke,   &   Stein,   2005).   A   heated   debate   on   whether   finance   was  
secondary  to  development  was  triggered.    
A   careful   reading   of   Robinson'ʹs   essay   'ʹGeneralizing   the   General   Theory'ʹ  
(Robinson,  1954),  which  contains   the  controversial  phrase,   shows   that   she  did  
not  intend  to  diminish  the  role  of  financial  structures  in  the  economy,  and  even  
less  so  in  economic  development.  Robinson  stressed  that  finance  might  well  be  
a   constraint  on  growth.  However,   financial  and  more  general   impediments   to  
entrepreneurial  activity  usually  coincide.  Hence,  during  economic  downswings  
both   financing   opportunities   as   well   as   entrepreneurial   energy   vanish,   since  
aggregate  demand  is  dampened.    
Hence,  Robinson'ʹs   fault   lay  merely   in   expressing   her   doubts   that   finance   is   a  
major   bottleneck   for   growth   in   advanced   economies.   This   unleashed   a  
vehement  reaction  by  mainstream  development  thinkers  of  her  time.  The  clash  
between   the   post-­‐‑Keynesian   and   the   mainstream   view   on   financial  
development   originates   from   their   fundamentally   different   understanding   of  
the   savings-­‐‑investment   relationship.   While   savings   are   a   precondition   for  
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investment   in   neoclassical   and   other   mainstream   thought,   they   are,   to   the  
contrary,   the   consequence   of   investment   for   post-­‐‑Keynesians.   This   is  
particularly   visible   in   Kalecki'ʹs   work   on   financing   development,   as   will   be  
discussed  in  the  following  section.  
Robinson’s   argument   is   attacked   today   and,   it   seems,   increasingly  
misconstrued.   Citing   the   phrase   'ʹwhere   enterprise   leads,   finance   follows'ʹ  
Trichet  (2010),  at  the  time  the  head  of  the  European  Central  Bank,  attributed  the  
concept   of   money   as   a   ‘veil’   to   her.   This   reading   of   Robinson’s   work   by   a  
mainstream   economist   is   especially   surprising,   as   the   loanable   funds-­‐‑cum-­‐‑
imperfect   information   view   is   itself   strongly   reductionist   with   respect   to  
finance.   Finance   only   appears   to   play   a   prominent   role   during   economic  
downswings   and   in   economically   less   advanced   societies.   Over   the   business  
cycle   financial   institutions   and   structures   presumably   transmit   and   amplify  
exogenous   shocks,   causing   swings   in   economic  activity   (see  Gertler,   1988  and  
Bernanke,  Gertler,  &  Gilchrist,   1999).   Similarly,   the   fragmentation   of   financial  
markets  in  developing  economies  is  believed  to  be  a  sign  and  an  impediment  to  
growth  and  development  (von  Pischke,  1991).  Much  less  is  said  about  the  role  
of   the   financial   system   in   generating   these   shocks   (somewhat   by   definition,  
since  they  are  exogenous).    
The   understanding   of   financial   institutions   in   developing   economies   also  
appears   incomplete.  While  developing  economies  are  often   lazily   classified  as  
financially   backward   and   therefore   underdeveloped,   there   is   ample   evidence  
that  formal  and  informal  structures  interact,  feeding  off  each  other,  rather  than  
informal  finance  being  a  mere  sign  of  backwardness  (see,   for   instance,  Mahdi,  
forthcoming).   Without   a   positive   definition   of   what   financial   institutions   do  
(beyond   collecting   information   to   avoid   market   failures)   our   ability   to  
understand  these  interactions  is  limited.  
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Hence,  even  though  it   is  repeatedly  stressed  that  financial  markets  are  unique  
in  the  sense  that  they  do  not  work  like  any  other  market  (see  Stiglitz,  1998)  it  is  
never   quite   clear   what   constitutes   this   uniqueness,   and   what   the   role   of   the  
financial   system   is   apart   from   taking   care   of   market   frictions.   This   is  
particularly   the   case   since   financial   markets   and   transactions   are   typically  
modelled  like  any  other  principle-­‐‑agent  problem.  While  Stiglitz  (1998)  stressed  
the   specificities   of   financial   markets   he   failed   to   spell   out   the   specificities,  
emphasising   at   the   same   time   that   a  wide   range   of   economic   activities   (from  
agricultural   sharecropping   to   employment)   can   be   understood   as   principle-­‐‑
agent  problems   (Stiglitz  &  Weiss,  1981).  Thus,  how  can   financial   relationships  
be  unique  while  at   the  same   time  methodologically  being   treated  no  different  
from  most  other  economic  phenomena?  This  does  appear  a  difficult  to  reconcile  
contradiction.  
5.1.3.3.  Mainstream  finance  theory  after  the  financial  crisis  
Since   the   causes   of   the   exogenous   shocks   that   trigger   business   cycle   swings  
according   to   much   of   mainstream   theory   often   remain   unexplored   (as   do  
financial  markets   in  developing  economies)   finance  still   can  be  easily  reduced  
to   a   ‘veil’.   Financial   structures   then   are   only   important   during   economically  
exceptional   times,   such   as   the   global   financial   crisis,   and  might   even   then   be  
reduced   to   exogenous   (and   by   implication   inexplicable)   shocks   (see,   for  
example,  Ohanian,  2010).    
Similarly,   this   reductionist   view   of   financial   structures   can   result   in   the  
simplistic   argument   that   increased   financial   deepening   will   almost  
automatically  contribute  to  accelerated  economic  growth  and  development  (see  
von   Pischke,   1991).   Despite   frequent   financial   crises   in   developing   and  
emerging   economies  particularly  during   the   1990s   and   2000s,   this  was   in   fact  
the  dominant  view  among  mainstream  economists  and  policy  makers  until  the  
financial   crisis   of   2007-­‐‑09.   Of   course,   there   were   some   dissenters   (see,   for  
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instance,   Ram,   1999;   Easterly,   Islam,   &   Stiglitz,   2001;   Arestis,   Demetriades,  
Fattouh,   &   Mouratidis,   2002)   and   empirical   work   supporting   this   view   was  
plagued   by   endogeneity   and   other   technical   problems   (Ang,   2008),   but   the  
argument   that   financial   development  was   good   for   growth  was   dominant.   It  
took   the   global   financial   crisis   (which   unlike   previous   crises   mainly   affected  
advanced  economies)  for  a  major  rethinking.      
Since  then  a  new  consensus  has  emerged,  which  views  the  interaction  between  
financial   sector   deepening   and   development   as   complex   and   not   always  
supportive  of  growth   (Stiglitz  &  Ocampo,  2008).   In   fact,   it  was  suggested   that  
‘too   much   finance’   (Arcand,   Berkes,   &   Panizza,   2012,   p.   1)   could   be   bad   for  
growth,   meaning   that   financial   deepening   after   a   certain   threshold   can   slow  
down  growth  (Shen  &  Lee,  2006;  Cecchetti  &  Kharroubi,  2012).  Given  the  role  
that   household   debt   and   leverage   of   financial   companies   had   played   in   the  
outbreak   and   propagation   of   the   2007-­‐‑09   financial   crisis   any   other   consensus  
would  have  been  difficult  to  attain.    
This   reorientation   of   mainstream   thought   towards   a   more   critical   stance   on  
finance   appears   to   mainly   revive   Tobin-­‐‑type   concerns   that   financial   activity  
diverts  limited  financial  funds  from  productive  and  efficient  use,  resulting  in  a  
misallocation   of   funds.   Cecchetti   &   Kharroubi   (2012,   2015)   of   the   Bank   for  
International   Settlement   (BIS)   argue   that   the   financial   sector   might   have   a  
detrimental   impact   on   the   economy,   since   it   not   only   drains   financial   funds  
from   investment   opportunities,   but,   once   it   attains   a   certain   size,   also   draws  
talent  and  skills  from  employment  in  other  sectors  of  an  economy.  In  this  way  a  
bloated  financial  industry  can  reduce  productivity  and  economic  growth.  
The  idea  of  shiftability  of  a  limited  stock  of  loanable  funds  appears  to  resonate  
in  this  argument.  Hence,  we  remain  stuck  in  the  loanable  funds  framework.  In  
consequence,  much  of  mainstream  economic  analysis  does  not  assess   the   type  
or   purpose   of   credit,   but   instead   attempts   to   identify   a   numerical   threshold  
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above   which   credit   extension   might   become   damaging   to   growth.   The  
threshold  has  been  put  at  around  80-­‐‑100%  of  private  credit  to  GDP  (Cecchetti  &  
Kharroubi,  2012).  Numerical  thresholds  only  appear  to  make  sense  if  the  stock  
of  something  cannot  be  rapidly  expanded.  This  leads  us  to  the  role  of  financial  
markets   in   heterodox   thought,   which   will   be   discussed   in   the   next   section,  
where  money  and  credit  is  understood  to  be  endogenous  to  the  financial  system  
and,   thus,   not   strictly   limited   in   volume.   Here,   the   role   of   finance   in   the  
economy  is  seen  more  critically.    
Before   this   chapter   turns   to   heterodox   economic   theory,   one   remark  must   be  
added   here.   Maybe   surprisingly   to   some,   the   New   Neoclassical   Consensus,  
which  was   the  dominant  monetary   theory   framework  until   the   financial  crisis  
(Woodford,   2003)   and   potentially   beyond,   has   not   been   discussed   here  
explicitly,  yet.  This  has   the   simple   reason   that   the   framework  has   little   to   say  
about  the  interaction  between  the  financial  sector  and  non-­‐‑financial  firms.  The  
focus   instead   is   on   the   activities   of   the   central   bank   and  how   it   can  maintain  
price  stability.    
However,  as  documented  in  this  section,  the  global  financial  crisis  has  induced  
substantial  dynamism   into   the  mainstream  discussion  on   finance  with   critical  
voices   increasingly   being   heard.   A   recent   working   paper   by   the   Bank   of  
England’s   head   of   research,   Kumhof,   calls   the   dominant   view   that   banks   are  
merely   financial   intermediaries   into   question   (Jakab   &   Kumhof,   2015).   The  
paper   embraces   the   endogenous   money   approach,   even   citing   important  
heterodox   economists  whose  work  was   based   on   the   premise   of   endogenous  
money:   namely   Moore,   Graziani   and   Minsky.   Whether   the   economic  
mainstream  is  on  a  way  to  open  up  to  more  critical  economic  thinking  remains  
to  be  seen.            
Before  turning  to  the  heterodox  take  on  the  role  of  finance  in  the  economy  in  the  
following   section,   the   three   questions   posed   at   the   beginning   of   this   chapter  
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should   be   answered   for   orthodox   economic   thinking   in  way   of   summary:   (1)  
what   is   the   role   of   finance   in   the   economy?   (2)  What   (or   who)   drives   credit  
extension?  And   (3)  Where   is   the   agency   (power)   in   the   relationship   between  
finance  and  non-­‐‑financial  business?    
Three   (somewhat)   distinct   strands   of   mainstream   economics   have   been  
identified   as   they   developed   over   the   years:   (1)   the   post-­‐‑World   War   II  
orthodoxy   (which   refers   to  neoclassical   and  orthodox  Keynesian   thought),   (2)  
the   ‘financial   repression’  view  and  (3)   the  current  consensus,  which   is  heavily  
influenced  by  New  Keynesian  ideas.  Table  5.1.  provides  of  answers  to  the  three  
questions  by  sub-­‐‑strand  of  mainstream  economic  thought.    
Table 5.1. Summary of macro perspective on finance, mainstream economics  
      
Notably,   ideas  on   the   role  of   finance   in   the  economy  have  evolved  over   time,  
but   the  role  of   finance  remains   limited   to  an   intermediary  providing  a  wealth  
preserving   service   to   households   and   credit   to   investing   non-­‐‑financial   firms.  
The  function  of  risk  management  (necessitated  by  asymmetric  information  and  
other   market   frictions)   is   the   main   addition   to   financial   institutions’   role.  
However,  overall,   the  financial  sector  merely  carries  out  the  role  it   is  assigned  
by   market   forces   (that   is   competition),   while   non-­‐‑financial   business   is   all  
together   reactive.   If   competition   is   inhibited   or   some   other   form   of   market  
friction   exists,   financial   institutions   are   prevented   from   taking   on   their   role  
fully,  resulting  in  market  failures  (including  crises).    
Macroeconomic role 
of financial institutions
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Crucially,   in  the  orthodox  framework,   it   is  savings  that  determine  investment.  
Hence,  firms  might  intend  to  invest  but  are  at  the  mercy  of  the  available  credit  
in   the   economy   for   investment   expenditure   beyond   internal   financing.  
Ultimately,  it  is  households’  decisions  to  save  that  drive  credit  extension  in  this  
framework.   Therefore,   there   is   little   consideration   of   agency   (outside   of  
corporate  control  imposed  by  equity  markets,  for  instance)  in  the  finance-­‐‑(non-­‐‑
financial)  business  relationship.    
5.2. Financial markets in heterodox economic theory 
This  section   is  organised  around  two  economic   thinkers   that  until   today  exert  
the   most   prominent   influence   onto   heterodox   economics:   Marx   and   Keynes  
(sub-­‐‑sections   5.2.1.   and   5.2.2.).5   Consequently,   in   this   section   the   literature  
review  is  split  into  continental  European  contributions  starting  with  Marx  and  
stretching   up   to   Schumpeter,   and   a   subsequent   discussion   of   Keynes’s  
understanding   of   the   role   of   finance   in   the   economy   and   those   economists  
influenced  by  him.    
The   distinction   between   these   two   parts   is   not   always   clear-­‐‑cut   since   some  
important  writers   typically   identified   as  post-­‐‑Keynesians  have  been   impacted  
by  so-­‐‑called  German  ideas.  The  influence  of  Schumpeter  on  Minsky,  who  was  
his  PhD  student,   is  one  example.  Another  is  Kalecki’s  (albeit   limited)  work  on  
finance,   which   arguably   follows   a   German   tradition,   identifying   firms   as  
drivers  behind  credit  extension  rather  than  banks,  which  is  where  Keynes  put  
his   emphasis   (Toporowski,   2012).   More   current   developments   –   in   both,   the  
Marxist   and  post-­‐‑Keynesian   literature  –  are  discussed   in   the   third   sub-­‐‑section  
(part   5.2.3.).   This   will   cover   the   most   important   contributions   to   the  
financialisation   debate,   which   provides   insights   on   the   role   of   finance   in   the  
economy.    
                                                                                                 
5  Keynes  reportedly  had  very  little  knowledge  of  the  writings  by  his  German-­‐‑speaking  
contemporaries  (Garvy,  1975)  and  also  ‘never  managed  to  read  Marx’  (Robinson,  1973,  
p.  ix).      
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5.2.1. Marx and ‘German’ economic thought on finance 
This   section   reviews   continental   European   finance   theory,   starting  with  Marx  
and  his  followers,  covering  so-­‐‑called  German  monetary  theory  from  the  turn  of  
the  19th  century  (see  Ellis,  1934)  and  stretching  up  to  Schumpeter’s  work.  Given  
how  fruitful   financial   theorising  was  during   this  period,   the   following   review  
will   only   focus   on   the   most   interesting   theoretical   contributions,   which   can  
provide  answers  to  the  three  questions  outlined  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter.    
5.2.1.1.  Marx’s  and  Marxist  thought  on  finance  
Marx’s  thinking  is  a  deliberately  chosen  starting  point  since  he  was  the  first  to  
analyse  the  function  of  credit  in  the  capitalist  economy,  explicitly  distinguishing  
between  capitalist  credit  and  pre-­‐‑capitalist  forms  of  lending,  such  as  usury  and  
mercantile   credit.   However,   the   thrust   of   Marx’s   analysis   of   capitalist  
economies   was   formulated   before   important   institutional   changes   in   the  
financial  markets  of  continental  Europe  (such  as  the  wide-­‐‑spread  emergence  of  
the  joint  stock  company)  had  taken  place.6    
Marx   never   put   forward   a   complete   theory   of   credit   (de   Brunhoff,   1976).  His  
writings  on  the  capitalist   financial  system  were  merely  a  collection  of  notes  at  
the  point  of  his  death   in  1883,  painstakingly  assembled  into  volume  III  of  Das  
Kapital   by  Engels   and  published   in   1894.   Therefore,   ‘Marx’s   analyses   on   such  
points  as  the  banking  system  […]  are  more  stimuli  to  thought  than  constituent  
parts  of  a  complete  theory’  (de  Brunhoff,  1976,  p.  73).  Nevertheless,  de  Brunhoff  
contended   that   the  manner   in  which  Marx   left   out   credit   from  his   analysis   in  
volume  I  and  II  of  Das  Kapital  implicitly  reveals  his  understanding  of  credit  (de  
Brunhoff,  1976).    
For   Marx,   credit   (in   the   capitalist   economy)   existed   mainly   in   relation   to  
production.  This  manifested  itself  in  the  view  that  interest  was  not  a  reward  for  
                                                                                                 
6  According   to   Friedrich   Engels   (Marx  &   Engels,   1996[1894])  Marx’s   thoughts   on   the  
role  of  finance  in  the  capitalist  system  did  not  majorly  develop  after  1856.  
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abstinence   from   consumption   or   the   return   on   capital   goods,   but   rather   a  
mechanism   to   distribute   surplus   value   among   capitalists,   that   is,   mainly  
between   industrial   and   financial   capitalists.   Hence,   the   dominant   form   of  
capitalist  activity  for  Marx  was  production,  since  it  was  the  only  activity  which  
could  generate  surplus  value  through  the  exploitation  of   labour.   In  the  course  
of   production,   capitalist   credit   would   be   necessary   to   bring   about   the  
equalisation   of   the   profit   rate   across   the   economy,   to   reduce   the   cost   of  
circulation  and  also  to  allow  for  large-­‐‑scale  production  embodied  in  joint  stock  
companies  (Marx  &  Engels,  1996[1894],  chapter  27).    
Historically,  Marx  conducted  his  analysis  in  a  time  when  most  bank  credit  was  
extended  to  finance  circulating  capital   (Kowalik,  2012;  Argitis,  Evans,  Michell,  
&   Toporowski,   2014).   Since   stock   exchanges   and   limited   liability   companies  
only  gained   importance   in  most  European  countries   towards   the   latter  half  of  
the  19th  century  (Kindleberger,  1984),  the  element  of  long-­‐‑term  capital  markets  
in  Marx’s  analysis  had  to  be  developed  subsequently.  This  was  chiefly  done  by  
Hilferding  (Hilferding,  1947[1910]).    
In  Marx’s  writings,   the   banking   sector   pools   idle  money   in   the   economy   and  
mainly  advances  it  to  the  industrial  capitalists  who  use  it  to  finance  production.  
Banks,  however,  are  not  mere   intermediaries  but   there   is  an  element  of   credit  
creation.   Thus,  Marx’s   thought   –   importantly,   following   the   English   Banking  
School   of   Tooke   and   Fullarton   (Argitis   et   al.,   2014)   –   can   be   linked   to   the  
endogenous  money   theory.  The  ability  of   the   financial   system   to   create   credit  
contributes   to   business   cycles,   providing   cheap   credit   in   the   early   phases   of  
economic   expansion,   and   tightening   alongside   rising   labour   and   input   costs  
during  the  boom.  The  recession  is  brought  about  either  through  a  rise  in  interest  
rates,   or   through   eroding   net   profits   as   wage   and   input   costs   rise,   leaving  
capitalists  unable   to  meet   their  payment  commitments   (Argitis  et  al.,  2014).   In  
summary,   for   Marx   –   as   far   as   one   can   interpret   his   views   on   the   financial  
system  –  credit  is  driven  by  industrial  capitalists  and  their  production  needs.    
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Hilferding   importantly  advanced  Marx’s  writings  on   finance,   so  much  so   that  
his  Finance  Capital  (Hilferding,  1947[1910])   is  sometimes  labelled  as  volume  IV  
of  Das  Kapital  (Argitis  et  al.,  2014).  Crucially,  Hilferding  closely  followed  Marx’s  
thought   by   highlighting   the   origin   of   credit   in   production.   He   stressed   that  
credit   arrangements   first   emerged  where   capitalists   granted   each   other   trade  
credit.  Hilferding   recognised   that   the   importance  of  more   sophisticated  banks  
and   capital   markets   lay   in   their   ability   to   provide   long-­‐‑term   capital   for   the  
financing   of   investment   by   non-­‐‑financial   companies   (Kowalik,   2012).   Here,  
stock  markets  and  banks  can  smooth  economic  activity  because  they  return  idle  
capital,  or  hoards,  into  the  circular  flow  of  the  economy,  by  making  it  available  
to   other   industrial   capitalists.   As   stressed   in   chapter   2,   hoards   in   Marx’s  
analysis  were  both  the  inherent  by-­‐‑product  of  capitalist  production,  and  also  a  
potential  symptom  of  crisis.    
For  Hilferding,  the  financial  system  could  potentially  have  a  growth-­‐‑enhancing  
and  stabilising  effect  on  the  economy.  Companies  could  achieve  a  much  larger  
scale  of  production  much  quicker  when  raising  capital  in  equity  markets,  rather  
than   relying  on  gradual   and   slow  accumulation  by   individual   capitalists.  The  
emergence   of   the   joint   stock   company   during   the   19th   century   served   exactly  
this  purpose.7  Additionally,  large  German  banks  (increasingly  intertwined  with  
German   industry)   were   believed   to   stabilise   economic   activity   because   they  
pushed  for  cartelisation.    
Despite  these  important  roles  that  banks  played  in  Germany  at  the  time,  and  in  
Hilferding’s  understanding  of  capitalist  development,  he  saw  the  driving  force  
behind   credit   in   production.   Thus,   in   chapter   4   of   Finance   Capital,   Hilferding  
stated  that  the  quantity  of  money  advanced  (including  credit)  is  determined  by  
                                                                                                 
7  Industrial   capitalists   in   countries   like   Germany,   in   those   days   industrially   lagging  
behind   the   UK,   could   catch   up,   establishing   internationally   competitive   concerns  
particularly  in  heavy  industry  sectors  that  required  large  capital  investment  (Chandler,  
1994).  
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the  price  of  commodities  that  have  to  be  purchased  for  the  production  process.  
Production  drives  credit   in  Hilferding’s  writings,  which   is   little   surprising   for  
the  work  of  a  Marxist  thinker.  This  becomes  clear  in  his  explanation  of  inflation.    
The   Marxist   writer   who   is   most   eminently   linked   to   early   business   cycle  
analysis   is   Tugan-­‐‑Baranowsky8  (Mitchell,   1927).   Since   he   himself   assigned   an  
important   role   to   the   financial   markets   in   his   theory   of   cycle,   it   is   worth  
reviewing   his   work.   Tugan-­‐‑Baranowsky’s   book   Studien   zur   Theorie   und  
Geschichte  der  Handelskrisen  in  England   (The  History  and  Theory  of  Trade  Cycles  in  
England,  published   in  German   in  1901)  vehemently  argued  against   the  under-­‐‑
consumptionist  argument  of  his  time  that  shrinking  wages  undermine  capitalist  
activity,   resulting   in   crisis.  Using  Marx’s   schemes  of   reproduction  he   showed  
that  in  fact  capitalists’  profits  are  independent  of  workers’  consumption  as  long  
as  investment  spending  is  forthcoming.9    
Thus,   according   to   Tugan-­‐‑Baranowsky   (1901)   crises   are   the   result   of  
disproportional   investment   and   production   in   the   two   departments   –   the  
capital   goods   and   the   consumption   goods   department.   Therefore,  
overproduction  of  goods  is  never  overproduction  in  an  absolute  sense,  but  only  
makes   sense   in   relative   terms:   ‘Allgemeine   Überproduktion   ist   partielle  
Überproduktion’   (‘General   overproduction   is   partial   overproduction’,   Tugan-­‐‑
Baranowsky,   1901,   p.   7).   Hence,   while   stable   expansion   of   the   system   is  
possible,   if   the   right   relationship   between   consumer   and   capital   goods   is  
maintained,   such   a   growth   path   is   unlikely,   especially   once   money   is  
                                                                                                 
8  A   wide   range   of   different   spellings   of   Baranowsky’s   name   has   been   used   when  
translating   his   name   from   the   Cyrillic   into   the   Roman   alphabet.   Here   ‘Tugan-­‐‑
Baranowsky’  will  be  used  since  this  is  the  spelling  used  on  the  German  translation  of  
this  Theories  of  Trade  Cycles  published  in  1901,  which  was  the  earliest  translation  of  the  
book.  
9  This  point  can  be  found  again  in  Kalecki’s  profit  equation  where  capitalists’  profit  in  
aggregate  are  only  determined  by  their  investment  spending.    
   246  
introduced   into   the   analysis.   Thus,   while   production   decisions   bring   about  
economic  fluctuations,  they  are  exaggerated  by  money  and  capital  markets.    
On  the  one  hand,  financial  markets  can  boost  capitalist  activity,  since  credit  can  
create   demand.   On   the   other   hand,   financial   markets   and   credit   contribute  
towards   stronger   interconnectedness   of   individual   producers,   larger   price  
fluctuations   and   speculation.   As   pointed   out   by   Kowalik   (Kowalik,   2012),  
among   others,   Tugan-­‐‑Baranowsky’s   crisis   theory,   and   especially   the   role  
finance   plays   in   it,   is   not   very   elaborate.   It   appears   to   chiefly   rest   on   the  
observation   that   rentiers’   income   (from   financial   instruments   and   real   estate)  
does  not  fluctuate  as  much  over  the  cycle  as  that  of  industrial  capitalists.    
The   idea   is   that   a   pool   of   idle   money   builds   up   during   the   economic  
downswing,  putting  downward  pressure  on   interest   rates.  This   contributes   to  
the   economic   upswing.   Simultaneously,   however,   so-­‐‑called   ‘free   capital’   (freie  
Kapitalien,  in  German)  swell,  and  in  the  course  of  the  upswing  make  their  way  
as  credit   into  the  booming  industries.  This  encourages  speculation,  which  lays  
the  grounds  for  the  coming  crisis.  From  Tugan-­‐‑Baranowsky’s  (1901)  exposition,  
it  is  not  clear  what  exactly  the  transmission  mechanisms  behind  these  processes  
are.   In   a   rather   mechanistic   and   hardly   insightful   manner,   he   seemed   to  
understand   ‘free   capital’   and   credit   as   a   type   of   reservoir,   which   once   it   has  
reached  a  certain  level,  floods  all  industries,  leaving  the  economy  in  crisis.    
Abstracting   from  Tugan-­‐‑Baranowsky’s   simplistic   analysis,  Marx  and   the   chief  
Marxist   financial   theorist,   Hilferding,   can   be   categorised   as   adhering   to   an  
endogenous  money   tradition,   understanding   the   financial   sector   as   creator   of  
money.   Furthermore,   they   identify   non-­‐‑financial   business   and   their   needs   as  
drivers   of   credit   extension.  Nonetheless,   for  Hilferding,   especially,   it  was   the  
large   German   banks,   which   were   the   more   powerful   partner   in   the   finance-­‐‑
business   relationship,   because   they   had   an   important   degree   of   control   over  
their  business  clients,  who  required  the  banks’  provision  of  long-­‐‑term  finance.      
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5.2.1.2.  The  lasting  influence  of  Wicksell  
Where  Tugan-­‐‑Baranowsky’s  theoretical  treatment  of  credit  in  the  business  cycle  
was   artless,   the   theory   put   forward   by   his   Swedish   contemporary,  Wicksell,  
was  refined.  Wicksell  was  one  of  the  major  influences  on  continental  European  
(mostly   German-­‐‑speaking)   economic   scholars   during   the   early   20th   century  
(Ellis,   1934).   His   thought   was   so   profound   that   Wicksell’s   work   exercises   a  
visible  impact  onto  economic  theory  until  this  day  (see,  for  instance,  Woodford,  
2003)10.    
Wicksell   (Wicksell,   2006[1898];   Wicksell,   1907)   was   most   original   in   putting  
forward   a   theoretical   analysis   set   in   a   so-­‐‑called   ‘pure   credit’   society,   where  
money  was  neither  a  commodity  (such  as  gold),  nor  backed  by  one.  Thus,  banks  
had   in   fact   control   over   the   money   supply   through   their   ability   to   generate  
credit.  Wicksell’s  views  were  based  on  writings  by  English  scholars  of  the  19th  
century  such  as  Tooke  and  Fullarton,  whose  ideas  are  commonly  labelled  as  the  
banking  school.    
In   Wicksell’s   view   (Wicksell,   2006[1898]),   economic   cycles   emanated   from  
mismatches   between   bank   and   natural   rates   of   interest.   The   former   is   the  
money   rate  of   interest   actually  present   in   the  economy,  while   the   latter   is   the  
rate  necessary   to   align   investment   and   savings.  The  natural   rate   of   interest   is  
therefore  an  equilibrium  concept,  and  in  Wicksell’s   theory  a  mere  benchmark.  
When   both   rates   are   aligned   there   is   no   change   of   the   price   level   in   the  
economy.   The   bank   rate   of   interest,   however,   is   assumed   to   trail   the   natural  
rate,   since   banks   do   not   immediately   react   to   changes   in   economic  
circumstances  (Ellis,  1934).    
In   consequence,   cumulative   processes   can   emerge   in   this   theoretical   setting.  
When  the  bank  rate  is  below  the  equilibrating  rate,  investment  opportunities  for  
                                                                                                 
10  Although  this  reference  should  be  qualified  since  Woodford  merely  claims  Wicksell’s  
name  while  presenting  an  analysis  that  is  hardly  in  the  latter’s  spirit.    
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non-­‐‑financial   firms   in   the   economy  are  plentiful,   given   the   low  cost   of   credit.  
Hence,   the   strong   increase   in  economic  activity   results   in   inflation,  until  bank  
rates  are  increased.  Conversely,  if  the  bank  rate  is  above  the  equilibrium  rate,  a  
deflationary  process  is  set  off  due  to  the  high  cost  of  external  finance.  
Therefore,   for   Wicksell,   it   was   non-­‐‑financial   companies,   which   set   off   credit  
expansion   through   their   credit   demand,   given   an   increase   in   returns   on  
investment.  Banks  are  somewhat  passive   in  his   framework.  Even   though  they  
provide  the  additional  funds  that  set  off  cumulative  inflationary  processes,  this  
happens   merely   due   to   their   slow   reaction   towards   changing   economic  
conditions.  
Hayek  summarised  the  reason  for  credit  cycles  succinctly:  
‘Die  entscheidende  Ursache  der  Konjunkturschwankungen  ist  also,  daß  infolge  
der  Veränderlichkeit  der  Umlaufmenge  der  Zins,  den  die  Banken  fordern,  nicht  
notwendig  immer  gleich  dem  Gleichgewichtszins  ist,  sondern  in  der  Bewegung  
über   kurze   Fristen   tatsächlich   von   den   Liquiditätserwägungen   der   Banken  
bestimmt  wird’11  (von  Hayek,  1929,  p.  103).    
This  is  at  the  core  of  Wicksell’s  argument.  Hayek  (1929)  was  determined  to  find  
a   fault   in   Wicksell’s   theory,   stressing   that   the   Wicksellian   benchmark   of   an  
equilibrium   interest   rate  was  misleading,   as   an   economy  might   be   outside   of  
equilibrium  without   facing   inflationary   pressures.   Despite  Hayek’s   insistence  
on   the   shortcomings   in   Wicksell’s   theorising,   their   understanding   of   credit  
cycles  (at  least  in  Hayek’s  early  work,  which  was  to  change  subsequently)  was  
essentially  the  same.  This  once  again  shows  the  profound  influence  Wicksell’s  
analysis  had  on  German  monetary  thinking.  
Hayek  became  a  follower  of  von  Mises  (Ellis,  1934).  The  latter  subscribed  to  the  
quantity   theory   of   money.   For   von   Mises,   credit   extension   was   driven   by  
                                                                                                 
11  ‘The   key   reason   behind   business   cycle   fluctuations   is   therefore   that,   due   to   the  
variability  in  the  volume  of  money  in  circulation,  the  interest  rate  demanded  by  banks  
does   not   always   necessarily   equal   the   equilibrium   interest   rate;   but   that   in   its  
movement  over  short  periods  the  interest  is  determined  by  the  liquidity  considerations  
of  the  banks’  (author’s  translation).    
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excessive  bank  lending  incentivised  through  short-­‐‑sighted  government  policies  
(Ellis,   1934).   Political   rationale   would,   according   to   von   Mises,   lead  
governments  to  favour  low  interest  rates.  This  political  intervention  results  in  a  
bank  rate,  which  is  too  low,  causing  business  cycles  and  price  level  fluctuations  
in  the  economy.  Once  again,  the  influence  of  Wicksell’s  trailing  bank  rate  (even  
though  turned  on  its  head,  given  that  banks  are  not  following  the  natural  rate  
but  are  actively  deviating  from  it)  is  clear.      
In   summary,  Wicksell   (in   contrast   to   von  Mises)   understood  banks   as  money  
creators.   Lending,   however,  was  driven   by   credit   demand   from  non-­‐‑financial  
businesses,  with  interest  rates  adjusted  by  banks  when  their  liquidity  positions  
became  concerning.  Thus,  answering  the  question  on  agency  for  the  Wicksellian  
framework   is  somewhat  complex.  While  von  Mises  assigned  agency  to  banks’  
(and  ultimately,  governments’)  lending  policy,  Wicksell  appears  to  situate  it  in  
the   interaction   between   banks’   financial   positions   and   non-­‐‑financial   firms’  
credit  demand.    
5.2.1.3.  Endogenous  money  in  Schumpeter’s  and  Hahn’s  analysis  
Among  the  German-­‐‑speaking  scholars  of  that  time,  two  are  particularly  striking  
because   of   the   originality   of   their   thought:   namely  Hahn   and,   even  more   so,  
Schumpeter.  Both  utilised  Wicksell’s  concept  of  the  pure-­‐‑credit  (thus,  cashless)  
economy,   and   both   stressed   the   primacy   of   credit   over   deposits.   However,  
while   Schumpeter   believed   that   credit   expansion   was   chiefly   driven   by  
entrepreneurial  need   for   external   finance,  Hahn  believed   that  banks’   liquidity  
considerations  were  the  main  determinant  of  credit  volumes.    
Hahn  was  a  banker  who  turned  to  scholarly  economics  after  completing  a  PhD  
in   law  (Hagemann,  2010).  His  subsequent  economics  PhD  thesis,  published   in  
1920,   Economic   Theory   of   Bank   Credit,   was   widely   discussed   among   financial  
   250  
theorists   of   the   1920s.12  Influenced   by   English   writings   on   banking13,   Hahn  
emphasised  that  the  asset  side  of  a  bank’s  balance  sheet  always  dominated  the  
liability   side.   Hence,   money   was   lent   out   first,   and   only   then   were  
arrangements   made   to   cover   the   position   and   any   liquidity   requirements  
(Hahn,   1924).   This   implied   that   savings   were   unimportant   for   investment   or  
growth.    
Hahn’s   contribution  was   very   critically   received,   and  was   not   helped   by   the  
socio-­‐‑economic  events  in  Germany  at  the  time.  In  his  early  work,  Hahn  insisted  
that  credit  expansion  did  not  create  inflation.  However,  the  reparations-­‐‑induced  
hyperinflation  was  a  major  concern   in  Germany  during  the  1920s.  The  second  
(and  major)   part   of   his   dissertation   claimed   that   a   sustained   economic   boom  
was  possible,  given  adequate  monetary  and  banking  policy.  During  the  1920s  in  
Germany   such   a   vision   must   have   appeared   distant,   if   not   completely  
unrealistic.    
As  a  consequence  of  his  bold  statements,  Hahn  was  labelled  an  inflationist  and  
over  time  moderated  his  position  until  he  came  around  to  call  his  early  work  a  
‘youthful   folly’   (Jugendsünde   in   German)   later   in   life   (Hagemann,   2010). 14  
Despite   the   bad   timing   and   some   exaggerated   aspects   in   Hahn’s   Economic  
Theory  of  Bank  Credit,  the  work  was  illuminating  because  it  actually  understood  
the  nature  of  credit  (see  comments  in  Schumpeter  &  Schumpeter,  1986).  Hahn’s  
                                                                                                 
12  It   was   so   controversial   at   the   time   that   during   the   1930s   it   seemed   worthwhile  
writing  PhD  theses  about  Hahn’s   thesis.  Wilhelm  (Pollack,  1937)  published  his   thesis  
on  Albert  Hahns  Volkswirtschaftliche  Theorie  des  Bankkredits  in  1937.  
13  Hahn   explicitly   referred   to   Macleod’s   theory   of   credit.   He   could   have,   however,  
equally  quoted  Withers’s  ideas  on  credit  (Withers,  1912).  
14  Hahn   performed   several   180-­‐‑degree   turnarounds   during   his   life.  While   he   was   in  
favour  of   expansionary   fiscal   and  monetary  policies  during   the   1920s,  he  denounced  
them   as   dangerous   subsequently.   Hence,   while   he   claimed   to   have   anticipated  
Keynes’s  finding  of  the  General  Theory,  he  also  objected  vehemently  to  Keynesian-­‐‑type  
policies.  While   modelling   himself   as   proto-­‐‑Keynesian   in   his   youth,   he   was   severely  
anti-­‐‑Keynesian  in  his  later  life  (Hagemann,  2010).    
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comments   (in  Börsenkredite  und   Industrie,   1929)   concerning   stock  market   credit  
demonstrate  this.    
By  the  early  20th  century,  the  German-­‐‑speaking  public  was  deeply  mistrustful  
of  the  stock  exchange.  This  distrust  had  its  roots  in  the  second  half  of  the  19th  
century  when   stock  market   excesses   (such   as   the  Gründerkrise,   the  promoters’  
crisis  dated  from  1873   to  1888)  resulted   in   (sometimes   fraudulent)  speculation  
and   economic   crises.   Popular   opinion  of   the   stock   exchange  was  damaged   so  
profoundly,   that   the   German   authorities   established   the  
Börsenenquetekommission   in   1892,   aiming   to   severely   restrict   stock   market  
activity  (Weber  &  Borchardt,  1999).  
Among  economic  thinkers,  the  idea  emerged  that  stock  market  activity  diverts  
scarce   funds   from   productive   activity.   Cassel   (1927)   rejected   this   idea   (other  
academics   who   dismissed   attacks   against   the   stock   market   included,   for  
instance,   Weber15).   Cassel   was   subsequently   attacked   by   economists   such   as  
Reisch   (Reisch,   1929,   1930),   who   argued   that   credit   for   equity   purchases  
undermined   productive   investment.   Cassel   rejected   the   argument   since   the  
borrowed  money  would  only  briefly  remain  in  the  equity  investors’  hands  and  
then   make   its   way   into   the   economy   where   it   could   be   lent   out   again   or  
invested  (Cassel,  1927).    
Reisch’s  argument  about  diverted  scarce  resources  appears  all   too  reminiscent  
of   recent   mainstream   research,   pointing   towards   the   dangers   of   too   much  
finance  without  thoroughly  identifying  the  mechanisms  at  work  (see  Cecchetti  
&  Kharroubi,  2012).  The  idea  that  credit  for  financial  investment  reduces  funds  
available   for   production   is   based   on   the   premise   that   the   credit   volume   is  
limited   since   there   is  only   some   finite  pool  of  money   (or   loanable   funds)   that  
                                                                                                 
15  Weber  was  involved  in  the  drafting  of  the  1896  Börsengesetz,  the  stock  exchange  law.  
He  argued  against  severe   limitations   to  stock  market  activity.  Weber’s  argument  was  
not   chiefly   an   economic   one   but   tinted   by  power  politics:  Germany  needed   its   stock  
exchanges  to  remain  influencial  in  European  finance  (Weber  &  Borchardt,  1999).  
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can  be  advanced.  Once   this  pool  has  been  exhausted  and  has  dried  up,  banks  
(and  capital  markets)  have  to  wait  until  the  pool  is  replenished  to  provide  credit  
again.    
For   Hahn,   the   practical   banker,   it   was   clear   that   credit   for   equity   market  
investment   did   not   affect   the   economy   except   for   its   expansionary   impact   on  
banks’  balance  sheets.  The  volume  of  credit  granted   to  stock  market   investors  
would   simply   show   up   as   assets   and   subsequently   as   liabilities   on   banks’  
balance   sheets   (Hahn,   1929).   Thus,   there   could   not   possibly   be   a   detrimental  
effect  on  industrial  investment  as  Reisch  claimed,  who  interestingly  was  also  a  
banker  during  the  1920s  -­‐‑  a  central  banker.  He  was  the  president  of  the  Austrian  
Central  Bank,  the  Oesterreichische  Nationalbank,  between  1922  and  1932.        
Another  Austrian  economist,  Schumpeter,  praised  Hahn  as  having  worked  out  
‘a  systemic  theory  that  fits  the  facts  of  bank  credit  adequately’    (Schumpeter  &  
Schumpeter,   1986,  p.   1115).16  Despite   Schumpeter’s  praise   for  Hahn’s  writings  
about  credit  (and  the  similarity  in  their  approaches,  Pollack,  1937)  there  was  a  
fundamental  difference  in  their  understanding  of  the  business  cycle.  For  Hahn  
it  was  credit  extension,  which  drove  economic  activity,  importantly  investment.  
For  Schumpeter,  by  contrast,   the   investment  behaviour  and  consequent   credit  
demand   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms   was   the   driving   force   behind   the   credit   cycle  
(Schumpeter,  1983[1934]).        
In   Schumpeter’s   understanding   of   economic   development,   credit   and   the  
financial  system  first  and  foremost  serve  industrial  development.  Hence,  credit  
is   extended   to   non-­‐‑financial   firms   so   that   they   can   invest   in   innovation,   be   it  
product,   process   or   organisational   innovation.  All   of   these   activities,   together  
with  the  exploration  and  conquest  of  new  markets  and  resources,  count  as  ‘new  
                                                                                                 
16  Schumpeter  identified  Macloed,  whose  analysis  Hahn  explicitly  assumed  as  leitmotif  
(for   instance,   in   quoting   Macloed   on   the   cover   page   of   his   Economic   Theory   of   Bank  
Credit,   Hahn,   1924),   as   the   writer   to   undertake   the   first   attempt   at   such   a   theory  
(Schumpeter  &  Schumpeter,  1986).    
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combinations’,  Schumpeter’s  term  for  innovation  (Schumpeter,  1983[1934]).  The  
possibility  of  consumption  credit  is  acknowledged,  but  left  aside,  since  lending  
for   consumption   purposes   is   not   ‘an   element   in   the   fundamental   forms   and  
necessities  of  industrial  life’  (Schumpeter,  1983[1934],  p.  103).    
But  industrial  credit  is  also  definite  in  a  specific  manner;  in  fact  it  refers  to  what  
Keynes  termed  ‘funding’  (Keynes,  1937).  It  excludes  the  financing  of  circulating  
capital   because   this   type   of   productive   credit   does   not   contribute   to  
development,  but  merely  to  current  reproduction.  This  can  be  financed  through  
hoards  –  or  saving  –  already  present  in  the  economic  system.  Here  banks  play  
the   role   of   financial   intermediary,   pooling   and   lending   out   these   hoards.  
However,   this   is   not   the   major   function   of   banks.   Their   ability   to   create  
purchasing   power,   by   lending   long-­‐‑term   (which   becomes   ‘funding’)   and  
beyond   funds   existing   in   the   economy,   turns   bankers   into   ‘the   capitalist   par  
excellence’  (Schumpeter  1983[1934],  p.  74).    
This   statement   is   reminiscent   of   Hilferding’s   notion   of   ‘finance   capital’.  
However,   in   Schumpeter’s   work   the   functions   of   financial   and   industrial  
capitalists  –  to  use  Marxist   terminology  –  appear  more  circumscribed  and  less  
integrated.   This   difference   originates   from   their   diverging   perception   of  
competition.   Whereas   Schumpeter   believed   in   the   innovative   and   self-­‐‑
rejuvenating   forces  behind  market   competition   –   as   expressed   in  his   ideas  on  
creative   destruction   (Schumpeter,   1994[1942])   –   Hilferding   sketched   out   a  
theory   based   on   ever-­‐‑increasing   economic   concentration,   that   is   trustification  
(Hilferding,  1947[1910]).    
For  Schumpeter  individual  entrepreneurs  were  necessary  to  ensure  growth  and  
progress,   resulting   in   desirable   bankruptcies   of   inefficient   companies.   In  
Hilferding’s  view  capitalist  competition  was  inefficient  and  wasteful,  resulting  
in  economic  instability,  bankruptcy  and  unemployment  as  companies  engaged  
in   unnecessary   price   wars.   Therefore,   a   closer   integration   of   financial   and  
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industrial   capital   would   increase   economic   stability,   making   the   disruptive  
activity  of  Schumpeter’s  entrepreneur  impossible,  but  also  unwanted.      
In   Schumpeter’s   eyes   the   credit   system   played   a   crucial   role   in   financing  
entrepreneurs   and   their   new   investment   projects   by   creating   money.   The  
interaction   between   financial   markets   and   entrepreneurs,   however,   also  
brought  about  economic  depressions  (or  crises),  since  for  him  it  was  the  driver  
of   the   business   cycle.   Upswings   were   caused   by   a   swarm-­‐‑like   emergence   of  
entrepreneurs  due  to  innovation  opportunities.  Credit  creation  by  the  banking  
system   fed   the   cycle,   allowing  entrepreneurs   to   reap   supernormal  profits,  but  
also  attracting  imitators.  The  cycle  turned  as  competition  among  entrepreneurs  
brought   down   prices,   reducing   the   reflux   –   and   therefore   profit   –   from  
innovative  investment.    
The   downswing   was   exacerbated   by   the   financial   system,   as   repayment   of  
credit  resulted  in  a  contraction  of  purchasing  power  and  consequent  deflation  
in   the   economy.   Hence,   for   Schumpeter   the   role   of   credit   was   to   finance  
corporate   investment   into   innovation.   In   this   sense,   banks  mainly   served   the  
needs  of  innovating  entrepreneurs.  Hence,  the  non-­‐‑financial  firm  and  its  credit  
needs   dictated   the   credit   volume   extended   according   to   Schumpeter.   While  
banks  did  not  fund  all  entrepreneurial  projects,  it  was  ultimately  in  the  power  
of   the   individual   entrepreneur   to   obtain   credit   through   his   or   her   superior  
entrepreneurial  ability.  Hence,  if  anywhere,  the  agency  is  with  the  (innovative)  
non-­‐‑financial  business  in  Schumpeter’s  analysis.    
Table 5.2. Summary of macro perspective on finance, German-language 
tradition 
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of financial institutions







Marx and Hilferding Money&creation Non-financial&business Banks
Wicksell Money&creation Non-financial&business
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Table  5.2.  summarises  the  answers  of  the  theories  reviewed  in  this  part  (5.2.1.)  
to   the   three  questions  outlined   in   the  beginning  of   the  chapter.  Of  course,   the  
German-­‐‑language   tradition   is   extremely  varied.  Thus,   the   table  only  provides  
stylised  answers,  focusing  on  specific  strands  of  theory.  Overall,   it  can  be  said  
that  money   creation   through   credit   (rather   than   financial   intermediation)  was  
generally   understood   to   be   the   function   of   financial   institutions.   Further,   this  
was   understood   as   driven   by   non-­‐‑financial   business.   Finally,   the   finance-­‐‑
business  relationship  was  seen  as  complex,  yielding  varying  responses.    
5.2.2. Keynes’s analysis and post-Keynesian thought on finance  
This   section   discusses   the   financial   theory   put   forward   by   Keynes,   alongside  
Marx  the  other  major  influence  on  heterodox  economic  thought,  and  the  diverse  
group  of  thinkers  usually  referred  to  as  post-­‐‑Keynesian.  Once  again,  the  aim  of  
this  part  is  not  to  provide  a  complete  overview,  but  to  highlight  the  most  salient  
and  interesting  contributions.  Alongside  Keynes’s  ideas  (part  5.2.2.1.),  circuitist  
thought   (part   5.2.2.2.),   Kaleckian   finance   theory   (part   5.2.2.3.)   and,   finally,  
Victoria  Chick’s   ideas   on   banking   evolution  will   be   covered   (in   part   5.2.2.4.).  
The   last  sub-­‐‑section  provides  an  elegant  connection  to   the  subsequent  section,  
which  will  highlight  some  aspects  of  financialisation  approaches.  Chick’s  work  
on   banking   evolution   is   particularly   important   for   emerging   and   developing  
economies   because   it   provides   a   bridge   between   old   development   economics  
and  (post-­‐‑)Keynesian  theory.      
5.2.2.1.  Keynes  on  the  role  of  finance  
Keynes   was,   with   few   exceptions17,   not   especially   interested   in   the   German-­‐‑
language   economic   literature   of   his   times   (Garvy,   1975).   Hence,   his  
                                                                                                 
17  In   his   Treatise   on   Money   (Keynes,   2011[1930],   p.   199),   Keynes   admitted   that   his  
knowledge   and  more   importantly,  use   of   the  German-­‐‑language   literature   in  his   own  
work   was   very   limited:   ‘I   should   have   made   more   reference   to   the   work   of   these  
writers   if   their   books,  which  have  only   come   into  my  hand  as   these  pages   are  being  
passed  through  the  press,  had  appeared  when  my  own  thought  was  at  an  earlier  stage  
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understanding  of  the  role  of  finance  in  the  macro  economy,  while  also  based  on  
endogenous  money18,   differed   from  much   of   the  German-­‐‑language   literature.  
Keynes   saw   the   agency   in   the   act   of   credit   extension   as   located   with   banks  
rather  than  with  non-­‐‑financial  corporations,  as  some  of  the  economists  writing  
in  the  German  tradition  would  have  argued.    
During   accelerating   economic   expansion,   non-­‐‑financial   firms   require   bank  
finance  to  undertake  their  investment,  meaning  that  ‘in  general,  the  banks  hold  
the   key   position   in   a   transition   from   a   lower   to   a   higher   scale   of   activity’  
(Keynes,  as  cited  in  Asimakopulos,  1983,  p.  227).  This  is  particularly  illustrated  
in   Keynes’s   A   Treatise   on   Money   (Keynes,   2011[1930]).   Chapter   37   is   the  
pertinent   point   of   reference,   which   is   tellingly   introduced  with   the  words:   ‘I  
reach  at  last  the  crux  of  the  whole  matter’  (Keynes,  2011[1930]).    
For   Keynes   the   crux   of   his   exposition   was   the   discussion   of   the   Banking  
System’s   influence  on  monetary  stability  and  macroeconomic  activity  at   large.  
While   Keynes   debunked   the   quantity   theory   of   money   in   this   chapter,   he  
assigned   the   ability   (albeit   circumscribed   by   a   range   of   institutional   and  
behavioural  factors)  to  preserve  monetary  stability  to  the  Banking  System.  The  
Banking  System   (capitalised  by  Keynes)   refers   to   the   interactions  between   the  
central  bank  and  commercial  banks.    
Crucially,   commercial   banks   can   influence   the   volume   of   investment  
undertaken  by  non-­‐‑financial  firms  through  their  credit  terms.  This  influence  is  
not  exercised  solely  through  interest  rate  changes  (that  is,  the  cost  of  capital)  as  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
of   development,   and   if   my   knowledge   of   the   German   language   was   not   so   poor’.  
Keynes  did,  however,   single  out  Neisser’s  work,   towards  which  he  was   ‘particularly  
sympathetic’  (Keynes,  2011[1930],  vol.  I,  p.  199,  also  discussed  in  Toporowski,  2012).          
18  As   discussed   by   Chick   (2005),   between   the   1930s   and   1960s   it   was   common   in  
economic  theory  to  assume  money  as  endogenously  created  by  commercial  banks.  This  
only   changed  with   the   advent   of  Monetarist   dominance.  Monetarism   in   its   orthodox  
form  requires   the  exogeneity  of  money,   since   the  money  supply   is  believed   to  be   the  
government’s  main  (and  only  desirable)  policy  tool.    
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often   assumed   in  mainstream   analysis.   It   is   exerted   due   to   the   existence   of   a  
‘fringe  of  unsatisfied  borrowers’:  
‘The  relaxation  or  contraction  of  credit  by  the  Banking  System  does  not  operate,  
however,   merely   through   a   change   in   the   rate   charged   to   borrowers;   it   also  
functions  through  a  change  in  the  abundance  of  credit.   […]  There  is,   that   is   to  
say,  in  Great  Britain  an  habitual  system  of  rationing  in  the  attitude  of  banks  to  
borrowers’  (Keynes,  2011[1930],  p.  364).            
Hence,  the  question  about  agency  between  commercial  banks  and  non-­‐‑financial  
firms   is  clearly  answered   in   favour  of  commercial  banks.   Importantly,  Keynes  
stated  that   the  Banking  System  (i.e.   the   interaction  between  commercial  banks  
and  the  central  bank)  determines  the  volume  of  credit  extended.  The  role  of  the  
central  bank  here  is  to  ration  commercial  banks  to  some  extent.  In  fact,  Keynes  
carried  on  to  explain  that  the  existence  of  the  unsatisfied  fringe  of  borrowers  is  
the  result  of  banks’  financial  positions:  
‘Thus   there   is   normally   a   fringe   of   unsatisfied   borrowers   who   are   not  
considered  to  have  the  first  claims  on  a  bank’s  favours,  but  to  whom  the  bank  
would  be  quite  ready  to  lend  if  it  were  to  find  itself  in  a  position  to  lend  more’  (  
(Keynes,  2011[1930],  p.  365).        
Thus,   in  Keynes’s  analysis   the   financial   system  played   the   role  of   enabling  or  
slowing   down   investment   expenditure   by   non-­‐‑financial   companies,   which   is  
the  main   driver   of   economic   fluctuations   and   growth.   Commercial   banks   are  
the   ones   that   determine   credit   extension   to   non-­‐‑financial   business.   However,  
they   confront   the   central   bank   with   their   demands   for   central   bank   money,  
which  they  require  to  consolidate  their  reserve  and  liquidity  positions  (Keynes,  
2011[1930],   Toporowski,   2012).   The   persistence   of   a   fringe   of   unsatisfied  
commercial   banks   and   unsatisfied   bank   customers   preserves   the   influence   of  
the   central   bank  over   individual   commercial   banks,   and  of   commercial   banks  
over  their  clients.    
5.2.2.2.  Endogenous  money  
This   idea   is   central   to   post-­‐‑Keynesian   thought   on   finance,   which   has   been  
especially   boldly   articulated   by  Moore   (Moore,   1979).   Since   the   1970s,  Moore  
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(among   other   heterodox   economists)   very   vocally   fought   the   loanable   funds  
doctrine   dominant   in   mainstream   economic   thinking.   Until   today   the   credit  
multiplier  theory  is  taught  to  economics  students  (e.g.  Krugman  &  Wells,  2013).  
The   suggested   causal   chain  here   runs   from  high-­‐‑power   (that   is,   central   bank)  
money   to   deposits,  which   in   turn   determine   a   bank’s   ability   to   extend   credit  
multiplied  by  a  factor  dependent  on  (and  inverse  to)  the  reserve  requirement.    
According  to  Moore  (2003),   the  supply  of  bank  credit   is  horizontal,  given  that  
the  interest  rate  set  by  the  central  bank  remains  unchanged.  In  its  open-­‐‑market  
operations   the   central   bank   will   attempt   to   provide   commercial   banks   with  
somewhat   less   than   their  desired   level  of   liquidity   to   ensure   their   recourse   to  
the   central   bank’s   overnight   lending   facility.   This   is   done   with   the   aim   of  
influencing  short-­‐‑term   interest   rates,   that  are   set  as  mark-­‐‑up  on   the  overnight  
lending   rate   paid   to   the   central   bank.  Crucially,   commercial   banks   determine  
the   volume   of   credit   lent   to   their   customers   since   they   assess   the   collateral,  
income  and  credit  history  of  borrowers.  The  agency  over  credit  expansion  lies,  
thus,   within   the   financial   sector,   determined   through   the   interplay   between  
central  banks  and  their  commercial  clients.                
Among   the   post-­‐‑Keynesian   schools   (and   their   close   relatives,   see   Fontana   &  
Realfonzo,   2005),   the   French   and   Italian   circuit   theories   express   the   idea   that  
banks   have   agency   over   credit   extension   most   clearly.   In   the   theory   of   the  
monetary   circuit   (Parguez   &   Seccareccia,   1999),   which   is   often   interpreted  
under   the   heading   of   financial   Keynesianism   (Bellofiore,   2013),   banks   extend  
money   to  non-­‐‑financial   firms   in   the   form  of   credit   before   any  production   can  
take  place.  Subsequently,  non-­‐‑financial  companies  engage  in  production,  which  
yields  returns  necessary  to  repay  bank  loans  (and  interest)  to  creditors.  In  order  
to   repay   credit   non-­‐‑financial   business   can   also   obtain  money   in   the   financial  
markets,  which   is  crucial   if  households  saved  substantial  amounts  and  refrain  
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from   consumption.   In   this   theoretical   setting,   all  money   is   credit  money   and  
takes  the  form  of  debt.19  
During   the   reflux   phase,   when   non-­‐‑financial   companies   have   to   meet   their  
payment   commitments   to   the   banking   sector   a   problem   can   occurs   (Renaud,  
1998,  Parguez  &  Seccareccia,  1999):  assuming  that  banks  do  not  consume  non-­‐‑
financial  companies’  produce,  production  cannot  –  in  a  given  period  –  generate  
higher   profit   than   the   amount   of   credit   advanced   initially.   However,   this  
surplus   would   be   necessary   to   meet   principle   and,   crucially,   interest   rate  
payments.   This   problem   can   be   solved   in   various   ways:   (1)   If   high-­‐‑powered  
central   bank   money   is   present,   non-­‐‑financial   business   can   sell   their  
commodities  to  the  public  sector  increasing  their  profits  (Cavalieri,  2003).  (2)  In  
order   to   invest,   non-­‐‑financial   companies   turn   to   banks   for   investment   credit,  
which   raises   profits   of   investment   goods-­‐‑producing   corporations.   Or   (3)   the  
circuit   is   closed   since   failures   of   banks   and   non-­‐‑financial   firms   are   a   regular  
phenomenon  of  economic  activity  (Messori  &  Zazzaro,  2005).    
Overall,   the  problem  appears  dependent  on   the  strict  separation  of   individual  
periods  and  the  assumptions   that  credit  must  be  paid  off   in   the  course  of  one  
such  period.  Therefore,  it  has  been  argued  that  the  closure  problem  is  based  on  
a   misinterpretation   of   the   monetary   circuit   theory   (Parguez   &   Seccareccia,  
1999).  However,  this  misinterpretation  brings  the  power  constellation  between  
banks   and   non-­‐‑financial   business   to   the   fore   very   clearly:  while   corporations  
might  drive  credit  demand,  the  agency  to  create  credit  is  with  the  banks.    
                                                                                                 
19  Circuit   theorists  argue  that  money  has  always  been  debt,   illustrated   in   the   fact   that  
credit   existed   before   coins   or   other   means   of   circulation   (Einzig,   1966;   Parguez   &  
Seccareccia,   1999).   This   view   corresponds   to   Schumpeter’s   emphasis   of   the   credit  
theory  of  money,  which  is  the  correct  theoretical  framework  according  to  the  Austrian  
economist.  Unfortunately,  much  of  economic  thinking  subscribes  to  a  monetary  theory  
of   credit   where   money   is   perceived   to   precede   credit   (Schumpeter   &   Schumpeter,  
1986).  The  latter  is  the  basis  for  the  loanable  funds  model.    
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5.2.2.3.  Kaleckian  finance  theory  
Within  the  post-­‐‑Keynesian  school  another  economist   (apart   from  Keynes)  was  
formatively   influential:   Kalecki.  His  work   arguably   both   anticipated   and  was  
substantially  different  from  Keynes’s  ideas  (Lavoie,  2015).  The  difference  in  the  
theories   of   these   two   economists   can   be   traced   in   their   understanding   of  
finance.   Despite   claims   to   the   contrary   (Kregel,   1989),   Kalecki   (in   contrast   to  
Keynes)   followed   the   German-­‐‑language   tradition   where   non-­‐‑financial  
companies,  rather  than  commercial  banks,  drive  credit  extension  (Toporowski,  
2012).      
Kalecki  did  not  write   extensively   on   finance.  Much  of   his   thought   on   finance  
was   influenced   by   his   colleague   at   the   Instytut   Badań   Koniunktury   i   Cen   (the  
Institute  for  Research  in  Business  Cycles  and  Prices),  Breit  (Toporowski,  2013).  
Breit  almost  vanished  into  obscurity  after  he  was  murdered  by  the  Nazi  regime  
in   1942   (Toporowski,   2005;   PWN,   2015),   which   makes   an   exposition   of   his  
thought  all  the  more  important.  
Breit   published   his   only   monograph   in   1933:   Stopa   procentowa   w   Polsce   (The  
interest   rate   in   Poland,   Toporowski,   2005).  Here,   he   elaborated   on   a   business  
cycle   theory   based   on   government   interference   and   a   lack   of   competition  
among   banks   in   the   credit   system   (Toporowski,   2005).   In   this   sense,   Breit’s  
earlier   work   was   clearly   influenced   by   Austrian   economic   thought   à   la   von  
Mises,  stressing  inappropriate  monetary  and  credit  policies.  Breit  moved  away  
from  this  position  in  his  later  work  (see  Breit,  1935).      
The   influence   Breit   and   Kalecki   had   on   each   other   manifests   itself   in   the  
‘principle   of   increasing   risk’   (Kalecki,   1937).   The   ‘principle   of   increasing   risk’  
highlights  the  dependence  of  credit  conditions  offered  by  commercial  banks  on  
their  clients’  level  of  leverage.  Breit  (1935)  stressed  the  lender’s  risk  side  of  the  
argument,  whereas  Kalecki  (1937)  focused  more  on  the  borrower’s  risk  (Chilosi,  
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1982).20  Importantly,  Breit,   like  Kalecki,  maintained  that  companies’   individual  
balance   sheets   determine   what   interest   rates   they   will   be   offered.   Moreover,  
abstracting   from   individual   firms,   Breit   (1935)   also   argued   that   there  was   no  
reason   to   assume   that   interest   rates   should   equalise   across   the   money   and  
capital  markets.  Deviations  between  short-­‐‑term  and  long-­‐‑term  rates  were  not  a  
sign  of  disturbances   in  the  credit  system,  but  rather  accounted  for  uncertainty  
and   the   –   as   Breit   called   it   –   transformation   cost   of   rolling   over   short-­‐‑term  
credit.   In   the   absence   of   costly   transformation   between   short-­‐‑term   and   long-­‐‑
term  credit,  interest  rates  would  indeed  equalise.  Importantly,  the  equalisation  
of  rates  would  not  be  driven  by  credit  supply  but  by  credit  demand:  
‘Wären  also  mit  der  gegenseitigen  Substitution  der  langen  und  kurzen  Kredite  
keinerlei   zusätzliche   Kosten   verbunden,   so   würde   der   Ausgleich   der  
Kreditmarktraten   in   Wirklichkeit   unvermeidlich   sein.   Doch   würde   er   nicht  
seitens   des   Angebots,   wie   bisher   angenommen   wurde,   sondern   seitens   der  
Nachfrage   zustande   kommen,   also   durch   Investierungen,   die   in   größerem   oder  
kleinerem  Maße  kurzfristig  finanziert  werden’  (emphasis  in  original,  Breit,  1935,  p.  
646).21  
Non-­‐‑financial  companies  and  their  investment  are  the  driving  force  behind  the  
conditions   in   financial   markets.   While   Kalecki   understood   credit   to   be  
endogenously   created   by   banks   (Sawyer,   2001),   he   stressed   the   presence   of  
unattached   deposits   (Kalecki,   1990[1933]),   that   is,   the   savings   of   other  
capitalists,   in   the   financial   system.  Hence,  while   banks   could   create   credit   ex  
nihilo,  much  of  their  function  (in  Kalecki’s  analysis)  was  to  manage  their  balance  
sheets,   creating   assets   (in   the   form   of   loans)   against   deposits   capitalists   hold  
with   them.   Hence,   banks   can   exacerbate   the   business   cycle   but   their   actual  
                                                                                                 
20  Breit   emphasised   that   above  a   certain   threshold  banks  might   curtail   the  amount  of  
credit   to   companies   due   to   increasing   risk   perceived   by   the   bank.   Kalecki   refers   to  
Breit’s   argument   while   stressing   that   firms   borrowing   to   finance   investment   will  
themselves  perceive  a  rise  in  risk  with  growing  credit  volume.    
21  ’If   there  were  no  additional  costs   linked  to   the  substitution  of   long-­‐‑term  and  short-­‐‑
term   credit   the   equalisation   of   credit  market   rates  would   be   inevitable.   However,   it  
would  not   happen   from   the   supply   side,   as   hitherto   assumed,   but   from   the  demand  
side,  hence  through  investment,  to  a  larger  or  smaller  extent  short-­‐‑term  financed’.  
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influence  on  the  cycle  through  lending  and  setting  of  commercial  interest  rates  
is  ‘to  a  large  extent  […]  illusory’  (Kalecki,  1990[1933],  p.  151).    
In   fact,   enterprises   and   their   investment   are   the   most   important   economic  
agents.  Since  for  Kalecki  profits  are  determined  by  companies’  investment  –  the  
reflux  principle  –  interest  rates  do  not  decisively  determine  private  investment  
but  rather  firms’  profitability.  Thanks  to  reflux,  firms’  investment  in  aggregate  
finances   itself   during   an   economic   upswing   –   abstracting   from   the   foreign  
balance.  Crucially,  Kalecki  assumed  that  non-­‐‑financial  businesses  mostly   fund  
their  investment  projects  internally,  that  is,  through  retained  profits.        
One  eminent  author  cannot  be  missing  from  a  discussion  of  the  role  of  finance  
in   post-­‐‑Keynesian   economics:   Minsky.   Minsky   formulated   a   business   cycle  
theory   (his   Financial   Instability   Hypothesis)   that   identifies   the   investment  
finance   decisions   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms   (alongside   their   investment  
expenditure)   as   the   force  behind  economic   fluctuation.   Since  Schumpeter  was  
his   PhD   supervisor,  Minsky  was   strongly   influenced   by  much   of   continental  
European  economics.  For  instance,  Kalecki’s  reflux  principle  –  where  firms  earn  
what  they  spend  –  forms  the  basis  of  Minsky’s  Financial  Instability  Hypothesis  
(Minsky,  1986;  Toporowski,  2005).22    
In   Minsky’s   Financial   Instability   Hypothesis   (Minsky,   1986),   the   interaction  
between  non-­‐‑financial  business  and  banks  lies  at  the  heart  of  economic  activity  
and   crisis.   Firms   drive   the   cycle   through   their   speculative   investment   into  
productive  assets,  which  is  only  possible  given  banks’  credit  extension.  Hence,  
the  question  of  agency  behind  the  business  (and  credit)  cycle  is  a  difficult  one.  It  
                                                                                                 
22  It  has  been  argued  (Toporowski,  2005)  that  Minsky  did  not  absorb  Kalecki’s  business  
cycle  ideas  fully,  since  it  is  contradictory  that  both  non-­‐‑financial  firms’  profits  and  debt  
levels  are  assumed  to   increase  over   the  cycle.  The  solution  to   this  problem  lies   in   the  
maldistribution  of  profits,  a  situation  where  some  firms  can  concentrate  profits  among  
themselves.   If   these   are   different   firms   than   those   incurring   increasing   debt,   a  
coexistence   of   ever-­‐‑increasing   profits   alongside   ever-­‐‑increasing   debt   burdens   can  
emerge  (Michell,  2014).    
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has  been  argued  that  Minsky’s  thought  follows  the  German  language  tradition,  
in   which   non-­‐‑financial   firms’   decisions   are   crucial   (Toporowski,   2012).  
However,   this   author   argues   that   Minsky’s   work   exhibits   a   stronger   leaning  
towards  the  Keynesian  than  the  German  tradition,  in  particular  with  regard  to  
understanding  of  finance.    
Crucially,   in   Minksy’s   theory   banks’   bring   about   the   turning   point   of   the  
business   cycle   and   the   so-­‐‑called   Minsky   moment,   heralding   crisis   (Minsky,  
1986).  Over   the   cycle,   non-­‐‑financial   corporations’   borrowing   increases   in   step  
with  their  investment  spending.  While  in  Schumpeter’s  theory  of  the  cycle  the  
downturn  comes  about  as  non-­‐‑financial  companies  start  paying  off  their  credit,  
for   Minsky   the   boom   ends   with   an   interest   rate   increase   initiated   by   the  
Banking   System:   either   endogenously   by   commercial   banks,   trying   to   protect  
their   liquidity   positions,   or   exogenously   by   the   central   bank,   alarmed   by   the  
economic  boom.  For  Schumpeter  (1983[1934])  the  actions  of  corporations  bring  
about  the  cycle  swing,  while  for  Minsky  it  is  the  financial  system.  Thus,  in  the  
Financial   Instability   Hypothesis   the   agency   behind   credit   extension   (and   its  
recall)  is  with  the  Banking  System.        
5.2.2.4.  Evolutionary  banking  theory  
Finally,  this  section  turns  to  Chick’s  (1992)  work  on  the  evolution  of  banking  at  
this  point,  because  it  is  in  Keynes’s  spirit  while  bridging  the  gap  to  the  current  
debate   (in   heterodox   circles)   on   financialisation.   The   evolutionary   banking  
approach,  which  goes  back  to   the  works  of  de  Viti  de  Marco  and  Dahlberg   in  
the   1930s   (Fontana  &  Realfonzo,   2005),   reconciles  Keynesian   thought   and   old  
development  economics,  which  hold  diametrically  opposing  views  on  the  role  
of   savings   in   economic   activity.  While   Keynes   and   the   post-­‐‑Keynesians   hold  
that   investment   creates   savings,   old   development   economists,   like   Lewis,   see  
savings   as   the   decisive   constraint   to   countries’   growth   and   development  
records  (see  part  5.1.2.2.).  Of  course,  Keynes  formulated  his  ideas  for  advanced  
economies,   while   development   thinkers   like   Lewis   had   poor   developing  
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countries  in  mind.  And  in  this  difference,  we  find  the  key  to  reconciling  the  two  
views23:  a  different  stage  of  development  entailing  a  different  set  of  institutions.        
Table 5.3. Victoria Chick’s stages of banking evolution (Chick, 1992) 
  
Chick   (1992)   stresses   that   financial   institutions   are   time   and   country-­‐‑specific,  
rather  than  generic,  as  often  implicitly  assumed.  She  puts  forward  a  framework  
                                                                                                 
23  Which  were   very   closely   related,   for   example,   in   the   work   of   the   Latin   American  
structuralists  (Hunt,  1989)  headed  by  Prebisch,  often  called  the  Latin  American  Keynes.  
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that   accounts   for   five   stages   of   financial   development   (see   Table   5.3.   below),  
which   is   modelled   on   the   progress   of   financial   intermediation   in   the   UK  
economy.  Crucially,  Chick  links  different  stages  of  development  with  different  
theoretical  conceptualisations  of  finance.    
Hence,   stage   1   where   banks   are   small,   numerous   and   geographically   semi-­‐‑
isolated   and   cash   payments   dominate   economic   activity,   appears   to   be   best  
captured  by   the   loanable   funds   theory.  Here,   banks  are  mere  depositories   for  
savings.   Thus,   credit   extension   drains   reserves,   which   effectively   limits   the  
overall  credit  volume.  As  will  be  discussed  in  detail  in  the  following  chapter,  in  
South  Africa  this  stage  was  prevalent  during  the  19th  and  early  20th  century.    
As   banks   become   more   integrated,   consolidate   and   importantly,   bank  
transactions   dominate   cash   payments,   the   financial   system   evolves   to   a   stage  
where   reserves   increasingly   cease   to   determine   credit   volumes.   With   the  
establishment  of  a  deep  interbank  money  market  and,  crucially,  the  acceptance  
of  the  central  bank  of  its  role  as  lender  of  last  resort  (which  it  exercises  not  only  
during  crisis  times),  banks  are  more  and  more  free  to  generate  credit  regardless  
of  their  liability  structure.  A  shortfall  in  liquidity  can  always  be  met  through  the  
interbank  money  market  or  the  overnight  discount  window  at  the  central  bank.    
The  final  stage  in  Chick’s  evolutionary  scheme  is  one  where  banks  are  thrown  
into   competition   with   other   financial   companies   and   therefore,   aggressively  
give   out   loans,   while   actively   managing   their   liabilities.   In   this   way,   they  
attempt   to  grow  their   loan  book,  capturing  as  much  market  share  as  possible,  
while  only  subsequently  looking  for  funding  assets.  This  scenario  is  reminiscent  
of  Hahn’s  ideas  on  bank  credit  extension.  The  agency  here  is  certainly  with  the  
banks,   which   can   (and  must,   given   competitive   pressures)   expand   their   loan  
supply  without  limits.  
As  mentioned,   evolutionary   banking   theory   is   especially   important   from   the  
viewpoint  of  developing  and  emerging  economies,  which  by  definition  possess  
financial   structures   that   are   in   the   process   of   (often   rapid)   change.   Old  
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development  economists  like  Lewis  rejected  the  idea  that  investment  results  in  
savings,  implicitly  embracing  the  loanable  funds  theory.  This  attitude  might  be  
founded   in   an   observation   that   in   the   first   half   of   the   20th   century   (when  
development   economics   established   itself   as   an   independent  discipline)  many  
developing  countries  had  very  rudimentary  financial  systems,  which  could  be  
subsumed  under  stage  1  outline  in  Table  5.3.  In  this  way,  evolutionary  banking  
theory  can  reconcile  Keynesian  theory  and  old  development  economics.    
Chick   formulated   these   ideas   in   the   mid-­‐‑1980s,   long   before   the   term  
‘financialisation’  was  coined.24  But  she  did  this  with  astounding  foresight.  Her  
argument   culminated   in   the   insight   that   there   was   no   obvious   limit   to   (or  
optimal   level  of)   credit  extension  because  demand  and  supply   for  credit  have  
no   clear   restrictions.   The   institutional   characteristics   of   the   final   stage   of  
financial   development   are   those   that   many   heterodox   economists   would  
associate  with  financialisation.          
5.2.3. The financialisation approaches on the role of finance 
This   section   outlines   the   role   of   finance   in   the   macro   economy   as   it   is  
understood  by  the  financialisation  literature.  This  literature  is  inspired  by  Marx  
and  Keynes.  Since  chapter  2  has  discussed  different  financialisation  approaches  
from  the  perspective  of  non-­‐‑financial   firms,   this  section  will   sketch   the  salient  
contributions  from  a  macroeconomic  perspective.  Thus,  the  following  overview  
is  kept  deliberately  concise.    
What  the  different  financialisation  approaches  undoubtedly  agree  upon  is  that  
financial   operations   and   the   financial   system   importantly   shape   (if   not  
outrightly   drive)   real   economic   activity.   Here,   this   literature   is   diametrically  
opposed   to  early  mainstream   theory,   in  which   finance  was  a  mere  veil.  Thus,  
                                                                                                 
24  The  term  ‘financialisation’  was  coined  in  the  mid-­‐‑1990s.  Arrighi  (Arrighi,  1994)  used  
it   in   his   ‘The   long   twentieth   century’.   But   our   present   understanding   appears   to   be  
closer   to   Phillips   (Phillips,   1994)   usage   of   the   term   in   his   book   on   the   influence   of  
financial  on  the  changing  political  landscape  in  the  US.  
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this  chapter  provides  a  tour  of  diverse  economic  thinking  on  the  role  of  finance  
in   the   economy,   starting   with   theories   that   completely   neglect   finance   and  
finishing  with  theories  that  potentially  exaggerate  its  influence.      
While   specific   ideas   within   the   financialisation   discourse   can   be   found   in  
writings  by  a   range  of   critical   and   illustrious   scholars  of   the   late   19th   and  20th  
century  (see  Erturk,  Froud,  Johal,  Leaver,  &  Williams,  2008),   the  origins  of  the  
literature   go   back   to   macroeconomic   inquires   on   the   reasons   for   the   secular  
decline  in  investment  rates  across  OECD  countries  since  the  1970s.  Once  again,  
the   regulationist   school   and   its   discussion   of   changing   accumulation   regimes  
(see  chapter  2)  are  important  to  mention.    
Authors   of   this   theoretical   approach   were   particularly   clear-­‐‑sighted   in  
highlighting   the   interaction   between   shifts   in   information   technology   and  
financial   globalisation   (Chesnais,   1996).   This,   so   the   argument   goes,   allowed  
capital   to   escape   the   consequences  of  declining  profitability   in  production,  by  
re-­‐‑orienting   accumulation   towards   financial   profits.   Some  writers   identified   a  
merging   of   financial   and   industrial   capital   (in   the   form   of   transnational  
corporations,  see    Serfati,  1996,  2008)  as  the  outcome  of  the  process.  Hence,  the  
role  of   finance   in   this   analytical   framework   is   to  generate  profits.  The  agency  
question  (‘Who  drives  credit  cycles?  Banks’  willingness  to  lend  or  firms’  desire  
to  borrow?’)  is  transformed  into  a  question  of:  Who  makes  the  profit?  Financial  
institutions   or   non-­‐‑financial   firms?   For   some   authors   –   like   Serfati   –   the  
difference  between  these  two  types  of  institutions  is  insignificant.  
In  much   of   the   financialisation   debate,   the   agency   (and   the   power)   is   clearly  
situated  with  the  financial  sector,  be  it  with  banks  or  other  financial  institutions.  
Financialisation   is   then   identified   as   a   process   that   increases   the   power   of  
financial   institutions  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  non-­‐‑financial  business   among  other   agents.  The  
work  by  Schaberg  (1999)  is  an  early  illustration  of  this  understanding.  Schaberg  
is  cited  as  precursor  for  the  insight  that  increased  financial  dominance  results  in  
lower   investment   rates   (Stockhammer,   2013).   He   employed   a   framework  
   268  
inspired   by   Gerschenkron   (1976[1962])   and   Hirschman   (2004[1970]),   which  
stressed  institutional  differences  across  countries’  financial  systems.    
Two   ideal   types  of   financial   systems  are   identified:   the  market-­‐‑based  and   the  
bank-­‐‑based   system.25  While   the   Anglo-­‐‑Saxon   countries   are   usually   associated  
with   the   former,   Japan   and   Germany   (and   to   a   lesser   extent   France)   are  
examples   of   the   latter.   In   market-­‐‑based   systems   capital   markets   (and  
consequently  equity  investors)  are  more  important  for  non-­‐‑financial  companies’  
investment   financing   than   in   bank-­‐‑based   economies,   where   non-­‐‑financial  
business  and  their  external  financing  are  closely  intertwined  with  large  banks.  
Schaberg   (1999)   argued   that   bank-­‐‑based   countries   (especially   France)   have  
increasingly  moved  towards  a  more  market-­‐‑based  regime  since  the  1970s.  This  
move  and  increased  financial  investment  by  non-­‐‑financial  firms  were  arguably  
at  the  heart  of  declining  investment  across  OECD  countries.  
As  will  be  discussed  in  detail  in  the  next  chapter,  the  bank-­‐‑based-­‐‑market-­‐‑based  
dichotomy   was   heavily   criticised   and   empirically   challenged;   most  
convincingly   by   Jenny   Corbett   and   Tim   Jenkinson   (1996,   1997),   who   showed  
that   the   majority   of   investment   across   OECD   countries   is   financed   through  
retained  profits,  rather  than  external  finance.  Thus,  the  suggested  classification  
of  countries  into  bank-­‐‑based  and  market-­‐‑based  economies  could  not  be  upheld  
empirically.    
Nevertheless,   Schaberg’s   argument   survived,   echoed   in   subsequent   research,  
which   argues   that   the   increased   influence   of   finance   (that   is,   financialisation)  
results  in  lower  private-­‐‑sector  investment  (see,  for  instance,  Stockhammer,  2004;  
                                                                                                 
25  A   similar   literature   emerged   around   the   contributions   by   Hall   and   Soskice   on  
varieties   of   capitalism.   Hall   &   Soskice   (2001)   distinguished   between   liberal   market  
economies  and  coordinated  market  economies.  The  concepts  are  closely  connected   to  
the   bank-­‐‑based-­‐‑market-­‐‑based  dichotomy.  However,   this   body   of   research   appears   to  
focus  on   the   comparative   study  of   institutions  and  country   classification,   rather   than  
critical   analysis.   As   a   consequence,   its   contribution   to   answering   the   agency   (and  
power)   question   between   finance   and   non-­‐‑financial   companies   is   limited.   For   these  
reasons,  the  literature  is  not  included  in  this  review  of  most  salient  contributions.  
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Orhangazi,   2008   and,   specifically   for   emerging   economics,   Demir,   2007).  
Another   aspect   of   Schaberg’s   work   is   also   present   in   some   authors’  
understanding  of   financialisation,  namely   that   financialisation  entails   the  shift  
from  a  bank-­‐‑based  to  a  market-­‐‑based  financial  systems.    
Aglietta  &  Breton  (2001),  for  instance,  recognise  bank-­‐‑based  and  market-­‐‑based  
financial  structures  as  part  of  any  sophisticated  financial  system.  However,  the  
process   of   financial   liberalisation   and   the   increased   importance   of   financial  
markets  have   led,   in   their  view,   to  a  shift  of  emphasis  away   from  bank-­‐‑based  
structures   to  market-­‐‑based  elements.  Lapavitsas   (2009,  p.  9)  ascribes  a  driving  
force   behind   the   financialisation   of   developing   economies   to   the  World   Bank  
and  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  which  ‘led  developing  countries  to  
alter   the   balance   of   domestic   finance   away   from   bank-­‐‑based,   relational,  
government-­‐‑controlled   toward  market-­‐‑based,   arms-­‐‑length,  private   institutions  
and   mechanisms’.   From   this   perspective   (especially   following   Lapavitsas)   a  
sure  sign  of  financialisation  of  the  firm  (and  an  economy  more  broadly)   is   the  
shift  of  external  financing  away  from  bank  lending  towards  financial  markets.  
Interestingly,  this  last  proposition  has  been  explored  for  the  New  South  Africa  
(see  Rodrigues  Teles  Sampaio,  2012),  but  could  not  be  confirmed.    
Importantly,   in   the   debates   about   financial   market   structures   non-­‐‑financial  
firms   are   often   perceived   as   passive   financial   entities,   adapting   to   changing  
external  pressures   such   as,   for   instance,   the  growing   influence  of   shareholder  
value   (Lazonick   &   O’Sullivan,   2000).   Chapter   2   outlined   the   concept   of  
shareholder  value  in  detail.  It  refers  to  the  need  of  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  to  
conform  to   financial  measures  of  profitability,  satisfying  their  shareholders  by  
maximising   the   value   of   the   latter’s   financial   investment   into   those  
corporations.   Toporowski’s   capital   market   inflation   theory   provides   an  
important   counter   position   to   this   stylised   passivity   of   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations  (Toporowski,  2000).    
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Capital   market   inflation   theory   explains   the   changes   in   the   two   big   Anglo-­‐‑
Saxon  financial  systems  as  resulting  from  the  rising  importance  of  institutional  
investors,  coupled  with  changes  in  middle  class  saving  behaviour  (Toporowski,  
2015).  The  theory  is  set  in  a  Kaleckian  framework  and  could  equally  have  been  
reviewed  as  modern  extension  of  Kaleckian  economic   thought   in  part  5.2.2.3.,  
especially  since  its  author  is  rather  critical  of  the  financialisation  literature  (see  
Michell  &  Toporowski,  2013).    
Capital   market   inflation   theory,   builds   upon   Steindl’s   concept   of   ‘enforced  
indebtedness’,  which  describes  the  detrimental  impact  of  household  saving  on  
non-­‐‑financial  firms’  profits  (Steindl,  1989).  Since  household  saving  is  a  leakage  
from  the  schemes  of  reproduction,  profitability  of  non-­‐‑financial  business  is  only  
warranted  if  investment  expenditure  by  non-­‐‑financial  firms  is  at  least  as  high  as  
this  leakage.  If  investment  falls  below  the  level  of  household  saving,  some  firms  
are  forced  into  debt.    
This   becomes   the   rationale   for   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   to   manage   their  
balance   sheets   more   actively,   investing   into   liquid   and   financial   assets;  
especially   since   spells   of   stock   market   booms   provide   cheap   finance.  
Importantly,   in   the   capital   market   inflation   theory   listed   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations  are  actively  engaged  in  the  structural  changes  that  the  relationship  
between   financial   markets   and   non-­‐‑financial   business   is   undergoing,   rather  
than  being  passive.  Hence,  in  this  framework  credit  extension  is  driven  by  the  
interplay  between  finance  and  non-­‐‑financial  companies  (as  in  the  Kaleckian  and  
Schumpeterian   setting),   while   agency   in   the   finance-­‐‑non-­‐‑financial   business  
relationship   is  nuanced,   impacted  by   entities’   heterogeneity   (small   companies  
will   be   at   the   mercy   of   a   banks,   while   large   corporations   have   considerable  
power  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  financial  institutions).    
Much   of   the   financialisation   literature   addresses   the   category   of   power   very  
directly.  Here,  by  definition,  financialisation  involves  a  shift  of  power  towards  
financial  institutions.  Epstein  and  others  (Epstein,  2002;  Epstein  &  Power,  2003;  
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Jayadev  &  Epstein,  2007),  for  instance,  regard  the  rise  of  the  financial  rentier  as  
central  in  the  process  of  financialisation.  With  increased  power  held  by  financial  
investors,  policies  that  benefit  this  group  of  people  (such  as  inflation  targeting)  
have  been  implemented  by  government  authorities.        
The  work  of  Duménil  &  Lévy  (2013)  also  very  clearly  gives  the  financial  sector  
agency,  making  it,  since  the  rise  of  neoliberalism,  the  more  powerful  partner  in  
the   relationship   between   non-­‐‑financial   business   and   finance.   Their   peculiar  
interpretation   of   financialisation   is   one   of   reoccurring   shifts   in   power   among  
the  three  classes:  workers,  managers,  and  (financial)  capitalists.  Since  the  1970s,  
a  rise  in  neoliberal  policies  –  so  the  argument  –  has  benefited  financial  interests  
at   the  expense  of  organised   labour.  For  Duménil  &  Lévy   (2013)  managers  are  
the   crucial   class  which   either   aligns   its   interests  with  workers   (as   during   the  
Fordist  years  of  the  1950s  and  1960s)  or  the  capitalist  class,  which  if  unfettered  
will   pursue   their   financial   interests.   Financialisation   once   again   is   seen   as   a  
process  that  shifts  power  towards  finance.    
The   financialisation   literature   has   its   origins   in   advanced   economies.   In   the  
context   of   developing   and   emerging   economies,   research   on   the   changing  
nature   of   financial   institutions   often   focuses   on   the   growing   financial  
vulnerability   of   these   countries   as   result   of   their   increasing   integration   into  
global   financial   structure   (for   instance  Chandrasekhar  &  Pal,   2006,   or  Akyüz,  
2015).   Therefore,   financial   liberalisation   –   advocated   by   proponents   of   the  
financial   deepening   hypothesis   discussed   in   part   5.1.3.1.   –   and   its   link   with  
currency   and   economic   crises   is   a  major   research   theme.   The   turbulent   1990s  
and  early  2000s,  which  saw  currency  crises  in  Russia,  East  Asia  and  across  Latin  
America,  provided  ample  material   to  study   the  destabilising   impact  of  capital  
flows  (see,  for  instance,  de  Paula  &  Alves,  2000;  Grabel,  2003;  Cruz,  Amann,  &  
Walters,  2006).    
In   this   context,   Minsky’s   Financial   Instability   Hypothesis   was   a   popular  
analytical  framework  to  explain  the  build-­‐‑up  of  financial  fragility  as  a  result  of  
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financial   deregulation   and   booming   capital   inflows   (see,   for   example,  Kregel,  
1998;  Dymski,  1999;  Arestis  &  Glickman,  2002).  Financial  liberalisation  reforms  
typically   raised   interest   rates   in   emerging   economies.   This   made   financial  
investment   attractive   for   foreigners,   resulting   in   rising   capital   inflows   that  
translated  into  asset  price  inflation.  As  long  as  the  inflationary  dynamics  were  
in   motion   (powered   by   further   capital   inflows)   emerging   economies   were  
booming,  however,  at  the  price  of  deteriorating  balance  sheet  positions  of  local  
non-­‐‑financial  businesses.    
Once   the   capital   inflow   dried   up,   because   the   financially   fragile   situation   of  
local   firms   started   surfacing,   inflationary   dynamics   transformed   quickly   into  
deflationary  ones,  bringing  about  an  economic  bust  and  a  currency  crisis.  These  
scenarios  were  often  worsened  by  managed  (or  quasi-­‐‑pegged)  exchange  rates,  
making   the   devaluation   process   even   more   painful,   as   domestic   debt  
denominated  in  foreign  currency  ballooned.    
While  the  body  of  research  around  currency  crises  in  emerging  economies  does  
not   officially   run   under   the   label   of   ‘financialisation’   it   highlights   the  
distinctiveness  of   financial   institutions   in   emerging  and  developing   countries,  
therefore,   forming   the   basis   for   the   growing   literature   on   financialisation   in  
emerging  markets.  What  it  further  demonstrates  is  that  agency  and  power  often  
are   not   located   within   the   country   (somewhere   in   the   interaction   between  
financial   institutions  and  non-­‐‑financial  firms),  but  rather  outside  of   it  with  the  
global  financial  structure  and  institutions.          
The  integration  of  emerging  economies  into  global  financial  structures  through  
financial   liberalisation   is   also   believed   to   increase   speculative   financial  
investment  by  domestic  non-­‐‑financial   firms   (see  Farhi  &  Borghi,  2009;  Correa,  
Vidal,  &  Marshall,  2012).  This  theme  was  discussed  in  more  detail  in  chapter  2,  
dealing  with   the  non-­‐‑financial  corporation  specifically.   It   is  sometimes  argued  
that   this  microeconomic   trend   jeopardises   the   industrialisation  process  on   the  
macroeconomic  level  in  emerging  economies  (Chandrasekhar,  2013).  
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Generally,   the   financialisation   process   in   these   countries   is   understood   to   be  
different   from   that   in   advanced   economies   and   locally   specific   (Becker,   Jäger,  
Leubolt,   &   Weissenbacher,   2010).   This   thesis   contributes   to   the   specific  
literature  on  the  changing  character  of  the  South  African  financial  system.      
Table 5.4. Summary of macro perspective on finance, (post-)Keynesian tradition 
  
5.3. Summary and conclusion 
By  way  of  summary,  the  answers  to  the  three  questions  guiding  this  chapter  are  
provided  here.  These  three  questions  were:  (1)  What  is  the  macroeconomic  role  
of  financial  institutions?  (2)  What  (or  who)  drives  credit  extension?  And  (3)  who  
is   the  more  powerful  party   in   the   interaction  between  financial   intermediaries  
and  non-­‐‑financial  corporations?  
For   mainstream   economic   analysis   the   role   of   the   financial   system   is   one   of  
economic   intermediation.  With   the   advent   of  New  Keynesian   economics,   this  
function   was   extended   to   include   risk   management.   Therefore,   with   a   few  
exceptions   at   the   more   enlightened   mainstream   fringe,   the   loanable   funds  
theory  remains  central  to  orthodox  economic  thinking.  Once  again,  it  should  be  
stressed  that  this  has  not  always  been  the  case  and  mainly  developed  after  the  
1960s.  In  consequence,  credit  extension  is  determined  by  loanable  funds  saved  
and   the  agency   (if   there  can  be  any  agency   in  a  perfectly  competitive  market)  
really  is  with  those  who  save.      
By  contrast,  German  language  economic  theory  was  so  rich  due  to  the  absence  
of  any  firm  consensus.  Thus,  it  is  not  the  intension  to  portray  it  as  uniform  by  
answering   the   three   questions   in   an   unequivocal   way.   Nevertheless,   certain  
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strands   (with   certain   answers   to   the   three   questions)   can   be   identified.   The  
Austrian   tradition   around   von  Mises   would   have   subscribed   to   the   loanable  
funds  theory,  while  assigning  the  driving  force  behind  credit  extension  to  banks  
and   their   inadequate   interest   rate   policies.   Hahn   and   Schumpeter,   who  
arguably  had  the  most  profound  insight  into  the  workings  of  credit,  would  see  
the   role   of   the   financial   sector   as   one   of   endogenous   credit   creation.   Their  
assessment   of  who  drives   credit   extension   and   agency  would,   however,   have  
differed  fundamentally.  Hahn  (at  least  in  his  early  writings)  assigned  banks  the  
power  to  extend  unlimited  credit.  The  agency  was,  therefore,  with  banks,  only  
limited  by  central  bank  intervention.  For  Schumpeter,  in  contrast,  entrepreneurs  
and   therefore   non-­‐‑financial   companies   drove   credit   extension.   Thus,   non-­‐‑
financial   firms   were   the   powerful   partner.   Even   though   Kalecki   is   typically  
labelled   a   post-­‐‑Keynesian   thinker   his   understanding   of   finance   in   the   macro  
economy  was  essentially  very  close  to  Schumpeter’s.    
Hahn’s   early   ideas   on   credit   were  mainly   influenced   by   English   writings   on  
banking   and,   maybe   unsurprisingly,   similar   ideas   can   be   found   in   Keynes’s  
writings   on   finance.   Once   again,   the   banking   sector   creates   money  
endogenously.   But   the   interaction   between   banks   and   the   central   bank  
determines   credit   extension.   The   agency   and   power   is   therefore   with   the  
Banking   System,   which   non-­‐‑financial   companies   face   in   their   demands   for  
credit.   The   post-­‐‑Keynesian   tradition   and   much   of   the   financialisation   debate  
follow  this  conviction.  The  role  of  financial  institutions  is  to  create  money  and  
financial   instruments.   They   are   the   driving   force   behind   credit   extension   and  
are  also   the  more  powerful  party   in   their   interaction  with  non-­‐‑financial   firms.  
The   financialisation   literature   explicitly   stresses   that   the   financial   sector   is   in  
fact   growing   its   power   vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis   other   entities   and   notably   non-­‐‑financial  
business.    
Generally,   the   recent  mainstream   and   the   heterodox   literature   fundamentally  
differ   in   their   understanding   of   credit:   While   it   is   exogenously   determined  
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(through   the   loanable   funds   framework)   for   orthodox   economists,   it   is  
endogenously  created  for  heterodox  writers.  Within  the  heterodox  tradition,  the  
split   runs  along  the   lines  of  agency:  There  exists  a  German-­‐‑language   tradition  
(even  though  not  all  German-­‐‑language  thinkers  ascribed  to   it),  which  sees   the  
agency   behind   financial   transactions  with   non-­‐‑financial   corporations.  Keynes,  
most  of  the  post-­‐‑Keynesians  and  much  of  the  financialisation  literature  see  the  
agency  with  financial  institutions  and  view  non-­‐‑financial  companies  as  victims  
of  increasing  financial  power  in  the  economic  system.    
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Chapter VI: A Flow-of-Funds Approach to Understand the 
Interaction between Finance and Non-
Financial Firms in the Macro Economy  
  
As   stressed   in   the  methodological  discussion   in   chapter   1,   in   this  dissertation  
the  view  is  taken  that  economic  theory  is  time  and  space  dependent,  rather  than  
universally   true.   Hence,   the   varying   theoretical   perspectives   on   finance  
presented  in  chapter  5  might  have  been  applicable  only  to  certain  economies  at  
certain  times.  In  fact,  contradictory  theories  might  have  been  equally  correct  for  
specific  countries,  but  in  different  historical  periods.    
This  dissertation  focuses  on  South  Africa.  Hence,  the  three  questions  about  (1)  
the  macroeconomic   role   of   financial   institutions,   (2)   the   driving   force   behind  
credit  extension,  and  (3)  agency  the  interaction  between  financial  intermediaries  
and  non-­‐‑financial  businesses  have   to  be  answered  specifically   for   this  African  
emerging   economy.   This   chapter   will   provide   the   tools   to   address   these  
questions,  which  will  subsequently  be  answered  in  chapter  7.  A  response  to  the  
question  of  what   roles  both   finance  and  non-­‐‑financial   firms  play   in  aggregate  
can   only   be   found   using   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   analysis.   The   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   approach,  
depicted  in  detail  in  section  6.1.,  is  crucial  to  unveiling  the  close  links  between  
real  and  financial  operations,  as  well  as  the  interdependence  between  economic  
aggregates  in  the  economy.  
Furthermore,  the  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  approach  has  been  adopted  to  shed  light  on  the  
second  question  concerned  with  the  driving  force  behind  credit  extension.  The  
literature   attempting   to   classify   financial   systems   using   the   dichotomous  
categories   of   bank-­‐‑based   vs.   market-­‐‑based   economies   has   embraced   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑
funds  analysis  in  its  empirical  application.  Section  6.2.  will  provide  an  overview  
of   the  most   relevant   developments  within   this   research   strand   and   identify   a  
method  suitable  to  answering  the  three  questions  for  South  Africa.  The  method  
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suggested   as  most   useful   for   purposes   at   hand  was   developed   by   Corbett   &  
Jenkinson  (1996,  1997),  calculating  net  financial  sources  and  uses  of  funds.  This  
approach   is   reasonable   when   focusing   on   real   sector   investment   only.   The  
approach   will   be   adapted   to   account   for   financial   investment,   which  
necessitates  the  inclusion  of  gross  (and  not  merely  net)  flows.  
The   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  accounts  were  developed  mainly  based  on   the  work  of   the  
US-­‐‑American   institutionalist   Morris   Copeland.   Thus,   the   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  
approach  is  intellectually  indebted  to  the  old  economic  institutionalism  school.  
This   school   of   thought   stressed   the   dependence   of   economic   institutions   on  
their  historical  context.  Therefore,  section  6.3.  will  provide  a  historical  view  on  
the  developments  among  non-­‐‑financial  businesses  and  financial  institutions,  in  
aggregate,   in   South  Africa.   This   overview  helps   to   answer   the   third   question  
about  agency  and  power   in  the   interaction  between  the  two  economic  sectors.  
The  chapter  argues   that   the  bank-­‐‑based-­‐‑market-­‐‑based  dichotomy  is  not  useful  
to   understand   the   development   of   the   financial   sector   and   production,   more  
generally,   in   South   Africa.   Historically,   it   was   the   corporate   non-­‐‑financial  
sector,  specifically  mining  companies,  that  shaped  the  development  of  financial  
markets   in   South   Africa.   Thus,   this   thesis   argues   that   in   contrast   to   popular  
perception   (see   Amphlett,   1914;   Jones,   2009)   the   domestic   financial   sector   as  
well   as   British   banks   contributed   little   towards   the   development   of   South  
African   industry.   Due   to   the   lack   of   domestic   external   finance,   the   South  
African   mining-­‐‑finance   houses   emerged,   which   had   strong   ties   to   European  
financiers   (rather   than  British  banks,  more  narrowly)  and,  over   time,  emerged  
as   powerful   financial   players   due   to   their   ability   to   generate   large   financial  
funds  internally.  
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6.1. The flow-of-funds approach in detail 
6.1.1. A brief historical perspective 
The   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  accounts  were  developed  and   first  published   in   the  United  
States.  Hick’s  The  social  framework  (Hicks,  1943)  is  sometimes  regarded  to  be  an  
early  predecessor  of  the  statistical  work  on  national  financial  accounts  (see  Roe,  
1973).   However,   his   book   does   not   contain   any   explicit   treatment   of   the  
financial  dimension  necessary  for  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  accounts,  apart  from  a  fanciful  
comment   to   give   ‘similar   elementary   treatment   to  Money   and   Finance’   in   an  
envisaged  sequel  publication  (Hicks,  1943,  p.  vi).      
However,  Copeland  and  his  research  team  and  later   the  Division  on  Research  
and  Statistics  at   the  Federal  Reserve  (Fed)  pioneered  the  actual  compilation  of  
flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   accounts   (Roe,   1973,   Taylor,   1996).   The   first   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   data  
for   the   US,   which   Copeland   called   ‘moneyflows’,   were   published   in   1952  
(Copeland,   1952).  During   the   1950s,   the   accounts  were   adjusted  and   renamed  
from  moneyflows  to  flow  of  funds  to  avoid  any  confusion  with  movements  in  
cash   stocks   (Cohen,   1972)   and   bring   the   terminology   closer   to   business  
accounting   (Taylor,   1996).   In   1955,   the   Federal   Reserve   published   a   historical  
annual  series  of  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  accounts:  Flow  of  Funds  in  the  United  States,  1939-­‐‑
1953.   And   shortly   after,   the   Fed   began   to   produce   quarterly   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  
statistics,   which   were   demanded   by   the   Fed’s   board   of   governors   to   better  
inform  policy  making  and  economic  forecasts  (Taylor,  1996).  
Copeland’s   original   approach   (and   similarly,   the   1955   accounts)   contained   a  
range  of  imputed  transactions  especially  for  non-­‐‑financial  transactions  such  as  
employers’   expenditure   on   wages,   non-­‐‑financial   firms’   interest   spending   etc.  
These   variables   were   difficult   to   calculate   on   an   annual   basis.   In   fact,  
Copeland’s  original  accounts  were  extremely  detailed,  splitting  the  economy  up  
into   ten   sectors,   namely:   households,   farms,   industrial   corporations,   business  
proprietors  and  partnerships  and  others,  state  and  local  government,  banks  and  
US  Monetary  Funds,  life  insurance  companies,  other  insurance  carriers,  security  
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and   realty   firms,   and   the   rest   of   the  world   (Copeland,   1952).   The   transaction  
items  listed  were  equally  comprehensive,  resulting  in  almost  140  pages  of  tables  
to   cover   a   sample   worksheet   of   moneyflows,   which   was   provided   in  
Copeland’s  1952  publication  for  the  year  1939.      
Hence,  in  order  to  deliver  quarterly  accounts  the  imputed  values  were  replaced  
by   the   income   and   expenditure   accounts   from   the   US   national   income   and  
production   accounts   (NIPA),  which  were  developed  by  Richard  Stone  during  
the   1930s.1  As   a   result,   the   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   accounts   were   simplified   (Cohen,  
1972). 2   Following   the   US,   other   countries   also   implemented   the   statistical  
innovation   of   the   flow   of   funds   because   the   data   were   believed   to   support  
monetary  policy.  In  the  UK,  the  Radcliff  Committee  stressed  the  need  for  flow-­‐‑
of-­‐‑funds  data  in  1959  and  the  first  accounts,  covering  the  years  1960-­‐‑1962,  were  
made  available  in  1963  (Bank  of  England,  1972).  In  South  Africa,  B.  van  Staden  
pioneered  the  work  on  flow  of  funds  in  1962.  This  first  compilation  was  limited  
to   the   main   financial   assets   and   liabilities,   and   focused   mostly   on   the  
government  sector  alongside  banks  in  aggregate  and  other  financial  institutions  
(Uys,  1984).  By  the  end  of  the  1960s,  internationally  standardised  procedures  for  
flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  compilation  were  established  by   the  United  Nations,  aiding   the  
proliferation  of  flow  of  funds  as  statistical  tool  across  countries.    
For   South   Africa,   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   data   are   available   in   the   National   Financial  
Accounts,   published   regularly   in   the   South   African   Reserve   Bank’s   (SARB)  
Quarterly  Bulletin.  The  first  national  financial  accounts  were  published  in  1982  
for   the   year   1980.   Since   then   the   SARB   has   regularly   included   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  
data   in  the  Quarterly  Bulletin.   Initially,   this  was  annual  data.  Starting  in  1990,  
quarterly   national   financial   accounts   were   made   available.   These   were  
                                                                                                 
1  See  Samuelson  &  Nordhaus,  1999,  for  a  history  of  NIPA.  
2  According   to   some   commentators   this   marrying   up   of   the   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   with   the  
NIPA   system   could   not   have   been   in   Copeland’s   spirit   (Taylor,   1996)   since   it  
substantially  narrowed  down  the  original  work  
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published   in   a   (by  now   rare3)   supplement   to   the   SARB  Quarterly  Bulletin   for  
December  1994  (SARB,  1994).  Along  with  the  introduction  of  quarterly  flow  of  
funds,   the   issue   also   included   historical   national   financial   accounts   for   the  
period   1970-­‐‑1979.  These   South  African  data   covering   1970  until   today  will   be  
the  basis  for  the  empirical  analysis  in  the  next  chapter.  
6.1.2. The flow-of-funds matrix 
The   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   accounts   are   commonly   presented   in   matrix   form.   The  
columns   (j)   represent   different   economic   aggregates,   whereas   the   rows   (i)  
account  for  transactions  of  assets/liabilities  (Green,  1992).  Cells  typically  contain  
gross   transactions,  meaning   that  each  cell   is   split   into   two,  containing  sources  
(S)  and  uses  (U)  of  funds  for  sector  j  and  transaction  item  i.  Therefore,  each  cell  
(i,   j)   shows   sales   and   purchases   of   asset/liability   i   by   sector   j   over   a   given  
period,   usually   a   quarter   or   a   year.   Tables   A.2.   and   A..3.   in   the   appendix  
provide  the  latest  national  financial  accounts  for  South  Africa  as  illustration.  
The  accounts  are  based  on  the  quadruple-­‐‑entry  principle.  There  are  four  entries  
for   each   transaction   because   the   two   parties   to   a   transaction   each   record   a  
change   in   sources   and   uses,   resulting   in   four   entries.   Importantly,   for   each  
sector   sources   and   uses   have   to   balance,   since   total   spending   on   real   and  
financial  assets  must  be  backed  by  an  equivalent  volume  of  funds.  Similarly,  for  
each  transaction  item  (which  is  listed  in  the  rows)  total  sources  and  uses  must  
balance  since  one  party’s  expenditure  is  another  party’s  receipt.    
Overall,   the   sector  balances  have   to  add  up   to  zero.  The  aggregate  balance  of  
the   private   sector   (households,   non-­‐‑financial   businesses   and   financial  
intermediaries),  the  government  sector  and  the  rest  of  the  world  have  to  sum  to  
                                                                                                 
3  Generally  South  African  national  statistics  are  relatively  easily  obtainable,  especially  
since  the  SARB  provides  the  majority  of  it  online.  In  contrast  to  the  Quarterly  Bulletins,  
however,   this   crucial   supplement   is   not   available   on   the   SARB’s   webpage.  
Consequently,   the   author   had   to   track   down   a   hard   copy   of   the   publication,   which  
proved  to  be  extremely  rare.  Therefore,  the  analysis  presented  in  the  following  chapter  
is   one   of   the   only   historical   discussions   of   the   South   African   national   financial  
accounts,  covering  the  period  1970-­‐‑2014.  
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zero  because  all  expenditure   in  a  country  has  to  be  backed  by  funds  received.  
This  is  –  in  a  nutshell  –  Godley’s  three  balances  approach.  In  practice,  recording  
of   transactions   is   of   course   imperfect   and   a   balancing   item   is   introduced   to  
smooth  out  any  recording  errors.      
The  number  of  rows  and  columns  depends  on  the  degree  of  disaggregation  and  
is  guided  by  data  availability.  In  the  early  UK  flow  of  funds,  for  instance,  only  
six   sectors   were   listed:   the   public   sector,   overseas   sector,   personal   sector,  
industrial   and   commercial   companies,   banking   sector   and   other   financial  
institutions   (Bank   of   England,   1972).   Notably,   the   order   of   and   terminology  
used  for  the  six  sectors  is  the  one  chosen  by  the  Bank  of  England.    
By   contrast,   the   first   South   African   national   financial   accounts   contained   far  
more  detail  concerning  different   financial   institutions.  The  South  African   flow  
of   funds   have   always   been   organised   into   five  major   sectors   in   the   following  
order:   foreign   sector,   financial   intermediaries,   general   government,   corporate  
business   enterprises   and   households.   These   sectors   then   have   various   sub-­‐‑
sectors.   Most   attention   is   given   to   the   disaggregation   of   the   financial  
intermediaries,   which   have   five   sub-­‐‑aggregates:   Monetary   authority,   other  
monetary   institutions,   the   Public   Investment   Commissioners,   insurers   and  
retirement  funds  and  other  financial  institutions.    
During  the  1980s  an  additional  sub-­‐‑sector  was  included  (namely,  other  deposit-­‐‑
receiving   institutions),   to   account   for   the   increased   importance   of   building  
societies  in  providing  mortgages  during  the  1970s.  The  sub-­‐‑sector  disappeared  
from   the   accounts   by   1990,   presumably   because   building   societies   lost   in  
importance  over  the  1980s,  as   the  financial  sector  experienced  a  growing  level  
of   concentration.   Building   societies   expanded   rapidly   between   1978   and   1980  
under   conditions   of   cheap   and   easy   liquidity   (Skinner   &   Osborn,   1992).  
Liquidity  tightened  from  the  mid-­‐‑1980s  onwards,  when  South  Africa  struggled  
to   raise   foreign   currency   through   both   private   sector   and   International  
Monetary   Fund   (IMF)   lending   (Padayachee,   1991).   In   consequence,   most  
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building  societies  either  were  taken  over  by  banks  or  squeezed  out  of  business  
during   the   1980s,   explaining   their   exclusion   from   the   national   financial  
accounts.    
This  development   illustrates   that   the   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  matrix   is   in   constant   flux,  
adapting  to  the  rising  importance  of  new  financial  transactions,  and  potentially  
also   the   changing   significance   of   sub-­‐‑sectors.   Importantly,   the   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  
matrix   contains   non-­‐‑financial   transactions   in   the   top   rows,   which   are   taken  
from   the   income   and   expenditure   accounts.   In   this   way   the   flow   of   funds  
provide  a  link  between  real  and  financial  operations  of  the  different  economic  
aggregates   in   the   overall   economy.  These   non-­‐‑financial   transactions   are   gross  
saving  and  gross  investment.  They  are  crucial  to  determine  whether  a  sector  is  a  
net  lender,  i.e.  its  gross  saving  exceeds  gross  investment  for  a  given  period,  or  a  
net  borrower,  i.e.  gross  saving  falls  short  of  gross  investment.  In  other  words,  if  
the   sources   of   funds   of   a   sector   exceed   its   uses   of   funds,   the   sector   is   a   net  
lender.   Conversely,   if   uses   are   larger   than   sources   of   funds,   the   economic  
aggregate  has  to  become  a  net  borrower.    
Finally,   as   with   all   data,   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   accounts   are   shaped   by   a   significant  
amount   of   domestic   accounting   convention.   In   the   case   of   South   Africa   it   is  
striking   that   the   foreign   sector   and   subsequently   financial   intermediaries   are  
listed  first  when  reading  the  accounts  from  left   to  right.  This  order  appears  to  
imply  the  perceived  importance  of   the  aggregates   in  the  financial   flows  of   the  
economy.  The  fact  that  financial  intermediaries  are  far  more  disaggregated  than  
any  other   sector   supports   this  view.  Equally,   it   is   somewhat   surprising   to   see  
the   monetary   authority   listed   as   part   of   financial   intermediaries   rather   than  
general   government.   This   is   linked   to   the   ownership   structure   of   the   SARB,  
which   has   legally   always   been   and   remains   a   private   (and   privately   owned)  
entity   (see   SARB,   2015).   The   more   recent   emphasis   on   central   bank  
independence  arguably  supports  this  type  of  ownership  arrangement.              
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6.1.3. The strength and weaknesses of flow-of-funds analysis 
When   Copeland   published   his   first   complete   set   of   moneyflow   accounts   in  
1952,   the  statistical   innovation  was  hailed  as  pushing  the   frontier  of  economic  
model-­‐‑building.  Mitchell  reportedly  expected  the  flow  of  funds  to  be  as  popular  
with  the  next  generation  of  economists  as  the  GDP  had  been  previously  (Cohen,  
1972).  These  expectations  proved  overly  optimistic.      
Among   economic   practitioners   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   analysis   is   very   popular,   much  
more  so  than  among  academic  economists.  During  the  1960s  and  70s,  when  the  
work   on   financial   accounts   was   still   in   its   early   stages,   the   lack   of   academic  
interest   was   put   down   to   limited   data   availability   across   countries   and  
especially   for   stock   data,   which   is   comparable   to   a   balance   sheet   for   the  
economy  as  a  whole  (Bank  of  England,  1972).  Stocks  are  necessarily  needed  to  
accompany  flows  to  provide  a  complete  picture.  Hence,  anticipating  a  change  in  
academic   attitudes,   once   the   data   would   be   provided,   textbooks   on   the  
compilation  and   interpretation  of   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  accounts  were  written  during  
these  years  (see,  for  instance,  Powelson,  1960  and  Mason,  1976).  
Today,   despite   excellent   data   availability   for  many   advanced   economies   and  
good  quality  of  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  data  in  a  range  of  emerging  economies  (including  
South  Africa)  the  situation  has  not  changed  much.  Discussions  of  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  
analysis   often   explicitly   address   practitioners   (such   as   the   excellent   edited  
volume   by  Dawson,   1996),   seemingly   aware   of   the   lack   of   academic   interest.  
One  reason  might  be  the  difficulty  to  impose  simple  economic  models  onto  the  
flow  of   funds  due  to   the   level  of  detail   that   financial  accounts  contain  (Green,  
Murinde,  Suppakitjarak,  &  Moore,  2000).    
But   the   scepticism,   at   least   among   mainstream   economists,   appears   more  
deeply   seated.   The   theoretical   and   academic   value   of   the   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  
accounts   have   been   doubted   early   on   in   their   history.  David  Meiselman   in   a  
review  of  Raymond  W.  Goldsmith’s  work  on  US  stocks  of  wealth  and  flows  of  
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saving   and   investment   after   World   War   II   expressed   this   scepticism   rather  
nonchalantly:  
‘Yet   despite   this   vast   and   continuing   outpouring   of   data   from   the   Federal  
Reserve’s   flow   of   funds   statistical   salt-­‐‑mill,   to   the   reviewer’s   best   knowledge  
not  a  single   important  substantive  contribution  to  the  fields  of  money,  finance  
and  investment  behaviour  has  resulted  from  the  availability  of  data  or  from  the  
special   accounting   format   used   to   assemble   and   classify   figures’   (Meiselman,  
1967,  p.  633).  
Such  attacks  were  countered  by  proponents  of  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  modelling  such  as  
A.   D.   Bain,   stressing   the   importance   of   flow   of   funds   for   policy   formulation  
(Bain,  1973)  or  Jacob  Cohen,  highlighting  the  influence  of  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  analysis  
on   the   theoretical   thinking  of,  among  others,  Gurley  and  Shaw  (Cohen,  1972).  
Arguably  a   stronger   emphasis  on   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  accounts   rather   than  national  
accounts   (and   GDP),   for   example   in   economics   teaching,   could   prevent  
common  economic  misconceptions  about  the  money  circuit.    
Anyone   who   has   worked   with   the   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   accounts   understands  
intuitively  that  ‘new’  money  does  not  enter  the  circuit  merely  at  the  discretion  
of   the  central  bank.  Rather  credit  money   is   created  by   financial   institutions   in  
their  lending  activity.  This  view  on  money  and  credit  creation  is  implicit  in  the  
set-­‐‑up   of   the   flow   of   funds   because   money   (that   is   cash   but   also   cash-­‐‑
equivalents,  meaning  any  other  financial  claims)  is  not  treated  as  a  commodity  
but  as  financial  claim,  generating  simultaneously  a  ‘credit’  and  a  ‘debit’  in  each  
transaction.    
There  is  also  no  necessary  lag  between  money  creation  and  its  effects  onto  the  
economy.  Therefore,  the  popular  image  that  inflation  is  a  situation  in  which  too  
many  dollars   (or  any  other  currency)  chase   too   few  goods   is  overly  simplistic  
and  mostly  incorrect.  Equally,  the  notion  that  hoarding  somehow  takes  money  
out  of  the  financial  system  is  wrong  (Millar,  1996).  Hence,  the  strength  of  flow-­‐‑
of-­‐‑funds   analysis   is   that   it   avoids   popular  misconceptions   about   the   financial  
system,   which   according   to   J.   R.   Millar   (1996)   often   rest   on   a   simplistic  
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understanding   of   financial   transactions   visualising   the   money   circuit   as   the  
opening  of  a  spigot.    
Copeland  suggested  to  counter  this  misplaced  hydraulic  analogy  by  imagining  
financial   flows   not   as   water   but   as   electricity   (Copeland,   1952).   Instead   of   a  
system   of   pipes   and   reservoirs   the   economy   works   like   a   network   of   cables  
connected  to  batteries.  This  image  is  superior  because,  for  one,  electricity  moves  
almost  instantaneously  and  two  parties  are  needed  for  it  to  flow  between  them.  
Copeland  must  have  been  very  fond  of  this  analogy  since  a  system  of  batteries  
and  cables  embellishes  the  inside  cover  of  this  1952  publication.  
Apart   from   avoiding   misconceptions,   the   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   framework   explicitly  
introduces  economic  dimensions  which  are  crucial  to  understand  the  workings  
of   the   economy,   which,   however,   until   recently   have   often   been   ‘simplified’  
away.  These   are:   (1)   the   importance  of   finance   and   the   inherent   link  between  
real  and  financial  transactions.  (2)  The  need  to  consider  stocks  as  well  as  flows.  
(3)  The  understanding  of   individual  economic  units  as   interconnected  balance  
sheets,   which   in   the   economy   as   a   whole   result   in   an   interdependence   of  
economic  sectors.  
(1)   Flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   accounts   are   the   manifestation   of   the   inherent  
interconnectedness   between   real   and   financial   transactions   in   the   economy.  
Crucially,  unlike  in  many  other  economic  frameworks,  financial  intermediation  
is  central  in  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  analysis.  The  flow  of  funds  reveal  that  real  economic  
transactions  must   always   have   a   financial   counterpart   because   for   individual  
economic   entities   as   well   as   economic   aggregates   gross   saving   and   gross  
investment   rarely   match.   Hence,   economic   units   with   a   shortfall   in   receipts  
need   to   acquire   additional   funds,   while   those   with   a   surplus   will   use   their  
excess  funds  for  financial  investment.    
(2)  At   this  point,   flow  analysis  calls   for   the  consideration  of  stocks  and  in  this  
way  stresses  the  inherent  link  between  economic  flows  and  stocks.  For  instance,  
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an  economic  sector  that  experiences  a  shortfall  in  receipts  (i.e.  in  sources)  over  
desired  spending   (i.e.  uses)  has   two  options:  either   to  borrow  or   to  run  down  
accumulated   saving   (i.e.   previously   undertaken   financial   investment).   The  
former   option   stresses   the   importance   of   financial   intermediation,   the   latter  
emphasises  the  need  to  account  for  economic  stocks.      
(3)  Finally,  the  accounts  are  built  on  the  quadruple-­‐‑entry  principle.  Thus,  every  
economic  unit  is  explicitly  understood  as  balance  sheet,  an  understanding  that  
Minsky  later  made  central  to  his  analysis,  as  discussed  in  chapter  2.  This  means  
that   assets   and   liabilities   are  not   independent  of   each  other,   since  one  party’s  
asset  is  another  party’s  liability.  In  the  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  accounts,  this  principle  is  
projected  onto   the  macroeconomic  plane.  Economic  aggregates  do  not  exist   in  
isolation.  They  are  interwoven  and  depend  on  each  other  for  their  receipts.  This  
is  beautifully  exemplified  in  the  misguided  policy  of  a  budget  surplus  rule  for  
instance.    
Of   course,   there   are   also   limitations   to   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   analysis.   They   mostly  
come  in  the  form  of  limited  data  availability,  which  is  connected  to  a  trade-­‐‑off  
between  detail,   on   the  one  hand,   and   cost   and   simplicity  of  use,  on   the  other  
hand.  For  this  dissertation,  the  lack  of  further  data  disaggregation  for  the  non-­‐‑
financial   businesses   aggregate   constituted   a   substantial   limitation.   As  
mentioned  above,  the  original  moneyflow  accounts  by  Copeland  distinguished  
between  (1)  the  industrial  sector  and  (2)  business  proprietors  and  partnerships  
and  others.  This  distinction  went  some  way  to  account  for  firm  heterogeneity.    
In  the  Kaleckian  research  tradition  it  was  principally  Steindl  (1945,  1976[1952])  
who   pointed   towards   the   crucial   difference   between   large   corporations   and  
small  and  medium  enterprises   (SMEs).   In  his  analysis   the   interaction  between  
firms   of   different   sizes   accounted   for   industry   dynamics,   explaining   growth  
and   stagnation   over   time   in   an   economy   as   a   whole.   According   to   Steindl,  
economic   stagnation   occurs   in   an   industry   if   profit   is   maldistributed,  
accumulating  mostly  with  large  businesses  that  reap  oligopolistic  profits,  while  
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small  competitive  businesses  are  suffering  low  profit  margins  and  growing  debt  
burdens.  If  such  a  maldistribution  becomes  characteristics  for  the  majority  of  a  
country’s  industries,  as  Steindl  believed  to  be  the  case  for  the  US  since  the  mid-­‐‑
20th  century,  general  economic  stagnation  will  take  hold.        
Neglecting  the  distinction  between  large  corporations  and  SMEs  in  the  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑
funds   data,   as   is   usually   the   case   including   in   the   South   African   national  
financial  accounts,  hides  the  dynamics  between  small  and  big  business.  Hence,  
what   the   analysis   in   the   following   chapter  will   address   is   an   aggregate   view  
onto  South  African  non-­‐‑financial  business.  This  means  that  even  if  non-­‐‑financial  
firms   in  aggregate  are  net   lenders   in  South  Africa,  which  can  be  observed   for  
the  period  between  the  mid-­‐‑1970s  and  the  late  1990s,  there  is  no  information  on  
how  this  financial  surplus  position  was  distributed  between  large  corporations  
and  SMEs.    
In  fact,  it  is  possible  to  envisage  a  situation  where  due  to  profit  misdistribution  
both  company  indebtedness  and  profit  accumulation  are  rising  in  tandem,  with  
small  non-­‐‑financial   firms  running  up   increasing  debt  while   large  corporations  
acquire  growing  savings  (see  Michell,  2014),  resulting  in  rising  overall  financial  
fragility.   Equally,   small   non-­‐‑incorporated   businesses   are,   for   lack   of   better  
accounting   tools,   part   of   the   household   sector   in   South   Africa.   Hence,   the  
financial   transactions   of   small   family   businesses   but   also   self-­‐‑employed  
individuals   are   part   of   the   household   aggregate.   The   analysis   to   follow   will  
stress   this   caveat   originating   from   a   lack   of   disaggregation   where   necessary,  
and  provide  possible  interpretations.    
A   further   complication   introduced  by  data   availability   is   the   transaction   item  
‘other’   in   the   South   African   national   financial   accounts.   Financial   operations  
that  cannot  be  subsumed  under  any  other  heading  end  up  in  this  category.  This  
is   problematic,   especially   as   transactions   in   ‘other’   financial   instruments   have  
grown   significantly   from   the   late   1990s   onwards.   In   previous   decades   the  
position  was  relatively  small,  which  might  explain  why  ‘other’  transactions  and  
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the  error  term  were  simply  merged  in  the  national  financial  accounts  during  the  
entire  1980s.  Interviews  with  relevant  SARB  officials  responsible  for  compiling  
flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  data  have  found  that  ‘other’  transactions  in  recent  years  are  likely  
to  largely  account  for  financially  innovative  instruments  (Monyela,  2012).  This  
data  limitation  and  its  significance  will  be  discussed  where  important.  
To   come   back   to   the   three   questions   set   out   at   the   beginning   of   the   chapter,  
choosing   the   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   approach   as   analytical   tool   means   implicitly  
replying  to  question  one  about  the  role  of  financial  institutions  in  the  economy.  
Banks   and   other   financial   intermediaries   have   the   ability   to   create   money  
because  money  is  merely  a  financial  claim,  which  becomes  apparent  in  the  flow  
of  funds.  
6.2. Classifying national financial systems using flow-of-funds analysis 
The   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   accounts   have   been   used   to   answer   the   question  what   the  
role  of  financial  institutions  is  across  different  countries.  Flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  data  has  
been  consulted   in   the  attempt   to  categorise   financial   systems   into   the  popular  
bank-­‐‑based  versus  market-­‐‑based  dichotomy.  This  section  is  mainly  interested  in  
the  method  used  for  doing  so  (see  Mayer,  1988  and  Corbett  &  Jenkinson,  1996,  
1997),  in  order  to  adjust  it  for  the  purpose  of  analysis  in  the  following  chapter.  
Nonetheless,  to  ensure  a  sound  grasp  of  the  methodology  this  section  will  first  
(in   sub-­‐‑section  6.2.1.)   outline   the   theoretical   argument   around   the  bank-­‐‑based  
and  market-­‐‑based  categories,   then   (in   sub-­‐‑section  6.2.2.)  move  on   to  highlight  
the  dichotomy’s  theoretical  and  empirical  shortcomings,  before  (in  sub-­‐‑section  
6.3.2.)  outlining  the  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  methodology  used  for  country  classification  
and  an  adaptation  proposed  for  the  purpose  of  this  research.  
6.2.1. The bank-based versus market based-financial systems classification   
Among  economic  historians,  outside  of  the  economic  mainstream  and  surely  in  
any   other   social   science,   the   idea   that   financial   systems   institutionally   differ  
from  country  to  country  and  cannot  be  treated  generically  as  ‘finance’  is  not  a  
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novel   insight.   Nonetheless,   this   issue   only   came   to   the   wider   attention   of  
(mainstream)  economists  during  the  1980s.    
Gerschenkron’s   (1976[1962])  Economic  backwardness   in  historical  perspective,   first  
delivered   as   a   lecture   in   1952,   is   generally   regarded   to   have   started   the  
economic   literature  on  differences   in  national   financial  systems.  Subsequently,  
prompted  by   the  general  perception   that   industrial   investment   in  Britain  was  
not   high   enough   in   the   late   1970s,   Carrington   and   Edwards   studied   the  
volumes   of   long-­‐‑term   finance   directed   towards   investment   across   five  OECD  
countries  (Carrington  &  Edwards,  1979).  The  five  countries  in  their  focus  were  
Germany,  France,  Japan,  the  US  and  the  UK.  Carrington  and  Edwards  analysed  
the  period  of  the  1960s  up  to  the  mid-­‐‑1970s.    
They   found   a   high   degree   of   integration   between   banking   and   industry   in  
Germany  and  Japan,  criticising  the  Anglo-­‐‑Saxon  tradition  of  finance  as  limiting  
to  firm  expansion  and  investment.  Heralding  the  financial  trouble  the  UK  and  
the  US  were  to  experience  during  the  1980s,  the  duo  warned  of  financial  asset  
inflation,  which  could  be  a  side  effect  of  an  active  stock  exchange:  
‘[I]f  a  stock  market  is  used  as  the  accredited  major  source  of  long-­‐‑term  external  
funds,  the  only  productive  money  canalised  to  the  investing  community  is  the  
amount   of   the   new   issue   capital.   Some   financial   investment   in   previously  
existing  shares  may  occur,  thereby  inflating  paper  values  and  providing  a  large  
secondary  market   for   shares  and  bonds,  but   this  does  not  assist   the  would-­‐‑be  
entrepreneur   or   corporate   investor   to   install   more   plant   and   equipment’  
(Carrington  &  Edwards,  1979,  p.  193).  
A   vigorous   debate   about   the   differences   in   national   financial   structures   and  
their   impact   on   growth   and   (socio-­‐‑)economic   change   started   in   the   1980s.  
Zysman  (1983)  and  Rybczynski  (1983)  suggested,  independently  of  one  another,  
a   classification  of   national   financial   systems  based  on   the  distinction  between  
market-­‐‑based   and   credit-­‐‑based   or   market-­‐‑oriented   and   bank-­‐‑oriented  
economies.   Given   the   changing   nature   of   financial   markets   especially   in   the  
Anglo-­‐‑Saxon  world,   Carrington   and   Edwards’   criticism   slowly   shifted   in   the  
course   of   the   debate.   The   idea   started   forming   that   market-­‐‑based   economies  
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possessed  more  developed  financial  markets,  which  took  on  a  more  important  
role  in  investment  financing.  The  US  and  UK  economies  were  perceived  to  be  in  
this   category,   while   continental   (and   Western)   European   countries   such   as  
Germany   together  with   Japan  had   financial   systems   that  were  based  on   large  
banks,  crucially  funding  investment.  
Zysman’s   work   (Zysman,   1983)   stressed   the   level   of   state   involvement   and  
control,   which   he   saw   as   larger   in   credit-­‐‑based   systems,   which   was   his  
terminology   for   the   bank-­‐‑based   model.   Thus,   whenever   conflict   arose   or  
institutional   adjustment   was   necessary,   this   would   happen   through   market  
mechanisms  under  the  lead  of  companies  in  market-­‐‑based  systems.  By  contrast,  
in   credit-­‐‑based   systems,   which   Zysman   divided   into   a   more   state-­‐‑controlled  
and  a  less  state-­‐‑controlled  version,  adjustments  would  happen  either  under  the  
lead   of   the   state,   or   as   result   of   negotiations   between   state   and   other  
stakeholders,  but  each  time  outside  of  the  market.    
Similarly,   Rybczynski   distinguished   between   bank-­‐‑oriented   and   market-­‐‑
oriented  financial  systems.  His  categorisation  was  based  on  a  dichotomy  where  
the  bank-­‐‑oriented  system  was  understood  to  be  a  result  of  and  closely  linked  to  
government  assistance,  whereas  the  market-­‐‑based  system  rested  on  the  absence  
of   this   assistance   (Rybczynski,   1983).  More   research   around   the  dichotomy  of  
financial   systems   during   the   1980s   (see,   for   instance,   Berglöf,   1988),      and  
towards   the   end   of   the   decade   a   certain   convention   established   amongst  
economists.              
According  to  this  convention,  Japan  and  Germany  are  prime  examples  of  bank-­‐‑
based  financial  systems,   followed  by  other  Western  European  economies  such  
as  Austria,  France  and  Sweden  among  others.  The  Anglo-­‐‑Saxon  economies,  i.e.  
mainly   the   US   and   the   UK,   but   also   Canada   and   Australia,   are   considered  
market-­‐‑based  financial  systems.  A  range  of  stylised  characteristics  are  ascribed  
to  the  two  different  systems.  
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Loosely   following   Gerschenkron,   bank-­‐‑based   financial   structures   were  
understood   to   have   emerged   where   the   state   and   banks   had   to   act   as  
entrepreneurs,   because   individual   entrepreneurship   and   development   in  
general  lagged  behind  (see,  for  example,  Rybczynski,  1983).  Hence,  the  level  of  
state   involvement   in   these   countries’   financial   institutions  was   believed   to   be  
high.  Banks  and  large  corporations  were  understood  to  have  close  links  because  
bank   lending  was  an   important  source  of   investment   finance.   In  consequence,  
banks   were   characterised   as   frequently   holding   substantial   shares   in  
corporations   that   were   their   clients.   Corporate   ownership   structures   were,  
allegedly,   more   concentrated   and   more   stable.   Inter-­‐‑company   cross-­‐‑
shareholdings  were  further  identified  as  typical.    
By   contrast,   market-­‐‑based   financial   structures   were   equated   with   more  
developed   financial   markets,   higher   levels   of   competition,   and   consequently  
more   efficient   resource   use   by   corporations,  which   could   be   disciplined   by   a  
hostile  takeover  through  the  equity  market.  Equity  and  debt  instruments  were  
also   integrated   into   the   categorisation,  with   equity   believed   to   be   a   common  
means  to  raise  finance  in  market-­‐‑based  systems,  whereas  corporations  in  bank-­‐‑
based  economies  would  mostly  resort  to  debt  financing  their  investment.  South  
Africa   is   somewhat  of   an  odd   case,   often   classified   as  market-­‐‑based   economy  
due   to   its   historical   links   to   the   UK   financial   system   (Andreasson,   2011).  
Furthermore,   the   link   to   the   UK   financial   system  was   established   via   British  
banks  and   the  popular  view   is   that   these   imperial  banks   contributed   towards  
the  country’s  development  (see  Jones,  2009).  Thus,  the  country  does  not  quite  fit  
the   classification   and   is   sometimes   also   seen   as   a   hybrid   case   (Andreasson,  
2011).  
While  some  researchers  pointed  towards  higher  stability  and  growth  as  result  
of   the   more   long-­‐‑term   oriented   bank-­‐‑based   arrangements   (as   mentioned   in  
Corbett,  1987),   the  dichotomy  was  more  often   interpreted  as  one  where  bank-­‐‑
based  systems  were  more  backward,  while  market-­‐‑based  economies  possessed  
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more   developed   financial   markets.   Thus,   market-­‐‑based   financial   structures  
could   lower   transaction  and  other   costs   for   corporations,   thus   raising  growth.  
The   latter   viewpoint   is   at   least   implicit   in   Rybczynski   (1983)   and   explicit   in  
Berglöf  (1988).      
Classifications   inevitably  are  simplifications,  but   the  bank-­‐‑based-­‐‑market-­‐‑based  
dichotomy  is  not   just  simplistic  but,  when  given  a  closer   look,   turns  out   to  be  
theoretically  unfounded  and  empirically  misleading.  As  Mayer  observed  these  
proposed  financial  system  categorisations  were  hardly  based  on  any  theoretical  
insights.   Hence,   they   were   ‘usually   more   of   a   reflection   of   the   particular  
prejudice   of   the   investigator   than   attempts   at   rigorous   testing   of   hypotheses’  
(Mayer,  1987,  p.  iii).  
6.2.2. Theoretical and empirical shortcomings of the classification 
These   interpretations   of   the   emergence   of   banking   in  Western  Europe   appear  
heavily   coloured  by   the  political   climate   of   the   1980s.  During   those   years   the  
Anglo-­‐‑Saxon  countries  experienced  a  substantial  change  in  governance,  moving  
towards   market   deregulation,   liberalisation   and   generally,   a   cutback   in   state  
provision.  At   the   same   time,  Western  Europe  held  on   to   social  provision   and  
the  larger  welfare  state,  which  developed  in  the  aftermath  of  World  War  II,  for  
longer.   Thus,   during   the   1980s   the   state   versus  market   dichotomy  must   have  
seemed   to   be   embodied   in   the   contrast   between   Western   European   and   the  
Anglo-­‐‑Saxon  economies.  
Historically,  it  would  be  difficult  to  argue  that  a  financial  system  dominated  by  
large  banks   is  necessarily  under   stronger  government   control   than  a   financial  
structure  based  on  more  active  capital  markets.  As  Gerschenkron   (1976[1962])  
showed   it   was   not   so   much   banking   in   general,   which   was   an   important  
impulse  to  development  in  Western  Europe,  but  rather  a  specific  type  of  bank  
manifested   in   the   French   Société  Générale   du  Crédit  Mobilier,   established   by  
the  Pereire  brothers  in  the  middle  of  the  19th  century.    
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The  Pereires,  influenced  by  Saint  Simon’s  ideas  about  the  developmental  power  
of   science   and   engineering,   established   an   investment   bank   with   the   aim   of  
financing  public  infrastructure  and,  according  to  Gerschenkron,  manufacturing.  
The   undertaking   failed   towards   the   end   of   the   19th   century   but   generated   so  
much   momentum   in   French   industrialisation   that   numerous   similar   projects  
were   started   across   the   continent,   imitating   Crédit   Mobilier.   These   early  
developments  are   the  roots  of   the  close   link  between  banking  and   industry   in  
the  European  bank-­‐‑based  tradition.    
According   to  Gerschenkron   (1976[1962]),   the   later   established  universal  banks  
in   Germany   combined   the   industrial   outlook   of   Crédit   Mobilier   with   the  
deposit   taking   activities   of   English   commercial   banks.   In   this   way,   universal  
banks   became   more   stable   institutions,   not   overextending   themselves   in  
industrial  investment,  which  was  a  major  problem  of  Crédit  Mobilier.4    
Historians   familiar   with   German   banking   criticise   Gerschenkron   for   an  
exaggerated   appraisal   of   universal   banking.   During   the   19th   century,   so   they  
argue,  only  few  banks  were  universal  banks.  The  phenomena  really  took  hold  
of   the   country   in   the   early   20th   century   and   later.  As   consequence,   only   few  
companies  were   actually   banked   by   commercial   joint-­‐‑stock   banks.   Small   and  
medium-­‐‑sized   enterprises   (the   Mittelstand),   which   made   up   the   majority   of  
German   enterprises   at   the   time,   were   not.   Equally,   reconstructing   company  
accounts  (for  example  in  the  Ruhr  area  by  Feldenkirchen)  has  shown  that  large  
steel   producers   did   not   use   bank   loans   as   important   source   of   funding   for  
investment  (Deeg,  2003).  
                                                                                                 
4   Gerschenkron’s   interpretation   of   the   role   of   universal   banks   in   German  
industrialisation  has  come  under  heavy  criticism  from  (German)  historians  (see,  among  
others,  Deeg,  2003,  Fohlin,  1997).  They  pointed  out   that   the  German  Crédit  Mobilier-­‐‑
equivalents,  that  is  the  commercial  joint-­‐‑stock  banks,  were  only  one  among  three  major  
types  of  banks  in  Germany  of  the  19th  century.  The  public  savings  banks,  which  mainly  
serviced  state  authorities  as  source  of  credit,  and  the  cooperative  banks,  which  targeted  
small   and  medium-­‐‑size   enterprises   (the  German  Mittelstand)   and   non-­‐‑urban   regions,  
were  the  other  two  important  bank  types.  
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Even  though  these  are  valid  criticisms  they  miss  Gerschenkron’s  central  point:  
the  introduction  of  industrial  banking  provided  a  source  of  long-­‐‑term  funding  
for   industrial   investors,  which  was   not   available   before.  Gerschenkron   shares  
Hilferding’s   (Hilferding,   1947)   belief   that   it   was   the   emergence   of   long-­‐‑term  
bank   loans   and   banks’   underwriting   of   capital   market   issues,   which  
transformed  businesses  investment  possibilities.  Therefore,  it  was  not  important  
that  not  all  firms  benefited  from  or  that  not  all  banks  were  universal  banks.  The  
change   in   practice,   which   as   Kindleberger   (Kindleberger,   1984)   documented,  
also   forced   established   financiers   like   the  Rothschilds   to   change   their   lending  
practices,  was  pivotal.          
Coming   back   to   the   bank-­‐‑based   and  market-­‐‑based   distinction,   not   only   does  
history  not  seem  to  always  square  up  with  the  bank-­‐‑based  versus  market-­‐‑based  
financial   systems   story,   empirical   analyses   have   shown   that   the   conventional  
classification  of  countries  into  these  categories  also  do  not  hold  up  scrutiny.  As  
aforementioned,   Japan   and   Germany   are   typically   regarded   to   be   prime  
examples   of   markets   that   possess   a   strong   banking   tradition.   Thus,   the  
mainstream   expectation   at   the   end   of   the   1980s   would   have   been   that   non-­‐‑
financial   business   in   both   countries   prominently   uses   bank   borrowing   to  
undertake   investment,   and   also   favour   bank   debt   over   equity   and   bond  
instruments.   Given   the   financial   development   narrative,   which   asserted   that  
financial  markets  are  more  advanced  in  market-­‐‑based  economies,  their  financial  
sectors  would  be  expected  to  be  smaller.  Conversely,  the  US  and  the  UK  would  
have  been  expected  to  have  larger  financial  sectors  and  stronger  market  based  
financing  of  corporate  investment,  i.e.  through  bonds  and  equity.      
Detailed   empirical   work   showed   that   many   of   these   distinctions   and  
expectations   were   not   met   by   reality.   It   was   difficult   to   identify   any   clear  
differences  as   to   the   size  of   the  countries’   financial  markets,   for  example   (see,  
Berglöf,  1988).  The  US  and  the  UK  had  large  financial  markets  during  the  1980s,  
but  so  did  Japan,  which  was  experiencing  a  prolonged  equity  price  boom  at  the  
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time.   The   expectation   that   corporations   in  Germany   and   Japan   (as  well   as   in  
France  and  Italy,  which  were  also  sometimes  included  in  the  bank-­‐‑based  group)  
had  higher  gearing  ratios,  i.e.  debt  to  total  assets,  in  comparison  to  corporations  
in   the  US  and   the  UK   seemed   confirmed,  but  measures   changed   significantly  
when   market   valuation   of   stocks   rather   than   book   values   were   used   (Borio,  
1990).   In   consequence,   some   researchers   claimed   that   the   high   debt   levels   of  
Japanese   firms   were   a   side   effect   of   different   accounting   and   statistical  
standards  across  countries  (see  Aoki,  1984).  
Others   like   Mayer   (1987,   1988,   1990)   were   doubtful   whether   stock   measures  
were  adequate  at  all  and  suggested  focusing  on  flow  data  such  as  the  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑
funds  for  international  comparisons.  What  all  of  these  empirical  studies  (Mayer,  
1987,  1988,  1990;  Borio,  1990;  Corbett  &  Jenkinson,  1996,  1997)  showed  was  how  
little   market-­‐‑based   finance   was   actually   used   to   undertake   corporate  
investment.   Only   during   the   early   1970s   were   bonds   and   equities   in   the   US  
issued  to  substantially  finance  investment  expenditure  (i.e.  accounting  for  more  
than  20%  of  total  capital  formation).  Especially,  equity  was  shown  to  be  a  drain  
on  US  and  UK  non-­‐‑financial  businesses  funds  rather  than  a  source  during  the  
1980s.    
Most   vigorously,   Corbett   and   Jenkinson   (1996,   1997)   dispelled   any   illusions  
about   the   bank-­‐‑based   market-­‐‑based   distinction   with   regard   to   corporate  
investment   financing.   Using   net   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   data,   harmonising   statistics   as  
much  as  possible  across  countries,   they  demonstrated   that   there   is,   in   fact,  no  
basis   for   a   so-­‐‑called   market-­‐‑based   classification   of   financial   systems.   When  
counting   both   bonds   and   equity   instruments,   the   only   country   where  
corporations   persistently   used   market   finance   over   the   years   1970-­‐‑1989   was  
Japan,  a  supposed  bank-­‐‑based  economy,  while  non-­‐‑financial  businesses   in   the  
US   and   the   UK   financed   virtually   all   of   their   investment   internally   through  
retained   profits.   Market   finance   was   unimportant   and,   as   mentioned   above,  
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turned  into  a  net  use  rather  than  a  source  of  funds  towards  the  end  of  the  time  
period.  
Hence,  what  appears  to  be  left  of  the  financial  systems  dichotomy,  at  least  with  
regard  to  financing  corporate  investment,  are  the  conclusions  that:  (1)  since  the  
1970s  non-­‐‑financial  businesses  have  increasingly  financed  investment  internally  
in  major   advanced   economies.   These   figures   have   been   recently  updated   and  
confirmed  by  Lapavitsas  (2013),  showing  that  in  recent  years,  namely  since  the  
early   2000s,   retained   profits   have   in   fact   exceeded   non-­‐‑financial   firms’  
expenditure   on   gross   capital   formation.   (2)   A   notable   exception   during   the  
1970s   and   1980s  was   Japan,   where   businesses   did   use   external   finance   of   all  
sorts   for   investment   outlays   (Corbett  &   Jenkinson,   1996,   1997).   This   seems   to  
have  changed  even  earlier  in  Japan  than  in  the  US,  the  UK  and  Germany.  Since  
the   late   1990s,   Japanese   non-­‐‑financial   businesses   have   generated   retained  
profits  in  excess  of  their  capital  investment  expenditure  (Lapavitsas,  2013).  
Despite   the  material   blow   that   empirical   analysis   inflicted   on   the   bank-­‐‑based  
versus  market-­‐‑based  categorisation,   a   similar  dichotomy  continues   to  be  used  
by  mainstream  economists  (see  Allen  &  Gale,  2000;  Rajan  &  Zingales,  2001,  and  
for  a  more  recent  example,  Wolf,  2011).  Allen  and  Gale  (2000)  accepted  that  the  
distinction  is  not  viable  on  the  basis  of  corporate  funding  behaviour  and  went  
over  to  looking  at  household  saving.  In  the  US  and  the  UK  household  saving  is  
to   a  much   larger   extent   invested   in   equity   than   in  Germany   and   Japan.   This  
allegedly  justifies  holding  on  to  the  categorisation.  
The   terminology   sometimes   morphed   from   bank-­‐‑based   to   relationship-­‐‑based  
and   from   market-­‐‑based   to   arms-­‐‑length   financial   system.   But   the   underlying  
stylised   characteristics  of   the   two  categories   are   the   same  as  before,   and  even  
the  same  roots  of  analysis,  namely  Gerschenkron’s  seminal  work,  are   invoked  
(see   Wolf,   2011).   One   strand   of   the   debate   re-­‐‑emerged   within   the   financial  
deepening   literature   (see   Levine   &   King,   1993   and,   for   an   overview,   Levine,  
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2005).   Here   the   focus   is   on   the   growth-­‐‑enhancing   impact   of   financial  
development.5    
Another   research   strand   that   can   be   linked   to   the   debate   about   bank-­‐‑based  
versus  market-­‐‑based   financial   systems   is   the   varieties   of   capitalism  paradigm  
(see  Hall  &  Soskice,  2001).  Here  the  liberal  market  economies  broadly  match  the  
market-­‐‑based  economies,  whereas  bank-­‐‑based   financial   systems  are   similar   to  
the   coordinated   market   economies   in   the   varieties   of   capitalism   approach.  
Similar   to   the   research   on   financial   development,   the   inconvenient   empirical  
findings   about   firms’   sources   of   finance   are   overlooked   to   hold   on   to   the  
stylised  characteristics  of  bank-­‐‑based  and  market-­‐‑based  systems.6    
Crucially,  in  neither  of  the  two  systems  are  financial  institutions  considered  to  
be   more   than   mere   intermediaries.   Hence,   their   function   is   reduced   to  
channelling  household  saving  to  corporates  in  need  of  external  funds  for  their  
investment   project.   Hence,   the   bank-­‐‑based   versus   market-­‐‑based   debate   is  
essentially  not  about  the  role  of  individual  financial  institutions  in  the  economy.  
Rather   more   narrowly,   it   asks   who   the   major   financial   intermediary   in   a  
textbook  economy  is.    
In  the  case  of  South  Africa,  as  will  be  argued  in  section  6.3.  below,  it  was  neither  
the   financial   markets   nor   domestic   banks   that   importantly   financed   early  
industrial   development   but   rather   the   local  mining-­‐‑finance   houses,   i.e.   South  
                                                                                                 
5   The   World   Bank   supports   this   research   effort   through   the   publication   and  
maintenance   of   the   so-­‐‑called   Financial   Development   and   Structure   database   (Beck,  
Demirgüç-­‐‑Kunt,  &  Levine,  2000,  and  the  latest  update,  Čihák,  Demirgüç-­‐‑Kunt,  Feyen,  
&  Levine,  2012).  Effectively,  what  the  World  Bank  database  does  is  construct  measures  
to  classify  countries  into  market-­‐‑base  and  bank-­‐‑based  financial  systems.  Two  measures  
are  suggested:  (1)  the  Structure-­‐‑Size  measure  which  is  calculated  as  ratio  between  stock  
market   capitalisation   divided   by   GDP   and   bank   credit   as   share   of   GDP.   (2)   Stock  
market   value   traded   to   GDP   divided   by   bank   credit   as   share   of   GDP.   Interestingly,  
none  of  these  measures  identifies  the  UK  as  particularly  market-­‐‑based  economy.  
6  In  a  recent  overview  article  (Deeg,  2010)  on  institutional  change  in  financial  systems  
the  contradictory  empirical  data  has  been  relegated  to  a  foot  note  mentioning  Corbett’s  
and  Jenkinson’s  results.  The  idea  that  in  Germany  and  Japan  businesses  use  bank  loans  
for   investment   finance,   whereas   UK   and   US   businesses   favour   market   finance  
continues  to  be  propagated.  
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Africa-­‐‑specific   institutions   that   developed   out   of   large   mining   businesses,  
sourcing  their  funding  from  European  financiers.  In  South  Africa  these  mining-­‐‑
finance   houses   emerged   because   local   financial   institutions   did   not   provide  
long-­‐‑term  finance  for  mining  undertakings,  i.e.,  as  the  next  section  will  explain  
in  more  detail,  funding  was  missing.    
6.2.3. A methodology to classify financial systems 
At   this   point   an   important   conceptual   distinction   has   to   be   introduced:   the  
difference   between   financing   and   funding   (see   Studart,   1995).   Keynes  
differentiated  between  the  two  in  the  following  way:  
‘The  entrepreneur  when  he  decides  to  invest  has  to  be  satisfied  on  two  points:  
firstly,   that   he   can   obtain   sufficient   short-­‐‑term   finance   during   the   period   of  
producing  the  investment;  and  secondly,  that  he  can  eventually  fund  his  short-­‐‑
term  obligation  by  a  long-­‐‑term  issue  on  satisfactory  condition’  (Keynes,  1937,  p.  
217)  
Hence,   the   distinction   between   financing   and   funding   goes   back   to   what  
Gerschenkron   observed   as   a   crucial   structural   change   in   Western   European  
banking  of   the   19th   century:   the  provision  of   long-­‐‑term   financing;   in  Keynes’s  
words,  the  advent  of  external  funding  sources  for  industrial  investors.    
The   industrial   investor   aims   to   secure   funding   because   only   with   long-­‐‑term  
financial   commitments   can   he   or   she   be   relatively   confident   of   the   venture’s  
success.  Theoretically,   it   is  possible  to  finance  investment  spending  short-­‐‑term  
by   continuously   rolling   over   debt,   but   that   increases   the   time,   effort   and   risk  
involved,  and  is  therefore  hardly  desirable.  Apart  from  absorbing  much  of  the  
industrialist’s   time   (continuously   re-­‐‑negotiating   new   short-­‐‑term   loans),   any  
changes  in  market  sentiment  and  interest  rates  would  impact  the  conditions  he  
or  she  is  able  to  obtain.  This  would  significantly  reduce  the  reliability  of  his  or  
her  budgeting.      
Within   the   market-­‐‑based   versus   bank-­‐‑based   financial   systems   debate   no  
difference   between   finance   and   funding   is   made.   But   whenever   sources   of  
corporate  investment  finance  are  analysed  the  implied  focus  is  on  funding.  For  
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instance,   Carrington   &   Edwards   (1979)   believed   that   German   and   Japanese  
financial  institutions  are  superior,  because  in  those  countries  long-­‐‑term  funding  
was  provided  by  banks   to  non-­‐‑financial  businesses  of  all   sizes.   In   the  US  and  
the   UK   long-­‐‑term   external   funding   was   mostly   obtained   through   capital  
markets  (at  least  during  the  1960s  and  early  1970s),  from  which  SMEs  and  also  
some   large   companies   are   excluded   (because   of   high   costs).   Similarly,  
Rybczynski   (1983,   p.   11)   stressed   that   a   major   difference   between   ‘bank-­‐‑
oriented’  and  ‘market-­‐‑oriented’  economies  was  the  way  ‘risk  capital  and  long-­‐‑
term   debt’   are   issued.   While   in   the   former   type   of   system   banks   provide  
funding,  in  the  latter  it  is  capital  markets.      
The   importance   of   the   funding-­‐‑finance   distinction   in   the   context   of   firm  
heterogeneity  has  been  stressed  by  J.  Penrose  (2015).  In  an  economy  where  large  
corporations  exhibit  a  heightened  liquidity  preference,  distinguishing  between  
financing   and   funding   becomes   crucial.   For   a   productive   non-­‐‑financial   firm,  
focused  on  investment  activity  (to  use  the  terminology  proposed  in  chapter  2:  a  
company   that   is   not   over-­‐‑capitalised)   the   aim   is   to   transform   finance   into  
funding  wherever  possible.  For  an  over-­‐‑capitalised  firm  obtaining  finance  will  
be   important   to   manage   liquidity.   This   distinction   has   important  
methodological  implications  for  the  next  chapter.    
The  debate  around  market-­‐‑based  versus  bank-­‐‑based   financial   systems  centred  
on  funding,  albeit  without  necessarily  spelling  this  out.  However,  this  explains  
why  the  adopted  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  analysis  can  legitimately  focus  on  net  positions.  
Of   course,   using   flow   of   funds   and   net   positions   also   takes   care   of   some  
accounting  problems.  For  instance,  accounting  for  stocks  of  assets  and  liabilities  
proved   to   be   a   major   challenge   when   comparing   the   use   of   financial  
instruments   by   non-­‐‑financial   firms   across   economies.   Problems   here   are  
manifold.  When  using  companies’  balance   sheets   the   figures  do  not   represent  
national   aggregates   since   large   modern   corporations   are   multinational  
enterprises.   Then   the   question   arises   whether   to   use   book   or   market   values.  
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Accounting   conventions   differ   on   this   question   across   national   borders,  
impacting  recorded  company  accounts.  When  using  national  sectoral  data  their  
definitions   are   in   practice   not   standardised   internationally   (Mayer,   1988;  
Corbett  &  Jenkinson,  1996).  
To  avoid   the  problem  of   stock  valuation,  Mayer   first   suggested  using   flow  of  
funds  data  to  assess  the  use  of  financial  instruments  by  non-­‐‑financial  business  
(Mayer,   1987).   The   approach   has   the   added   advantage   that   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  
accounts   represent   national   figures   rather   than   company   data,  which   reaches  
beyond  national   borders,   spanning  multinationals’   entire   geographical   sphere  
of   activity.   Corbett   and   Jenkinson   (1996,   1997)   picked   up   Mayer’s   proposed  
methodology   and   documented   it   in   great   detail,  when   analysing   the   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑
funds  data  for  the  US,  the  UK,  Japan  and  Germany  in  their  study.    
Using   net   positions   implicitly   assumed   that   the   financial   operations   of   non-­‐‑
financial   business   are   exclusively   geared   towards   productive   investment.  
Whatever   financial   transactions   happen   they   are   in   place   to   support   firms’  
investment  activity  and,  therefore,  net  sources  of  funds  tell  the  entire  story  (at  
least,  all  that  is  interesting).  Implicitly,  Corbett  and  Jenkinson  (1996,  1997)  were  
merely   interested   in   the   sources   of   funding   for   non-­‐‑financial   businesses.   This  
cannot  be  held  against   them,  because   their   sole  analytical   aim  was   to  debunk  
the   mainstream   idea   that   German   and   Japanese   non-­‐‑financial   firms   fund  
themselves   heavily   through   bank   borrowing,  while  US   and  UK   non-­‐‑financial  
businesses  take  recourse  to  the  capital  markets  for  funding.    
Table   6..   details   Corbett’s   and   Jenkinson’s  methodology.  Non-­‐‑financial   firms’  
(NFFs)   transactions   are   classified   into   gross   sources   and   gross   uses   of   funds,  
following   the  structure  of   the   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  accounts.  The   ten   listed   items  are  
standardised  and  include:  (1)  Internal  funds,  which  refers  to  retained  profits,  (2)  
bank  loans,  (3)  new  equity  issues,  (4)  bond  issues,  (5)  trade  credit  received,  (6)  
cash   and   deposits,   (7)   equity   purchases,   (8)   bond   purchases,   (9)   trade   credit  
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given  and  (10)  new  capital  formation.  Items  1  to  5  are  sources  of  funds,  while  6  
to  10  refer  to  uses  of  funds.  
Of   course,   they  have   to  be  adapted   to   the   specific   country’s  actually   reported  
items.  This  will  be  done  for  South  Africa  in  the  following  chapter.  Net  positions  
for   individual   financing   items   are   calculated,   which   are   represented   in   the  
bottom   left   column   in  Table   6..   For   instance,   bank   loans   are   balanced   against  
cash  and  deposits  held  with  banks,  yielding  a  net  position  (item  2  minus  item  6  
in  Table  6.1.  on  bank  assets  held  by  non-­‐‑financial  firms.  In  this  way,  net  sources  
for  each  financial  position  can  be  calculated,  which  in  sum  should  correspond  
in  total  to  physical  investment  (item  10)  undertaken  by  non-­‐‑financial  companies  
in  aggregate.    
Table 6.1. Calculation of net sources of investment funding by NFFs  
          
Source:  Adapted  from  (Corbett  &  Jenkinson,  1997).  
Corbett’s   and   Jenkinson’s   rationale   for   focusing   on   net   positions   was   to  
eliminate  as  many  sources  of  potential  cross-­‐‑country  discrepancies  as  possible.  
Gross sources Gross uses
1 Internal
2 Bank,loans 6 Cash,and,deposits
3 New,equity,issues 7 Equity,purchases
4 Bond,issues 8 Bond,purchases
5 Trade,credit,received 9 Trade,credit,given
10 New,capital,formation
TOTAL SOURCES TOTAL USES






NET SOURCES 10 PHYSICAL INVESTMENT
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Since   they  were  simply   interested   in   the  net   sources  of   corporate   financing  of  
investment,   i.e.   funding,   the   logical   choice  was   to  abstract   from  gross   figures,  
forgoing   that   layer  of   additional   information.  The  question,  which   they   could  
answer   using   this   method   was   what   type   of   funding   is   dominant   for   non-­‐‑
financial   firms.   But   the   question  was   posed   in   a  mainstream   framework   that  
assumed   that   the   main   functions   of   financial   institutions   were   wealth  
preservation,  financial  intermediation  and,  additionally,  risk  management  (this  
is  explicitly  mentioned,  for  instance,  in  Borio,  1990).    
Despite   the   shortcomings   of   its   exclusive   focus   on   net   positions,   the  
methodology  presented  is  useful  in  establishing  net  movements  of  flows.  It  can  
shed   light  onto  questions  about  which  sectors  are  net   lenders  and  which  ones  
are   net   borrowers.   In   mainstream   theory,   households   are   conventionally  
attributed   the  position   of   net   creditor,  while   non-­‐‑financial   businesses   and   the  
government   are   understood   to   be   the   main   debtors.   Applying   Corbett’s   and  
Jenkinson’s  method  to  South  African  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  data  in  the  next  chapter  will  
reveal   whether   this   typology   is   correct   for   South   Africa,   and   whether   it   has  
shifted   over   time.   The   financialisation   approach   (as   discussed   in   chapter   5)  
would  expect  non-­‐‑financial  firms  to  have  become  net  lenders.    
However,  netting  out   sources  and  uses  hides   the   true  volumes  of,   say,   equity  
issuance  and  purchases  among  non-­‐‑financial   firms  since  merely  the  difference  
between  sales  and  purchases   is  presented,  rather  than  their   total  volume.  This  
difference   can   be   exactly   the   same,   regardless   whether   a   large   volume   of  
transactions  was  undertaken  in  a  given  period  or  only  a  very  small  one.  Thus,  
the  full  extent  of  financing  by  non-­‐‑financial  businesses  is  hidden.  Therefore,  this  
thesis   suggests   adjusting   the   Corbett   &   Jenkinson   approach   to   reveal   this  
crucial  layer  of  detail.    
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Table 6.2. Relationship between gross sources and gross uses of funds by non-
financial firms 
  
To  distinguish  between  financing  and  funding,  it  will  be  calculated  how  much  
every  individual  gross  source  item  (including  internal  finance,  bank  loans,  new  
equity,  bonds  issued  and  trade  credit,  that  is,  the  left-­‐‑hand  side  column  in  Table  
6..)   could   cover   of   the   gross   physical   investment   actually   undertaken.   The  
amount   of   physical   investment   serves   as   a   proxy   for   the   volume   of   funding  
needed   by   non-­‐‑financial   businesses.   Adding   up   the   calculated   percentages  
subsequently   provides   a   measure   of   financing,   i.e.   a   measure   of   financial  
sources  raised  (or  retained)  for  the  purpose  of  financial  investment.    
Consequently,   summing   up   gross   sources   of   funds   and   expressing   them   as  
share   of   physical   investment   will   show   how   large   financial   investment   is  
because  every  percentage  point  above  100%  proxies  financial  investment.  Since  
the  specific  interest  of  this  dissertation  is  the  South  African  economy  rather  than  
country  comparisons,  introducing  gross  figures  does  not  bias  the  investigation,  
as  was  feared  by  Corbett  and  Jenkinson  (1996,  1997).    
This  methodology  alone  will,  however,  not  provide  a  full  picture.  It  will  merely  
identify  the  extent  of  financing  for  liquidity  management  among  non-­‐‑financial  
business.   Therefore,   as   second   step   the   individual   financing   items   on   the  
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uses  of   funds  among  these  companies.  For   this  purpose,   the  main   issuers  and  
main   buyers   of   major   financing   items   will   have   to   be   identified.   All   of   this  
information  has  been  gathered  in  extremely  time-­‐‑consuming  and  detailed  work  
for   the   analysis   in   the   next   chapter.   These   data   will   constitute   the   basis   for  
answering   the  questions   about   the  driving   force   behind   credit   expansion   and  
agency.  
6.3. A historic perspective on the interaction between finance and non-financial 
firms in the macro economy 
The  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  accounts  were  developed  and  later  promoted  by  a  range  of  
(old)   institutional   economists,   first   and   foremost,   of   course,   Copeland.   In   the  
spirit   of   institutional   methodology,   this   section   will   provide   a   historical  
overview   of   the   relationship   between   finance   and   non-­‐‑financial   businesses   in  
South  Africa.  The  overview  will   shed  some   light  on   the  question  how  agency  
and   power   relations   have   played   out   between   these   two   economic   interest  
groups  in  the  past.  This  is  important  since  modern  institutions  in  South  Africa  
have  not  emerged  ex  nihilis,  but  have  a  history  that  moulded  them.  This  section  
argues   that   the   bank-­‐‑based   market-­‐‑based   dichotomy   is   not   suitable   for  
understanding  the  South  African  financial  system.    
Mining  activity  was  a  driving  force  behind  the  emergence  of  capitalism  in  the  
colonial   territories   which   were   to   become   South   Africa.   Diamond   and   gold  
extraction   here   necessitated   a   large   outlay   of   capital.   This   capital  was  mostly  
sourced   in   Europe   because   local   banking   and   financial  markets  were   in   their  
infancy.   Hence,   in   many   ways   mining   gave   the   impulse   for   financial  
development.   But   the   relationship   between   finance   and   non-­‐‑financial  
businesses   in   South   Africa   is   more   complex.   This   is   best   illustrated   in   the  
mining  groups  that  developed  over  time.  They  are  also  referred  to  as  ‘mining-­‐‑
finance   houses’   because   they   typically   combine   heavy   investment   in   mining  
claims  with  large  volumes  of  financial  investment.    
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In   contrast   to  popular  perception   (Amphlett,   1914;   Jones,   2009)   local   financial  
markets   and   both,   local   and   European   banks,   have   contributed   little   to  
economic  development   in  South  Africa,  especially  during  the  19th  century  and  
early   20th   century.   In   fact,   it   was   large   South   African  mining   businesses   that  
took   on   the   role   of   shaping   local   financial   markets,   becoming   important  
financial  players  themselves.    
Developments   in  mining  and   finance  have  been  going  hand-­‐‑in-­‐‑hand   in  South  
Africa  for  many  years.  Nevertheless,  it  appears  that  mining  often  had  the  upper  
hand,  at   least  over  domestic  financial   institutions,  due  to  the  large  volumes  of  
(often   highly   liquid)   financial   assets,   which   the   mining   groups   were   able   to  
amass.   Especially   in   the   19th   and   early   20th   century,   funding   for   the   mining-­‐‑
finance   houses   mostly   came   from   European   financiers   and   banks.   Here   UK-­‐‑
based   investors  were   important   but   by   no  means   the   only   financial   investors  
since  German  and  French  financiers  were  also  heavily  involved  (see  Innes,  1984;  
Kubicek,  1979).  The  sheer  amount  of  funds  necessary  to  get  resource  extraction  
on  its  way  (especially  deep-­‐‑level  gold  mining)  meant  that  these  mining  groups  
often  commanded  larger  financial  resources  than  domestic  banks  and  financial  
institutions,  making  mining-­‐‑finance  houses  powerful  financial  actors.  
This  section  now  reviews  the  development  of  the  banking  sector  (in  part  6.3.1.),  
the  mining-­‐‑finance  houses  (in  part  6.3.2.)  and  the  stock  exchange  (in  part  6.3.2.)  
in  South  Africa.  The  aim  is  to  illustrate  the  way  finance  and  mining  developed  
in   the   country,  with  mining  always  keeping  a   slight   edge  over   finance.  Thus,  
historically   the  question  of  agency  and  power   is  answered   in   favour  of  South  
African  mining  companies,  i.e.  a  specific  type  of  non-­‐‑financial  business.      
6.3.1. The historical origins of banking in South Africa 
Popular   perception   links   the   arrival   of   British   banks   and   their   spread   across  
South  Africa  closely  with  the  country’s  development  (see  Amphlett,  1914;  Jones,  
2009).  The  argument   is   that   ‘[e]conomic  develop[ment]   followed   closely  upon  
   306  
the  heals  of  the  banks,  not  because  they  caused  development,  but  because  they  
facilitated   the   process’   (Jones,   2009,   p.   94).   This   section   argues   that   banking  
development   in  South  Africa   followed   the  mining   industry,   contributing   little  
to  actual  capital  accumulation  because  funding  (rather  than  short-­‐‑term  finance)  
was  not  available  until  the  mid-­‐‑20  century.    
For   a   long   time   banking,   and   more   broadly   monetary   developments,   in   the  
territories  which  were  to  become  South  Africa  was  dominated  by  their  status  as  
colonies:   currency   was   supplied   or   sanctioned   by   the   colonial   powers,  
permission  for  the  establishment  of  private  banks  was  sought  from  Britain  and  
the   Netherlands   and,   once   private   banking   was   established,   large   banking  
institutions  from  Europe  entered  the  colonies.  In  this  setting,  the  large  volumes  
of  funding  necessary  for  diamond  and  gold  mining  were  mainly  sourced  from  
European   capital  markets   and  banks,   rather   than   locally.  A   brief   overview  of  
the  most  salient  events  in  the  development  of  South  African  banking  will  serve  
to  illustrate  this  narrative.    
Cape  Town,  where  today’s  South  Africa  saw  its  beginnings,  was  established  by  
the  Dutch  East  India  Company  in  1652  to  serve  as  stop-­‐‑over  for  merchant  ships  
on   their   way   to   India   and   East   Asia.   Its   early   financial   system   was   heavily  
dependent   on   European   colonial   powers,   which   supplied   the   territory   with  
bullion.  Notes  were   initially  prohibited  from  being  issued,  due  to  a  belief   that  
paper  money  would   result   in   inflation   and  was   dangerous   for   the  monetary  
health  of   the   colony.  Due   to   its  geographical   remoteness,   the   local   authorities  
had   to   resort   to   the   issuance   of   government   paper   for   the   first   time   when  
bullion  supply  was  not  forthcoming  due  to  the  Anglo-­‐‑Dutch  War  of  the  1780s,  
however,  with  the  expressed  promise  to  destroy  the  notes  once  the  shipping  of  
coins  was  re-­‐‑established  (Arndt,  1928).            
The  financial  difficulties  of  local  authorities  paired  with  re-­‐‑occurring  economic  
depressions   (often   linked   to   troop   withdrawals   like   the   departure   of   the  
Württemberg   Cape   Regiment,   ordered   by   the   Dutch   East   India   Company   in  
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1790)  made   it   impossible   to   redeem  the  promise,  because  bullion  remained   in  
short  supply,  while  notes  were  commonly  used   in  economic   transactions.  The  
prejudice,  that  local  stagnation  and  high  prices  of  imported  goods  were  caused  
by  imprudent  handling  of  money  in  the  colony,  stuck.  Explicit  opposition  to  the  
establishment  of   any  note-­‐‑issuing   institution  delayed   the   formation  of  private  
banks   in   the  South  African   territories  markedly   (objections   to  applications   for  
banking  concessions  are  well  documented  by  Arndt,  1928).    
Therefore,  the  first  bank  established  in  the  region,  the  Lombard  Bank  (or  ‘Bank  
van  Leening’)  in  1793,  was  in  fact  a  type  of  state  bank,  since  it  was  founded  by  
the  Commissioners-­‐‑General  Nederburgh   and  Frykenius,   sent   to   the   colony   to  
improve   the   economic   climate   and   increase   revenue   for   the  Dutch   East   India  
Company.   The   institution   operated   as   a   mortgage   bank,   granting   credit   to  
individuals  with  valuable   real  property.   In   1808,   the  Lombard  Discount  Bank  
was  added  to   the  established  organisation,  discounting  short-­‐‑term  promissory  
notes  at  an  interest  rate  (Arndt,  1928;  Volkskas  Limited,  1984).  
Despite   an   invigorating   effect   of   the   bank   on   the   colony,   the   belief   that  
banknotes   debased   the   currency   and   banking   practices   were   too   risky   to   be  
undertaken  by  governments  prevailed.  Consequently,  in  1808  the  decision  was  
taken   to   fade   out   the   Lombard   Bank   by   calling   back   outstanding   loans  
gradually,   while   not   granting   new   ones.   The   Lombard   Discount   Bank   was  
subsequently   terminated   in   1843,   at   a   time   when,   after   much   government  
opposition,  the  first  private  banking  institutions  had  emerged  (Arndt,  1928).    
The  Cape  of  Good  Hope  Bank  was  the  first  commercial  bank  to  be  founded  on  
South  African   territory,  namely   in  Cape  Town,   in  1837.   Shortly  after,   in  1838,  
the  South  African  Bank  was  also  formed  in  Cape  Town.  Both  were  commercial  
banks  backed  by  joint  stock  capital,  issued  locally  and  bought  by  merchants  and  
other  well-­‐‑to-­‐‑do  citizens  of  the  colony.  As  Arndt  (1928)  documents  in  detail  the  
banks’  business  (according  to  their  founding  deeds)  was  to  keep  cash  accounts  
and  receive  deposits,  issue  and  circulate  cash  notes,  discount  bills  of  exchange,  
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promissory  notes  and  other  negotiable  public  and  private  securities.  They  also  
were   to  make  advances  on  bullion  or  goods  and  other  property,  deposited  as  
collateral.    
Crucially,  in  the  territories  which  were  to  become  South  Africa,  there  were  two  
main  waves   of   bank   formation.   The   first   started   in   1838   and   lasted   until   the  
early  1860s  when  small   local  banks  were   formed,  backed  by  domestic   capital.  
This   happened  mainly   in   the   British-­‐‑controlled  Cape  Colony   and  Natal.   This  
first  wave  was   followed  by   the   arrival   of   imperial   banks,   that   is,   large   banks  
that  were   part   of   European   (mostly   British)   banking   institutions,   in   the  Cape  
Colony.  In  1862,  the  first  imperial  bank,  Standard  Bank  of  British  South  Africa,  
started  operations  in  South  Africa  (Arndt,  1928).  The  discovery  of  copper  in  the  
1850s   in   Namaqualand,   leading   to   a   mining   and   financial   boom   (Rosenthal,  
1968),  surely  encouraged  this  influx  of  imperial  banks.    
The  Dutch  settler  colonies  of  the  Orange  Free  State  and  the  Transvaal  (the  South  
African  Republic  since  1852)  witnessed  a  much  slower  development  of  banking  
with   the   first   institutions   only   cropping   up   in   the   1870s   (Arndt,   1928).   These  
territories  were   sparsely   populated   by  Dutch-­‐‑origin   farmers   (the   Boer).   Thus,  
trade  activity  was  less  vibrant  and  less  geographically  concentrated  than  in  the  
Cape   Colony.   But   the   discovery   of   diamonds   in   Kimberly,   situated   at   the  
intersection  of  the  Cape  Colony,  the  Orange  Free  State  and  the  Transvaal,  and  
even  more  so  the  striking  of  gold  on  the  Witwatersrand  (or  simply,  the  Rand)  in  
Transvaal   in   the   1880s   made   these   areas   attractive   for   banking   business.   To  
visualise   the   geographical   dimensions   Figure   6.1.   shows   a   historical   map   of  
South   Africa   in   1885,   illustrating   the   British   possessions   as   well   as   the   Boer  
territories.    
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Figure 6.1. Historical map of South Africa, British possessions and Dutch settler colonies in 1885 
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The  imperial  banks,  backed  by  European  capital,  were  significantly  larger  than  
local  ones.  Thus,  their  arrival  prompted  an  amalgamation  move,  consolidating  
the   variegated   banking   landscape   in   the   South   African   territories.   The   new  
arrivals   were   certainly   keen   on   acquiring   local   banks,   which   succeeded   in  
isolated   instances.   However,   local   banks   mostly   strived   to   retain   their  
independence   from   foreign   banking   institutions,   perceiving   mergers   among  
themselves   as   the   only   possibility   to   compete   with   the   newly   arrived  
opponents.   In   the   end,   a   series   of   crises   (triggered   by   financial   and   mining  
speculation,   such   as   the   crisis   of   1881   and   the   crisis   of   1890)   pushed   smaller  
banks  either  into  failure  or  mergers  with  larger  banks  (Arndt,  1928),  resulting  in  
the  almost  complete  extinction  of  local  banks  by  the  end  of  the  century.  
As  early  as  1926,  three  big  banks  dominated  the  Union  of  South  Africa,  namely,  
Standard   Bank,   Netherlands   Bank   and   Barclays   Bank   (Dominion,   Colonial   &  
Overseas).  Hence,  the  basis  for  a  strongly  concentrated  banking  sector  had  been  
laid  early  in  South  Africa.  Today,  there  are  four  dominant  banks.  The  roots  of  
these  ‘big  four’  banks  can  be  traced  back  to  the  early  20th  century.  
The  ‘big  four’  are:  ABSA,  part  of  the  Barclays  Africa  Group,  which  is  majority  
owned  by  Barclays  Bank  Plc.,   First  National  Bank   (FNB),  which  was  Barclays  
National   Bank   Ltd.   until   19867,   The   Standard   Bank   of   South   Africa,   which  
originated  from  the  Standard  Bank  of  British  South  Africa,  and  Nedbank,  which  
has  its  roots  in  the  Netherlands  Bank.  
In  the  1880s,  when  diamonds  and  gold  were  found,  borrowing  from  domestic  
banks  was  not  a  viable  option  for  mining  developers.  Local  banks  were  simply  
too   small   to  provide   the   large   sums  necessary   for  mining  development.  They  
did   grant   credit   against  mining   claims,   that   is,   against   ground   that  might   (or  
might  not)   contain  gold.   Such   lending  brought   local   banks   into   trouble  when  
                                                                                                 
7  FNB  emerged  when  Barclays  withdrew   from  South  Africa   in   1986  due   to   increased  
international  pressure  on  the  apartheid  regime.  
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prices  for  land  claims  slumped  at  the  end  of  mining  and  financial  booms,  such  
as  in  1881  and  the  1890  (Arndt,  1928).    
But   actual   mine   development   proved   to   be   extremely   capital   intensive   and  
therefore  well  beyond  the  funding  possibilities  of  local  banks  for  both  diamond  
and   gold   extraction.  Mining   investors   in  Kimberley,  where   the   first   diamond  
was   found   in   1867,   were   convinced   that   diamond   claims   had   to   be  
monopolised,  in  order  to  ensure  the  viability  of  the  industry  (Innes,  1984).  Since  
diamonds   are   a   luxury   good,   keeping   them   in   short   supply   is   essential   to  
maintain  high  prices.  Thus,  competition  would  result  in  over-­‐‑production  in  the  
eyes  of  diamond  producers.    
Therefore,  the  diamond  claims  in  the  Kimberley  area  were  monopolised  swiftly  
under   the   lead  of  Cecil  Rhodes.  A  consortium  of  European   financiers,  headed  
by  the  Rothschilds,  had  to  be  formed  in  order  to  provide  the  immense  amount  
of  funding  necessary  to  buy  out  other  investors  in  the  area,  ensuring  a  complete  
monopoly.   Further   funds  were   required   to   start   actual  mining   operations,   all  
the  while  being  on  the  lookout  for  new  diamond  discoveries,  which  would  have  
to   be   purchased   in   order   to   defend   the   established   monopoly   position   and  
elevated  diamond  prices  (Innes,  1984).  
By  contrast,  gold  production  did  not  depend  on  monopolised  rights  because  the  
gold   standard   to   which   Britain   had   adhered   since   1816   (and   other   countries  
since  the  mid-­‐‑19th  century)  ensured  unlimited  demand  at  a  stable  price.  The  first  
finds   of   gold  deposits   date   back   to   1868   at   the  Olifants  River.   These  deposits  
were,   however,   relatively   small.   Three  more   discoveries   followed   during   the  
1870s,   the   last   one   in   the  Barbeton  district   in   1875,   resulting   in   a  pronounced  
speculative  boom  and  then  crash.  But  it  was  not  until  1886  that  the  outcrop  of  
the   large  gold  deposits  at  Witwatersrand  were   found.  The  discovery  attracted  
many   small-­‐‑scale   miners,   often   extracting   the   gold,   which   was   literally  
cropping  out  of   the  ground,   in  a  one-­‐‑man  operation.   In   these   early  years,   the  
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number  of  mining   claims  was   limited   to   two  per  head  and  non-­‐‑white  miners  
were   not   excluded   from   ownership   (‘diggers   democracy’).   Both   regulations  
were   to   change   at   the   insistence   of   large  mining  developers,  who  made   their  
fortunes  in  the  Kimberley  area  (Innes,  1984).  
Gold   mining   turned   capital   intensive   when   it   became   obvious   that   the  
discovered   gold   reef  was  merely   the   upper   edge   of   a   half   submerged   saucer  
that   fell   off   steeply   into   the   ground,   extending  down   and   South   of   the   initial  
discoveries.  The  gold  was  poor  in  quality  and  even  the  top-­‐‑layer  finds  needed  
to  be  crushed  and  extracted  using  mercury  plates.  These  extraction  techniques  
necessitated   some   machinery.   However,   capital   requirements   shot   up   even  
further  when  deep-­‐‑level  mining  and  the  erection  of  shafts  were  undertaken.  For  
this  purpose,  miners  sought  to  accumulate  a  number  of  adjacent  ground  claims  
to  make  shaft  sinking  more  scale-­‐‑efficient.    
Deeper-­‐‑level   gold  was   even  poorer   in   quality,   it   transpired   by   the   late   1880s,  
causing   the  1890  crash.  The  hauled  up  gold  was  not  oxidised,  but  covered  by  
pyritic  crystals  preventing  the  familiar  mercury  plates  technique  from  working  
effectively.   A   different   chemical   procedure   was   invented   to   take   care   of   this  
complication:  the  MacArthur-­‐‑Forrest  process  or  gold  cyanidation.  This  process  
proved  highly   efficient,   but   once   again  heavy  machinery  was   required   for   its  
implementation  (Feinstein,  2005).      
Thus,  during   the   early  years  of  diamond  and  gold  exploration   funding   large-­‐‑
scale  mining   investment  and  especially  development  simply  went  beyond   the  
possibilities  of  local  banks.  But  even  the  larger  imperial  banks  operating  in  the  
South   African   territories   could   not   be   of   help   since   most   of   them   (with   the  
notable   exception   of   Standard  Bank  which   arrived   in   1862)   only   started   their  
operations   during   the   1870s   or   later.   At   that   point   the   diamond   boom   was  
already  in  full  swing.    
   313  
But   even   subsequently   South   African   banks   might   have   been   reluctant   to  
provide  mine  funding.  Since  the  banks  present   in  South  Africa  operated  in  an  
English  tradition  they  did  not  engaged  in  much  long-­‐‑term  lending.  This  made  it  
difficult   for  mining   investors   to   obtain   funding   for   their   ventures.   Long-­‐‑term  
lending  among  South  African  commercial  banks  was  only  championed  in  1948  
by  Netherlands  Bank  of  South  Africa,  providing  industrial  funding  through  its  
subsidiary   Netherlands   Finance   and   Investment   Corporation   in   a   move   to  
diversify  and  enlarge  its  product  and  client  base  (Verhoef,  1992b).    
Historically,   South   African   banking   forms   part   of   the   Anglo-­‐‑Saxon   tradition  
and  is  therefore  often  classified  as  a  market-­‐‑based  financial  system  according  to  
the   categorization   controversy   discussed   in   the   previous   section.   Only   the  
Volkskas   established   as   cooperative   bank   during   the   1930s   somewhat  
resembled   a   German-­‐‑style   universal   banks   of   the   1920s   between   1968-­‐‑1980  
when   it   acquired   (and   later   sold)   substantial   industrial   interests,  which  made  
up  80%  of  its  assets  by  1980  (Verhoef,  1992a).  This  was,  however,  in  a  move  to  
promote   the   engagement   of   white   Dutch-­‐‑origin   South   Africans   (so-­‐‑called  
Afrikaners)   in   business.   Until   the   mid-­‐‑1960s,   when   Anglo   American   sold   a  
major   stake   in   a   leading   mining-­‐‑finance   house   to   the   Afrikaner   financial  
services   group,   SANLAM,   Afrikaner   ownership   of   mining   was   marginal  
(Feinstein,  2005).  Due  to  rivalry  between  Afrikaner  and  British  capital,  it  would  
have  been  unlikely  to  see  mining  development  be  financed  by  institutions  like  
Volkskas.      
Commercial  banks  dominated  the  South  African  banking  sector  until  the  1950s.  
Aggressive  competition  for  market  share  from  other  financial  institutions  such  
as  building  societies  and  hire  purchase  banks  during  the  1960s  was   facilitated  
by  strict  government  controls  of  commercial  banks’  credit  expansion,  aimed  at  
containing   inflationary   pressures.   These   measures   had   little   effect   since   they  
disregarded   the   money-­‐‑creating   abilities   of   other   deposit-­‐‑taking   institutions.  
   314  
Competitive   pressures  made   the  move   into   industrial   financing   necessary   for  
commercial  banks.    
At   this   point   the   mining-­‐‑finance   houses   were   well   established,   often   held  
substantial   shares   in   big   banking   groups,   and   in   fact   were   pushing   for   the  
deepening   of   local   financial   systems,   as   the   case   of   the   Anglo   American’s  
initiative  to  set  up  a  South  African  money  market  will  demonstrate  (in  section  
6.3.3.).  Hence,  while  South  African  banks  were  unable  and  unwilling  to  provide  
large-­‐‑scale   funding   for  mine  development   in   the   early  years   (when  European  
investors   were   important)   and   until   the   mid-­‐‑20th   century,   their   assistance  
became   less   crucial   subsequently   due   to   the   strong   financial   position   large  
mining  companies  had  secured  by  the  1950s:  They  had  become  mining-­‐‑finance  
houses  and  as  such  they  could  finance  much  of  their  investment  internally.  
6.3.2. The historical origins of mining-finance houses in South Africa 
Mining-­‐‑finance  houses   in  South  Africa  are   company  groups  with   interest   and  
expertise  mainly   in  mining   and   finance.   In   the   course   of   the   20th   century,   the  
mining-­‐‑finance   houses   diversified   increasingly   into   manufacturing   and  
services,  forming  company  groups.  The  distinct  feature  of  these  South  African  
groups   was   their   complex   ownership   structures   (so-­‐‑called   pyramid   structure  
holding   companies),   which   allowed   the  main   owner   (often   a   family,   like   the  
Oppenheimers  in  Anglo  American)  to  control  a  large  number  of  business  assets  
with  a  relatively  small  ownership  share  (Barr  &  Kantor,  1994).8    
Historically,   they  emerged  during  the  late  19th  century  when  both  engineering  
knowledge  and  financial  backing  from  large  investors  in  Europe  were  essential  
to   bring   successful   mining   operations   into   production.   These   mining-­‐‑finance  
                                                                                                 
8  In  South  Africa   the  practice  of   issuing  non-­‐‑voting  shares  was  not  common  until   the  
late  1990s.  Hence,  in  order  to  retain  control  but  increase  equity  capital  layers  of  holding  
companies   were   established.   Ownership   could   then   be   diluted   without   forgoing  
control.   Gerso   &   Barr   (1996)   show   that   the   Oppenheimer   family   controlled   Anglo  
American  in  the  1990s  with  an  ownership  share  of  15%.  The  Rupert  family’s  ownership  
in  Rembrandt  even  fell  to  1.5%  without  endangering  their  control.        
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houses  were,   therefore,   not   so  much   holding   companies   but   rather   a   specific  
form   of   conglomerate,   offering   specialised   services   to   all   their   subsidiaries.  
During   the   first   big  wave   of   gold  mining   in  Witwatersrand,   that   is  when   the  
Central  Rand  mining   interests  were  established  and  mined  between  1886  and  
1914,   ten   big   mining   groups   emerged   along   with   some   smaller   ones,   which  
were  to  grow  during  the  second  wave  of  development,  when  claims  on  the  Far  
East  Rand  were  consolidated.  
These   ‘big   ten’  were   (1)   the  Corner  House,   led  by  Wernher,  Beit  &  Company  
and  Eckstein  &  Company,  (2)  Cecil  Rhodes’s  and  Charles  Rudd’s  Consolidated  
Gold  Fields,   (3)   the  Bernato  group,   (4)   Joseph  Robinson’s  Robinson  group,   (5)  
George  Ferrar  and  associates,  (6)  George  Albu,  or  General  Mining,  (7)  A.  Goerz  
&  Company,  (8)  S.  Neumann  &  Company,  (9)  Lewis  and  Marks  partnership  and  
(10)  Abe  Bailey  interests  (Kubicek,  1979).  There  were  also  a  number  of  smaller  
mining   groups,   which   over   time   were   bought   up   or   disappeared   otherwise,  
with   the   notable   exception   of   Anton   Dunkelsbuhler   whose   speculative  
investment   in   Far   East   Rand   claims   in   those   early   years  were   to   become   the  
basis  for  the  Anglo  American  empire  (Pogue,  2000).    
The   stories   of   the   ‘big   ten’   are   important,   since   they   illustrate   the   complex  
relationship   between  mining   and   finance  within   these   groups.  Many   of   them  
such   as   the   Corner  House   or   Consolidated  Gold   Fields  were   involved   in   the  
development   of   the   diamond   mines   in   Kimberly.   The   Corner   House,   or   its  
predecessor  Jules  Porges  and  Company,  made  a  fortune  from  selling  substantial  
claims  on  diamond  grounds   to   the   investor  group  around  Cecil  Rhodes.  This  
enabled  the  group  to  invest  in  gold  claims  on  a  large  scale,  becoming  the  largest  
gold  producer   in   South  Africa   by   the   early   20th   century.  Their   share   of   South  
African   gold   output   was   37%   for   the   years   1902-­‐‑13,   translating   into   11%   of  
global  output  (Kubicek,  1979).      
   316  
While  using  the  equity  markets  in  South  Africa  and  Europe  to  generate  profits  
(rather   than   raising   funding),   the   Corner   House   also   emerged   as   first   large  
undertaking   to   focus   seriously   onto   mine   development   rather   than   the  
speculative   phase   of   exploration.   Therefore,   Kubicek   (1979)   identifies   the  
Corner   House,   which   later   became   Rand   Mines,   as   the   first   mining-­‐‑finance  
house   to   emerge.   Their   development   efforts   are   best   illustrated   in   the  
pioneering  push  for  deep-­‐‑level  gold  mining  during  the  1890s.  The  funds  needed  
for  this  move  were  so  enormous  that  the  Corner  House  only  put  up  half  of  the  
sum,  while  involving  European  investors  (approaching  those  who  also  invested  
in   the   earlier   diamond   venture)   and   even   local   rivals   like  Consolidated  Gold  
Fields  in  funding  the  other  half.    
Consolidated  Gold  Fields  emerged  as  main  rival  to  the  Corner  House,  however  
only   becoming   a   serious   mining-­‐‑finance   house   by   1900.   Rhodes   and   Rudd  
established  the  company  in  1887.  But  their  activities  during  the  first  three  years  
of  the  company’s  existence  were  purely  financial.  They  managed  to  double  the  
undertaking’s   capital   and   even   declare   dividends   on   the   back   of   successful  
equity  market  speculation  with  gold  and  diamond  shares  (Kubicek,  1979).  
After   1894   Consolidated   Gold   Fields   turned   more   towards   actual   mine  
development,  also  cooperating  with  the  Corner  House.  The  group  subsequently  
purchased   and  developed   important  mines   such   as   the   Simmer  &   Jack  mine,  
Sub  Nigel  and  the  Village  Reef  Mine,  which  have  all  been  active  until  recently  
as  documented  in  chapter  4.  In  1899,  the  group  issued  debentures  for  what  was  
to  become  one  of  its  most  profitable  mines,  the  Robinson  Deep.  Hence,  by  1900  
the  main  focus  of  the  group  was  mining  operations,  making  it  a  mining-­‐‑finance  
house  rather  than  a  finance  house  speculating  in  mining  shares,  which  it  used  
to  be  in  its  early  days.  
The  Bernato  group,   the  Robinson  group  and  Ferrar   and  associates  became  all  
well   known   for   their   speculative   involvement   in  mining.  A   recurrent  practice  
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among   the   ill-­‐‑reputed   mining   groups   was   to   float   mining   companies   and  
allocate   individual  partners  of   the  group  share  packages  below   floating  price.  
These   could   then   be   sold   lucratively   when   share   prices   increased   during   a  
boom.   Joseph  Robinson’s  speculative  activity  was  so  outrageous   that  even  his  
fellow  mining   investors   (and   speculators)  despised  him,   blocking  him   from  a  
peerage   in   the  House  of  Lords   in  Britain.  Robinson,   for   instance,  overcharged  
Solly  Joel  of  the  Bernato  group  for  mining  interests  so  excessively,  that  the  latter  
took  him  to  court  over  it  in  1916.  Of  the  £4.5  million  pounds  selling  price  Solly  
Joel  was  able  to  recover  £500,000  (Kubicek,  1979).    
Thus,  speculative  mining  groups  tended  to  focus  on  exploration  while  investing  
very  little  in  actual  mine  development  and  extraction.  Speculation  was  possible  
due   to   exploration   risk,  which  made   the   assessment   of  mineral   deposits   in   a  
given   piece   of   ground   at   the   best   an   educated   guess.   Importantly,   Bernato,  
despite   or   maybe   because   of   its   highly   speculative   investment   strategy,  
managed  to  outstrip  both  Rand  Mines  and  Consolidated  Gold  Fields  in  terms  of  
gold  production  by  1913   (Kubicek,   1979).  The  basis  was   their   early   (and  once  
again  speculative)   investment   in  Far  East  Rand  mining  claims.  Coincidentally,  
speculative   investment   in   the   Far   East   Rand  was   also   the   foundation   for   the  
Anglo   American   empire.   Once,   again   this   illustrates   the   close   link   between  
speculation  and  production  in  the  mining  industry.  Large  pools  of  capital  were  
useful  for  both,  but  essential  for  the  latter.    
From  the  ‘big  ten’  mining-­‐‑finance  groups  six  large  company  groups  emerged  in  
South  Africa  after  World  War  II  (and  not  all  of  them  were  rooted  in  mining)  to  
control   the  majority  of  business   interested   listed  on   the   JSE.  These   six  groups  
were  Anglo  American,  SANLAM,  Liberty  Life,  Rembrandt  (later:  Remgro),  SA  
Mutual   (later:   Old   Mutual)   and   Anglovaal   (Roberts,   2004).   Their   dominance  
within   the  South  African  economy  stemmed,  on  the  one  hand,   from  their  size  
and  ability   to   invest  on  a   large   scale.  On   the  other  hand,   the   concentration  of  
business  interest  in  the  country  was  accelerated  during  the  1960s  when  capital  
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controls  were  introduced  with  the  aim  of  stopping  domestic  capital  from  flight.  
This   situation   was   exaggerated   when   international   corporations   started  
withdrawing   their   investment   from   South   Africa   during   the   1980s,   when  
international   sanctions   were   finally   imposed   against   the   racist   apartheid  
regime.    
With  the  end  of  apartheid  in  the  early  1990s,  the  groups  came  under  pressure  to  
‘unbundle’,  meaning  to  break  up  their  extremely  large  conglomerate  structures,  
because  simplifying  pyramid  ownership  structures  would  allegedly  make  their  
shares   more   attractive   to   foreign   investors. 9   Breaking   up   these   large  
conglomerates   also   appeared   to   hold   the   promise   of   less   concentration   and  
more  dynamic  competition  for  the  South  African  economy.    
In   the   process   of   unbundling   the   company   groups   reduced   their   degree   of  
activity  diversification,  focusing  on  their  core  businesses.  Many  of  them  –  such  
as  Anglo  American  in  1999  –  used  the  opportunity  to  move  their  primary  listing  
from  the  JSE  to  either  the  London  Stock  Exchange  or  the  capital  market  of  some  
other   OECD   country.   It   is   doubtful   whether   the   promised   increase   in  
competition   and   foreign   direct   investment   (which   allegedly   would   flow   into  
South   Africa   once   the   big   groups   could   source   capital   cheaper   abroad)   ever  
materialised  (Chabane,  Goldstein,  &  Roberts,  2006).    
Looking   at   the   historical   evolution   of   the   mining-­‐‑finance   houses   this   recent  
development  is  maybe  not  overly  surprising.  The  early  mining  groups,  at  least  
the  large  ones,  already  embodied  a  global  outreach  (rather  than  a  dedication  to  
South  Africa  as  the  centre  of  operations)  and  a  wish  to  reduce  risky  investment  
in  a  potentially  politically  unstable  environment.  The  wish  to  reduce  their  risk  
stem,  on  the  one  hand,  from  the  inherently  risky  nature  of  gold  exploration  but  
equally,   on   the   other   hand,   from   the   politically   unstable   situation   in   the  
                                                                                                 
9  Barr  &  Kantor   (1994)   argue   that   there   is   no   evidence   of   higher   profitability,  which  
would  increase  the  groups’  attractiveness  for  investors.    
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Transvaal   where   Afrikaner   and   British   interests   clashed,   resulting   in   violent  
conflict.   This  made  mining   (and   property)   rights   uncertain.   Thus,   the  Corner  
House,   for   instance,   held   £1   million   worth   of   low-­‐‑risk   financial   investment  
(mainly   government   bonds)   in   London   around   the   turn   of   the   century,  
alongside   real   estate,   interest   in   cement   and   public   utility   companies   in   the  
Transvaal   and   other   mining   interests   on   the   American   continents   (Kubicek,  
1979).   But   the   financial   power   that   the   mining-­‐‑finance   houses   held   in   South  
Africa   is   best   exemplified   in   the   establishment   of   the   local  money  market   in  
1955.                  
6.3.3. The historical origins of capital and money markets in South Africa    
Anglo  American  gave  the  impulse  for  a  local  money  market  to  emerge  in  South  
Africa   (through   the   foundation   of   the   first   merchant   bank,   the   Union  
Acceptances  Ltd.)  in  1955  (Laight,  1982).  But  money  markets  provide  short-­‐‑term  
lending,   whereas   during   the   diamond   and   gold   rush   it   was   large   long-­‐‑term  
finance,  which  was  needed.  Here,  local  equity  markets  could  help  somewhat.    
The   first   recorded   security   dealings   in   South   Africa   go   as   far   back   as   1782  
(Rosenthal,   1968).   The   discovery   of   diamonds   in  Kimberley   in   the   late   1860s,  
prompted   the   establishment   of   a   stock   exchange   there,   which   became   the  
financial  centre  of  the  South  African  territories.  At  the  time,  there  was  another  
important   stock   exchange   in   Pietermaritzburg.   The   1880s   provided   for   an  
interlude   at   Barbeton,   where   a   gold   rush   started   in   1883,   triggering   the  
establishment  of   two  security  exchanges.  Both  were,  however,  closed  once  the  
gold  boom  in  the  area  came  to  an  end  in  1890  (Andrews  &  Kok,  1984).    
Today’s   stock  market   in   the   country,   the   Johannesburg   Stock  Exchange   (JSE),  
has  its  origins  in  the  gold  finds  of  1886  in  Witwatersrand.  Poor  communication  
links  because  of   the  geographical  distance  between   the  Rand   (which   is   in   the  
Transvaal,   see   Figure   6.1)   and   Kimberley   made   the   establishment   of   a   local  
exchange   in   Johannesburg   essential.   The   Witwatersrand   Club   and   Exchange  
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Company  Limited  announced  in  1886  is  often  named  as  predecessor  of  the  JSE  
(see,   for   instance,   Andrews   &   Kok,   1984   and   Goldie-­‐‑Scot,   1996)   which   was  
established   the   following   year.   However,   according   to   the   Committe   of   the  
Johannesburg   Stock   Exchange   (1948)   there   are   no   records   proving   that   the  
Witwatersrand   Club   was   ever   established.   Since   1931,   when   the  
Pietermaritzburg   Exchange   closed   its   doors,   the   JSE   has   been   the   only   stock  
exchange  in  South  Africa.  
As  discussed  in  part  6.3.1.,  it  was  the  major  European  stock  markets  that  helped  
to   raise   much   of   the   funds   needed   to   develop   the   South   African   mining  
industry.  Kubicek  (1979)  estimated  that  South  African  mines  absorbed  between  
£116-­‐‑134   million   during   the   period   1886-­‐‑1913   alone.   To   put   this   into  
perspective,   the   amount   equates   to   three   times   as   much   as   Canadian   and  
Australian  mines   received   and   to   about   half   the   sum   the   public   and   private  
sectors   in  Argentina  were   able   to   raise   together   in   those   years.  Nevertheless,  
some  (much  smaller  volumes  of)  funds  were  obtained  locally  through  the  JSE.    
Until  British  Company  Law  was  introduced  in  the  Transvaal,  when  the  colony  
fell  under  British  rule  during  the  Second  Boer  War  (1899-­‐‑1902),  local  regulations  
were  so  lax  that  many  dubious  mining  investors,  such  as  Joseph  B.  Robinson  of  
the   Robinson   group,   preferred   to   set   up   business   in   the   Transvaal   and   seek  
finance   locally.   In   fact,   Robinson   started   his   gold   mining   enterprise,   which  
became  one  of   the   ‘big   ten’  mining  houses  present  around  the   turn  of   the  20th  
century,  through  a  loan  he  obtained  from  Alfred  Beit,  a  leading  member  of  the  
Corner  House,   the  most  well-­‐‑reputed  mining   group   in   those   times   (Kubicek,  
1979).  However,  a  large  number  among  these  ‘big  ten’  used  the  JSE  to  generate  
speculative   gains   during   stock   market   booms,   which   were   a   frequent  
phenomenon  during  these  early  days  of  diamond  and  gold  discovery.    
Nonetheless,  the  large  mining-­‐‑finance  houses  that  developed  in  the  20th  century  
all  made   their   fortunes   through   actual  mining   activity.   In   the   course   of   their  
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development  they  became  so  big  that  their  financial  power  rivalled  (and  often  
exceeded)   that   of   many   local   financial   institutions.   The   Corner   House,   for  
instance   held   £1.17million   in   low-­‐‑risk   financial   assets   with   Union   Bank   of  
London   at   the   beginning   of   the   last   century.   This  was   in   addition   to   its   rich  
deep-­‐‑level   gold   mines   in   South   Africa,   a   smaller   portfolio   of   local   property  
holdings   and   manufacturing   interests   and   significant   global   investment   into  
diversified  mining   and   other   primary   commodity   extraction   claims   (Kubicek,  
1979).  
Their   financial   power   and   influence   was   exemplified   in   the   Corner   House  
group’s   involvement   in   supporting   the   formation   of   a   national   bank   in   the  
South   African   Republic   (or   the   Transvaal).   After   ten   years   of   abortive  
negotiations   with   a   range   of   different   potential   investors,   it   was   Eckstein   &  
Company   (part   of   the   Corner  House),  which   helped  Kruger’s   government   to  
raise  £4  million  capital  (taking  part  of  the  interest  out  themselves)  in  Europe,  so  
that  the  bank  could  finally  be  established  in  1891  (Arndt,  1928,  Kubicek,  1979).  
This  episode  exemplifies  the  financial  power  and  influence,  which  these  groups  
accumulated  over  time.      
Anglo  American,   founded  in  1917  and  the   largest  modern-­‐‑day  mining-­‐‑finance  
house   is  another  example.   In  1955,  Anglo  American  organised  and   financially  
stemmed   the   establishment   of   the   first   merchant   bank   in   South   Africa,   the  
Union   Acceptances   Ltd.   Almost   80%   of   the   capital   was   provided   by   the  
company  and  other  companies   that  were  part  of   the  Anglo  group,  such  as  De  
Beers.  Similarly,   the  head  of   the  bank  was  appointed  by  Ernest  Oppenheimer,  
on  the  basis  of  being  a  close  ally,  rather  than  due  to  skill  or  merit  (Jones,  1992).  
Hence,   the   influence  of   these  groups   (also  based  on   their   financial  might)   ran  
deep  into  the  financial  sector  of  South  Africa.    
The   establishment   of   Union   Acceptances   triggered   further   creations   of  
merchant  banks  by  other  financial  institutions  and  also  discount  houses.  Hence,  
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Anglo   American   by   no   means   single-­‐‑handedly   created   the   South   African  
money  market.  However,  it  provided  the  crucial  trigger  for  it.  And  this  trigger  
appears  to  have  been  importantly  motivated  by  the  company’s  own  cash  flow  
position,  which  at   the  time  it  desired  to   invest   in  South  Africa  rather   than  the  
London   money   market   as   was   practice   until   then.   Hence,   in   Stuart   Jones’s  
words:    
‘Endogenous   factors,   however,   were   even   more   important   [for   the  
establishment   of  Union  Acceptances].   […]   the  Free   State   gold-­‐‑fields,   in  which  
Anglo   American   occupied   a   commanding   position,   were   about   to   come   on  
stream  and  produce  a  greatly  enlarged  cash  flow  for  the  group’  (Jones,  1992,  p.  
155).  
Apart   from  Anglo  American-­‐‑controlled  Union  Acceptances,   four  other  private  
merchant   banks   were   established   in   South   Africa   during   the   1950s   and   ’60s.  
These   were   Central   Finance   and   Acceptance   Corp.   backed   by   the   SANLAM  
Group,   the   Accepting   Bank   for   Industry   in  which   the   state-­‐‑owned   Industrial  
Development  Corporation  had  a  40%  stake  and  the  Philip  Hill  Acceptance  Co.,  
wholly-­‐‑owned  by  Philip  Hill,  Higginson,  Erlanger’s  Ltd  (Innes,  1984).      
Hence,   the  mining-­‐‑finance  houses  were  powerful   financial   actors  due   to   their  
financial   expertise,  but  more   importantly,  because  of   the   large   financial   funds  
they  held,  and  the  links  to  financial  institutions  abroad  they  were  able  to  build.  
These  three  assets  gave  the  mining-­‐‑finance  houses  the  upper  hand  over  South  
African  financial  institutions.    
6.4. Summary and conclusion 
This  chapter  set  out  the  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  methodology,  which  is  used  in  analysing  
the  South  African  economy  in  the  next  chapter,  with  the  aim  of  answering  the  
questions   about   (1)   the   role   of   financial   institutions   in   the   economy,   (2)   the  
driving   force   behind   credit   expansion   and   (3)   the   agency   (or   power)   in   the  
relations  between   finance  and  non-­‐‑financial  business.   In  economics,   the  bank-­‐‑
based   versus   market-­‐‑based   literature   attempts   to   account   for   institutional  
differences  in  financial  markets  across  countries,  addressing  question  (1)  about  
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the   macroeconomic   role   of   financial   institutions.   However,   the   literature  
implicitly  presumes  that   the  function  of  both,  banks  and  capital  markets,   is   to  
channel   household   saving   to   corporates   in   need   of   external   funds   for   their  
investment   project.   Hence,   the   bank-­‐‑based   versus   market-­‐‑based   debate   is  
essentially  not  about  the  role  of  individual  financial  institutions  in  the  economy.  
Rather   more   narrowly,   it   asks   who   the   major   financial   intermediary   in   a  
textbook  economy  is.  The  bank-­‐‑based  market-­‐‑based  dichotomy  is  of  little  use  in  
understanding   the   development   of   South   African   finance.   Here,   the   mining  
sector,   hence   a   specific   part   of   the   non-­‐‑financial   corporate   sector,   was  
instrumental   in   shaping   domestic   financial   institutions.   This   historical  
experience  cannot  be  captured  by  the  simplistic  dichotomy  used  in  economics  
to  classify  financial  systems.      
In   contrast,   the   mere   use   of   a   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   approach,   if   true   to   its   (old)  
institutionalist  origins,  implies  the  recognition  of  financial  institutions  as  money  
creators  rather  than  mere  intermediaries  channelling  household  saving  to  non-­‐‑
financial   firms.  Thus,   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  analysis   is  chosen   to  answer  questions   (2)  
and  (3)  in  the  subsequent  chapter.  Some  preliminary  answers  to  these  questions  
have  been  given  in  this  chapter:  
The  historical  overview  of  the  origins  of  South  African  banking,  mining-­‐‑finance  
houses  (which  were  the  main  businesses  in  search  of  funding  in  the  early  days  
of  the  South  African  colonies)  and  the  stock  exchange  illustrate  that  finance  and  
non-­‐‑financial  businesses  have  always  been  closely   intertwined   in   the   country.  
However,   mining   interests,   in   the   shape   of   the   mining-­‐‑finance   houses,   were  
able   to  establish   themselves  as  a  dominant  economic   force   in   the  country  and  
also   as   powerful   financial   actors.   Hence,   the   question   of   power   in   the  
relationship   between   financial   institutions   and   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   is  
historically  answered  in  favour  of  mining  businesses,  a  specific  part  of  the  NFF  
sector.        
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Chapter VII: The Macroeconomic Impact of Non-Financial 
Firms Financial Operations 
  
This  chapter  will  identify  the  impact  of  non-­‐‑financial  firms’  financial  operations  
on  the  macro  economy,  using  South  Africa  as  case  study.  The  macroeconomic  
level  of  analysis   is   important,  because  economic  entities   such  as  non-­‐‑financial  
businesses   do   not   exist   in   isolation.   Chapter   2   discussed   the   nature   of   non-­‐‑
financial   corporations’   financial   operations   from   both   firm   and   industry  
perspectives.  Here,   it  became  clear   that   for  mainstream  economic  analysis   the  
non-­‐‑financial  corporations’  motivation  to  hold  liquidity  had  to  be  found  within  
the   firm,   namely,   in   either   of   the   three   motives   of   liquidity   preference  
examined:  the  transaction,  the  precautionary  or  the  speculative  motive.  Such  a  
reductive   approach   neglects   that   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   as   a   group  
constitute  an  economic  aggregate.  Crucially,  as  a  sector  they  interact  with  other  
aggregates  in  the  economy.  This  is  illustrated  in  the  so-­‐‑called  sectoral  balances,  
i.e.  the  financial  positions  of  the  different  macroeconomic  aggregates.    
The   sectoral   balance   is   the   difference   between   a   sectors’   gross   saving   and   its  
gross   investment   for   a  given   time  period.   If   an   economic   aggregate  generates  
more  saving  than  it   invests   its   financial  balance  will  be  positive,  meaning  that  
the   sector   is   a   net   lender.   Conversely,   if   a   sector   has   investment   expenditure  
that   exceeds   savings,   the   financial   balance   is   negative.   The   aggregate   is   a   net  
borrower.    
Mainstream   (textbook)   economic   theory   assumes   that   non-­‐‑financial   firms   and  
the  government  are  net  debtors   in   aggregate,  whereas  households  as   a  group  
are   perceived   to   be   net   creditors   (Mishkin   &   Eakins,   2012).   Net   (rather   than  
gross)   financial   positions   are   typically   considered,   identifying   surplus   and  
deficit   sectors   in   an   economy   and   visualising   the   direction   of   financial  
intermediation.   Examining   the   aggregate   behaviour   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms  
   325  
(rather   than   their   isolated  micro  behaviour)   can   shed   light   on   the   reasons   for  
their  rising  liquidity  holdings.  Therefore,  this  chapter  will  use  sectoral  and  flow  
of   funds   analyses,   stressing   the   interconnectedness   of   macroeconomic  
aggregates.  
The  chapter  is  organised  as  follows:  First  (in  part  7.1.),  the  structure  of  the  South  
African  National   Financial  Accounts   (NFA)  will   be   discussed,  which   provide  
the   necessary   data   for   this   chapter’s   analysis.   In   section   7.2.,   the   sectoral  
balances  as  provided  by  the  NFA  will  be  examined.  While  sectoral  balances  are  
typically   considered   in  net   terms,  here  both  will  be   considered,  net  and  gross  
financial  positions.    
Analysing  flow  of  funds  data  for  the  years  1970-­‐‑2013,  this  chapter  finds  that  (1)  
the   South   African   government   has   attempted   to   shrink   its   net   borrowing  
position   since   the   mid-­‐‑1980s   (that   is,   since   the   onset   of   neo-­‐‑liberal   reforms  
aimed  at  deregulation  and  state  reduction);  (2)  households’  net  creditor  position  
has  been  eroded  since  the  1990s;  (3)  the  sectoral  balance  of  private-­‐‑sector  non-­‐‑
financial  firms  moves  in  tandem  (and  inversely)  to  the  financial  balance  of  the  
rest   of   the   world,   illustrating   the   strong   international   orientation   of   South  
African  corporations.    
Since  the  focus  of  the  chapter  is  the  impact  of  non-­‐‑financial  businesses’  financial  
operations  in  aggregate  on  the  South  African  economy  as  a  whole,  the  chapter  
will  proceed  to  investigating  the  sources  and  uses  of  non-­‐‑financial  companies’  
funds  (in  part  7.3.).  The  results  of  this  investigation  have  to  be  seen  against  the  
background   of   the   orthodox   and   heterodox   economic   theory   discussed   in  
chapter  5.    
Mainstream  economics  expects  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  to  be  a  net  debtor  in  
aggregate,   receiving   credit   generated   by   financial   intermediation   out   of  
household   savings.   The   better   the   intermediation   functions,   the   higher  
investment  and  growth  rates  will  be.  In  contrast,  much  of  heterodox  economic  
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theory   –   especially   that   closely   linked   to   Marx’s   and   Keynes’s   thought   –  
predicts  productive  credit   to  be  created  either  out  of   idle  money  hoards,  or  ex  
nihilis   by   banking   institutions   to   serve   the   investment   needs   of   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations.  The  financialisation  literature  –  the  pinnacle  of  modern  heterodox  
thought   on   finance   –   often   predicts   either   a   shift   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms’  
financing   behaviour   from   banks   to   capital  markets   as  major   source   of   funds,  
and/or  an  increase  in  their  financial  operations,  which  allegedly  happens  at  the  
expense   of   productive   investment.   This   then   explains   the   tendency   towards  
lower  economic  growth  and  a  declining  investment  rate.  
According   to   the   mainstream   view,   South   Africa’s   relatively   deep   financial  
markets   should   be   a   development   success   (Jones,   2009).   The   absence   of   this  
success   is  puzzling   for  mainstream  economists   (Eyraud,  2009),  while   it  makes  
South   Africa   a   prime   example   of   a   financialised   emerging   economy   for  
heterodox  writers  (Ashman  et  al.,  2011;  Ashman  et  al.,  2013).  This  thesis  argues  
that   South   Africa’s   financialisation   story   is   a   more   complex   one.   The  
mainstream  view  can  be  refuted.  In  contrast   to  popular  perception  (Amphlett,  
1914;   Jones,   2009),   the   South   African   financial   sector,   and   especially   the   big  
banks,  did  historically  not  contributed  to  the  country’s  economic  and  industrial  
development  because  long-­‐‑term  funding  was  not  made  available.  South  African  
non-­‐‑financial   companies   financed   much   of   their   investment   internally,  
especially  during  the  second  half  of  the  20th  century,  as  this  chapter  will  show.  
But   equally   the   heterodox   argument   misses   out   on   layers   of   complexity   by  
lazily  accusing  large  South  African  NFFs  of  financial  speculation  that  emerged  
as   consequence   of   the   country’s   financialisation   since   the   mid-­‐‑1990s.   In   fact,  
NFFs   always   invested   heavily   into   financial   instruments   in   South   Africa.  
Crucially,   NFFs   changed   (rather   then   intensified)   their   financial   investment  
strategies   in   the   course   of   the   1990s,   shifting   away   from   trade   credit   towards  
active   liquidity  management.  Thus,   this   thesis   reveals   the  mechanisms  behind  
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the  heterodox  ‘gut  feel’  that  finance  in  South  Africa  is  not  contributing  towards  
investment  and  employment  creation,  but  rather  weakening  the  local  economy.  
This   chapter   will   show   that   in   South   Africa   borrowing   and   lending   do   not  
necessarily  follow  the  orthodox  economic  model.  While  the  government  sector  
has  been  a  net  debtor  (as  mainstream  theory  would  expect),  this  is  not  always  
true  for  non-­‐‑financial  companies,  which  are  the  other  main  deficit  sector  in  the  
economy,   according   to   the   textbook   approach.   During   much   of   the   1980s,  
corporations   ran   large   financial   surpluses   in   South   Africa.   Non-­‐‑financial  
businesses   then   used   these   surpluses   to   provide   credit   for   household  
consumption   and,   potentially,   business   activity   of   small   (non-­‐‑incorporated)  
firms.  Hence,  as  far  as  household  credit  goes,  non-­‐‑financial  companies  figured  
as  financial   intermediaries,  which  is  at  odds  with  mainstream  theory  in  which  
financial   institutions   (banks   and   capital  markets)   take   on   the   role   of   financial  
intermediaries.    
The  New  South  Africa   is   labelled  as   increasingly   financialised   (Ashman  et  al.,  
2011).   There   are   different   interpretations   of   the   financialisation   of  NFFs.   One  
view   is   that   NFFs   increasingly   undertake   financial   speculation   instead   of  
productive   investment   (see   Ashman   &   Fine,   2013,   for   South   Africa;   and  
Orhangazi,   2008,   for   the   general   argument).   Another   view   is   that   NFFs   turn  
away   from   bank-­‐‑based   finance   towards   financial   markets   as   main   source   of  
financing   (see   Aglietta   &   Breton,   2001;   Lapavitsas,   2009;   Lapavitsas,   2013).  
Neither  of  these  interpretations  fits  the  South  African  case,  exposing  the  overly  
simplistic   understanding   of   NFFs’   financial   activity   in   much   of   the  
financialisation  literature.        
Crucially,   in   South   Africa   NFFs   have   shifted   the   bulk   of   their   financial  
operations   from   providing   trade   credit   to   purchases   of  more   liquid   financial  
assets.   The   importance   of   financial   operations   for   non-­‐‑financial   firms   has   not  
increased  over   time.  Similarly,  bank   credit  has  not  been   replaced  with   capital  
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market   lending   for   investment   purposes.  Hence,  while   non-­‐‑financial   firms   in  
South  Africa  are  increasingly  investing  into  innovative  financial  assets,  it  would  
be   incorrect   to   speak   of   their   increased   financialisation.   If   anything,   South  
African  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  have  always  been  highly   financialised.   It   is  
merely  the  type  of  their  financialisation,  which  has  changed  over  time.    
Non-­‐‑financial   firms   in   South  Africa   raise   a   substantial   amount   of   their   liquid  
funds   from   the   foreign   sector.   Part   7.4.   will   show   that   these   funds   are   then  
channelled  into  the  South  African  banking  sector.  An  analysis  of  the  four  major  
South  African  banks,  which  cover  around  three  quarters  of   loan  extensions   in  
South   Africa,   shows   that   while   banks   have   increasingly   relied   on   corporate  
deposits   over   the   past   two  decades,   their   loanbooks   have   experienced   a   shift  
towards  mortgage   loans.  Among   corporate   clients   credit   extension   to   finance,  
insurance  and  real  estate   (FIRE)  businesses  has  been  the  highest  since   the   late  
1990s  at  least.    
These  changes  have  gone  hand   in  hand  with,  and  have  arguably  encouraged,  
the  inflation  of  the  South  African  real  estate  market.  In  this  way  the  amplified  
corporate   liquidity   preference   among   South   African   non-­‐‑financial   firms  
discussed   in   chapter   4   has   facilitated   asset   price   inflation   in   the   country’s  
housing  market,  because  liquid  funds  deposited  with  South  African  banks  are  
channelled  into  mortgages  and  business  credit  for  the  FIRE  industries.    
Tracing  the  flow  of  funds  in  this  way  shows  that  non-­‐‑financial  firms  can  shape  
the  behaviour  of  financial  institutions  as  theorised  by  Kalecki  and  many  of  his  
German  contemporaries.  This  chapter  argues  that  NFFs  decisions  not  to  invest  
into  productive  capital  but  to  hold  on  to  financial  investment  can  also  facilitate  
credit   extension,   since   banks   now   extend   credit   to   households   and   financial  
companies   (and   finance-­‐‑related   firms,   such   as   real   estate   businesses)   in   their  
search  for  assets  to  balance  liabilities  owed  to  non-­‐‑financial  firms.          
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7.1. The structure of the South African National Financial Account 
Each   economy   can   be   understood   as   an   organic   whole   composed   of   four  
sectors:  (1)  the  government  sector,  (2)  households,  (3)  non-­‐‑financial  companies  
and  (4)  financial  institutions.  These  four  interact  among  each  other  and  with  a  
fifth  aggregate,  namely  (5)  the  rest  of  the  world.  To  preserve  a  logical  structure,  
the   sectoral   analysis   presented   in   this   chapter   will   always   follow   this   order,  
starting   with   the   government   balance,   moving   across   the   private   sector  
aggregates  to  consider  the  foreign  sector  last.      
The   National   Financial   Accounts   (NFA)   link   real   activity   with   financial  
transactions   in   the   economy,   and   this   link   is   the   focal   point   of   this   thesis.   In  
South  Africa,  flow  of  funds  analysis  and  data  compilation  was  pioneered  by  B.  
Van   Staden   in   1962   (H.   B.   Falkena,   Fourie,  &  Kok,   1984).   Since   the   1980s   the  
South   African   Reserve   Bank   (SARB)   has   compiled   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   data   in   the  
form  of  the  NFA,  which  is  regularly  published  in  the  SARB’s  Quarterly  Bulletin.  
Thus,  flow  of  funds  data  are  available  going  back  to  1970.1    
The   NFA   are   set   up   as   tables   with   columns   representing   different   economic  
aggregates  and  sub-­‐‑sectors,  whereas  rows  provide  transaction  items.  The  latest  
flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   table   (for   2014)   is   provided   in   the   appendix   (Table   A.2.).   The  
SARB   has   been   providing   quarterly   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   data   since   the   1990s.   The  
analysis  to  follow  will  only  use  annual  data  to  take  advantage  of  the  longer  data  
series.  
Flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  data  are  provided  for  the  following  macroeconomic  aggregates,  
which  are  covered  in  the  columns  (SARB,  2011):  
                                                                                                 
1  Since  1982  the  SARB  Quarterly  Bulletins  have  regularly  included  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  data,  
covering  the  years  1980  until  today.  Data  for  the  period  1970-­‐‑1979  was  published  in  the  
supplement   to   the   SARB   Quarterly   Bulletin   for   December   1994.   That   issue   also  
introduced  quarterly  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  data,  which  since  have  been  provided  by  the  SARB  
alongside  annual  NFA  figures  (SARB,  1994).  
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• General   government   with   its   two   levels:   (1)   central   and   provincial  
government  and  (2)  local  government  
• Households  and  others.  
• Non-­‐‑financial  corporate  business  enterprises,  subdivided  into  (1)  public  
non-­‐‑financial  corporations  and  (2)  private  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  
• Financial  intermediaries,  including:  (1)  the  monetary  authority,  (2)  other  
monetary   institutions,   (3)   the   Public   Investment   Corporation,   (4)  
insurers  and  retirement  funds  and  (5)  other  financial  institutions  and  
• Foreign  sector.  
The  entities  making  up  part  of  the  financial  intermediaries  sector  require  a  more  
detailed   explanation.   The  monetary   authority   sector   comprises   the   SARB   and  
its   subsidiary,   the   Corporation   for   Public   Deposits.   The   SARB   is   legally   a  
private  institution  with  shareholders  other  than  the  South  African  government.  
This   is   a   historical   remnant   and   has   not   been   altered,   unlike   in   many   other  
countries  (but  similar  to  the  United  States,  for  example,  SARB,  2015e).    
Other   monetary   institutions   cover   the   accounts   of   banks,   mutual   banks,   the  
Land  Bank   and   the  Postbank.   The  Public   Investment  Corporation   is   the   fund  
manager   of   public-­‐‑sector   entities,   including   official   pension   and   provident  
funds,   social   security   funds   and   other   government   funds.   Finally,   other  
financial   institutions   are   non-­‐‑bank   financial   institutions,   such   as   collective  
investment   schemes   (unit   trusts   and   participation   bond   schemes),   trust  
companies,  finance  companies  and  public  financial  enterprises  that  invest  funds  
on  behalf  of  their  clients.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  sector  ‘households  and  
others’   refers   to   households   in   aggregate,   but   importantly   also   pick   up   all  
remaining  unclassified  entities  such  as  non-­‐‑incorporated  businesses  or  not-­‐‑for-­‐‑
profit   organisations   (SARB,   2011c).   As   discussed   in   section   3.3.1.,   informal  
economic   activity   accounts   for   a   substantial   share   of   the   South   African  
economy,   and   this   was   even   more   so   the   case   in   the   past   when   informal  
businesses  were  either  discouraged  or  simply  not  allowed  to  formalise.      
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The   top   part   of   the   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   table   shows   the   national   income   (and  
production)   accounts,   providing   sectoral   data   on   net   saving,   consumption   of  
fixed  capital,   capital   transfers  and  gross  capital   formation.  The   first   two   items  
(net  saving  and  consumption  of  fixed  capital)  add  up  to  gross  saving.  This  is  the  
real  activity  part  of  the  economy.  The  difference  between  gross  saving  (together  
with  capital   transfers,  which  are  typically  small)  and  gross   investment,  results  
either   in   a   net   lending   (+)   or   net   borrowing   (-­‐‑)   position   for   each   of   the   listed  
sectors.  The  difference  is  shown  directly  below  the  real  activity  account.  This  is  
followed   by   a   breakdown   of   the   financial   liabilities   and   financial   assets   each  
sector  has   incurred  and  accumulated  over  the  period  in  question,  which  sums  
up  to  the  financial  balance  of  each  sector.    
The  methodological  framework  used  for  these  calculations  is  similar  to  the  one  
suggested  by  the  International  Monetary  Funds  (IMF)  in  the  System  of  National  
Accounts.  However,  the  SARB  uses  the  balance  sheet  approach  rather  than  the  
transaction   approach   to   calculate   financial   flows.   The   former   calculates   flows  
from  the  changes  in  the  balance  sheet  positions  of  institutions  (de  Beer,  Nhlapo,  
&  Nhleko,  2010).  
Of  course,   the  balance  on  a  sector’s  real  account  has   to  be  met  by   its   financial  
account  balance.  Thus,  if  an  economic  aggregate  (say  households)  generates  net  
saving,   it   will   acquire   financial   assets,   yielding   a   positive   financial   balance.  
Conversely,   a   deficit   sector   (say   the   government)  will   have   to   incur   financial  
liabilities  to  balance  its  net  debtor  position.  The  lower  half  of  the  table  provides  
the   types   of   financial   liabilities   taken   out   and   the   types   of   financial   liabilities  
acquired   by   each   sector   in   aggregate.   The   different   transaction   items   are  
specified  on  the  rows.  There  are  24  different  financial  instruments  listed  in  the  
latest  NFA  tables.  They  will  be  discussed  in  more  detail  further  below.  
This   is   then   a   flow   analysis   of   financial   sources   (S),   i.e.   the   net   increase   in  
liabilities  at  transaction  value,  and  financial  uses  (U),  meaning  the  net  increase  
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in  assets  at  transaction  value.  Both  S  and  U  can  be  either  positive  or  negative.  A  
positive  entry  under  sources  means  that  new  financial  liabilities  were  taken  on,  
while   a   negative   entry   represents   the   paying   off   of   past   liabilities.  A  positive  
position  under  uses  reflects  the  increase  in  financial  assets  acquired  by  a  sector  
in  aggregate,  while  a  negative  position  means  that  assets  have  been  disposed  of,  
reducing   the  overall   stock  of  assets  held.  Therefore,   flow  analysis  needs   to  be  
seen  in  the  context  of  the  corresponding  stocks.  This  complication  is  addressed  
more  fully  in  section  7.3.3.  Assessing  the  stock  of  financial  instruments  held  by  
South  African  non-­‐‑financial  firms  below.    
7.2. Analysing net and gross sectoral balances for South Africa  
Meanwhile,   the   net   and   subsequently   the   gross   financial   flows   among   South  
African   economic   aggregates   require   discussion.   For   a   first   simplified  
illustration   the  different   sub-­‐‑sectors  of   the  government   (i.e.   central,  provincial  
and   local   government   authorities,   as   well   as   public   enterprises)   and   the   two  
components  of   the  private   sector   (private   enterprises  and  households)  will  be  
collapsed   to   reduce   the   amount   of   economic   aggregates   to   four:   (1)   total  
government,  (2)  private  sector,  (3)  financial  sector  and  (4)  foreign  sector.  Figure  
7.1.  below  shows  the  resulting  sectoral  balances  expressed  as  share  of  GDP  for  
the  years  1970-­‐‑2013.  
The  following  observations  can  be  made:  (1)  The  government  sector  has  been  a  
net  debtor  over  the  entire  period.   It   is  striking  that   the  government’s   financial  
deficit  position  shrunk  notably  towards  the  end  of  the  1980s,  and  then  again  in  
the  early  2000s.  Since  the  late  1970s,  the  South  African  government  has  followed  
reform   policies   inspired   by   laissez-­‐‑faire   ideology,   aimed   at   shrinking   state  
expenditure   and   provision,   with   a   strong   focus   on   reducing   general  
government  debt  levels.  For  the  state-­‐‑owned  enterprises  this  initially  meant  that  
their  business   strategies  changed,  aiming  at  balanced  books  with   the   result  of  
significantly  decreased  investment  expenditure  on  their  side  (Malherbe  &  Segal,  
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2001).   A   privatisation   process   was   also   brought   underway   with   large   state-­‐‑
owned   companies,   such   as   Sasol,   being   gradually   privatised.   Sasol   was  
privatised  and  listed  on  the  JSE  in  1979.    
(2)   The   private   sector   (here   comprising   both,   private   non-­‐‑financial   firms   and  
households)  has  been  a  net  creditor  during  most  of  the  late  20th  century.  In  the  
mid-­‐‑1970s  and  mid-­‐‑1980s,  the  saving  surpluses  generated  by  the  sector  peaked  
around   10%  of  GDP.   This   position   deteriorated   noticeably   in   the   early   2000s,  
reaching  a  trough  of  -­‐‑7%  of  GDP  in  the  wake  of  the  global  financial  crisis.      
Figure 7.1. Simplified sector balances for South Africa, 1970-2013 
  
Source:  SARB,  1994,  SARB  1995a-­‐‑2014a.  
  (3)  The   financial   sector  mostly   saw  modest   financial   surpluses  until   the  mid-­‐‑
1990s.  Thereafter,  and  especially  during   the  2008-­‐‑09  crisis,   the  sector  captured  
large  creditor  positions.  
Finally,  (4)  the  financial  balance  of  the  rest  of  the  world  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  South  Africa  is  
a   very   volatile   one.  Over   the   period   under   study,   the   foreign   sector   at   times  
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country.2  Simultaneously,   the   country   witnessed   strong   outflows   of   foreign  
funds   during   the   late   1970s   and   mid-­‐‑1980s,   in   response   to   South   Africa’s  
international  debt   crisis   (Aron  &  Muellbauer,   2000).   In   the  New  South  Africa,  
net   outflows   of   foreign   funds   have   been   only   experienced   during   the   2002  
currency   crisis.   Nevertheless,   the   country   saw   strong   slowdowns   in   foreign  
funding  inflows,  which  (albeit  not  as  severe  as  outright  outflows)  took  a  toll  on  
the  economy  in  the  aftermath  of  the  financial  crisis.    
These   four   findings  must   now   be   investigated   in  more   detail,   drawing   upon  
disaggregated  and  gross  data  from  the  national  financial  accounts.  Gross  NFA  
data  is  publically3  only  available  (that   is,  available  online)  from  1980  onwards.  
However,   the   author   was   able   to   locate   the   rare   SARB   Quarterly   Bulletin  
supplement   published   in  December   1994,  which   provides   detailed   figures   on  
net  and  gross  financial  positions  (SARB,  1994).  
To  allow  for  a  closer  look,  first,  the  government  sector  has  to  be  disaggregated  
into  government  authorities  (of  different  levels  from  local  to  general)  on  the  one  
hand,  and  public  enterprises  on  the  other  hand.  Historically,  publically  owned  
companies  were  important  for  the  development  of  the  South  African  economy.  
They   proved   an   effective   tool   for   the   government   to   provide   economic  
infrastructure  (for   instance,  electricity  and  fuel  supply,  rail  and  road  building)  
in   support   of   South   African   businesses.   Thus,   until   the   mid-­‐‑1980s   the   gross  
investment   of   public   enterprises   (see   Figure   7.2.)   was   substantial   and   well  
above  their  gross  saving.    
With  the  advent  of  neo-­‐‑liberal  reform  thinking  in  South  Africa,   the  role  of   the  
government   in   infrastructure   and   other   public   provision   was   increasingly  
called  into  question.  The  idea  that  publically  owned  enterprises  should  operate  
like  private-­‐‑sector   companies,  while   running   financial   surpluses,   spread.   This  
                                                                                                 
2  Namely,  in  the  early  1970s  and  in  the  run-­‐‑up  to  the  global  financial  crisis.  
3  ‘Publically’  means  from  the  SARB  online  resources.    
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change  in  economic  thinking  is  visible  in  Figure  7.2.,  where  gross  investment  by  
public   enterprises   drops   off   markedly   during   the   1980s.   From   1987   onwards  
these   companies   stayed   out   of   the   red   for   almost   20   years,   right   up  until   the  
global  financial  crisis  hit  South  Africa  in  2008.  The  government’s  preoccupation  
with  balanced  books,   however,   resulted   in   an   ever-­‐‑decreasing   contribution  of  
these  companies  to  South  African  investment.  This  is  explained  a  change  in  the  
investment   strategy   of   state-­‐‑owned   enterprises   as   well   as   the   start   of   their  
privatisation   during   the   1980s   (Malherbe   &   Segal,   2001).   While   on   average  
public   enterprises   invested   8%   of   GDP   between   1970-­‐‑85,   this   rate   fell   to   a  
meagre  2%  of  GDP  for  the  subsequent  20  years  (1986-­‐‑2006).    
Figure 7.2. Gross saving and investment of South African public enterprises, 
1980-2013 
 
Source:  SARB,  1994,  SARB,  1995a-­‐‑2014a.  
Unsurprisingly,   the   importance   of   public   companies   as   drivers   of   investment  
and   economic   growth  has   declined   severely   since   the  mid-­‐‑1980s.   The   notable  
loss   in   importance   of   public   enterprise   investment   since   the   1980s   has  
determined  the  focus  of  this  thesis  on  private-­‐‑sector  non-­‐‑financial  firms,  rather  
than  non-­‐‑financial   firms   in  general.   The   close   link  between  public   enterprises  
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balance   deteriorated   almost   hand   in   hand   with   improvements   on   public  
companies’  books  (see  Figure  7.3.).    
Figure 7.3. Financial balances of general government and public enterprises in 
South Africa, 1980-2013 
  
Source:  SARB,  1994,  1995-­‐‑2014.  
Figure 7.4. Gross saving and investment of the South African general 
government, 1970-2013 
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Strong   government   intervention   in   the   South   Africa   economy   until   the   mid-­‐‑
1980s   also   ensured   the   high   profitability   of   private   sector   enterprises.   For  
instance,   the   creation   of   state-­‐‑owned   energy   providers,   that   generated  
electricity  at  a   low  cost,  was  highly  beneficial   for   the   capital-­‐‑intensive  mining  
companies  for  instance.    
Equally,   racist  apartheid  policies  were  based  on  the  exploitation  of  black  (and  
non-­‐‑white)   labour.  Cheap   labour  was  particularly   important   for  mining   since  
resource  prices  were  determined  in  dollar-­‐‑denominated  international  markets.  
Any  squeeze  in  labour  cost  was  then  automatically  an  increase  in  profit  for  the  
resource-­‐‑extracting  industry.  
The   neo-­‐‑liberal   reforms   contributed   to   the   shrinking   of   government’s   gross  
investment  in  South  Africa,  which  fell  from  4%  of  GDP  in  1980  to  around  2%  of  
GDP   for   most   of   the   1990s.   Interestingly,   this   contraction   in   government  
spending  was   accompanied  by  worsening  public   finances   (with   an   increasing  
public  deficit),  rather  than  an  improvement  as  typically  proclaimed  by  austerity  
proponents.   Both   government   investment   and   the   budget   balance   only  
improved  in  the  2000s  (see  Figure  7.3.),  when  infrastructure  investment  for  the  
upcoming  football  World  Cup  in  2010  began.  Turning  to  the  private  sector  and  
the  second  finding  outlined  above,  households  and  non-­‐‑financial  private-­‐‑sector  
corporations  will  be  considered  separately,  since  their  integration  was  merely  a  
means  to  facilitate  visualisation.  
There   are   certain   similarities   in   the   development   of   their   financial   positions  
since  the  1970s.  Both  sectors  generated  net  savings  during  the  1980s  and  much  
of   the  1990s,  while   the  2000s  were  accompanied  by  a   financial  deficit  on   their  
accounts   (see  Figure  7.5.).   Importantly,  both  net   savings  and  net  deficits  were  
more   pronounced   (and,   in   terms   of   the   2000s   deficit,   longer-­‐‑lasting)   for   non-­‐‑
financial  private   sector   companies   than   for  households.  The  households’   (and  
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non-­‐‑incorporated  firms’)  position  is  discussed  in  more  detail  first,  followed  by  
an  in-­‐‑depth  consideration  of  private  non-­‐‑financial  companies.    
Figure 7.5. Financial balances of South African private enterprises and 
households, 1970-2013 
  
Source:  SARB,  1994,  SARB,  1995a-­‐‑2014a.  
Figure 7.6. Gross saving and investment of South African households, 1970-2013 
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South  African  households  have  been  a  surplus  sector  until  recently,  generating  
saving  that  exceeded  their  gross  investment  (see  Figure  7.6.).  In  that  sense,  the  
South   African   economy   corresponded   to   the   mainstream   textbook   case.  
However,   this   surplus   was   increasingly   eroded   over   the   second   half   of   the  
1990s,  and  between  2005  and  2009  South  African  households  as  a  group  became  
net  debtors.  This  development  coincided  with  the  peak  of  house  price  inflation  
in  the  country.    
Crucially,   the   reason   for   this   change   in   households’   financial   position   was  
extraordinarily   high   investment   levels.   Figure   7.6. shows   that   the   peak   of  
household   investment  expenditure   (3%  of  GDP)   in   the  early  2000s  was   in   line  
with   average   household   expenditure   between   1970   and   1995.   What   pushed  
households   into   a   financial   deficit   in   those   years  was   a   fall   in   gross   savings,  
rather  than  a  marked  rise  in  investment.    
Figure 7.7. Gross saving and investment of South African private enterprises, 
1970-2013 
  
Source:  SARB,  1994,  SARB,  1995a-­‐‑2014a.  
Where   the   South   African   economy   has   deviated   fundamentally   from   the  
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beyond   their   gross   saving,   South   African   non-­‐‑financial   firms   were   able   to  
generate   substantial   net   saving   continuously   from   the   late   1970s   up   until   the  
1990s   (see   Figure   7.7.).   It   has   to   be   stressed   that   government   policies   and  
especially   the   racist   apartheid   regime   ensured   high   profitability   of   private  
(white-­‐‑owned)  enterprises  in  South  Africa.  
As  mentioned  in  chapter  3,  black  wages  in  mining  (and  unskilled  black  labour  
made  up   the  bulk  of  workers  employed   in   the  sector)   could  be  squeezed   to  a  
ratio  of  1:21  in  comparison  to  white  workers’  wages  by  the  early  1970s  (Lipton,  
1980).   Even   after   a  wave   of  wage   increases   during   the   1970s   average  African  
earnings   per   month   in   agriculture,   mining,   commerce   and   government   were  
substantially   below   R100.   At   that   time,   R120   was   the   official   poverty   line  
(Keenan,   1983).   Furthermore,   the   previous   chapter   outlined   that   depriving  
black   South   Africans   of   their   subsistence   (especially   in   agriculture)   was   an  
important  strategy  pushed  by  the  mining  companies  to  ensure  sufficient  supply  
of  cheap  labour  to  the  mines  (Innes,  1984).  Thus,  the  apartheid  regime  ensured  
high  profits  for  mining  capitalists,  at  least  in  the  short  to  medium  run  (Nattrass,  
1991).      
During   the  1980s,  South  Africa  was  hit  by   the   international  debt   crisis,  which  
engulfed   many   emerging   and   developing   countries.   Private-­‐‑sector   non-­‐‑
financial   firms   kept   a   low   profile,   presumably   holding   back   some   of   their  
planned   investment.   An   uncertain   outlook   for   (black)   labour   costs,   given   the  
declining   power   of   the   apartheid   regime,   certainly   contributed   towards  
cautious   investment  outlays  by  mining   companies,  which  benefitted   from   the  
exploitation   of   black   workers.   Concurrently,   South   African   capitalists   were  
facing   a   shortage   of   skilled   labour   and   depressed   domestic   demand   (due   to  
subdued  wages   paid   to   the   non-­‐‑white  working   population   under   apartheid).  
These   factors   combined   with   political   unrest   of   the   1980s   and   uncertainty  
during   the   democratic   transformation   of   the   1990s   certainly   also   hampered  
investment.    
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Consequently,  private  enterprises’  investment  only  picked  up  again  in  the  early  
2000s,  encouraged  by  public  infrastructure  investment  for  the  World  Cup.  Once  
again,   government   intervention   generated   investment   opportunities   for   the  
corporate   sector.   As   a   result,   private   non-­‐‑financial   companies   became   net  
debtors  for  the  years  2000  to  2008.  In  reaction  to  the  global  financial  crisis  and  
the   recession   it   caused   in   South   Africa,   non-­‐‑financial   firms   returned   to   net  
saving  by  2009,  avoiding  deficits  on   their   financial  balance   for   the  subsequent  
four   years.   Since   non-­‐‑financial   firms   are   at   the   centre   of   this   thesis,   the  
discussion  will  return  to  their  financing  decisions  in  part  7.3.  below.  
Meanwhile,   the   chapter  will   proceed   to   discuss   finding   (3),   as   outline   above,  
with  respect  to  the  financial  sector.  As  discussed,  the  financial  sector  has  been  
increasingly   able   to   generate   financial   surpluses   since   1990.   Analysing   gross  
profits   and   investment   (see   Figure   7.8.),   the   origins   of   the   rising   net   savings  
become  evident:  financial  institutions  in  South  Africa  have  been  able  to  capture  
growing   profits,   while   reducing   their   own   investment   spending.   Whereas  
financial  sector  profits  had  been  increasing  since  the  early  1970s,   they   initially  
were  matched  by  rising  investment  spending  of  the  sector.    
In   fact,   in   the   early   1990s   capital   formation   outlays   of   financial   institutions  
exceeded  their  profits,  pushing  the  sector  into  a  financial  deficit.  Subsequently,  
profits  kept  soaring,  while  investment  expenditure  was  reduced  over  the  1990s,  
and  kept  below  1%  of  GDP  since  1998.  The  strong  increases  in  financial  sector  
profits   coincided   with   the   deregulation   of   financial   market   in   South   Africa,  
which   followed   the   three  Reports  of   the  De  Kock  Commission  of   Inquiry   into  
the   Monetary   System   and   Monetary   Policy   of   South   Africa   (1979,   1982   and  
1985)  already  mentioned.    
These  three  reports  encapsulated  neo-­‐‑liberal  ideas,  mirroring  recommendations  
put   forward   in   the   UK   at   the   time   (Jones,   1992).   Neo-­‐‑liberal   policies   were  
advocated  in  South  Africa  by  ‘liberals’,  who  argued  that  the  state  intervention  
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of   the  apartheid  government  was  beneficial   to  some  capitalists  while  harming  
South   African   capitalism   (e.g.   by   slowing   down   productivity   growth   and  
domestic  demand)  more   generally   (Nattrass,   1991).   Thus,   a   shift   towards   less  
state   interventionism  was   seen  as  potential   fix   to   the  South  African   economic  
crisis,  which  took  hold  of  the  country  during  the  1980s.    
Financial   liberalisation  was  part  of   these  neo-­‐‑liberal  policies.   Interest  rate  caps  
and  credit  controls  were  removed  in  1980.  With  the  1986  Building  Societies  Act  
competition   in   the  mortgage  market   intensified.  This   trend  was   reinforced  by  
demutualisation   and   takeovers   in   1989   and   1990   (Aron  &  Muellbauer,   2000).  
Importantly,   the   era   of   the   New   South   Africa   coincided   with   financial  
liberalisation.   In   1995   exchange   controls   on   non-­‐‑residents   were   relaxed.  
Controls   on   South   African   residents   were   partly   relaxed   after   1997   and  
increasingly  so  (especially  for  corporations)  after  2010.    
Figure 7.8. Gross saving and investment of the financial sector in South African, 
1970-2013 
  
Source:  SARB,  1994,  SARB,  1995a-­‐‑2014a.  
The  deregulation  of  the  South  African  financial  markets  resulted  in  a  doubling  
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success   of   a   financial   industry   re-­‐‑dynamised   by   market   forces   (Jones,   1992).  
How  dynamic  a  sector  with  small  and  stagnating   investment  expenditure  can  
be  is  a  separate  question.  What  the  South  African  finance  industry  undoubtedly  
succeeded  in  was  to  grow  their  gross  (and  net)  profits  markedly.  
Finally,  it  is  time  to  consider  the  foreign  sector.  South  African  enterprises  have  
historically  had  a  global  orientation,  rather  than  a  primarily  domestic  one  (see,  
for   instance,   Innes,   1984).   This   is   reflected   in   the   sectoral   balances   of   private  
enterprises   and   the   foreign   sector   (see   Figure   7.9.).   Whenever   South   African  
private-­‐‑sector   non-­‐‑financial   firms   recorded   a   net   deficit,   the   rest   of   the  world  
was  in  surplus.    
Figure 7.9. Financial balances of South African private enterprises and the 
foreign sector, 1970-2013 
  
Source:  SARB,  1994,  SARB,  1995a-­‐‑2014a.  
Between  1970  and   the  mid-­‐‑1990s   these   two  sectors  moved  reliably   in   tandem,  
with   foreign   inflows   increasing  when   private   balances   deteriorated,   and   vice  
versa.  Towards  the  end  of  the  1990s  this  close  link  appeared  lost.  But  it  emerged  
with   reinvigorated   strength   around   2003.   This   apparent   link   will   be   at   the  
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South   African   economy   chiefly   end   up   with   private   non-­‐‑financial   firms.  
Chapter  4  has  argued  that  large  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  in  South  Africa  have  
exhibited   a   growing   preference   for   liquid   financial   assets.   Hence,   the   two  
questions   to   be   investigated   are:   (1)   Do   South   African   non-­‐‑financial   firms   in  
aggregate  obtain  significant  financial  funds  from  foreign  investors?  (2)  If  that  is  
the   case,   what   happens   to   these   funds   once   they   are   absorbed   by   the   non-­‐‑
financial  firms’  balance  sheets?  
The  chapter  argues  that  South  African  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  receive  in  fact  
a  substantial  amount  of   foreign  financial   inflows.  The  funds  obtained  are  well  
beyond   non-­‐‑financial   firms’   requirements   for   investment   funding.   They   are  
subsequently   held   as   liquid   financial   assets   (mostly,   cash   and   deposits)   with  
South   African   banking   institutions,   from   where   they   are   channelled   into  
mortgage  credit  for  household  customers.  In  this  way,  the  heightened  liquidity  
preference  exhibited  by  South  African  corporates  over  the  past  two  decades  has  
contributed  to  asset  price  inflation  in  the  country’s  real  estate  markets.    
7.3. Sources and uses of funds for South African non-financial firms 
The   aim   of   this   chapter   is   to   provide   an   improved   understanding   of   non-­‐‑
financial   firms’   financial   operations   and   their   impact   on   macroeconomic  
dynamics.  For  this  purpose,  the  previous  section  explored  the  financial  balances  
of   the   macroeconomic   aggregates   (i.e.   the   government,   households,   non-­‐‑
financial   corporations,   the   financial   sector  and   the   rest  of   the  world)   in  South  
Africa.  This  section  concentrates  on  non-­‐‑financial  companies,  scrutinising  their  
overall   financial  position  by  examining   the   sources  and  uses  of   their   funds   in  
detail.    
An   analytic   methodology   developed   by   Corbett   and   Jenkinson   (Corbett   &  
Jenkinson,  1996;  Corbett  &  Jenkinson,  1997)  is  applied  to  assess  the  net  sources  
of  non-­‐‑financial  companies’  investment  spending.  Corbett  &  Jenkison,  however,  
focus  entirely  on  productive  investment,  i.e.  gross  capital  formation.  Since  this  
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analysis  is  primarily  interested  in  the  financial  investments  of  corporations,  this  
methodology  had  to  be  adjusted  to  account  for  gross  (rather  than  net)  sources  of  
financing.   Furthermore,   studies   preoccupied   with   companies’   financing   of  
productive  investment  typically  focus  on  flow  analysis.  However,  to  provide  a  
full  macroeconomic  picture  the  consideration  of  stocks   is  vital.  Since  there  are  
no  data  available  on  the  stocks  held  by  South  African  non-­‐‑financial  companies4,  
a  series  was  constructed  that  will  give  an  indication  of  the  size  of  these  financial  
stocks.  
The  chapter  shows  that  South  African  non-­‐‑financial  businesses  in  aggregate  can  
finance  most   of   their   gross   capital   investment   internally.  The   external   finance  
they   acquire   goes   far   beyond   their   productive   investment   needs,   resulting   in  
large  volumes  of   financial   investment.  Most   of   that   investment   is   likely   to   be  
denominated  in  domestic  currency,  since  most  of  it  is  held  with  South  African  
banks,   where   less   than   5%   of   total   deposits   are   foreign   currency   deposits  
(SARB,  1995a-­‐‑2015a).  The  depth  of   local   financial  markets  would  also   suggest  
that  assumption.  Equally,  the  big  company  groups  that  are  likely  to  hold  large  
shares  of  their  assets  in  foreign  currency  are  not  South  African  any  more  after  
listing   abroad   (such   as   Anglo   American).   The   large   volumes   of   financial  
investment   are   not   a   recent   development,   but   a   historic   trend,   calling   into  
question  the  idea  that  South  African  companies  have  financialised  with  the  re-­‐‑
integration  of  South  Africa  into  the  global  economy.    
The  most   popular   instrument   for   external   financing   in   the  New   South  Africa  
has   been   corporate   paper   (i.e.   corporate   equity,   bonds   and   bills).   Financial  
assets   are   then   to   a   large   extent   held   in   cash,   short-­‐‑   and  medium-­‐‑term   bank  
deposits.   Thus,   South   African   non-­‐‑financial   companies   prefer   to   hold   their  
financial  investment  in  highly  liquid  form,  confirming  the  findings  in  chapter  4,  
                                                                                                 
4  This  was  confirmed  by  the  SARB,  which  has  been  consulted.    
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which   discussed   the   heightened   liquidity   preference   of   South   African   non-­‐‑
financial  corporations  since  the  end  of  the  apartheid  regime.    
During  the  1970s  and  1980s,  trade  credit  was  another  major  financial  asset  held  
by   non-­‐‑financial   firms.   A   high   proportion   of   their   non-­‐‑invested   profits   were  
directly   channelled   towards   households   and   small   non-­‐‑incorporated  
businesses.   In   this   way,   large   non-­‐‑financial   firms   acted   as   financial  
intermediaries,   something   mainstream   economic   theory   does   not   consider.  
Non-­‐‑financial   companies   have   shifted   their   financial   investment   from   trade  
credit   towards   other   financial   assets,   which   according   to   the   SARB   capture  
financially  innovative  operations.  These  other  financial  assets  are  thus  likely  to  
be  highly  liquid.  Non-­‐‑financial  companies’  rising  liquidity  preference  facilitated  
banks’   mortgage   loan   expansion   over   the   past   two   decades,   contributing   to  
house   price   inflation   in   South   Africa.   This   happens   because   much   of   non-­‐‑
financial   firms’   liquid   assets   (especially   cash   held   in   demand   deposits   and  
assets   in   short,   medium   and   long-­‐‑term   deposits)   end   up  with   South   African  
banks.  Banks  in  turn  issue  mortgages  to  households  and,  increasingly,  credit  to  
businesses  that  are  part  of  the  FIRE  industries,  meaning  the  finance,  insurance  
and  the  real  estate  sector.  
7.3.1. Assessing net sources and uses of funding for South African non-financial 
firms 
During   the   1990s,  Corbett  &   Jenkinson   (Corbett  &   Jenkinson,   1996;  Corbett  &  
Jenkinson,  1997)  put  forward  a  methodology  that  assesses  the  main  sources  of  
investment   finance   for   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   as   a   whole   in   a   given  
economy.   Their   study   aimed   at   debunking   the   strict   country   typologies,  
distinguishing   between   bank-­‐‑based   and   market-­‐‑based   financial   systems.   As  
discussed   in   chapter   6,   the   context   of   the   debate   around   bank-­‐‑based   versus  
market-­‐‑based  economies  can  be  traced  back  to  Gerschenkron’s  (Gerschenkron,  
1979[1962])   writings   on   economic   development   in   Europe.   Gerschenkron  
   347  
stressed   the   varying   roles   states   (and   other   institutions)   played   in   different  
countries  during  the  development  process.  The  idea  was  that  financial  systems  
differ  across  countries,  which  in  itself  is  doubtlessly  true.  However,  the  reaction  
to   this   insight   was   to   reduce   these   differences   to   two   archetypes.   The   bank-­‐‑
based   system  was   seen   as   one   in   which   large   banks   and   large   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations  have  close  ties  and  dominate  the  economy.  In  contrast,  the  Anglo-­‐‑
Saxon  economies  were  stylised  as  examples  of  market-­‐‑based  systems,  in  which  
capital   markets   (rather   than   banks)   were   the   most   important   source   of  
investment   finance.   These   economies   were   believed   to   be   more   dynamic,   as  
they  are  not  dominated  by  large  non-­‐‑financial  firms  and  banks.    
Corbett   &   Jenkinson   (1996,   1997)   among   others   (see   also   Mayer,   1987,   1988,  
1980)  call  this  distinction  and  the  related  country  classification  into  question,  by  
pointing  out  that  (among  other  things)  the  majority  of   investment  financing  is  
done   internally   across   major   OECD   countries.   This   of   course   is   in   line   with  
Kalecki’s  ideas  on  non-­‐‑financial  companies’  financing.    
A   good   starting   point   is   to   assess  which   sources   South  African   non-­‐‑financial  
companies  use  most   for   productive   investment.   For   this   purpose,   the   chapter  
will   use   the   Corbett   &   Jenkinson  methodology,  which   distinguishes   between  
companies’   gross   sources   and   gross   uses   of   funds.   Sources   include   positions  
such  as  internal  finance  (that  is  retained  profits),  bank  loans,  new  equity  issued,  
bond   issuance   and   trade   credit.   These   are   items   1-­‐‑5   in   Table   7.1. (which   has  
been   introduced   in   chapter   6,   see   Table   6.1.).  As   for   uses,   non-­‐‑financial   firms  
can   channel   the   finance  obtained   into   cash   and  deposits,   equity,   bonds,   trade  
credit  or  new  capital  formation  (items  6-­‐‑10  in  the  table).        
The  methodology  demands  that  net  positions  for  the  individual  financing  items  
are  calculated.  For  instance,  bank  loans  are  balanced  against  cash  and  deposits  
held  with  banks,  yielding  a  net  position  (item  2  minus  item  6  in  Table  7.1.)  on  
bank   assets   held   by   non-­‐‑financial   companies.   In   this   way,   it   is   simple   to  
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calculate   net   sources   for   each   financial   position,   which   in   sum   should  
correspond   in   total   to   physical   investment   (item   10)   undertaken   by   non-­‐‑
financial  companies  in  aggregate.  This   is   in  fact  the  case  for  the  South  African  
flow  of  funds  data,  with  only  minor  divergences.  In  order  to  apply  the  Corbett  
&   Jenkinson   approach   to   South   African   flow   of   funds   data,   the   transaction  
items   detailed   on   the  National   Financial  Accounts   have   to   be   adapted   to   the  
gross  sources  and  gross  uses   items  presented   in  Table  7.1. Not  all  of   them  are  
relevant   to   the   investigation   of   net   sources   of   finance   used   by   non-­‐‑financial  
firms.  Gold  and  other  foreign  reserves,   for   instance,  are  not  a  source  or  use  of  
funds  for  non-­‐‑financial  corporations.    
Table 7.1. Calculation of net sources of investment financing  
          
Source:  Adapted  from  Corbett  &  Jenkinson  (1997).  
Thus,   gross   sources   of   funds   for   non-­‐‑financial   firms   were   determined   as  
follows:  (1)  internal  funds  were  taken  from  the  national  production  and  income  
accounts,   as   stated   in   the   top   panel   of   the   flow   of   funds   data.   Internal   funds  
Gross sources Gross uses
1 Internal
2 Bank,loans 6 Cash,and,deposits
3 New,equity,issues 7 Equity,purchases
4 Bond,issues 8 Bond,purchases
5 Trade,credit,received 9 Trade,credit,given
10 New,capital,formation
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equal  gross  saving,  containing  net  saving  and  a  provision  for  depreciation.  (2)  
Bank   loans   were   calculated   as   the   sum   of   two   positions:   bank   loans   and  
advances,   and   mortgage   loans.   Strictly   speaking,   mortgage   loans   might   go  
beyond   bank   lending,   since   in   South   Africa   mortgages   can   be   extended   by  
institutions  that  are  not  banks.  There  is  limited  data  available  on  the  issuance  of  
mortgages   by   non-­‐‑bank   monetary   institutions.   This   position   will   be  
disaggregated  where  necessary   in   the  analysis   to   follow  (see  parts  7.3.3.1.  and  
7.3.3.2.).   
However,   since   mortgage   loans   issued   by   non-­‐‑bank   financial   companies  
accounted   for   merely   one   tenth   of   total   mortgage   issuance,   the   analysis   will  
abstract  from  this  complication  for  the  moment.  (3)  Equity  issuance  covers  the  
emission  of  ordinary  shares,  and  other  loan  stock  and  preference  shares.  (4)  The  
position   ‘new   bond   issues’   is   interpreted   broadly   and   matched   with   the  
transaction  item  ‘other  bills’  provided  on  the  NFA.  Thus,  this  covers  corporate  
paper  except   for  stocks.   (5)  The   item  ‘trade  credit’  consists  of   trade  credit  and  
short-­‐‑term   loans,   which   is   one   joint   position   in   the   South   African   flows   of  
funds.   Finally,   there   are   two   additional   items   that   do   not   figure   in   the   list   of  
sources   in  Table   7.1.  The   first   is   the  position   ‘other’,   containing  deposits  with  
other   institutions,   other   financial   assets   and   the   balancing   item.   The   financial  
instruments  gathered  under  the  ‘other’  category  were  small  during  the  1970s,  as  
will   be   shown   below.   They   have   grown   substantially   in   recent   years.   This  
position  will  be  disaggregated  in  the  analysis  where  necessary.  
The  second  position  is  non-­‐‑bank  long-­‐‑term  loans.  These  loans  can  be  issued  by  
any   institution   in   the   South   African   economy,   including   corporations,   the  
government,   non-­‐‑bank  monetary   institutions   or   banks   themselves.   These   two  
items  have  been  added   to   the   list,  while   items   (3)  and   (4)  were  merged,   since  
equity  and  bond   issuance  both   tap   into   the  capital  markets.  Effectively,   in   the  
case   of   South   Africa   issuance   of   other   bills   is   a   small   item   in   comparison   to  
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equity  issuance,  which  dominants  the  market  of  issued  corporate  securities  (see  
Figure  7.10.).  Therefore,  this  merging  is  justified.  
Figure 7.10. Bonds and equity issued as share of total investment by South 
African non-financial firms, 1970-2014 
  
Source:  SARB,  1994,  SARB,  1995a-­‐‑2015a.  
The  gross  uses  of  funds  are  set  up  in  correspondence  to  the  list  of  gross  sources:  
(6)   Cash   and   deposits   are   cash   and   demand,   short-­‐‑term,   medium-­‐‑term   and  
long-­‐‑term  deposits  with  banking   institutions,   including  mutual  banks  and   the  
Postbank.  The  position  also  includes,  somewhat  curiously,  the  items  mortgage  
loans.   This   is,   however,   a   small,   intermittently   appearing   position.   (7)   Equity  
purchases  by  non-­‐‑financial  firms  cover  purchases  of  ordinary  shares,  and  other  
loan  stock  and  preference  shares.   (8)  Bond  purchases  are  calculated  as  sum  of  
other  bills  (that  is,  corporate  securities  with  the  exception  of  equity)  and  long-­‐‑
term   loans   provided   by   non-­‐‑financial   firms   to   their   debtors.   Since   long-­‐‑term  
loans  are  specifically  singled  out,  and  not  part  of  trade  credit,   they  are  simply  
long-­‐‑term   payment   commitments   to   non-­‐‑financial   corporations,   bearing   a  
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namely   trade   credit   and   short-­‐‑term   loans,   foreign   branch   balances   and  
receivables.    
Finally,   once   again   the  positions   ‘other   financial   assets’   and   ‘long-­‐‑term   loans’  
are  added.  The   former  covers  non-­‐‑financial   companies’   interests   in   retirement  
and   life   funds,  deposits  with  other   institutions,  other   financial   instruments,  as  
well  as   the  balancing   item.  The   latter   consists  of   long-­‐‑term   loans  extended  by  
non-­‐‑financial   firms.   Balancing   these   items,   as   indicated   in   the   lower   panel   of  
Table  7.1.  (for  instance,  subtracting  cash  and  deposits  from  bank  loans),  yields  
the  net  sources  of  funds.  Once  the  net  financing  items  are  obtained,  they  can  be  
expressed   as   share   of   physical   investment   expenditure,   resulting   in   a  
breakdown  of  total  net  sources  for  investment  finance  (see  Figure  7.11.).    
Figure 7.11. Net sources of funds as share of total investment for South African 
non-financial firms, 1980-2014  
  
Source:  Author’s  calculations  based  on  SARB,  1994,  SARB,  1995a-­‐‑2014a.  
It   becomes   clear   that   during   much   of   the   period   from   1970   to   2014   South  
African   non-­‐‑financial   companies   in   aggregate   were   able   to   cover   their  
investment  expenditure  through  retained  profits.  Only  in  the  early  1970s  (more  
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financial   corporations   in   aggregate   require   considerable   external   funding   for  
their  investment,  because  retained  profits  on  average  only  met  60-­‐‑70%  of  their  
financing  needs.  The  2000-­‐‑2007  period  saw  a  pick-­‐‑up  in   investment  activity   in  
South  Africa.  Once   the  global   financial   crisis  hit   South  Africa,   internal  profits  
were  restored  as  single  most  important  net  source  of  investment  finance,  again  
covering  all  of  the  gross  capital  expenditure  undertaken  by  non-­‐‑financial  firms.    
Internal   funds  as   share  of   total   investment  were  particularly  high   in   the  mid-­‐‑
1980s,   when   South   African   non-­‐‑financial   companies   could   have   financed   2.5  
times   as  much   investment   as   they   chose   to   undertake.   This,   of   course,  was   a  
symptom  of   the  social  and  economic  crisis  under  the  apartheid  regime,  which  
coincided   with   the   country’s   debt   crisis.   Non-­‐‑financial   businesses   abstained  
from   investing,   while   also   facing   capital   controls,   which   hampered   outright  
capital  flight.  It  has  to  be  stressed  that  all  these  considerations  are  made  from  a  
macroeconomic   perspective,   meaning   non-­‐‑financial   companies   are   treated   as  
aggregate.  Hence,  a  maldistribution  of  retained  profits  across  firms  could  result  
in   a   situation  where   large  profits   coexist  with   the  need   for   external   financing  
(see,  for  example,  Michell,  2014).      
Crucially,  South  African  non-­‐‑financial  companies  during  these  years  used  their  
internal  funds  to  a  large  extent  for  trade  credit.  This  might  in  fact  be  a  sign  of  
Steindlian  maldistributed  profits  within  the  non-­‐‑financial  business  sector:  while  
some   companies   managed   to   accumulate   large   retained   profits,   others   were  
dependent  on   trade  credit   for   their  operations.  South  African  alcohol  brewers  
but  also  other  consumption  goods  producers  were  among  these  companies  (see  
chapter   3).   Importantly,   over   the   course   of   the   1990s   the   role   of   trade   credit  
diminished  markedly,  while  other  financial  operations  became  a  net  outlet  for  
non-­‐‑financial   firms’   funds.  Much   of  what   is   contained   in   the   position   ‘other’  
represents  new  financial  products,  thus,  financial  innovation  (Monyela,  2012).    
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The   second   most   important   source   of   external   finance   among   non-­‐‑financial  
companies  during   the   1980s  was  bonds   and   equities.  Here,   equity   issuance   is  
the   important   component.   The   resources   generated   through   new   corporate  
bonds  never   exceeded  more   than  20%  of   total   investment   expenditure  during  
the  period,  while  new  equity   raised  up   to  120%  of   total   investment  spending,  
going   well   beyond   financing   needs   for   productive   investment.   Figure   7.11. 
shows   that  bond  and  equity  emission  was  an   important  net   source  of   finance  
during  the  1980s,  when  retained  profits  were  also  high.    
In   the   early   1990s   equity   and   bond   emission   became   less   important.  
Interestingly,   issuance  volumes  picked  up  again  from  the  mid-­‐‑1990s  onwards,  
coinciding   with   a   decline   of   retained   profits   as   major   financing   source.   As  
mentioned   before,   between   2000   and   2008   internal   profits   fell   below   100%   of  
total   investment   expenditure   by   non-­‐‑financial   firms.   In   those   years   external  
financing  gained   in   importance,  with  bond  and  equity   issuance,  bank   lending  
and   even   trade   credit   (which   until   then  was   essentially   a   drain   on   funds)   all  
contributing   towards   investment   outlays.   Non-­‐‑bank   long-­‐‑term   loans   never  
mattered  much   as   net   source   of   funds   for   South  African   non-­‐‑financial   firms,  
maybe  with  the  exception  of  a  few  of  years  during  the  1970s.  
Table  7.2.  below  provides  data  on  net  sources  of  funds  as  share  of  South  African  
non-­‐‑financial   companies’   investment   expenditure   by   decade.   Two   important  
events  are  singled  out,  due  to  their  political  and  economic  significance:  the  end  
of  the  apartheid  regime  in  1994,  and  the  arrival  of  the  global  financial  crisis  in  
South  Africa   in   2008.  While   the   socio-­‐‑economic   importance   of   the   crisis   is,   of  
course,  nowhere  near  that  of  the  end  of  apartheid,  it  had  a  profound  impact  on  
South  African   employment   and  people’s  welfare.  During   the   crisis,   close   to   1  
million   jobs  were   lost   (South  African  National   Treasury,   2011;   South  African  
National  Treasury,   2014).  The   end  of   apartheid  provides  a   structural  break   in  
institutions   and   policies,   while   the   2008   recession   is   a   one-­‐‑off   event   worth  
highlighting.    
   354  
Considering   decade   averages   the   graphical   representation   is   confirmed.  
Internal  funds  are  the  single  most  important  source  of  investment  finance,  and  
mostly  cover  all  of  non-­‐‑financial  firms’  expenditure  on  gross  capital  formation.  
This  changed  somewhat  during  the  early  2000s  and,  unsurprisingly,  there  was  a  
shortfall  of  retained  profits  as  result  of  the  2008  crisis.  However,  internal  funds  
regained  their  importance  right  after  the  crisis.    
Table 7.2. Total net sources of funds by South African non-financial firms as 
share of their capital formation, by decade 
  
Source:  Author’s  calculations  based  on  SARB,  1994,  SARB,  1995a-­‐‑2014a.  
As  mentioned   above,   the   years   2000-­‐‑2007  were  marked   by   rising   investment  
across  the  South  African  economy,  in  anticipation  of  the  World  Cup.  It  is  likely  
that   small   and   medium   sized   enterprises   (for   example   in   the   hospitality  
industry)   also   intensified   their   investment   spending.   This   group   of   firms  
typically   has   very   limited   savings   at   their   disposal   and   would   have   needed  
bank  loans  to  finance  their  investment.  Bank  lending  as  source  of  funds  gained  
in  importance  during  the  period.  However,  bond  and  equity  issuance  did  even  
more   so.   These   financing   options   are   not   open   to   most   SMEs   and   hint   at  
increased  investment  outlays  by  large  companies  in  those  years.  
Bond   and   equity   emissions   (of  which,   as  mentioned   before,   the   vast  majority  
are  equity  issues)  have  gradually  grown  since  the  1970s.  It  would  be,  however,  
difficult  to  speak  of  a  shift  among  non-­‐‑financial  companies  from  bank-­‐‑based  to  
market-­‐‑based  financing,  which  some  authors  suggest  as  a  central  characteristic  
of  the  financialisation  of  non-­‐‑financial  companies  (see  Lapavitsas,  2013).  Here  a  
historical  assessment  (rather  than  a  simple  focus  on  the  New  South  Africa,  see  
1970%1979 1980%1994 1995%1999 2000%2007 2008 2009%2014
Internal(funds 96% 156% 105% 72% 62% 113%
Bond(&(equity(issuance 20% 34% 64% 40% >8% 51%
Bank(loans 6% 4% 5% 7% 65% 1%
Long>term(loans((non>bank) 12% 0% >9% 5% 8% 4%
Trade(credit >56% >84% >27% 6% >25% >29%
Other 20% >9% >38% >30% >5% >34%
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Rodrigues   Teles   Sampaio,   2012)   is   necessary   to   understand   non-­‐‑financial  
businesses’  financial  operations.    
Bank  loans  (together  with  non-­‐‑bank  long-­‐‑term  loans)  never  played  a  significant  
role   in   investment   finance   among   South   African   firms.   Internal   funds   were  
sufficient   to   meet   these   needs.   Bank   lending   and   other   financial   instruments  
generated  liquidity,  which  was  then  used  for   trade  credit.  Since  the  1990s,   the  
importance   of   trade   credit   has   shrunk   considerably,   and   the   liquidity   raised  
through   lending   and   capital   market   operations   is   put   into   financially  
‘innovative’  assets.    
The  important  question  emerges:  who  was  the  main  beneficiary  of  trade  credit?  
Trade  credit  often  benefits  small  and  medium-­‐‑sized  enterprises,  which  tend  to  
have   very   poor   access   to   bank   lending   and   virtually   no   access   to   capital  
markets.  This  is  the  case  in  many  advanced  economies  and  it  appears  to  be  even  
more  so  in  South  Africa  (Berry  et  al.,  2002).  The  limited  access  to  finance  is  one  
aspect   that   squeezes   South   African   small   and   medium-­‐‑sized   non-­‐‑financial  
businesses,  which  are  not  very  numerous.    
To   see   whether   non-­‐‑financial   firms   use   substantial   trade   credit   for   their  
investment  finance  the  next  section  will  assess  gross  sources  and  uses  of  funds.  
Netting   out   sources   and   uses   hides   important   information.   It   is   possible   that  
trade  credit  benefits  South  African  SMEs  significantly,  but  does  not  show  up  in  
the  net  position,  since  large  companies  expand  far  more  trade  credit  than  small  
and  medium-­‐‑size  non-­‐‑financial  firms  obtain.          
7.3.2. Assessing gross sources and uses of funding for South African non-financial 
firms 
Netting  out  sources  and  uses,  as  in  the  previous  section,  hides  the  true  volumes  
of,  say,  equity  issuance  and  purchases  among  non-­‐‑financial  firms,  since  we  are  
presented   with   the   difference   of   sales   and   purchases.   Therefore,   the   author  
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suggests  adjusting   the  Corbett  &   Jenkinson  approach   to   reveal   this  additional  
layer  of  detail.    
For   this   purpose,   it   will   be   calculated   how   much   physical   investment   every  
individual   gross   source   item   (including   internal   finance,   bank   loans,   new  
equity,   bonds   issued   and   trade   credit,   i.e.   the   left-­‐‑hand   side   column   in   Table  
7.3.)   could   cover.   This   will   provide   a   measure   of   financial   investment,  
expressed  in  relation  to  gross  capital  formation.  Summing  up  gross  sources  and  
expressing  them  as  share  of  physical  investment  will  show  how  large  financial  
investment   is,   because   every   percentage   point   above   100%   captures   financial  
investment.    
Figure  7.12. shows  gross  sources  of  funds  expressed  as  share  of  total  investment  
spending  by  South  African  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  between  1970  and  2013.  
The   top   line   represents   total   gross   sources.   On   average   for   the   entire   period  
total   gross   sources   amounted   to   twice   the   sum   of   physical   investment  
undertaken   by   South   African   non-­‐‑financial   firms.   Hence,   on   average   South  
African  corporations  invested  as  much  in  financial  as  in  productive  assets.    
Table 7.3. Relationship between gross sources and gross uses of non-financial 
firm funds 
  
The   gross   positions   in   Figure   7.12.   emphasise   the   role   that   different   types   of  
finance   play   for   non-­‐‑financial   firms.   For   instance,   the   analysis   of   net   sources  
suggested   that   trade   credit  was  mainly  an  outlet   for  non-­‐‑financial  businesses’  







TOTAL SOURCES TOTAL USES
FINANCIAL 
INVESTMENT
   357  
funds,   rather   than   a   source   of   it.   This   is   confirmed   by   the   analysis   of   gross  
sources.   They   do   not   substantially   contribute   towards   investment   financing  
until  the  2000s.  Hence,  to  answer  the  question  raised  at  the  end  of  the  previous  
section,  it  is  unlikely  that  incorporated  small  and  medium-­‐‑sized  enterprises  are  
the  major  beneficiaries  of  non-­‐‑financial  companies’  trade  credit.  However,  non-­‐‑
incorporated  firms,  which  tend  to  be  very  small  and  are  counted  as  part  of  the  
household  sector,  could  be.  
Figure 7.12. Gross sources of funds as share of total investment for South African 
non-financial firms, 1970-2014 
  
Source:  Author’s  calculations  based  on  SARB,  1994,  SARB,  1995a-­‐‑2015a.  
Similarly,  bonds  and  equity  in  gross  terms  also  gain  in  importance  as  source  of  
financing  during  the  1990s.  Strikingly,  the  role  bank  loans  play  in  non-­‐‑financial  
companies’   financing   is   revealed   even   more   clearly   when   assessing   gross  
sources  of  funds.  As  internal  finance  declined  drastically  after  2005  bank  loans  
came   in   to   fill   this   gap,   replacing  waning   equity   emission   in   2008,  when   the  
impact   of   the   financial   crisis   arrived   in   South  Africa.   Bank   loans  were   not   as  
prominent   in   the  net   sources  analysis  presented   in  Figure  7.11.,   implying   that  
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banking   institutions.   In  a  net  assessment  bank   loans  and  bank  deposits  cancel  
each  other  out.    
The  share  of  cash  and  bank  deposits  in  total  gross  uses  of  funds  has  increased  
markedly   since   the   1970s   (see   Table   7.4.).   This   trend   only   halted   in   the  
aftermath   of   the   global   financial   crisis   and   is   likely   to   re-­‐‑emerge.   In   2014,   a  
quarter   of   gross   uses,   expressed   as   share   of   gross   capital   formation,   was  
channelled   into   cash   and  bank  deposits,   implying   that   these   extremely   liquid  
assets   are   on   the   rise   again.   Table   7.4. below   reaffirms   the   findings   of   the  
previous   section.   It   would   be   difficult   to   claim   that   equity   and   bonds   have  
constituted  a  new  destination  for  non-­‐‑financial  companies’  financial  investment  
in  the  New  South  Africa.  During  the  latest  period  (2009-­‐‑2014),  the  share  of  bond  
and  equity  purchases  in  total  financial  investment  was  in  fact  below  the  levels  
of  financial  investment  into  the  two  instruments  during  the  1970s  and  1980s.    
Table 7.4. Total gross uses of funds by South African non-financial firms as share 
of their capital formation, by decade 
  
Source:  Author’s  calculations  based  on  SARB,  1994;  SARB,  1995a-­‐‑2014a.  
Similarly,   it   is   not   true   that   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   in   South  African   have  
increased   their   financial   investment   in   relation   to   gross   capital   spending  
markedly   since   the   1970s,   or   since   the   end  of   apartheid.   Financial   investment  
among   South   African   non-­‐‑financial   firms   has   always   been   high.   During   the  
1970s,   for   instance,   gross   investment   into   financial   assets  matched  productive  
investment  spending.  While  this  percentage  increased  in  the  early  years  of  the  
New   South  Africa   (1995-­‐‑1999),   it   came  down   below   1970s   levels   by   the   early  
2000s.    
1970%1979 1980%1994 1995%1999 2000%2007 2008 2009%2014
Cash%&%bank%deposits 17.4% 19.1% 37.8% 44.9% 43.7% 13.9%
Bond%&%equity%issuance 2.0% 10.6% 13.7% @4.2% 0.7% 1.9%
Long@term%loans%(non@bank) 0.5% 0.2% 0.7% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2%
Trade%credit 77.2% 47.2% 34.6% 19.4% 16.7% 25.9%
Other 1.8% 8.4% 29.4% 17.7% 18.4% 34.6%
Total/gross/financial/uses 98.7% 87.0% 104.3% 70.5% 69.4% 65.3%
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This   statement   requires  one  qualification.  The  vast  majority  of   financial  assets  
held   by   South   African   non-­‐‑financial   companies   during   the   1970s   was   trade  
credit.   During   this   period,   corporations   extended   trade   credit   of   an   amount  
equivalent   to   more   than   three   quarters   of   their   investment   expenditure.   The  
volume  was   somewhat   smaller   in   the   following  decade   (1980-­‐‑1994),   falling   to  
just   below   half   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms’   entire   expenditure   on   gross   capital  
formation.   Nonetheless,   trade   credit   was   the   largest   position   among   the  
different  types  of  financial  assets  held  by  non-­‐‑financial  corporations.  However,  
trade   credit   is   often   identified   as   a   productive   financial   asset   because   it   is  
typically  extended  among  companies.  Thus,  a  supplier  might  demand  advance  
payment   for  an  order   to   facilitate   the  production  of   the   intermediate  goods  to  
be  supplied.    
Table 7.5. Share of total trade credit received by sector, 1970-2014 
  
Source:  SARB,  1994,  SARB,  1995b-­‐‑2015b.    
Table   7.5.   provides   the   share   that   each   sector   listed   in   the   flow  of   funds  data  
received  of   total   trade  credit  expanded  by  decade.  The  sector  with   the   largest  
share   in   total   trade   credit   is   highlighted   in   grey   for   each   decade.  During   the  
1970s  and  1980s,  households  (including  non-­‐‑incorporated  businesses)  benefited  
from  more  than  70%  of  total  trade  credit.  This  share  declined  markedly  during  
the   second   half   of   the   1990s.   From   2000   onwards   other   economic   aggregates  
have  received  more  trade  credit  than  South  African  households.    
For   South  African  households   in   the   1970s   and   1980s   credit   obtained  directly  
from   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   most   likely   took   the   form   of   instalment   sale  
1970%1979 1980%1994 1995%1999 2000%2007 2008 2009%2014
Foreign1sector 7% 9% $7% $31% 27% $40%
Monetary1authority 0% 0% 11% $61% $11% 16%
Other1monetary1institutions 0% 6% 6% 18% 54% $12%
Public1investment1corporation 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Insurers1and1retirement1funds 3% 5% 7% 14% 3% 51%
Other1financial1institutions 1% 0% 5% 1% 5% $2%
General1government $2% 3% 25% 29% 19% 28%
Public1corporations 19% 9% 2% $1% 19% $11%
Private1corporations $2% $18% $7% 77% $8% 39%
Households 73% 86% 57% 54% $7% 31%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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and   lease   agreements   or   open   accounts,   which   include   all   outstanding   (and  
mostly   short-­‐‑term)   debt   to   dealers   (Prinsloo,   2002).   Interestingly,   increased  
involvement   in   direct   financial   intermediation   by   non-­‐‑financial   companies   is  
often   interpreted  as   sign  of   financialisation.   If   this  definition   is  accepted,   then  
South  African  non-­‐‑financial  businesses  were  substantially  financialised  already  
during  the  1970s.  In  fact,  this  type  of  financial  activity  fell  off  steeply  after  1994,  
the  year  which  is  often  seen  to  mark  the  beginning  of  increased  financialisation  
in  the  country.  
Hence,  if  one  wants  to  tell  a  financialisation  story  here,  it  is  not  straightforward  
and   does   certainly   not   run   along   stylised   lines,   which   take   the   growth   of  
financial   investment   by   non-­‐‑financial   companies   or   a   shift   towards   more  
market-­‐‑based  financial  assets  as  characteristic.  What  can  be  said  with  certainty  
is   that   the   importance   of   trade   credit   as   outlet   for   non-­‐‑financial   companies’  
liquidity   has   steadily   diminished   since   1970.   Only   recently   (2009-­‐‑2014)   was  
there   a   slight   uptake   in   trade   credit   measured   as   share   of   total   capital  
formation.  Concurrently,  the  significance  of  other  financial  assets  (according  to  
the   SARB   this   is   financial   innovation)   has  more   than   doubled   (as   a   share   of  
capital  formation)  since  the  1980s.    
It   is  also  very  clear   in  both  Figure  7.11.  and  Figure  7.12.   that  flows  of  external  
funds,  be  they  generated  by  bond  and  equity  issuance,  bank  loans,  trade  credit  
or   other   sources,   are   quite   volatile.   This  means   that   bank   lending   can   be   the  
most   important   source   of   financing   for   a   couple   of   consecutive   years   (as  
happened   between   2006   and   2008),   and   subsequently   collapse   almost  
completely  (like  in  2009).  Thus,  to  have  a  full  picture  of  the  importance  of  non-­‐‑
financial   firms’   financial   operations   for   their   own  balance   sheets,   but   also   for  
the  macro  economy,  one  has   to  assess   the   stocks  of   financial   instruments   that  
non-­‐‑financial  corporations  carry  on  their  balance  sheets.      
   361  
7.3.3. Assessing the stock of financial instruments held by South African non-
financial firms 
Sources   of   external   funds   for   South   African   non-­‐‑financial   companies   appear  
somewhat  volatile  over  time.  This  is  not  surprising,  as  equity,  for  example,  will  
mostly   be   issued   when   market   conditions   are   advantageous   to   preserve   the  
share  price.  Hence,  what  is  needed  to  provide  a  more  comprehensive  picture  of  
non-­‐‑financial   companies’   aggregate   financial   operations   and   their  
macroeconomic   importance   is  an  examination  of  stocks  of   financial  assets,  not  
just  their  flows.    
As  South  Africa  regained  access  to   international  markets   in  1994,   the  volumes  
of  debt  –  often  financed  through  foreign  capital   inflows  –  held  on  the  balance  
sheets  of  non-­‐‑financial  companies  located  in  South  Africa  increased  markedly.  
This  was  encouraged  by  the  financial  liberalisation  that  South  Africa  underwent  
during   the   1990s   (Aron   &   Muellbauer,   2000).5  Together   with   the   fact   that  
financial  assets  were  also  accumulated,  albeit  at  a  somewhat  slower  speed,  this  
observation   is   sometimes   interpreted   as   sign   of   financialisation   (McKenzie,  
2013).   These   developments   are   illustrated   in   Figure   7.13.,   which   shows   the  
accumulation  of  financial  asset  and  liability  stocks  since  1995.    
The   stock   figures   have,   in   the   absence   of   better   data   sources,   been   calculated  
from   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   data.   Therefore,   they   do   not   represent   actual   levels   of  
corporate   financial   stocks.   Data   on   stocks   of   financial   assets   and   liabilities   of  
private  non-­‐‑financial   firms  in  South  Africa  are  not  available.  Nonetheless,   this  
calculation   provides   an   indication   of   the   importance   of   financial   assets   and  
liabilities  for  the  private  enterprise  sector  in  the  New  South  Africa.  Since  these  
calculations   are   based   on   a   range   of   simplifications6,   they   have   not   been  
                                                                                                 
5  According   to   an   IMF   financial   reform   index,   South   Africa   is   the   most   financially  
liberalised  economy  in  Sub-­‐‑Saharan  Africa  (Abiad,  Detragiache  &  Tressel,  2008).  
6  These   simplifications   include,   for   example,   the   absence   of   value   changes   to   the  
financial   assets   held   by   non-­‐‑financial   firms   on   their   balance   sheet.   This   is   especially  
problematic   for   equity   purchases.   Value   re-­‐‑assessments   are   typically   provided   in  
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calculated   further   back   than   1995,   which   marks   the   beginning   of   a  
fundamentally  new  political  era  in  the  country.7  
Figure 7.13. Selected financial stocks accumulated by South African non-
financial firms between 1995 and 2013 
  
Source:  Author’s  calculations  based  on  NFA  data  (SARB,  1995-­‐‑2014b).  
Using  nominal   data,   the   stock   of   financial   liabilities   run  up  by   South  African  
non-­‐‑financial  firms  since  1995  was  R2.3  trillion  in  2013,  which  was  matched  by  a  
stock  of  R2  trillion  of  financial  assets.  Importantly,  the  majority  of  the  financial  
assets   amassed   since   1995  –  namely  R1.3   trillion  –  were   liquid  assets,   such  as  
cash   and   cash   equivalents,   deposits   held   with   other   financial   institutions,  
government   bonds,   other   bills   and   other   financial   instruments.8  While   this  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
companies’  annual   reports.   It   is,  however,  difficult   to   re-­‐‑assess   the  worth  of   financial  
assets   held   by   non-­‐‑financial   firms   in   aggregate.   Trade   credit   and   very   liquid   assets  
(such  as  cash  and  bank  deposits)  will  not  be  as  (if  at  all)  vulnerable  to  this  shortcoming.  
Since   these   two   positions   account   for   the   lion’s   share   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms’   uses   of  
financial   assets,   the   calculations   appear   less   problematic   for   uses   of   funds   than   for  
sources  of  funds.  
7  The  origins  of  the  New  South  Africa  are  typically  dated  to  April  1994.  However,  the  
country’s  new  constitution  was  agreed  upon  in  1995.      
8  According   to   the   SARB   (2012)   this   category   is   most   likely   to   pick   up   on   financial  
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observation  does  not  demonstrate  the  overcapitalisation  of  South  African  NFFs,  
i.e.   the   excessive   holding   of   liquid   assets   by   these   firms,   across   the   board,   it  
does   show   that   financial   instruments,   especially   highly   liquid   ones,   have  
increased   on   their   balance   sheets   over   time.   In   fact,  macroeconomic   data   are  
unlikely   to   demonstrate   general   overcapitalisation   of   South   African   firms  
because   of   the   aggregation   of   large,   medium   and   small   companies   on   the  
macroeconomic   level.   Nevertheless,   the   findings   here   are   consistent   with   the  
increasing   presence   of   overcapitalisation   among   JSE-­‐‑listed   NFFs   found   in  
chapter  4.    
What   is  more  enlightening   than  a   simple  analysis  of  volumes,  however,   is   an  
assessment  of  which   types  of   sources   and  uses  have  been  most   important   for  
non-­‐‑financial  firms,  both  over  time  and  in  terms  of  stocks.  Hence,  it  is  useful  to  
express  the  estimations  of  financial  stocks  by  type  of  financial   instrument  as  a  
share  of  the  total  financial  asset  stock.  For  this  purpose,  the  24  transaction  items  
provided  by   the  SARB   in   the   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  data,   and  discussed   in  part   7.3.1.,  
have  been  grouped  into  eight  different  categories  of  financial  assets.    
Moreover,  one  should  distinguish  between  sources  of  funds,  which  provide  the  
stocks  of  financial  liabilities,  and  uses  of  funds,  which  yield  stocks  of  financial  
assets.  As  to  sources  of  finance  for  private  non-­‐‑financial  firms  –  that  is,  sources  
of   external   financing   as   opposed   to   retained   profits   –   there   are   eight   main  
options:   non-­‐‑financial   firms   tend   to  mostly  use   (1)   bond   and   equity   issuance,  
meaning   issuance   of   other   bills,   other   loan   stock   and   preference   shares   and  
ordinary   shares.   This   is   followed   by   (2)   long-­‐‑term   credit,   (3)   bank   loans   and  
advances,  (4)  trade  credit  and  short-­‐‑term  loans,  (5)  other  liabilities,  (6)  deposits  
with  other   institutions,   (7)  amounts  payable  and  (8)   interest   in  retirement  and  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
necessarily   highly   liquid,   it   appears   a   reasonable   assumption   given   recent  
developments.  Collateralised  debt  obligations  were  such  a  success  in  the  run-­‐‑up  to  the  
subprime   mortgage   crisis   because   of   the   very   liquid   markets   in   which   they   were  
traded.   This   of   course   does   not   mean   that   liquidity   cannot   disappear   quickly   (see  
Nesvetailova,  2012).    
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life   funds.   This   list   is   arranged   in   order   of   importance   of   these   liabilities   as  
source   of   external   finance   in   1995,   the   beginning   of   the   constructed   series.   It  
should   be  noted   that   the   category   ‘long-­‐‑term   credit’   has   been   constructed   for  
the  purpose  of  this  analysis  as  the  sum  of  long-­‐‑term  loans  and  mortgage  loans.    
As  mentioned   above,   this   category   of   loans   can   be   either   issued   by   banks   or  
non-­‐‑bank   monetary   institutions.   Data   to   help   distinguish   between   the   two  
sources   of   long-­‐‑term   credit   (that   is   banks   and   other   non-­‐‑bank   financial  
companies  that  extend  credit)  is  available  for  the  years  since  1995.    
When  analysing  the  uses  of  funds  –  that  is  the  outlets  for  financial  investment  –  
by  South  African  non-­‐‑financial  corporations,  the  items  that  are  important  from  
the   above   list   change   somewhat.   In   1995,   the   order   of   importance   among  
financial   assets  was:   (1)   Cash   and   deposits,   (2)   interest   in   retirement   and   life  
funds,   (3)   other   financial   assets,   (4)   trade   credit   and   other   short-­‐‑term   loans  
given  by  non-­‐‑financial  firms,  (5)  government  securities,  (6)  long-­‐‑term  loans  and  
mortgage  loans,  (7)  amounts  receivable  and  (8)  bond  and  equity  purchases.    
Figure   7.14.   reports   on   the   share   of   mortgage   advanced   in   total   credit  
expansion,   differentiating   between   banks   and   all   monetary   institutions.   It   is  
striking  that  mortgage  loans  make  up  a  large  share  and,  since  2006,  the  majority  
of  credit  extension.  It  also  becomes  obvious  that  banks  grant  the  vast  majority  
of   mortgage   loans,   while   the   share   of   mortgages   extended   by   non-­‐‑bank  
monetary   institutions   has   increased   recently.   Non-­‐‑bank   financial   companies  
slightly  exceeded  one  tenth  of  all  mortgage  lending  in  South  Africa  during  the  
second   half   of   the   1990s,   and   this   share   increased   to   18%   of   total   mortgage  
credit  after  the  financial  crisis  (2009-­‐‑2013,  see  SARB,  2010a-­‐‑2014a).  Hence,  there  
is   clearly  growth   in   credit   extension  by  non-­‐‑banking   institutions   in   the   South  
African  economy.  Nevertheless,  the  overwhelming  majority  of  credit  extension  
remains  with  South  African  banks.        
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When  analysing  the  uses  of  funds  –  that  is  the  outlets  for  financial  investment  –  
by  South  African  non-­‐‑financial  corporations,  the  items  that  are  important  from  
the   above   list   change   somewhat.   In   1995,   the   order   of   importance   among  
financial   assets  was:   (1)   Cash   and   deposits,   (2)   interest   in   retirement   and   life  
funds,   (3)   other   financial   assets,   (4)   trade   credit   and   other   short-­‐‑term   loans  
given  by  non-­‐‑financial  firms,  (5)  government  securities,  (6)  long-­‐‑term  loans  and  
mortgage  loans,  (7)  amounts  receivable  and  (8)  bond  and  equity  purchases.    
Figure 7.14. Mortgage loans as share of total loans and advances 
  
Source:  (SARB,  2001b-­‐‑2014b).  
These   groupings   will   be   the   basis   for   the   examination   of   stocks   of   financial  
liabilities   (in   part   7.3.3.1.   below)   and   financial   assets   (in   part   7.3.3.2.   below)  
amassed  by  South  African  non-­‐‑financial  firms  on  their  balance  sheets.  Both  lists  
are   in  places  more  detailed   than   the  groupings  used  above   for   the  analysis  of  
net   and   gross   sources   and   uses,   for   example.   The   increasing   disaggregation  
where   necessary   and   interesting   is   done   purposefully   as   the   focus   of   the  
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7.3.3.1. The stock of non-financial firms’ financial liabilities 
Due  to  the  importance  of  stocks  in  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  analysis,  the  SARB  is  currently  
compiling   a   complete   balance   sheet   of   stocks   of   asset   and   liabilities   for   the  
South   African   economy   (Monyela,   2012).   Unfortunately,   these   efforts   are  
limited   to   public   authorities   and   enterprises,   as   data   on   the   private   sector  
balance  sheet  –  referring  to  private  enterprises  and  households  (the   latter  also  
including   non-­‐‑incorporated   businesses)   –   are   not   available.   Therefore,   the  
accumulated  stocks  since  1995  have  been  calculated  for  the  eight  main  sources  
of  corporate  external  finance  named  above.  Of  course,  these  stock  figures  do  not  
represent   actual   corporate   financial   stocks.   Nonetheless,   this   calculation   can  
yield  information  on  the  importance  of  different  types  of  financial  liabilities  for  
the  private  enterprise  sector   in   the  New  South  Africa.  The  estimates  provided  
are  expressed  in  real  (2010  Rand)  terms  to  ensure  that  inflation  is  not  distorting  
the  calculated  stocks.    
Figure   7.15.   shows   the   stocks   of   financial   liabilities   amassed   by   private   non-­‐‑
financial   firms   in  South  Africa   in  aggregate  between  1995  and  2013.  The  eight  
main   sources   of   external   finance   are   represented   as   a   share   of   total   liabilities  
incurred.  Negative  values   indicate   that  old  –  meaning  pre-­‐‑1995  –   stocks  were  
paid  off.  This  development  mainly   refers   to  other   liabilities,  which  contain  all  
instruments   not   part   of   the   24   categories   of   financial   assets   and   liabilities  
recorded  in  the  National  Financial  Account.    
According  to  SARB  representatives  familiar  with  the  data,  the  category  ‘other’  
mostly   includes   new   financial   instruments   that   were   the   consequence   of  
financial  innovation  (Monyela,  2012).  The  vast  majority  –  that  is,  70%  and  more  
–  of  external  finance  amongst  private  enterprises  is  sourced  through  bonds  and  
equities,   long-­‐‑term   credit   and   bank   loans   and   advances.   The   single   most  
important  source  of  financial  liability  is  corporate  securities.  For  the  years  1995  
to  2013,  the  stock  of  bonds  and  equity  issued  accounted  for  more  than  half  of  all  
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amassed  liabilities  on  average.  Among  corporate  securities,  ordinary  shares  are  
the  most  important  source  of  external  finance,  accounting  for  three  quarters  of  
total   corporate   paper   in   2013,   while   other   bills   made   up   a   mere   6%   of   the  
category,  with  other  loan  stock  and  preference  shares  accounting  for  18%.  This  
means   that   41%   of   all   liabilities   accumulated   by   private   non-­‐‑financial   firms  
since  the  end  of  the  apartheid  regime  were  ordinary  shares.  
Figure 7.15. Stocks of financial liabilities of South African non-financial firms, 
1995-2013 
  
Source:   Author’s   calculations   based   on   National   Financial   Account   (SARB,   1996b-­‐‑
2014b).  
Note:  The  calculation  is  based  on  financial  liabilities  stocks  measured  in  constant  2010  
ZAR,  using  the  GDP  deflator  (World  Bank,  2014)  to  obtain  real  values.    
The   foreign   sector   is   the   most   important   buyer   of   ordinary   shares   in   South  
Africa.  Over  the  years  1995  to  2013,  it  purchased  45%  of  all  ordinary  stocks  sold  
in  South  Africa.   Its   importance   in  demanding   JSE-­‐‑issued  shares  was   followed  
by  that  of  other  domestic  financial  institutions  (purchasing  24%  of  all  ordinary  
stocks)  and  the  Public  Investment  Corporation  (buying  up  17%  of  all  ordinary  
stocks).  Of  course,  private  non-­‐‑financial   firms  are  not   the  only  entities   issuing  
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corporations  are  the  two  other  major  issuers.  Nevertheless,  private-­‐‑sector  non-­‐‑
financial  firms  issued  the  majority  of  all  ordinary  shares  between  1995  and  2013,  
accounting  for  53%  of  the  total  stock  in  ordinary  shares.    
As  discussed  in  sections  7.2.  and  7.3.  above,  this  trend  is  unlikely  to  be  new.  The  
financial  positions  of  domestic  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  and  the  foreign  sector  
have  been  intricately  linked  at  least  since  the  1970s.  From  then  onwards  it  can  
be   shown,   using   flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds   data,   that   the   two   sectors   possess   financial  
positions   that   complement   each   other,   moving   in   tandem.   Hence,   there   is  
evidence   that   South  African   non-­‐‑financial   firms   have   been   relying   on   foreign  
capital   inflows   as   source   of   funding   for   a   long   time.   Arguably,   major   South  
African  corporations   (such  as  Anglo-­‐‑American  used  to  be  until   recently)  were  
reliant   on   foreign   capital   for   their   foundation   and   kept   these   ties   throughout  
their  existence  (see  Innes,  1984).  
On   the   liability   side,   bank   loans   and   advances   as   well   as   long-­‐‑term   credit,  
which   refers   to  mortgages   and   other   long-­‐‑term   loans,  mostly   from  banks   but  
increasingly  from  non-­‐‑bank  monetary  institutions,  have  grown  considerably  on  
non-­‐‑financial   firms’   balance   sheets   since   1995.   Bank   loans   and   advances  
represented  28%  of  total  liabilities  run  up  by  non-­‐‑financial  corporations,  while  
long-­‐‑term   loans   accounted   for   22%.   Nonetheless,   bonds   and   equities,   which  
total   54%,   exceeded   the   sum  of   these   two  positions,  making   them   the   largest  
stock  of  liabilities  held  by  South  Africa  non-­‐‑financial  firms.9          
The   run-­‐‑up   of   these   liabilities   by   private   non-­‐‑financial   enterprises   has   been  
accompanied  by  a  swift  accumulation  of   financial  assets  on  the  balance  sheets  
of   these   companies.   Until   2001   the   accumulation   of   financial   assets   and  
liabilities  proceeded  hand  in  hand.  Subsequently,  during  the  global  boom  years  
leading  up  to  the  2007/08  financial  crisis,  corporate  amassing  of  financial  assets  
                                                                                                 
9  These  three  items  together  exceed  100%  because  some  stocks  were  run  down,  edging  
into   negative   terrain.  Most   notably   ‘other’   financial   liabilities  were   reduced   between  
1995  and  2013,  by  11%  of  total  liabilities  held  in  2013.      
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and  liabilities  diverged  when  financial  liabilities  accumulated  more  quickly  (see  
Figure   7.13.).   This   means   that   private-­‐‑sector   non-­‐‑financial   firms   were   net  
borrowers  during  these  years.  However,  by  2009  and  surely  as  response  to  less  
favourable   external   financing   conditions   after   the   crisis,   private   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations  returned  to  a  net  lender  position.  Thus,  the  stock  of  financial  assets  
they  have  accumulated  since  1995  has  to  be  examined.  
7.3.3.2. The stock of non-financial firms’ financial assets 
This   section  will   answer   the  question:   in  which   types   of   financial   assets   have  
South   African   non-­‐‑financial   firms   mostly   invested   since   1995?   Figure   7.16.  
illustrates  these  stocks  of  accumulated  financial  assets.  Two  aspects  stand  out:  
(1)  Demand  and  other  bank  deposits  are  the  main  destination  for  financial  flows  
from  the  private  non-­‐‑financial  corporate  sector.  This  mirrors  the  rising  liquidity  
preference  among  non-­‐‑financial  firms  observed  in  chapter  4.  These  deposits  are  
mostly   demand,   short-­‐‑term   and   medium-­‐‑term   deposits,   i.e.   very   liquid  
financial  assets.  Concurrently,  it  is  important  to  stress  that  all  of  these  deposits  
are  held  with  banking   institutions,  meaning  South  African  banks   (rather   than  
other   financial   companies)   are   the   main   destination   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms’  
financial  investment.    
(2)   Especially   since   the   early   2000s,   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   have   shifted  
away   from  holding   trade  credit,  which   is  mostly  extended   to  households  and  
informal  businesses  (as  discussed  in  section  7.3.2.),   to  other  financial  assets  on  
their   balance   sheet.   These   other   financial   assets,   since   they   are   likely   to   be  
financial  innovation,  are  also  highly  liquid,  once  again  reflecting  the  heightened  
liquidity  preference  of  non-­‐‑financial  firms.    
In   Figure   7.16.   cash   and   cash   equivalents10   (making   up   33%   of   total   net  
acquisition  of   financial   assets  between  1995  and  2013)  and   long-­‐‑term  deposits  
                                                                                                 
10  This  refers  to  cash  and  short-­‐‑term,  as  well  as  medium-­‐‑term,  deposits.  
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(5%   of   total   net   acquisition   of   financial   assets   in   2013)   have   been   grouped  
together,   since   these   assets   are   all   held   with   South   African   banks   –   that   is,  
commercial   banks,   mutual   banks,   the   Land   Bank,   and   the   Postbank.   These  
assets   tend   to  be  very   liquid,  as   they  are  either  held   in  current  accounts  or   in  
short-­‐‑term   and   medium-­‐‑term   deposits   with   banks.   Even   long-­‐‑term   deposits,  
which  have  a  maturity  span  of  a  year  or  more,  can  typically  be  resolved  before  
the  end  of  their  maturity  period,  albeit  for  a  fee.  In  this  sense,  cash  and  deposits  
are   liquidity   hoards   amassed   by   private   non-­‐‑financial   firms   to   manage   their  
liquidity.   Notably,   South   African   private-­‐‑sector   non-­‐‑financial   firms   have  
increased  their  cash  and  deposit  holdings  over  the  1990s  and  early  2000s,  from  
around  30%  of  total  financial  asset  stock  during  the  late  1990s,  to  more  than  40%  
of  total  financial  asset  stock  since  2005.  
Figure 7.16. Stocks of financial assets of South African non-financial firms, 1995-
2013 
 
Source:  Author’s  calculations  based  on  SARB,  1996a-­‐‑2014a.  
Note:  The  calculation  is  based  on  financial  liabilities  stocks  measured  in  constant  2010  
ZAR,  using  the  GDP  deflator  (World  Bank,  2014)  to  obtain  real  values.    
Tracing   the   flow  of   funds   from   the   firms’   perspective,   it   appears   that   foreign  
funds  flow  into  South  African  non-­‐‑financial  firms,  which  then  in  turn  use  much  
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of   this   finance   to   acquire   liquid   assets   that   end   up   on   the   balance   sheets   of  
South  African   banks   and,   in   the   case   of   other   financial   assets,   also   non-­‐‑bank  
financial   institutions  (see  Figure  7.17.).  The  eminent  question  now  is:  What  do  
financial   intermediaries   do  with   these   funds?  Which   assets   do   they   create   on  
their  own  balance  sheets  to  balance  their  liability  positions?  
The  second  question  is  what  happens  to  households’  balance  sheets.  It  has  to  be  
stressed   once   again   that   the   household   sector   also   contains   non-­‐‑incorporated  
businesses.  That  means  households  and   these  very   small,   informal  businesses  
receive  less  trade  credit  from  non-­‐‑financial  firms.  Does  that  mean  their  sources  
of   funds   have   shifted?   Both   these   questions   are   investigated   in   the   following  
section.    
Figure 7.17. Direction of funds flowing into the South African economy 
  
7.4. The Impact of corporate liquidity on other macroeconomic aggregates 
This  section  will  investigate  what  impact  non-­‐‑financial  firms’  use  of  funds  has  
on   other   macroeconomic   aggregates   in   the   South   African   economy.   The  
examination  of  non-­‐‑financial  firms’  financial  operations  in  aggregate  has  shown  
that   South   African   non-­‐‑financial   businesses   have   changed   their   financial  
investment   behaviour   since   the   1970s.   Maybe   surprisingly,   they   have   not  
increased   their   financial   investment   as   share   of   total   productive   investment.  
Equally,   they   do   not   seem   to   have   shifted   their  main   sources   of   funding   for  
gross   capital   formation   (from   bank   to   market-­‐‑based   finance),   as   the  
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but   has   changed   focus   from   trade   credit   to   households   towards  more   liquid  
financial  assets,  mainly  classified  as  ‘other’  financial  assets.  The  impact  of  non-­‐‑
financial   firms’   withdrawal   from   trade   credit   to   households   and   non-­‐‑
incorporated   firms   is  discussed   in  part   7.4.1.   Section  7.4.2.  will   then   show   the  
impact   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms’   financial   operations   on   the   balance   sheets   of  
financial  institutions.    
7.4.1. The impact on South African households and non-incorporated non-
financial business 
This  section  examines  other  financial  assets  and  liabilities  in  detail,  because  they  
have   become   a   growing   financial   asset   on   non-­‐‑financial   firms’   balance   sheets  
over  the  past  two  decades.  So  far,  several  flow  of  funds  transaction  items  have  
been  grouped  under   ‘other   financial   assets’   to  make   the   empirical   analysis   in  
this  chapter  manageable,  avoiding  detail  that  might  obscure  the  bigger  picture.  
In   terms   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms’   uses   of   funds,   three   transaction   items   were  
combined   as   ‘other’   assets:   (1)   deposits   with   other   financial   institutions,   (2)  
interest  in  retirement  and  life  funds  and  (3)  other  financial  assets11.    
Table 7.6. South African non-financial firms’ uses of funds for other financial 
assets as share of their capital formation, 1970-2014 
  
Source:  SARB,  1994,  SARB,  1995a-­‐‑2015a.    
Table   7.6.   disaggregates   total   other   financial   assets   into   these   three   sub-­‐‑
categories  by  decade.  Total  other   financial  assets  were  negligible   in   the  1970s.  
Subsequently,  they  grew  somewhat  during  the  1980s  and  early  1990s.  But  they  
only  started   to  make  up  a   substantial   figure,  measured  as   share  of   total  gross  
                                                                                                 
11  Throughout   the   1980s,   the   SARB   reported   the   items   other   financial   assets   and   the  
balancing   item   as   one   position.   This   implies   that   officials   had   limited   knowledge   of  
what  type  of  transactions  made  part  of  other  financial  assets.  This  combined  reporting  
suggests   that   other   financial   transactions   and   potential   measurement   errors   were  
indistinguishable.    
1970%1979 1980%1994 1995%1999 2000%2007 2008 2009%2014
Deposits1with1other1institutions 0.9% 1.0% 1.5% 1.0% %4.8% 4.9%
Interest1in1retirement1and1life1funds 0.0% 4.3% 14.4% 3.1% 12.6% 5.9%
Other1financial1assets 0.8% 3.0% 13.5% 13.6% %0.2% 23.7%
Other1(total) 1.8% 8.4% 29.4% 17.7% 7.6% 34.6%
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capital   formation   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms,   by   the   late   1990s,   when   total   other  
financial   investment   amounted   to  more   than   a   quarter   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms’  
productive   investment.  During   that   period,   non-­‐‑financial   corporations  mostly  
invested  into  retirement  and  life  funds  and  other  financial  assets.  
As   stated   previously,   the   latter   position   can   be   equated   with   financially  
innovative   instruments   (Monyela,   2012).   Since   2000   non-­‐‑financial   firms  
attention  switched  to  other  financial  assets,  with  the  exception  of  the  crisis  year  
2008,   when   non-­‐‑financial   companies   in   aggregate   attempted   to   sell   off   other  
financial   instruments   (therefore   the   negative   figure   of   -­‐‑0.2%   of   gross   capital  
formation,)  while   acquiring   interest   in   retirement  and   life   funds.  Overall,   and  
among  the  categories  of  ‘other’  assets,  other  financial  assets  have  been  the  focus  
of   non-­‐‑financial   firms’   financial   investment.   South   African   households   have  
(aside   from  mortgage   and   bank   borrowing)   increasingly   financed   themselves  
through   other   liabilities   since   the   mid-­‐‑1990s.   Table   7.7.   shows   how   much  
external   finance   (as   a   share   of   GDP)   the   different   macroeconomic   sectors  
obtained  by  taking  on  other  financial  liabilities.    
Table 7.7. Other financial liabilities as source of funds by sector, as share of 
GDP, 1970-2013 
  
Source:  SARB,  1994,  SARB,  1995a-­‐‑2015a.    
Note:  Other  financial  non-­‐‑bank  institutions  include  the  Public  Investment  Corporation,  
insurers  and  retirement  funds  and  other  financial  institutions.    
The  sector  that  generated  the  highest  amount  of  external  funds  through  the  use  
of   other   financial   liabilities   is   highlighted   in   grey   for   each   time   period.  Once  
again,   it   is   clear   that   of   all   the   macroeconomic   aggregates   South   African  
households   and   non-­‐‑incorporated   companies   used   this   financial   instrument  
most   enthusiastically  between   the  mid-­‐‑1990s   and   the   financial   crisis.  Between  
1970%1979 1980%1994 1995%1999 2000%2007 2008 2009%2013
Foreign2sector 0.7% %0.2% 0.0% %0.4% %1.7% %0.4%
Monetary2authority 0.7% %0.1% 0.0% %0.3% %0.1% 0.0%
Other2monetary2institutions 0.2% 1.0% 0.5% 0.2% %0.8% %0.1%
Other2financial2non%bank2institutions 0.3% 0.4% 0.8% 0.5% %1.1% 1.9%
Government2 0.8% 0.1% 0.2% %0.3% %0.4% 0.9%
Private2corporations 0.3% 0.4% 0.0% %1.4% 0.4% %0.1%
Households 0.2% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 2.3% 0.5%
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1995  and  2007,  households  in  aggregate  borrowed  on  average  0.8-­‐‑0.9%  of  GDP  
in   this   manner.   In   the   post-­‐‑crisis   period   this   changed,   and   households  
(including  non-­‐‑incorporated  firms)  were  only  able  to  generate  0.5%  of  GDP  on  
average  from  other  financial  liabilities.    
Contrasting  other  financial  liabilities  with  other  financial  assets  (see  Table  7.8.),  
it  is  again  confirmed  that  private-­‐‑sector  non-­‐‑financial  firms  have  been  the  main  
investors  into  this  asset  type  in  the  New  South  Africa.  Hence,  it  is  conceivable  
that  South  African  non-­‐‑financial  companies  simply  switched  from  trade  credit  
to   households   and   non-­‐‑incorporated   business   to   other   financial   instruments,  
which  once  again  benefit  this  group.    
Table 7.8. Other financial assets as use of funds by sector, as share of GDP, 
1970-2013 
  
Source:  SARB,  1994,  SARB,  1995a-­‐‑2015a.    
Note:  Other  financial  non-­‐‑bank  institutions  include  the  Public  Investment  Corporation,  
insurers  and  retirement  funds  and  other  financial  institutions.    
However,   it   is  unclear  whether  banks  and  non-­‐‑bank  financial  institutions  now  
are  involved  in  the  intermediation  process.  Trade  credit  was  directly  extended  
to   households   and   non-­‐‑incorporated   firms.   Other   financial   liabilities   might  
cover   arrangements   such   as   store   cards,   which   effectively   function   as   credit  
cards,  provided  by  non-­‐‑financial   firms  to   their  consumers.   It   is   likely  that   this  
switch   of   financial   investment   outlets   among   non-­‐‑financial   firms   was  
detrimental   to  non-­‐‑incorporated  companies.  Trade  credit  directly  supports  the  
productive  activity  of  companies,  in  this  case  small  and  micro  business  activity.  
Other   financial   assets,   such   as   store   cards,   are   likely   to   support   consumption  
rather  than  small  business  operations.  In  this  way,  the  change  in  non-­‐‑financial  
corporations’   financial   investment  behaviour  might  have  been  detrimental   for  
1970%1979 1980%1994 1995%1999 2000%2007 2008 2009%2014
Foreign1sector 1.0% 0.2% &0.3% 0.2% 1.3% 0.7%
Monetary1authority 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% &0.3% 1.5% &0.1%
Other1monetary1institutions 0.8% 0.9% &0.1% 0.0% &0.4% 0.2%
Other1financial1non%bank1institutions 0.7% 0.4% 1.7% 0.1% &1.1% &0.1%
Government1 1.1% 0.7% 0.0% &1.5% &2.8% &0.2%
Private1corporations 0.2% 0.2% 1.9% 1.0% &0.1% 2.4%
Households 0.0% &0.3% &1.3% &0.3% 0.0% 0.0%
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the   South   African   economy,   since   informal   businesses   are   an   important  
provider  of  employment  and  a  source  of  enterprise.    
But   even   if   these   new   ‘other’   financial   arrangements   linked   non-­‐‑financial  
companies   and   households   (including   non-­‐‑incorporated   firms)   directly,   there  
has   been   a   structural   change   in   non-­‐‑financial   firms’   financial   operations   that  
affects   South   African   households   and   non-­‐‑incorporated   business   profoundly.  
Non-­‐‑financial   firms   increasingly   invest   into  cash  and  bank  deposits  held  with  
South  African  banks  (as  shown  in  parts  7.3.2.  and  7.4.2.1.).  Thus,  the  amount  of  
funds   that   non-­‐‑financial   firms   provide   through   other   financial   assets   and  
liabilities   is   much   smaller   than   the   volume   of   trade   credit   South   African  
consumers  and  non-­‐‑incorporated  business  used  to  receive  during  the  1970s  and  
1980s.  Hence,  there  is  evidence  that  the  link  between  formal  (and  most  probably  
mainly   large)   non-­‐‑financial   businesses   and   small,   non-­‐‑incorporated   non-­‐‑
financial  firms  has  broken  down  in  South  Africa.    
In   2008,   South   African   households   (and   non-­‐‑incorporated   firms)   obtained   an  
exceptional   2.3%   of  GDP   through   the   acquisition   of   other   financial   liabilities.  
During  the  1970s,  consumers  benefited  every  year  from  trade  credit  equivalent  
to  4%  of  GDP  on  average.  This  figure  rose  to  5%  of  GDP  for  the  years  1980-­‐‑1994.  
Hence,   the   withdrawal   of   trade   credit   by   South   African   non-­‐‑financial   firms,  
which   were   increasingly   concerned   with   liquidity   management,   meant   that  
households   and   non-­‐‑incorporated   companies   had   to   turn   to   banks   and  
potentially   non-­‐‑bank   financial   institutions   for   borrowing.   This   is   particularly  
likely  to  have  harmed  non-­‐‑incorporated  businesses,  which  notoriously  struggle  
to  access  formal  credit  (Falkena  et  al.,  2002).    
Table  7.9.  shows  the  main  sources  of  external  finance  for  households  and  non-­‐‑
incorporated  businesses  by  decade  since  1970.  As  discussed  above,  trade  credit  
and   short-­‐‑term   loans   to   households   and   non-­‐‑incorporated   businesses   were  
likely  extended  as  instalment  sale  and  lease  agreement  or  open  accounts,  which  
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together  accounted   for  60%  and  more  of  consumption  credit  during   the  1970s  
(Prinsloo,   2002).   During   the   1970s,   more   than   half   of   households’   (and   non-­‐‑
incorporated   businesses’)   borrowing   was   raised   this   way.   As   non-­‐‑financial  
firms   shifted   their   uses   of   funds   away   from   trade   credit,   households  moved  
more  towards  bank  loans  and,  since  2000,  also  mortgage  loans.    
Table 7.9. Main sources of households’ and non-incorporated businesses’ 
external finance by decade, 1970-2014 
  
Source:  SARB,  1994,  SARB,  1995a-­‐‑2015a.    
The   latter  move   coincided  with   the   inflation   of   the   South   African   real   estate  
market.   Between   the  mid-­‐‑1990s   and   the  mid-­‐‑2000s,   South  Africa   experienced  
some   of   the   strongest   inflationary   pressures   in   global   housing   markets.   Its  
house  price  inflation  is  comparable  to  that  seen  in  Ireland,  where  real  prices  for  
residential  property  almost  tripled  during  that  period  (André,  2010).  Real  house  
price   inflation  averaged  14.2%  annually  during   the  years   in   the   run-­‐‑up   to   the  
global  financial  crisis,   that  is,  between  2000  and  2007.  For  the  period  of  strong  
South   African   growth   (2003-­‐‑2007),   real   price   gains   were   well   above   price  
increases   in   the   UK   and   the   US   –   two   economies   known   for   their   buoyant  
housing  markets   (see Figure  7.18.).  At   its  peak,   in  August   2004,   annual  house  
price  growth  in  real  terms  was  37%  in  South  Africa.  
What   Table   7.9.   also   shows   is   that   as   much   as   non-­‐‑financial   firms   have  
increasingly  started  to  invest  into  other  assets  since  the  1990s,  households  (and  
potentially   non-­‐‑incorporated   businesses)   have   begun   to   use   other   types   of  
liabilities   as   source   of   finance.   This   coincides   with   the   period   of   financial  
deregulation   in   South   Africa.   Competition   in   credit   and   mortgage   markets  
increased  since  interest  rate  caps  and  other  rules  were  removed.  As  mentioned  
1970%1979 1980%1994 1995%1999 2000%2007 2008 2009%2014
Trade/credit/and/short%term/loans 55% 44% 30% 8% '2% 10%
Mortgage/loans 31% 24% 26% 51% 46% 21%
Bank/loans/and/advances 12% 23% 20% 21% 9% 38%
Amount/payable 0% 0% 2% 4% 18% 17%
Other/liabilities 3% 7% 15% 16% 28% 14%
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before,   other   financial   assets   are   likely   to   mainly   consist   of   financially  
innovative  instruments,  often  issued  by  non-­‐‑bank  financial  institutions.  
Figure 7.18. Real price inflation of residential property in US, UK and South Africa    
  
Source:  Absa  House  Price  Index  data  accessed  through  Global  Insight  Southern  Africa  
(2014),  Halifax   (2014),   S&P/Case-­‐‑Schiller   (2014),   inflation  data   from:   Bureau   of   Labor  
Statistics  (2014),  ONS  (2014).  
These   instruments  will   be   examined  more   closely   in   the   following   section.   It  
should   be   stressed   once   again   that   non-­‐‑incorporated   businesses   typically  
struggle  to  obtain  external  finance  because  of  their  limited  assets.  Hence,  while  
they   are   the   ones   who   most   likely   lost   out   significantly   when   non-­‐‑financial  
firms   shifted   away   from   trade   credit  provision,   they   are  unlikely   to   be  prime  
clients   obtaining   other   (that   is,   financially   innovative)   liabilities.   These   are  
probably  rather  given  to  households.      
7.4.2. The impact on South African financial intermediaries 
This  section  traces  the  destinations  of  corporate  liquidity.  It  will  be  argued  that  
in  South  Africa  corporate  liquidity  supports  property  price  inflation,  because  it  
tends  to  be  channelled  through  domestic  banks  into  mortgage  loans.  Cash  and  
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stock  of  financial  assets  held  by  private-­‐‑sector  non-­‐‑financial  firms.  By  contrast,  
financial  receivables  and  trade  and  short-­‐‑term  credit  –  both  instruments  which  
provide   suppliers   and   clients   with   trade   credit   supporting   productive  
operations  and  sales  –  only  account  for  around  one  fourth  of  the  total  financial  
asset  stock  amassed  by  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  in  the  private  sector.  Hence,  
financial   operations   in   support   of   liquidity   management   appear   of   greater  
importance   to   these   companies   than   financial   transactions   supporting  
productive   operations.   As   argued   in   chapter   3,   this   phenomenon   is   called  
overcapitalisation.    
Crucially,  this  result  depends  on  South  Africa’s  status  as  an  emerging  market.  
Of   course,   the   author   does   not   subscribe   to   the   loanable   funds  model,  where  
creation   of   loans   is   only   possible   if   deposited   savings   increase.   This   thesis  
firmly   stands   with   the   concept   of   endogenous   money,   acknowledging   that  
loans  create  deposits.  However,  as  shown  by  Chick  in  her  influential  stages  of  
banking  evolution  (see  chapter  5),   for  reserves  not   to  be  a  constraint  on  credit  
creation  at  all,   the  central  bank  needs  to  accept  full  responsibility  for  financial  
stability.   This   goes   hand-­‐‑in-­‐‑hand   with   a   stable   and   low   interest   rate   policy  
(Chick,  1992).  Importantly,  this   is  arguably  not  the  case  in  South  Africa  where  
interest   rates   are   relatively   (some  would   say   ‘ridiculously’,   Bond,   2005,  p.   98)  
high   and   often   driven   by   portfolio   inflow   considerations. 12   Thus,   in   this  
situation   corporate   liquidity   on   bank   balance   sheets   can   facilitate   credit  
creation.  Therefore,  the  agency  question  is  answered  in  favour  of  non-­‐‑financial  
corporations.    
                                                                                                 
12  For   an   in-­‐‑depth   analysis   of   the   detrimental   impact   of   high   interest   rates   on   South  
African  growth  see  Isaacs  (2014)  who  argues  that  high  interest  rates  are  in  line  with  the  
interests   of   large   South   African   corporations   (for   example   when   they   transfer   their  
listing   abroad)   and   relatively   low   inflation   encourages   financialisation.   If   this   is   the  
case,   inflation   targeting   and   monetary   policy   more   broadly   support   the   interests   of  
large  non-­‐‑financial  companies,  rather  than  those  of  local  banks.  When  thinking  back  of  
the  question  about   agency   in   the   relationship  between  banks  and   large  non-­‐‑financial  
businesses,  it  seems  that  large  corporations  once  again  have  the  upper  hand.    
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In   the   late   1990s,   private-­‐‑sector   corporate   deposits   –   in   contrast   to   household  
deposits  –  became  the  main  source  of  funds  for  South  African  banks.  Generally,  
customer  deposits  make  up  the  bulk  of  financial  liabilities  on  the  balance  sheets  
of   banks   in   South   Africa.   Between   2008   and   2013,   deposits   amounted   on  
average  to  85%  of  total  liabilities  for  South  African  banks  (SARB  2010b-­‐‑2014b).  
However,  traditionally  South  African  banks  held  mostly  household  deposits  as  
their  liabilities.  This  is  illustrated  in  Figure  7.19.  below.    
Figure 7.19. Deposits held with South African banks, 1995-2013 
  
Source:  SARB,  1996a-­‐‑2014a,  SARB,  1996b-­‐‑2014b.  
In   the  mid-­‐‑1990s,   half   of   all   deposits   held   in   South  African   banks   came   from  
households,   while   only   around   one   quarter   belonged   to   private-­‐‑sector   non-­‐‑
financial   firms,   with   the   balance   made   up   by   deposits   held   by   financial  
institutions  (including  banks  themselves),  public  entities  and  foreign  residents.  
Since   then,  corporate  deposits  have  grown  at  a  pace  which  by  far  outstripped  
growth   in  household  deposits.  As   a   consequence,   by   1999  private-­‐‑sector  non-­‐‑
financial   firms   had   taken   over   from   households   the   position   of   major  
depositors,   accounting   for   more   than   50%   of   total   deposited   funds   in   South  
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remaining   close   to   50%  of   total   deposits.  Hence,   South  African   banks   are   not  
only  the  main  destination  for  the  liquidity  held  by  private-­‐‑sector  non-­‐‑financial  
firms,   but   equally,   private-­‐‑sector   non-­‐‑financial   firms   are   also   the   biggest  
depositor  group  with  South  African  banks.      
The  question  arises  what  South  African  banks  did  with  the  substantial  volume  
of  liquid  financial  assets  they  received  from  their  corporate  clients.  The  majority  
of   assets   held   by   South   African   banks   are   loans   and   advances   to   customers.  
Between   1995   and   2013   on   average   74%   of   total   banks   assets  were   loans   and  
advances  (SARB,  1996b-­‐‑2014b).  Within  this  asset  group  mortgage  loans  are  the  
single   biggest   category.   In   2013,   38%   of   total   loans   and   advances   by   South  
African  banks  were  mortgage  loans.  Around  three  quarters  of  these  mortgages  
(that   is  29%  of  all   loans  and  advances  extended  by  banks   in  2013)  were  home  
loans,   while   one   quarter   (or   9%   of   all   loans   and   advances)   were   commercial  
mortgages.13    
Figure  7.14.  above  illustrates  that  mortgages  have  become  an  asset  of  increasing  
importance  on  the  balance  sheets  of  South  African  banks,  because  their  share  in  
overall   loans   increased   during   the   2000s.   For   both   types   of   financial  
intermediaries   –   banks   as   well   as   other   financial   (non-­‐‑bank)   institutions   –  
mortgage   finance   gained   in   importance   as   an   asset   class   during   the   2000s.  
Mortgage  extension  by  South  African  banks  had  accounted  for  a  mere  35%  of  
total  loans  and  advances  in  2001,  while  this  share  increased  to  46%  by  2010.    
There  has  been  an  acceleration  of  mortgage  volumes  extended  by  South  African  
banks.  In  constant  2010  Rand  mortgage  extension  rose  from  around  R400bn  in  
1995   to   R1trn   by   2010,   declining   somewhat   subsequently   to   about   R930bn   in  
2013.   The   increase   in   the   total   mortgage   volume   advanced   to   South   African  
households   and   corporations   rose   sharply  between  2004   and  2007   (see  Figure  
                                                                                                 
13  This   is   true   for   the   years   between   2008   and   2013   (SARB   2009b-­‐‑2014b).   SARB   only  
started   releasing   disaggregated   mortgage   data,   distinguishing   between   home   loans  
and  commercial  mortgages,  in  2009.      
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7.20.).   In   real   terms   these  years   saw  mortgage  growth  of  20%  on  average  and  
24%  at  its  peak  in  2006.  These  years  coincide  with  particularly  strong  growth  in  
deposits  by  private-­‐‑sector  non-­‐‑financial   firms   (see  Figure   7.19.).  This   is  not   to  
say   that   rising   deposit   growth   causes   increased   credit   extension.   However,  
rising   liabilities   on  banks’   balance   sheets  did  necessitate   asset   creation  on   the  
part  of  the  banks  to  balance  this  development.  Hence,  corporate  deposit  growth  
might   have   encouraged   banks   to   extend   mortgage   finance,   especially   since  
house  prices  were  on  the  rise.  
Figure 7.20. Mortgage extension by South African banks, 1995-2013 
  
Source:  SARB,  1995b-­‐‑2014b.  
Over   the   2000s,   consumer   loans   in   general   have   become   an   increasingly  
important  asset  for  South  African  banks.  Table  7.10.  provides  the  sectoral  share  
in  overall  outstanding   loans  that  benefited  the  FIRE  industry  and  households.  
The  four  major  South  African  banks  are   listed:  Absa,  FirstRand,  Nedbank  and  
Standards   Bank.   In   the   early   2000s,   these   four   together   owned   75%   of   total  
banking   assets   in   South  Africa   (Falkena   et   al.,   2002).   Thus,   it   is   reasonable   to  
assume   that   their   loan   books   are   representative   for   South   African   credit  
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The  figures  in  Table  7.10.  are  arranged  by  time  period,  starting  in  the  late  1990s,  
covering   the   pre-­‐‑crisis   2000s,   the   crisis   itself,   and   the   post-­‐‑crisis   period   until  
2013.  Data  was  extracted   from  the  banking  groups’  annual   reports.  Therefore,  
the  availability  and  degree  of  disaggregation  vary.  It  is  striking  that,  during  the  
run-­‐‑up   to   the   crisis,   the   largest   sectoral   share   in   credit   extension   flowed   to  
households.  The  second  most  important  borrower  for  South  African  banks  was  
the  FIRE  sector,  which  at  that  point  benefitted  from  the  real  estate  boom  in  the  
country.   To   put   things   into   perspective,   it   should   be   noted   that   credit   to   the  
manufacturing   sector   (typically   the   next   largest   loan   recipient   alongside   the  
service   industry)  accounted   for  a  mere  6%  of  outstanding   loans  between  2000  
and  2007.    
Table 7.10. Sectoral shares in total outstanding credit for the four major South 
Africa banks 
  
Source:  Annual  reports  by  Absa,  2003-­‐‑2014,  First  Rand,  2000-­‐‑2014,  Nedbank,  1998-­‐‑2014,  
Standard  Bank,  2002-­‐‑2014.  
Hence,  banks  directly  contributed  to  the  build-­‐‑up  of  financial  fragility  in  South  
Africa  by  increasingly  lending  to  FIRE  businesses  and  households  in  the  course  
of  the  early  2000s.  Most  importantly,  non-­‐‑financial  firms’  liquidity  management  
facilitated  this  development.  Following  the  direction  of  financial  flows  set  out  in  
this   chapter   it   can   be   argued   that   –   fuelled   by   foreign   capital   inflows   –  
companies’   financial   operations   contributed   to   the   price   inflation   in   South  
African   property   markets.   South   African   (private-­‐‑sector)   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations  draw  a  substantial  share  of  their  liquid  funds  from  abroad,  issuing  
equity  purchased  by  foreign  investors  (as  shown  in  part  7.3.).  To  counter  their  
liabilities  non-­‐‑financial   firms  manage   their   liquidity  actively,  holding  between  
40%  and  60%  of  financial  assets  in  highly  liquid  instruments.    
FIRE Households FIRE Households FIRE Households FIRE Households
late 1990s 16% 31% 22% 37%
2000-2007 19% 55% 18% 48% 24% 40% 19% 50%
2008 17% 55% 24% 52% 17% 56%
2009-2013 17% 56% 24% 39% 22% 53%
Absa First Rand NedBank Standard Bank
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Domestic   banks   are   under   pressure   to   create   assets   to   counter   this   inflow   of  
liabilities   (that   is,   the   increase   in   corporate  deposits).  Thus,   these  are   likely   to  
either   cause   asset   price   inflation   or   exaggerate   present   inflationary   dynamics  
especially   in   the   real   estate   market.   In   the   2000s,   South   African   property  
markets   were   inflating   noticeably.   Banks   had   been   increasing   their   share   of  
mortgage  loans  in  total  loans  since  2003  (see  Figure  7.14.),  channelling  financial  
funds   into   the  property  markets.  The   inflationary  process  attracted   increasing  
investment,  further  raising  prices  until  mortgage  extension  stalled  in  2008,  and,  
in  fact,  contracted  in  real  terms  in  2009.  Hence,  corporate  liquidity  management  
can  contribute  to  asset  and  –  in  this  specific  case  –  house  price  inflation.  In  an  
emerging  market,  foreign  financial  inflows  play  a  crucial  role  because  they  can  
make  the   issuance  of  equity  attractive  for   listed  non-­‐‑financial   firms   in  a  rising  
market.  The  possibility   that   the  dynamics   in   the  capital  market  might  reverse,  
also   make   it   necessary   for   these   companies   to   hold   on   to   large   volumes   of  
liquidity,  if  they  want  to  retain  a  flexible  balance  sheet.  Liquidity  provides  them  
with   the   flexibility   to   shrink   their   balance   sheet   –   through   debt   pay-­‐‑offs   and  
share   buybacks   at   any   given   time   –   and   to   acquire   other   companies   and  
subsidiaries.  
Hence,  the  financial  operations  of  non-­‐‑financial  firms  have  an  impact  on  banks’  
balance  sheets,  as  the  case  of  South  Africa  demonstrates.  The  corporate  liquidity  
preference  results  in  the  creation  of  large  volumes  of  liabilities  for  banks.  Banks  
are  in  turn  induced  to  counter  this  development  by  the  creation  of  assets.  In  the  
case  of  South  Africa,   these  assets  are  mainly   loans.  This  might  have  historical  
and   regulatory   reasons  because  South  African   corporations   remain   somewhat  
restricted  in  foreign  direct  investment.  It  is  perfectly  conceivable  that  a  similar  
effect   can   be   found   on   the   balance   sheets   of   banks   and   other   financial  
institutions  in  advanced  economies,  where  corporate  liquidity  preferences  have  
been  on  the  rise  since  the  1980s.  Here,   in  the  run-­‐‑up  to  the   last   financial  crisis  
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increasingly  exotic  assets  were  purchased  by  banks   to  create  assets,  balancing  
growing  liabilities.      
7.5. Summary and conclusion 
This   chapter   has   explored   the  macroeconomic   impact   of   the   rising   corporate  
liquidity   preference   among   South   African   NFFs.   Flow   of   funds   analysis   has  
shown   that   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   in   South   Africa   historically   engaged  
extensively   in  financial   investment,  while  financing  the  majority  of   their  gross  
capital  formation  internally.  In  the  New  South  Africa,  which  is  often  seen  as  the  
era  of  financialisation,  these  companies  have  changed  their  financial  operations,  
rather   than   simply   intensifying   them.   The   change   consisted   of   a   reduction   in  
trade  credit  towards  households  and  non-­‐‑incorporated  firms,  and  the  increased  
holding  of  cash,  bank  deposits  and  other   financial  assets.  Non-­‐‑financial   firms,  
thus,   increased   their   liquidity   preference   as   was   documented   in   the  
microeconomic  data  discussed  in  chapter  4.    
This  shift  of  uses  of  funds  by  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  is  particularly  likely  to  
have   hurt   non-­‐‑incorporated   businesses,   which   were   most   probably   major  
beneficiaries  of  trade  credit  in  the  past.  Small  businesses  in  general  struggle  to  
access  external  finance  and  non-­‐‑incorporated  firms  even  more  so.  As  discussed  
in  chapter  3,  South  African  informal  firms  have  historically  had  strong  links  to  
the  formal  sector,  for  instance  in  the  alcohol  industry.  With  a  reduction  of  trade  
credit   (measured  as  share  of  GDP),  both   the  activities  of  and   the  employment  
provided   by   these   very   small   companies   suffers.   This   altered   liquidity  
management   behaviour   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms   is   part   of   the   financialisation  
story.   Thus,   this   chapter   reveals   the   exact   transmission   mechanism   through  
which  financialisation  hurts  productive  economic  activity  and  employment,  as  
often   claimed   without   much   thorough   explanation   by   financialisation  
proponents.      
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Importantly,   the   intensified  liquidity  management  by  non-­‐‑financial  companies  
impacts   the   balance   sheet   of   South  African   banks,   facilitating   the   build-­‐‑up   of  
financial   fragility.   Non-­‐‑financial   firms   obtain   much   of   their   external   finance  
through   equity   issuance,   which   (as   stressed   by   the   capital   market   inflation  
theory  discussed  in  chapter  2)  necessitates  the  holding  of  liquid  assets  to  avoid  
an   evaporation   of   assets   and   effective   insolvency   during   recessions.   In   South  
Africa,  these  corporations  invest  into  financial  (and  mostly  Rand-­‐‑denominated)  
assets  that  become  liabilities  for  domestic  banks.  Banks  are  then  under  pressure  
to  generate  assets  matching  their  liabilities.  This  happens  mainly  in  the  form  of  
mortgage   lending  and  credit  extended  to   the  FIRE  sector.  Bank  credit   flowing  
into   the  real  estate  market  substantially   inflated  house  prices  during   the  early  
2000s.  Therefore,  non-­‐‑financial  firms’  liquidity  holdings  have  contributed  to  the  
house  price  boom  in  South  Africa.    
Crucially,   the   financial   operations   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms   had   an   impact   on  
banks’  balance  sheets  in  South  Africa  during  this  period.  Hence,  the  Kaleckian  
idea   that   non-­‐‑financial   firms’   investment   decisions   drive   credit   extension   is  
confirmed.   The   agency   question   posed   in   chapter   5   is   answered   in   favour   of  
non-­‐‑financial   corporations.   In   fact,   this   finding  goes   beyond   the  German   idea  
that   investment   leads   credit.   Here,   non-­‐‑financial   companies’   financial  
transactions   induced   credit   extension;   not,   as   sometimes   claimed   by  
financialisation   proponents,   because   non-­‐‑financial   firms   ceased   to   be   banks’  
clients   as   they  moved   to   finance   their   gross   capital   formation   through   capital  
markets  (to  the  contrary,  non-­‐‑financial  firms  made  stronger  use  of  bank  credit  
for   productive   invest   between   2000   and   2007),   but   because   their   liquidity  
holdings  grew  so  markedly  over  the  same  period.    
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Chapter VIII Conclusion 	  	  
8.1. Summary 
This   thesis   set   out   to   examine   the   research   question:   What   role   do   financial  
operations  play  in  the  activities  of  non-­‐‑financial  firms  and  what  impact  do  they  
have   on   the  macro   economy?  The   chosen   analytical   lens   for   the   investigation  
are   the   rising   corporate   cash   holdings   among   non-­‐‑financial   firms.   The   South  
African   economy   with   its   relatively   deep   financial   markets   has   elicited   clear  
predictions   from   orthodox   and   heterodox   economic   theory:   mainstream  
economists   and   policy   makers   expect   South   Africa’s   liberalised   financial  
institutions   to   support   rapid   economic  growth  driven  by  business   investment  
(see   Jones,   2009;   BRICS,   2012;   National   Planning   Commission,   2012),   while  
financialisation   researchers   believe   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   engage   in  
financial   speculation,   which   jeopardises   growth   (Ashman,   Fine,   &   Newman,  
2011;  Ashman,  Mohamed,  &  Newman,  2013;  Ashman  &  Fine,  2013;  McKenzie,  
2013;  Marais,  2011).    
To  assess  these  competing  views  on  non-­‐‑financial  firms’  financial  operations  the  
thesis   followed   a   Kaleckian   methodology,   understanding   micro   and   macro  
economic  phenomena  as  varying  dimensions  of  the  same  underlying  processes.  
Therefore,  the  argument  was  organised  in  two  parts,  with  chapters  2  through  4  
illuminating   the   micro   level,   while   chapters   5   to   7   dealt   with   the   macro  
perspective.  For  each  part  three  guiding  analytical  questions  were  formulated.  
In  part  one  these  questions  asked:  
(1)   What   is   the   role   of   financial   operations   within   the   operations   of   non-­‐‑
financial  businesses?    
(2)   Which   non-­‐‑financial   businesses   are   considered   when   analysing   financial  
operations?  And   (3)  why  might   non-­‐‑financial   firms   increase   their   holdings   of  
liquid  assets  (such  as  cash  and  cash  equivalents)?  
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Conversely,   the   macro   analysis   in   part   two   was   guided   by   the   following  
questions:  
(1)  What  is  the  macroeconomic  role  of  financial  institutions?    
(2)  What  (or  who)  drives  credit  extension?    
And   (3)   how   are   non-­‐‑financial   companies   as   a   whole   positioned   vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  
financial  institutions?  
The  findings  of  the  thesis  can  be  summarised  as  follows.  The  literature  review  
presented   in   chapter   2   showed   that   corporate   finance   theory   offers   little  
guidance   on   non-­‐‑financial   companies’   financial   operations   and   liquidity  
holdings.  The   theory   is  more   interested   in   the   financial   instruments   issued  by  
large   corporations,   than   in   non-­‐‑financial   businesses’   financial   and   productive  
dealings,   giving   its   clear   focus   on   large   listed   non-­‐‑financial   companies.   To  
explain   the   empirical   observation   that   cash   holdings   on   the   balance   sheets   of  
non-­‐‑financial   corporations   have   secularly   increased   in  major  OECD   countries  
over  the  past  two  decades  or  so,  mainstream  economists  have  identified  several  
motives   (of   non-­‐‑financial   corporations)   to   hold   cash   and   cash   equivalents.  
Backed  by  empirical  evidence,  the  precautionary  motive,   inspired  by  Keynes’s  
liquidity  preference   theory,   is   seen   as   one  of   the  most   influential   ones  within  
this  literature.    
By   contrast,   many   unconventional   economists   are   sceptical   towards   the  
financial   dealings   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms,   suspecting   a   harmful   impact   on  
productive   operations,   and   particularly   investment.   Thus,   they   stress   the  
speculative   motive   as   a   potential   reason   for   non-­‐‑financial   companies   rising  
liquidity   holdings.   This   is   the   one   motive   that   hardly   figures   in   mainstream  
analyses  of  non-­‐‑financial  businesses’  liquidity  holdings.    
Chapter   2   also   demonstrated   that   research   agendas   across   mainstream   and  
heterodox   economics   tend   to   concentrate   on   large   non-­‐‑financial   corporations,  
leaving   aside   the   issue   of   firm   heterogeneity.   The   Kaleckian   economics  
tradition,  however,   explicitly   emphasises   that   firms  vary  with   respect   to   their  
size,   ability   to   access   external   finance,   patterns   of   competition   and   ability   to  
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generate   profit.   Therefore,   this   thesis   adopted   a   Kaleckian   understanding   of  
non-­‐‑financial  firms’  financial  operations,  allowing  for  the  existence  of  a  rentier  
firm  (Toporowski,  1993).  The  rentier  firm  generates  financial  income  alongside  
profit   from  production.  Crucially,   the  motivation   of   the   rentier   firm  does   not  
have  to  be  speculative,  but  can  in  fact  be  driven  by  precaution  as  mentioned  by  
Kalecki  (1991[1954])  and  elaborated  by  Toporowski  (1993).  In  either  case,  rentier  
firms  become  overcapitalised,  meaning  they  hold  more  liquidity  than  necessary  
for  their  productive  operations.  
Chapter  3  incorporated  the  Kaleckian  understanding  of  non-­‐‑financial  firms  and  
their   financial   operations   into   balance   sheet   analysis.   The   ‘comprehensive  
balance   sheet   approach’   (coined   by   the   author   and)   developed   here   goes  
beyond   the   mainstream   focus   on   individual   or   aggregate   net   worth,   which  
disregards   the   size   of   a   balance   sheet,   netting   out   assets   against   liabilities.  
Conforming   to   the   assessment   of   critical   accountants,   the   comprehensive  
balance   sheet   approach   includes   qualitative   information   contained   in   firms’  
financial   statements   and   annual   reports.   The   thesis   developed   an   original  
overcapitalisation   ratio,   which   flags   the   overcapitalisation   of   non-­‐‑financial  
firms,  helping  to  identify  their  motives  for  large  liquidity  holdings.  
The   proposed  methodology   targeted   listed   non-­‐‑financial   corporations   due   to  
limited  data   availability.  Crucially,   chapter   3   surveyed   the   characteristics   and  
heterogeneity  of  South  African  non-­‐‑financial  companies  in  detail  to  allow  for  a  
better   understanding   of   the   impact   that   financial   operations   by   listed   non-­‐‑
financial   companies  have  on  other  domestic  businesses  and   the  economy  as  a  
whole.  It  documents  the  link  between  large  formal  non-­‐‑financial  companies  and  
small   non-­‐‑incorporated   non-­‐‑financial   enterprises,   which   have   been   strong   in  
South  Africa  in  the  past.      
Subsequently,  chapter  4  implemented  the  proposed  methodology  for  assessing  
evidence  on  overcapitalisation  among  listed  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  in  South  
Africa,   in   aggregate,   by   sector   and   individually.   In   response   to   questions   1  
(What   role   do   financial   operations   play   in   the   dealings   of   non-­‐‑financial  
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businesses?)   and   3   (Why   has   the   liquidity   preference   of   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations   increased   in  South  Africa  over   the  past  decades?)   the  main   firm-­‐‑
level  findings  of  the  thesis  are  that:  
The   surveyed   overcapitalised   non-­‐‑financial   firms   have   both   precautionary   as  
well  as  speculative  intentions.  A  major  reason  to  hold  large  amounts  of  cash  for  
non-­‐‑financial   corporations   is   the   ability   to   acquire   business   interests,   be   they  
subsidiary   companies   or,   in   the   case   of   a   resource-­‐‑rich   economy   like   South  
Africa,   mines.   These   acquisitions   can   be   made   either   with   the   intention   of  
generating  cash  flow  from  operations,  or  to  reap  profits  from  value  gains  in  the  
acquired   business   assets.   Hence,   an   important   finding   is   that   the   distinction  
between  productive   and   speculative   activity   is   in   fact   often   blurred,   and   that  
productive  and  financial  operations  are  often  closely  intertwined.    
The   rising   liquidity   preference   among   South   African   listed   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations   is   shaped   by   the   country’s   geographic   specificities,   such   as   its  
mineral   endowments.   Mining   companies,   which   have   moulded   the   South  
Africa  economy  since  the  early  beginnings  of  local  capitalism,  undertake  much  
of   the   financial   dealings   among   non-­‐‑financial   business.   During   the   1990s,   a  
change   in   financing  patterns  among  the   large   local  mining-­‐‑finance  houses  has  
resulted   in   a   large   number   of  mining   exploration   companies   being   forced   to  
finance   themselves   outside   of   the   mining-­‐‑finance   houses’   structures.  
Consequently,   these   risky   businesses  units   have   attempted   to   raise   capital   on  
the   JSE.  Previously,  when  exploration   companies  were  part  of   large   company  
groups,   these   mining-­‐‑finance   houses   could   take   advantage   of   economies   of  
scale   in   their  provision  of   liquidity   to   a   large  number   of   exploration  projects,  
reducing  the  overall  demand  for   liquidity.   If  not  part  of  a  profitable  company  
group,   those   individual  businesses  now  need   to  overcapitalise   to   ensure   their  
survival  until  exploration  is  successful,  at  which  point  when  they  can  sell  their  
mining  rights  or  start  actual  mining  activity.  
To  explore   the  macroeconomic   implications  of   the  raised   liquidity  preferences  
among  listed  non-­‐‑financial  corporations  in  South  Africa,  chapter  5  reviewed  the  
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role  of   the   financial  system  in  mainstream  and  heterodox  economic   theory.   In  
conventional   economics,   the   role   of   finance   is   one   of   financial   intermediation  
and,   more   recently,   risk   management.   In   heterodox   economic   theory,   the  
financial   system   is   often  more   than   a  mere   intermediary;   it   rather   engages   in  
credit  creation,  potentially  driving  business  activity.  Recent  mainstream  and  the  
heterodox   literature   fundamentally   differ   in   their   understanding   of   credit:  
While  it  is  exogenously  determined  (through  the  loanable  funds  framework)  for  
conventional   economists,   it   is   endogenously   created   for   heterodox   writers.  
Within   the   heterodox   tradition,   the   split   runs   along   the   lines   of   agency:   a  
German-­‐‑language   tradition   exists   that   ascribes   the   agency   behind   financial  
transactions  to  non-­‐‑financial  businesses.   In  contrast,  Keynes,  most  of   the  post-­‐‑
Keynesians   and   much   of   the   financialisation   literature   see   the   agency   with  
financial   institutions   and   non-­‐‑financial   companies   as   victims   of   increasing  
financial  power  in  the  economic  system.    
To  analyse  the  South  African  economy  to  answer  the  questions  about  the  role  of  
financial  institutions  in  the  economy,  the  driving  force  behind  credit  expansion  
and   the  agency   (or  power)   in   the   relations  between   finance  and  non-­‐‑financial  
business   flow   of   fund   analysis   is   used.   Chapter   6   reviewed   the   (old)  
institutionalist   origins   of   this   type   of   analysis.   Additionally,   an   historical  
overview  of   the  origins  of   South  African  banking,  mining-­‐‑finance  houses  and  
the   stock   exchange   illustrate   that   finance   and   non-­‐‑financial   business   have  
always   been   closely   intertwined   in   the   country.   Historically,   mining  
corporations  established   themselves  as  a  dominant  economic   force,  being  able  
to   also   attain   a   financially   powerful   position.   Consequently,   the   question   of  
power   in   the   relationship   between   financial   institutions   and   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations   is   historically   answered   in   favour   of   non-­‐‑financial   firms,  
specifically,  mining  business.        
Finally,   chapter   7   revealed   the  macroeconomic   impact   of   the   rising   corporate  
liquidity   preference   among   South   African   non-­‐‑financial   firms.   In   the   New  
South  Africa,  which   is  often   seen  as   the  era  of   financialisation   in   the   country,  
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these   non-­‐‑financial   companies   have   changed   their   financial   operations   rather  
than   intensifying   them.   The   change   consisted   of   a   reduction   in   trade   credit  
towards  households  and  non-­‐‑incorporated   firms,  and  an   increased  holding  of  
cash,   bank   deposits   and   other   financial   assets.   This   shift   of   uses   of   funds   by  
non-­‐‑financial   corporations   is  particularly   likely   to  have  hurt  non-­‐‑incorporated  
business,  which  were  most  probably  a  major  beneficiary  of   trade  credit   in   the  
past.  The  intensified  liquidity  management  by  non-­‐‑financial  companies  impacts  
the  balance  sheet  of  South  African  banks,   facilitating   the  build-­‐‑up  of   financial  
fragility.    
Non-­‐‑financial   firms   obtain   much   of   their   external   finance   through   equity  
issuance,  which  necessitates  the  holding  of  liquid  assets  to  avoid  an  evaporation  
of   assets   and   effective   insolvency   during   recession.   In   South   Africa,   these  
corporations   invest   into   financial   assets   that   become   liabilities   for   domestic  
banks.   Banks   are   then   under   pressure   to   generate   assets,   matching   their  
liabilities.   This   happens   mainly   in   the   form   of   mortgage   lending   and   credit  
extended  to  the  FIRE  sector.  Bank  credit  flowing  into  the  real  estate  market  has  
substantially   inflated   house   prices   during   the   early   2000s.   Therefore,   non-­‐‑
financial  firms’  liquidity  preference  has  contributed  to  the  house  price  boom  in  
South  Africa.  This  result  depends  on  South  Africa’s  status  as  emerging  market,  
because  the  SARB’s  actions  are  often  driven  by  a  desire  to  attract  foreign  capital  
inflow  or  avoid  the  withdrawal  of  such  capital,  rather  than  an  embracing  of  low  
and   stable   interest   rates.   Thus,   in   this   situation   corporate   liquidity   on   bank  
balance  sheet’s  can  facilitate  credit  creation.    
8.2. Major findings  
The  thesis  provides  original  empirical  and  theoretical  insights.  Empirically,  this  
thesis   finds   evidence   for   the   overcapitalisation   of   NFFs   in   South   Africa,  
especially   since   1994.   There   are   two   types   of   companies   that   are   driving   the  
overcapitalisation  trend.  On  the  one  hand,  mining  companies  hold  substantial  
liquid   assets   out   of   precaution   due   to   the   inherently   risky   nature   of  mining,  
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especially  mining  exploration.  On  the  other  hand,  large  established  companies  
(including   mining   firms)   hold   liquid   assets   to   support   their   mergers   and  
acquisitions   activity.   These   microeconomic   findings   are   consistent   with  
macroeconomic   data,   which   show   that   non-­‐‑financial   firms   in   aggregate   have  
increasingly   been   acquiring   liquid   assets   since   the   1990s.   NFFs’   liquidity  
management,   while   beneficial   for   the   individual   companies,   has   an   adverse  
effect   on   economic   growth   and   financial   stability   in   the   country.   NFFs   have  
shifted   away   from   providing   trade   credit   to   non-­‐‑incorporated   informal  
businesses   towards  holding   liquid  assets  with  domestic  banks.  Since   informal  
businesses   have   notoriously   bad   access   to   formal   lending,   they   have   lost   an  
important   source   of   external   finance.   This   is   likely   to   have  weakened  growth  
and   employment   creation   in   South   Africa.   The   liquid   assets   held   by   non-­‐‑
financial   corporations   are   recycled   through   the   domestic   banking   sector   and  
mainly   end   up   as   mortgage   lending   and   credit   to   the   FIRE   sector.   As  
consequence,   NFFs’   liquidity   management   induces   credit   extension   by  
domestic  banks,  which  fuels  the  South  African  real  estate  bubble.      
From  a  theoretical  perspective,  the  thesis  argues  that  the  South  African  financial  
sector,   and   especially   the   big   banks,   did   historically   not   contributed   to   the  
country’s  economic  and  industrial  development  because  long-­‐‑term  funding  was  
not  made  available.  Thus,  the  thesis  refutes  the  popular  mainstream  perception  
(Amphlett,   1914;   Jones,   2009)   and   argues   that,   in   fact,   South   African   non-­‐‑
financial   companies,   and   especially   mining   conglomerates   financed   much   of  
their  investment  internally,  especially  during  the  second  half  of  the  20th  century.  
Specifically,   the   bank-­‐‑based   market-­‐‑based   dichotomy   is   of   little   use   in  
understanding   the   development   of   South   African   finance.   Here,   the   mining  
sector,   hence   a   specific   part   of   the   non-­‐‑financial   corporate   sector,   was  
instrumental   in   shaping   domestic   financial   institutions.   This   historical  
experience  cannot  be  captured  by  the  simplistic  dichotomy  used  in  economics  
to  classify  financial  systems.      
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Equally   the   heterodox   (financialisation)   argument   misses   out   on   layers   of  
complexity  by  lazily  accusing  large  South  African  NFFs  of  financial  speculation  
that   emerged   as   consequence   of   the   country’s   financialisation   since   the  mid-­‐‑
1990s.  In  fact,  NFFs  always  invested  heavily  into  financial  instruments  in  South  
Africa.   Crucially,   NFFs   changed   (rather   then   intensified)   their   financial  
investment  strategies  in  the  course  of  the  1990s,  shifting  away  from  trade  credit  
towards  active  liquidity  management.  Thus,  this  thesis  reveals  the  mechanisms  
behind  the  heterodox  ‘gut  feel’  that  finance  in  South  Africa  is  not  contributing  
towards   investment  and  employment  creation,  but  rather  weakening   the   local  
economy.   Consequently,   the   thesis   argues   that   the   financialisation   literature  
oversimplifies   financial   activity   by   NFFs   by   either   reducing   it   to   financial  
speculation   or   a   shift   from   bank-­‐‑based   to   market-­‐‑based   finance.   As  
consequence,  in  much  of  the  financialisation  literature  NFFs  are  merely  reacting  
to   changes   under   way   in   the   financial   sectors   of   advanced   and   emerging  
economies.  The  case  of  South  Africa  shows  that  NFFs  can  and  do  actively  shape  
financial  structures,  for  instance  through  their  own  liquidity  management.    
8.3. The significance of the findings 
The   findings   outlined   above   have   an   important   significance   for   micro-­‐‑   and  
macroeconomic  theory.  They  also  contain  critical  methodological   insights.  The  
microeconomic  analysis  in  this  thesis  shows  that  real  and  financial  transactions  
of   non-­‐‑financial   firms   are   more   closely   intertwined   than   typically   assumed.  
Non-­‐‑financial   businesses   do   not   merely   undertake   financial   transactions   to  
facilitate   their   productive   investment,   which   is   a   central   assumption   in  
mainstream   economic   theory   as   discussed   in   chapter   5.   In   fact,   non-­‐‑financial  
firms  can  be  rentiers  in  the  sense  that  they  generate  financial  profits  alongside  
profit  from  productive  operations.  The  former  can  be  an  important  supplement  
to,  and  in  extreme  cases  even  completely  replace,  (missing)  operational  income.    
However,  rentier  incomes  do  not  have  to  be  speculative,  as  often  implied  in  the  
financialisation   literature.   Moreover,   productive   investment,   which   is   often  
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hailed   among  heterodox   economists   as   the  only  desirable   type  of   investment,  
can  be  highly  speculative;  speculative  in  the  sense,  that  a  firm  does  not  use  it  for  
income  generation,  but  undertakes   it  with  the  aim  of  generating  capital  gains.  
Mining  assets  lend  themselves  to  speculation,  since  mining  rights,  subsidiaries  
or  mines   themselves   can   be   sold   on  with   a   capital   gain   on   the   investment,   if  
commodity  prices  have   increased  meanwhile.  But  equally,  holding  companies  
can  buy  and   sell   subsidiaries  or   shares   in   subsidiaries,   generating  profits   that  
way.   Here,   the   blur   between   financial   and   productive   investment   becomes  
apparent:  if  a  company  holds  a  small  share  of  the  total  stock  volume  in  another  
company   this   would   count   as   financial   investment.   However,   if   it   possesses  
controlling  interest  (the  UN  sets  the  threshold  for  control  as  low  as  10%  of  total  
voting  power)  the  investment  would  be  labelled  as  productive.        
The   listed  non-­‐‑financial   firms   identified   as   overcapitalised   in   this   thesis   often  
use  liquid  assets  (including  financial  instruments)  as  insurance  against  potential  
financial   (and   productive)   difficulties.   Mining   exploration   companies   are   a  
prime  example,  since  they  typically  amass  large  volumes  of  liquidity  to  bridge  
the   time  before  mining  rights  can  be  sold  on,  or  actual  mining  activity  can  be  
started.  This  period   is   typically  of  uncertain   length.  Hence,   their  behaviour   is  
individually   rational   and   guards   these   companies   from   financial   troubles.  
However,  on  the  macroeconomic  level  this  behaviour  induces  greater  financial  
fragility  in  the  South  African  economy  as  a  whole  because  it  contributes  to  asset  
price  inflation  in  the  real  estate  market.    
The   liquidity   holdings   of   large   non-­‐‑financial   companies   can   facilitate   credit  
expansion   in  an  emerging  market   like  South  Africa,  where   the  central  bank   is  
not  willing  to  fully  accept  the  role  to  provide  financial  stability  and  –  crucially  –  
low  and  stable   interest  rates.  Therefore,  non-­‐‑financial   firms  and  their   financial  
transactions  shape  economic  dynamics  actively.  This  is  an  important  theoretical  
insight  because  mainstream  theory  tends  to  neglect  financial  operations  of  non-­‐‑
financial   firms,  while  heterodox  economists  have  a   tendency   to  perceive  non-­‐‑
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financial  businesses  as  victims  of  their  financial  transactions,  for  instance,  under  
pressure  to  generate  shareholder  value.        
In   contrast,  Kalecki   and   the  German   tradition  discussed   in   chapter   5   stressed  
the  important  role  that  non-­‐‑financial  companies  have  in  the  financial  system  of  
an   economy   because   they   drive   credit   extension   through   their   investment  
decisions.   The   thesis   finds   that   in   South   Africa   non-­‐‑financial   companies   are  
powerful   economic   and   financial   agents.   The   historical   overview  provided   in  
chapter   6   supports   these   findings,   showing   that   mining   companies,   i.e.   non-­‐‑
financial   firms,   have   influenced   the   South   African   financial   system   since   the  
beginnings   of   capitalist   production.   This   thesis   finds   that   non-­‐‑financial  
corporations’   investment   decisions   (including   the   decision   to   hold   liquid  
financial  assets)  drives  credit  expansion,  since   it  puts  banks  under  pressure  to  
generate  other  balance  sheet  assets,  off-­‐‑setting  non-­‐‑financial  corporates’   liquid  
asset  holdings  in  South  African  banks.    
Here,  firm  heterogeneity  must  be  factored  into  the  analysis  because  only  large  
non-­‐‑financial   corporations   are  powerful   economic   and   financial   agents.     Over  
the  past   two  decades,   South  African  non-­‐‑financial   businesses   have  noticeably  
shifted  their  uses  of  funds  from  providing  trade  credit  to  households  and  small  
informal   business   towards   amassing   innovative   financial   instruments.   They  
have   neither   increased   the   volume   of   their   financial   investment   (when  
measured   as   share   of   capital   formation),   nor   shifted   their   funding   towards  
capital  market.   These   two   characteristics   are   often   identified   as   symptoms   of  
financialisation.  Nevertheless,  South  Africa   is  generally  perceived  as   suffering  
from  financialisation,  which  is  believed  to  subdue  investment  and  employment  
creation.  However,   the   financialisation  narrative   is  often   too  simplistic,   failing  
to  state  how  a  growing  financial  sector  might  harm  growth  and  development.    
This   thesis   provided   evidence   that   the   link   between   large   corporations   and  
small  (often  informal)  businesses  has  broken  down  in  South  Africa.  In  this  way,  
it   explains   the   underlying   process   that   has   a   detrimental   effect   on   economic  
activity.   Since   small   and   informal   enterprises   have   poor   access   to   finance   in  
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South  Africa,   their   loss  of   trade  credit   from  large  liquid  companies   is   likely  to  
put   them   under   financial   pressure   during   business   cycle   downswings,   when  
cash  flow  wanes.  This  is  another  way  in  which  financial  fragility  might  increase  
on  the  macroeconomic  level.  Thus,  non-­‐‑financial  companies  liquidity  facilitates  
house  price  inflation  on  the  one  hand,  while  weakening  the  financial  position  of  
smaller  (informal)  non-­‐‑financial  businesses.  
Methodologically,   the   thesis   underlines   and   exemplifies   the   need   for   the  
inclusion  of   qualitative  data  because  processes   such   as   those  described   above  
cannot   be   captured   or   explained   by   quantitative   data   alone.   The   thesis,  
therefore,   champions   mixed   methods   and   the   incorporation   of   historical  
context,   through   in-­‐‑depth   case   study   work,   into   the   analysis   of   complex  
economic  processes  and  problems.  
The  originality  of  the  thesis  lies  in  its  contribution  to  the  understanding  of  the  
processes   behind   the   financial   operations   of   non-­‐‑financial   companies,  
illustrating   in   particular   how   non-­‐‑financial   companies   utilise   financial  
operations   to   support   their   speculation   in   real   assets.   In   consequence,   these  
firms  are  overcapitalised,   i.e.  hold   liquid  assets  beyond   their   requirements   for  
productive  operations.  The   research  also   contributes   to   the  growing   literature  
on   financialisation   in   emerging   economies.   The   thesis   develops   an  
operationalisation   of   the   concept   of   overcapitalisation   and   an   original  
adaptation  of  existing  flow-­‐‑of-­‐‑funds  analysis  of  corporate  investment.  
8.3. Future research 
To  address  the  data  limitations  encountered,  future  research  avenues  could  aim  
at   gathering   balance   sheet   information   for   small   and   medium-­‐‑sized   non-­‐‑
financial  companies,  as  well  as  for  micro  and  very  small  enterprises.  This  would  
provide  a   fuller  picture  of   firm  heterogeneity.  Similarly,   interviews  with  chief  
financial   officers   (or   similarly   placed   key   informants)   of   overcapitalised   non-­‐‑
financial   corporations   would   be   desirable   to   obtain   further   qualitative  
information   about   the   liquidity   management   strategies   of   these   companies.  
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However,   just   like   much   of   the   qualitative   information   contained   in   annual  
reports,   such   data   would   have   to   be   interpreted   critically   and   triangulated  
carefully,  since  company  representatives  are  always  concerned  to  present  their  
businesses   in   a   favourable   light.   This   is   the   reason   why   the   author   not   yet  
embarked  onto  such  a  project,  preferring  to  first  gather  extensive  data  and  build  
up  knowledge  about  the  South  African  corporate  sector.  
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Table A.2. National financial account 2014, (SARB, 2015, p. S-46) 
  
 
S–46 Quarterly Bulletin  June 2015
South African Reserve Bank
206 644 155 49 980 31 258 22 565
56 11 888 1 591 2 708
180 416
193 13 930 2 749 380
206 408 18 47 938 30 100 24 893
206 408 18 47 938 30 100 24 893
-48 340 64 002 255 807 122 628 259 184 151 967
158 068 64 020 303 745 122 628 289 284 176 860
16 602 16 602
15 275 38 386 -2 476 75 996 8 327 -29 900 1 934 8 388
22 640 222 -2 230 121 235 -14 260 5 323 27 807
10 446 1 576 -201 15 037 -6 653 2 286 -5 341
-4 168 475 -440 1 759 3 903 41 990 -4 168
30 004 32 460 122 628 18 491 18 491 81 213 33 321
-4 380 127 25 688 -114 -567 -1 070
91 227 85 814 -1 663 2 397 7 684 -608 -2 322 -4 387
6 380 -3 518 22 336 21 806 147 694 3 18 074
-30 878 115 384 1 287 -8 154 120 272 -41 630 633 2 777 18 709 28 505
-107 10 678 -1 861 -5 529 -9 309
565 43 563 632 -4 715 58 593 50 026 15 335
-4 523 -1 529
934 146 2 796 -765
792 -707 2 493 17 864 17 203 -1 208 -5 990 3 599
-3 333 -7 254 7 388 41 844 8 617 45 34 015 -178 492
85 438 40 591 4 324 6 638 42 483 1 089 153 471 112 373
9 212 81 150 24 616 -5 8 533 1 580 8 827 7 495 9 478
4 657 83 824 97 -371 4 267 1 712
1 598 1 587 113 499
-194 279 -123 077 -1 687 -9 009 -124 787 -14 753 78 523 -45 046 47 046 -27 414
-56 179 -37 493 627 -37 780 8 001 -14 737 20 440 44 667 -3 969 23 157 -11 521
-335    85 557 11 -281 -175
National financial account




Public Insurers and Other
Foreign Monetary Other monetary Investment retirement financial
sector authority institutions2 Corporation3 funds institutions
Transaction items S U S U S U S U S U S U
1. Net saving4 ....................................................
2. Consumption of fixed capital4 ........................
3. Capital transfers .............................................
4. Gross capital formation4................................
5. Net lending (+)/net borrowing (-) (S) ...............
6. Net financial investment (+) or (-) (U) ..............
7. Net incurrence of financial liabilities 
(Total S 9 – 32) ..............................................
8. Net acquisition of financial assets 
(Total U 9 – 32)..............................................
9. Gold and other foreign reserves ....................
10. Cash and demand monetary deposits5 ..........
11. Short/Medium-term monetary deposits5 ........
12. Long-term monetary deposits5 ......................
13. Deposits with other financial institutions .........
14. Deposits with other institutions.......................
15. Treasury bills ..................................................
16. Other bills.......................................................
17. Bank loans and advances ..............................
18. Trade credit and short-term loans ..................
19. Short-term government bonds .......................
20. Long-term government bonds........................
21. Non-marketable government bonds6 .............
22. Securities of local governments......................
23. Securities of public enterprises.......................
24. Other loan stock and preference shares.........
25. Ordinary shares..............................................
26. Foreign branch/head office balances..............
27. Long-term loans.............................................
28. Mortgage loans ..............................................
29. Interest in retirement and life funds7 .................
30. Amounts receivable/payable ..........................
31. Other assets/liabilities.....................................
32. Balancing item ...............................................
S = Sources, i.e., net increase in liabilities at transaction value.
U = Uses, i.e., net increase in assets at transaction value.
KB230
1. A negative amount reflects a decrease in that item. In the case of liabilities (sources) it denotes a reduction in the available sources of funds and in the case of assets (uses) it indicates an additional source
of funds.
2. Including mutual banks and the Postbank.
3. Before April 2005 the Public Investment Commissioners.
4. As taken from the national income (and production) accounts.
5. Namely deposits with the South African Reserve Bank (including coin liabilities), Corporation for Public Deposits, banks, the Land Bank, mutual banks and the Postbank.
6. Non-marketable bonds and other Treasury bills.
7. Members' interest in the reserves of retirement and all insurance funds.
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Table A.3. National financial account 2014, continued, (SARB, 2015, p. S-47) 
  
S–47
South African Reserve Bank
Quarterly Bulletin  June 2015
-42 905 -37 207 -16 423 90 730 -54 105 250 692
54 900 19 510 63 892 308 633 58 938 522 116
48 478 28 990 -188 2 018 64 18 074 116 49 074 49 074
75 300 54 126 149 986 406 216 69 928 772 808
-111 783 -42 833 -102 705 -4 899 -47 137 -
-111 783 -42 833 -102 705 -4 899 -47 137 -
204 122 22 602 107 972 623 859 156 346 1 920 149
92 339 -20 231 5 267 618 960 109 209 1 920 149
16 602 16 602
-18 276 1 662 2 424 94 661 32 363 114 382 114 382
33 483 -5 154 2 028 703 51 117 121 457 121 457
1 570 337 1 623 4 718 7 828 16 613 16 613
545 76 8 607 53 060 -25 843 37 898 37 898
19 825 -22 012 -36 847 648 149 111 149 111
32 797 4 353 28 417 28 417
-447 -1 076 -104 16 779 12 632 36 102 981 102 981
7 518 -946 11 072 76 275 33 366 170 030 170 030
-120 9 614 -4 272 -10 134 -124 -31 476 22 999 51 548 14 210 129 575 129 575
-8 413 -2 283 -2 -8 413 -8 413
157 769 -5 098 -2 158 334 158 334
-6 754 -702 -6 754 -6 754
2 380 -731 2 380 2 380
-5 159 -449 27 387 -6 490 29 24 682 24 682
-73 -247 109 2 662 687 58 352 -13 743 -5  64 689 64 689
700 681 -188 321 470 57 001 -67 413 002 413 002
-4 264 27 809 7 740 -213 21 817 91 50 274 -438 879 1 183 127 882 127 882
-5 -25 -104 56 237 19 991 85 140 85 140
1 559 14 142 38 031 56 582 113 499 113 499
37 951 31 467 -188 -4 001 9 289 -14 806 112 431 239 850 40 782 -28 130 5 081 5 081
-12 361 3 894 -8 827 45 727 -1 799 -14 517 148 446 9 744 52 760 52 760
-121 1 360 57 575 67 46 755 801 801
General government Corporate business enterprises
Central Sectors
and
provincial Local Public Private Households,
governments governments sector sector etc. Total
S U S U S U S U S U S U Transaction items
1. Net saving4
2. Consumption of fixed capital4
3. Capital transfers
4. Gross capital formation4
5. Net lending (+)/net borrowing (-) (S)  
6. Net financial investment (+) or (-) (U)
7. Net incurrence of financial liabilities 
(Total S 9 – 32)
8. Net acquisition of financial assets 
(Total U 9 – 32)
9. Gold and other foreign reserves 
10. Cash and demand monetary deposits5
11. Short/Medium-term monetary deposits5
12. Long-term monetary deposits5
13. Deposits with other financial institutions
14. Deposits with other institutions
15. Treasury bills
16. Other bills
17. Bank loans and advances
18. Trade credit and short-term loans 
19. Short-term government bonds
20. Long-term government bonds
21. Non-marketable government bonds6
22. Securities of local governments
23. Securities of public enterprises
24. Other loan stock and preference shares
25. Ordinary shares
26. Foreign branch/head office balances
27. Long-term loans
28. Mortgage loans




National financial account (continued)
Flow of funds for the year 20141
R millions
S = Sources, i.e., net increase in liabilities at transaction value.
U = Uses, i.e., net increase in assets at transaction value.
KB231
1. A negative amount reflects a decrease in that item. In the case of liabilities (sources) it denotes a reduction in the available sources of funds and in the case of assets (uses) it indicates an additional source
of funds.
2. Including mutual banks and the Postbank.
3. Before April 2005 the Public Investment Commissioners.
4. As taken from the national income (and production) accounts.
5. Namely deposits with the South African Reserve Bank (including coin liabilities), Corporation for Public Deposits, banks, the Land Bank, mutual banks and the Postbank.
6. Non-marketable bonds and other Treasury bills.
7. Members’ interest in the reserves of retirement and all insurance funds.
